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1.1 Understanding Nature: Scientifically and Otherwise
In Ibsen’s play The Lady of the Sea, written in 1888, the main character (Ellida) 
reluctantly confessed to her husband (Wangel) that she is still under the spell of a 
mysterious rapport with a sailor she once knew, at a time when she was living with 
her father far off on the Norwegian coast. Wangel wants to be informed in a more 
detailed manner about their relationship. Ellida tells him that they spent most of 
their time talking to each other.
Wangel. Of what did you speak, then?
Ellida. We spoke mostly about the sea.
Wangel. About the sea?
Ellida. Yes. About storms and calm. Of dark nights at sea. And of the sea in the glittering 
sunshiny days we spoke also. But we spoke most of the whales, and the dolphins, and the 
seals that lie out there on the rocks in the midday sun. And then we spoke of the gulls, and 
the eagles, and all the other sea birds. I think – isn’t it wonderful? – when we talked of such 
things it seemed to me as if both the sea beasts and sea birds were one with him.1
Their dialogue hints at the existence of a form of knowledge about the sea and its 
inhabitants that is quite unlike scientific knowledge. It is different, but not 
 necessarily deficient. Rather, it has an epistemological profile of its own. It has 
its own sources of information, a style of its own, relying on verbal, informal 
pathways of communication. It is a more “intimate” form of knowledge: the 
 subject seems to be one, more or less, with its object, seems to coincide with it – 
Ellida’s allusions hint at participation rather than objectification. It is knowledge 
of an experiential nature, based on careful observations and so elaborate and rich 
that apparently the mysterious sailor can converse about it, perhaps even  “lecture” 
about it, endlessly. It is not the kind of knowledge one is likely to encounter in 
scholarly writings. Rather, it seems to evolve from more intuitive ways of know-
ing nature, perhaps one should even say: from more “natural” ways of gaining 
insight into the flux and dynamics of pristine coastal life. The subject or observ-
ant is attuned to nature. Moreover, whereas scholarly forms of discourse will 
1 Ibsen (1888/2002). Cf. Gutenberg-version: http://www.gutenberg.net/etext01/ldyse10.txt
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comply with academic formats, literary texts (novels, poems, plays) seem more 
apt to capture and articulate this “other”, more intimate type of knowledge, albeit 
often in a fragmentary or allusive manner.
We are accustomed, however, to identify “real” knowledge of nature with 
 science, and for good reasons, so it seems. It is no coincidence that of the two lead-
ing international scientific journals, one is called Nature and the other Science. 
These titles refer to the two basic poles of the knowledge process, the object and the 
subject pole. They seem to cover the whole epistemological trajectory. And indeed, 
science and nature are intimately connected. At first glance, nature seems to have 
primacy. It seems to go without saying, to speak for itself, that nature is primordial, 
and science derivative. In the beginning there is nature, presenting itself to us, and 
science is a “representation”. But if we look at their relationship more closely, things 
are not that straightforward. In a certain way we could also say that primacy belongs 
to science, because it is science that allows nature to reveal itself, to present itself to 
us in a certain manner. It creates the epistemological conditions that allow nature to 
become visible and measurable. Nature is not simply there, she must be made dis-
cernable. Without science, our knowledge of nature would be rather limited and 
superficial; our experience of nature would no doubt be impoverished and less pre-
cise. Science has provided us with highly reliable techniques and instruments 
(e.g. microscopes) as well as with powerful ideas (such as the idea of conducting an 
experiment) that allow us to discern dimensions of nature that would remain more 
or less inaccessible if we were to rely solely on “non-scientific” styles of observa-
tion. In short, both poles seem equally important. Without nature, science would 
make no sense, but the opposite is also true: no nature without science. Without 
 science, we would see nature in a completely different and rather diffuse light. 
Science constitutes the clearing that allows nature to emerge.
This book starts from the conviction, however, that there are other ways of know-
ing about nature besides science. At first glance, this may not seem all that contro-
versial. It seems obvious, for example, that there is something like practical 
knowledge concerning nature, such as the uncodified, experiential knowledge of 
gardeners, sailors, wanderers or pet-owners. Someone who travels through a particu-
lar landscape on foot on a regular basis is likely to acquire a certain amount of 
knowledge about such a site. Another important form of knowledge concerning 
nature is the knowledge articulated by artists, such as poets, novelists, landscape 
painters or even composers. Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749–1832) has written 
many poems on flowers that bear witness to his intimate knowledge of plant forms, 
although not everybody will regard his knowledge as being “scientific” in a strict 
sense. Stories by Ivan Turgenev (1818–1883), situated in the Russian countryside, 
with its endless birch forests and misty ponds, rely on his “firsthand knowledge” 
(Troyat 1985/1988) of landscapes, birds, mammals and trees, accumulated through 
years of careful observation and a close “reading” of rural environments. The 
German landscape painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774–1840) studied the scener-
ies that he paid tribute to in his paintings very carefully and thoroughly. One could 
say of his paintings, such as Riesengebirge [1835], for example, that there is “truth” 
in them, even “knowledge”. And this even applies to music, so it seems. We can 
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 listen to Waldesrauschen [1862] by Franz Liszt, for example, as a fascinating and 
even bewildering play of notes and chords, but we may also appreciate it as a genu-
ine effort to allow a recognisable forest experience to come to life. Or, to give yet 
another example, it is clear that Jean Sibelius (1865–1957), in his symphonic poem 
Finlandia as well as in various other works, succeeded in creating a truthful and 
convincing musical “image” of the Finish landscape. Apparently, he knew this land-
scape extremely well and this enabled him to really call it to life in his symphonic 
masterpieces. A poem by Goethe, a story by Turgenev, a painting by Friedrich or a 
musical score by Sibelius may tell us more about a particular flower or site than, for 
example, a botanical, geological or ecological publication in Nature or Science. 
Artists may allow nature to emerge, to come forward in a certain manner – and so 
does science. Neither the artistic nor the scientific rendering of nature can be 
regarded as a straightforward “representation”. Rather, in all the cases mentioned, 
nature is experienced under certain conditions. Particular aspects of nature are 
revealed whereas others are neglected or even eclipsed. And to a certain extent we 
may say that the artist’s nature really is different compared to the nature of (particu-
lar branches of ) scientific research. Until recently, however, epistemology as a phil-
osophical discipline was almost exclusively devoted to reflecting on the structure 
and reliability of scientific knowledge. The objective of this book is to contribute to 
the emergence of a more comprehensive epistemology, one that is willing and able 
to critically reflect on the structure and reliability of other knowledge forms as well, 
in the context of a comparative epistemology.
1.2  Towards a Comparative Epistemology of Divergent 
Knowledge Forms
Epistemology as a philosophical discipline is devoted to answering questions such as 
What is knowledge? How to assess the reliability and truthfulness of various knowl-
edge forms? In this book, knowledge will be regarded as a process in the course of 
which nature as ϕ σις, i.e. as something which initially presents itself to us as incom-
prehensible, inaccessible, unpredictable and diffuse, becomes increasingly transpar-
ent and discrete: objectified and accountable nature. In order to capture the basic 
momentum of the knowledge process (the work of science), we could refer to the 
famous Freudian maxim Wo Es war soll Ich werden (Freud 1933/1940). Gradually, 
using concepts and technologies involved in the process of scientific knowledge pro-
duction, undisclosed, primary, diffuse nature as it initially presents itself to us, will 
gradually be replaced by more articulate and precise renderings of nature. What 
tended to be bewildering and non-transparent becomes increasingly discrete. To use 
a phrase coined by René Descartes (1596–1650): science allows that which was 
vague and uncertain to become “clear and distinct”.
Yet, a similar dynamic can be discerned in art. Artists (poets, novelists, painters, 
and composers) also have means at their disposal to produce and articulate strik-
ingly “clear” and recognisable renderings of nature. They are also able to present 
1.2 Towards a Comparative Epistemology of Divergent Knowledge Forms 5
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6 1 Comparative Epistemology
us with convincing images of natural entities and to make vague intuitions more 
accessible and discrete. Their rendering of nature may be astonishingly “true to 
life”, sometimes inspiring us to refine and revise our understandings of the dynam-
ics of natural processes. In other words, both science and art can be regarded as 
forms of knowledge production, as possibilities for nature disclosure. Science is no 
doubt an important strategy we have at our disposal for studying nature, but there 
are other ways to further our knowledge and to consolidate our experience of 
nature. All these various strategies allow nature to present itself to us in a certain 
way. Comparative epistemology is the discipline that tries to assess, in a critical 
manner, the relative validity and value of these various forms of knowledge pro-
duction, these different strategies that enable us to gain important insights concern-
ing nature or natural entities, such as landscapes, animals or plants.
In other words, a comparative epistemology refuses to accept the identification 
of knowledge with science as obvious or taken-for-granted. Moreover, it refuses to 
start from a dichotomy distinguishing “hard core” science from other forms of dis-
course directed towards understanding and describing our world. A famous version 
of the science–literature dichotomy was presented by C.P. Snow in his book Two 
Cultures (1959). According to Snow, intellectual life in Western society is domi-
nated by two polar groups, namely literary authors and scientists. Between the two, 
there is mutual hostility and misunderstanding. Although his evidence was basi-
cally anecdotal, he articulated a widespread view. And epistemology as a philo-
sophical discipline from the very outset has tended to accept this demarcation as 
well. Traditionally, the focus has unequivocally been on science. In fact, a substan-
tial part of epistemology (from Kant up to Popper and Kuhn) has been devoted to 
one particular branch of science, a favoured discipline so to speak, namely phys-
ics. Research in physics was regarded (by generations of epistemologists) as a 
model for other forms of scientific discourse – it was regarded as the science par 
excellence. And until recently it was more or less atypical to turn attention to alter-
native branches of research, such as chemistry (Bachelard) or biomedicine 
(Canguilhem). And it was even more unusual to submit literary genres to an epis-
temological assessment and to compare them, from an epistemological perspective, 
with various forms of science – as Bachelard did.
For a comparative epistemology, however, the opposition between “science” 
(often identified with “physics”) and literature is not a viable point of departure. 
Rather, a comparative epistemology will tend to distinguish and compare a rela-
tively large number of genres, scientific and otherwise. Each discipline tends to 
develop an epistemological profile of its own, but the dividing line between “scientific” 
and other forms of discourse remains fluid and controversial. First of all, it may 
take some time before particular discourse forms are formally identified as either 
“scientific” or “literary”. In fact, historically speaking, it is a rather recent distinc-
tion. Countless texts have been written, in the course of centuries, that may be 
regarded as belonging to the history of both literature and science. For example, 
Diderot’s Rêve de d’Alembert may be read either as a “drama of manners”, focus-
ing on views on love and procreation as they existed in progressive circles in the 
second half of the eighteenth-century in France, but it can also be seen as a scientific 
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
treatise, a science-based anticipation concerning the future development of the life 
sciences – or both. Moreover, it may take some time for scientific forms of dis-
course to evolve from a more or less literary towards a more “scientific” style and 
format. Typically, pioneers in a certain field will tend to express themselves in a 
rather personal and narrative manner, whereas later generations will tend to for-
malise and codify their language. Charles Darwin, for example, uses a much more 
literary and individualistic style of writing than the great majority of subsequent 
contributors to evolutionary theory, while the writings of Sigmund Freud, William 
James and other founding fathers of modern psychology are much more personal 
and narrative in style than most books and articles produced by later generations 
of academics in the field they helped to create. And the identification of certain 
documents as belonging to either literature or science can always be challenged. 
Some scholars have argued, for example, that authors such as Darwin (Bulhof 
1988) or Freud (Marcus 1985) can and perhaps should be regarded as novelists 
rather than as academic authors. On the other hand, although books such as Alice 
in Wonderland (1965a) or Through the Looking-Glass (1965b) by Lewis Carroll 
are usually seen as literary documents, it is not impossible to regard them as 
reflections on mathematics or as playful introductions to a mathematical under-
standing of our world. In Chapter 4, I will argue that it would be a simplification 
to call Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick a “novel”, because what we are dealing with 
here is a piece of writing that explicitly questions its own official literary status. 
Melville’s book simply does not want to be seen “merely” as a novel. Rather, it 
presents itself as a work of maritime scholarship.
A similar view applies to the opposite end of the knowledge process, namely 
“the object”. From the very outset, epistemology has challenged a position that is 
usually referred to as “naïve realism”, i.e. the belief that (natural) entities (such as 
roses or dogs) are simply there, waiting for us to perceive and describe them (in a 
scientific manner or otherwise). Truth, in this view, is basically the conformity of 
our descriptions, representations and understandings to the things out there. From 
the outset, it has been the objective of epistemology to reveal and understand the 
extent to which we ourselves (as subjects) are present in the things we perceive, in 
the entities that present themselves to us. Our sense organs, and also our biogra-
phies, theoretical frameworks and cultural embeddings will, to a considerable 
extent, determine the ways in which we allow the natural world to emerge. Once 
again, knowledge is a process, a synthesis, the product of a complex interaction 
between sense data and cognitive structures. There are, however, moderate and 
radical versions of this view. Most scientists, for example, tend to be realists, not 
in a naïve, but in a moderate way. They realise the extent to which their equipments 
and contrivances shape their objectivity, but still they tend to believe that their 
measurements eventually refer to an external reality. Philosophers and other schol-
ars, involved in science studies (in a broad sense), may be moderate realists as well, 
but more radical epistemologies have also been adopted. In German idealism, for 
example, the world is primarily the product of thought. And also in our own, more 
“pragmatic” era, the reality of things has been questioned. According to authors 
like Latour, for example, scientific “facts” must be regarded as socially constructed. 
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Whatever position we adopt, the common ground is that roses or dogs are never 
simply “there”. Our practices and discourses allow them to appear in a certain way. 
In a laboratory setting, a particular plant form will appear in a different light than 
in a garden. And a poem will bring other dimensions of roses to the fore than the 
records of experimental trials using them as model species.
This volume starts from the conviction than an abstract and general view on the 
way in which reality is constituted will not bring us very far. It will merely repeat 
the various arguments that have already been produced in a somewhat repetitious 
manner by countless others. Rather than addressing the traditional list of epistemo-
logical issues in an abstract manner, I will opt for a bottom-up or case-study 
approach. I will make use of a number of concrete examples of efforts to describe 
nature or natural entities that will allow us to confront and compare them as 
detailed and concretely as possible. In other words, this volume adheres to what 
may be called an “empirical turn” in epistemology.
For example, this book contains a chapter on dogs (Chapter 5). They have been 
used as research animals in various experiments, and functioned as favourite ani-
mal model for researcher such as Claude Bernard and Ivan Pavlov. But they also 
appear in countless stories and novels. Indeed, the dog novel can be regarded as a 
literary genre in its own right. Chapter 5 is not concerned with dogs “as such”, but 
with various discourses on dogs. It is not the objective of a philosophical discourse 
to speak about dogs directly. Rather, I study the ways in which dogs appear in vari-
ous discursive genres. In assessing the truthfulness of a particular form of dis-
course, it is not possible to step outside the world of discourse into a discursive 
vacuum, so to speak, in order to ascertain to what extent a dog novel (or an experi-
ment with dogs) does justice to the dog as an “objective” entity. Neither is it my 
intention to become yet another author writing about dogs myself, as an animal 
psychologist, or a novelist, or otherwise – that is not my objective. Rather, I will 
look at dogs indirectly, through the eyes as it were of particular discourse forms. 
My interest is in forms of discourse, rather than in dogs as such. I do not try to 
understand nature, but rather the various ways is which nature is being studied and 
understood in various practices and fields. How do certain types of discourse allow 
us to disclose nature and shape our world? Implicitly or explicitly, the discourses 
involved will mutually challenge one another. For example, from the point of view 
of experimental biology, novels about dogs are often regarded as “anthropomorphic”. 
Literary authors are blamed for projecting human thoughts and feelings on the 
 psyche of a dog. Novelists may feel challenged by this reproach, and this may 
inspire them to refine their methods, or they may remain indifferent to this type of 
critique. And they on their part may be of the opinion that the ways in which dogs 
are being described by experimental biologists is impoverished and unconvincing. 
In other words, dogs always emerge in a particular context, in a way that is ques-
tionable from the point of view of rival discourse forms.
One of the dog novels we will discuss in Chapter 5 is The Call of the Wild by 
Jack London. From the point of view of comparative epistemology, this is a very 
interesting novel because its author is clearly struggling with some of the epistemo-
logical issues involved in writing about dogs. His objective is to present us with a 
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
truthful account of the vicissitudes of a dog who suddenly finds himself exposed to 
extreme circumstances, namely the Yukon region in wintertime, in the days of the 
Gold Rush. On the one hand, he tries to describe the experiences of his main char-
acter more or less “from within”, from the dog’s point of view, which is of course 
a difficult thing to do, a real challenge for a literary genius, not only because dogs 
do not communicate their experiences in a linguistic form, but also because their 
being-in-the-world, their experience of the world is undoubtedly quite unlike ours. 
What does it mean to be a dog? How to imagine a world in which smell is much 
more important than sight, for example? London clearly feels challenged by this 
epistemological problem, but at the same time he tries to avoid an overtly anthro-
pomorphic bias. But is it at all possible to write a non-anthropomorphic novel 
about dogs? These are the kind of the epistemological questions I will address in 
Chapter 5.
Moreover, his novel is not about dogs as such, but rather about the way they 
interact with and respond to their environment. The animal emerges, comes to life, 
so to speak, in the context of a concrete life-world. To a certain extent, this world 
is determined by geographical and climatologic conditions and the author tries to 
describe (as plausibly is possible) how a dog experiences hunger and cold. At the 
same time, however, it is a human world, of course, inhabited by gold diggers, 
Indians and adventurers of all walks of life. The author tries to imagine how a dog 
will manage to adjust himself to such a socio-cultural environment. Epistemological 
criteria for assessing the extent to which London solves his epistemological prob-
lems are not available beforehand. On the contrary, the novel is highly innovative 
and more or less has to provide its own epistemological criteria. Its aim is to enter 
and flesh out the Klondike world as seen from the eyes of a dog without turning its 
main character into a quasi-human being. An epistemological reading of the novel 
is guided by the question to what extent this ambitious goal is actually achieved. 
The novel itself must provide us with benchmarks for testing its credibility. We 
cannot compare the experiences of London’s main character with the experiences 
of an “objective dog”, because from an epistemological point of view dogs will 
always remain entities that emerge in the context of particular situations and par-
ticular discourses. That is, we can only determine the truthfulness of London’s 
account in a comparative manner.
In short, rather than addressing epistemological issues on an abstract level, I opt 
for a case-study approach. This is also reflected in the way in which this book was 
written. It brings together a series of case studies in comparative epistemology, 
analysing important episodes in the history of research on nature, rather than pro-
ducing a continuous narrative. Earlier versions of a number of chapters have 
already been published elsewhere during recent years.2 The reason for bringing 
them together in a single volume is that I want to focus attention on comparative 
epistemology as a philosophical method or research field. In separate publications, 
2 Chapter 4 (2000a), 6 (2000b) and 8 (2004) as well as parts of Chapter 2 (2005a), 3 (1997, 2005b) 
and Chapter 7 (2003).
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10 1 Comparative Epistemology
the focus will tend to be on the case study that is actually addressed. In a compre-
hensive volume, attention will shift from “object” to “method”, from the case stud-
ies at hand to comparative epistemology as a particular way of looking at nature, 
literature and science.
The focus will be on the epistemology of the life sciences, on types of research 
devoted to ecosystems, animals and plant forms. “Nature” primarily refers to living 
nature. A comparative epistemology of the life sciences involves a whole set of 
questions, but the most important one can be formulated as follows: What is the 
epistemological profile of science in general, and of the life sciences in particular, 
in comparison to other forms of knowledge concerning living nature? I will com-
pare the knowledge claims produced by the life sciences with insights and experi-
ences concerning the living world as I find them expressed in novels, poems and 
plays. What is it that distinguishes scientific forms of knowledge from artistic ways 
of experiencing the natural world? Is the distinction between literature and science 
a meaningful one at all? And if so, is it possible to assess the reliability and truthful-
ness of these different forms of knowledge? Can we determine their strengths and 
weaknesses in a meaningful way?
1.3 Cross Sections: A Synchronic Approach
In the context of comparative research of knowledge forms it is important to distin-
guish between a diachronic (or “historical”) and a synchronic approach. A dia-
chronic approach studies the ways in which scientific disciplines evolve in the 
course of time. In the context of historical research it can be interesting, for exam-
ple, to compare the discipline called natural history as it flourished during the first 
decades of the nineteenth century with the newly emerging research field that 
began to refer to itself as “biology” – but that is not what is at stake here. In this 
volume, the focus will be on synchronic similarities and dissimilarities, on compari-
sons between contemporary knowledge forms. The volume analyses a series of 
discrete episodes, rather than presenting history as a linear (diachronic) story line. 
This book starts from the conviction that contemporary forms of knowledge have 
something in common. They originate from a common ground; they emerge against 
the backdrop of the same cultural environment, they are informed by one and the 
same Zeitgeist. Therefore, differences that exist between them will be of an episte-
mological rather than of a historical nature. Thus, the comparison is not between 
different epochs or periods, but rather between different techniques of knowledge 
production. What I have in mind is not a history of ideas, but rather a critical com-
parison of the structure and reliability of scientific and artistic knowledge forms.
Most histories of the life sciences will rather opt for a more or less diachronic 
approach. It seems the obvious route to take: to start at the beginning (e.g. with 
Aristotle’s History of Animals) and from there to work your way towards the 
present (e.g. the Human Genome Project). Histories of the life sciences tend to 
focus, moreover, on the “internal” history of a field. How are certain events influenced 
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or inspired by previous research efforts and what has been their impact on subse-
quent developments? Such an approach follows a longitudinal route through his-
tory, preferably focusing on the “highlights” of the field in question. From the very 
beginning, the life sciences are set apart to a certain extent from other realms of 
intellectual activity. Indeed, every realm of culture, every single scientific field 
seems entitled to a diachronic history of its own.
It is also possible, however, to opt for a synchronic approach. In this case, we 
are interested in the relationships that exist between contemporary intellectual 
trends in various realms of culture such as, for example, art, biology, mathematics 
or politics. This kind of research opens up cross sections through history. It starts 
from the basic intuition that contemporary events bear a certain family likeness to 
each other. To the extent that this is true, the confrontation of developments within 
the life sciences with simultaneous processes occurring in other domains of a cul-
ture may be enlightening. Events that coincide in time evolve from a common cultural 
background; they share a basic intellectual mood – although the term Zeitgeist 
tends to be avoided as a “mystification”, a concept that is too reminiscent of 
 nineteenth-century idealism. Contemporary events mirror and elucidate each other. 
We may study an event in the realm of politics or art in order to deepen our under-
standing of simultaneous events in the field of biology, and vice versa. Developments 
in one particular field may help us to determine the basic dynamics and structure 
of similar events occurring in other fields. The focus is on relationships and interac-
tions between various fields of human activity, rather than on developments within 
a single field.
An example of a study that opts for a synchronic approach is Wittgenstein’s 
Vienna by Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin (1973). The authors do not restrict 
themselves to studying philosophy as such; the scope of their study is much 
broader. They try to place Wittgenstein’s philosophical work within its “context of 
discovery”. They try to capture the intellectual atmosphere, the Viennese social and 
cultural situation during Wittgenstein’s youth by linking and comparing his ideas 
to those of representatives of various others fields of activity, such as literature 
(Musil), politics (Franz Josef, Lueger, Herzl), journalism (Kraus), music (Offenbach, 
Schönberg), psychoanalysis (Freud, Adler), art (Klimt, Kokoschka), physics 
(Mach, Planck) and so on. At a certain point they raise a question in their book that 
can be regarded as typical for a synchronic approach: “Was it an absolute coinci-
dence that the beginnings of twelve tone music, ‘modern’ architecture, legal and 
logical positivism, nonrepresentational painting and psychoanalysis … were all 
taking place simultaneously?” (p. 18). According to Janik and Toulmin, the answer 
obviously should be No. Simultaneous events have something in common. They 
evolve from the same cultural setting; emerge against the backdrop of the same 
societal landscape. It seems admissible to start from the idea that there exists a cer-
tain affinity or family likeness between contemporary forms of creativity, scientific 
or otherwise. Indeed, similar books as the one on Wittgenstein could be written, for 
example, on Comte’s Paris, Spengler’s Munich or Habermas’ Frankfurt.
From the point of view of comparative epistemology, however, the unity of site 
is not a prerequisite. In comparative epistemological research the focus is not on 
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particular cities or places, but rather on simultaneity as such. Far more important 
than the unity of place is the unity of time. Synchronicity as such suffices. Paris, 
Munich and Vienna are not seen as different worlds, but rather as local strongholds 
of a widespread cultural climate – worth studying in their own right, but as case 
studies so to speak. In other words, a more likely title than Wittgenstein’s Vienna 
for a comparative epistemological assessment of his work would have been some-
thing like Wittgenstein’s Decade.
As was already indicated above, this volume contains a series of cross sections 
through the history of scientific research, focusing on the history of the life sciences, 
but sensitive to contemporary developments and trends emerging elsewhere in their 
cultural environments. Although synchronicity is the starting point, in the sense 
that comparisons are made between simultaneous developments in different fields 
of intellectual activity, the diachronic dimension is not completely absent. 
Diachronicity is present in the sense that a series of case studies is presented, in a 
more or less chronological order.
Furthermore, whereas more radical forms of comparative epistemology will try 
to take as many dimensions of a given cultural epoch into account as possible, my 
objective is more modest in this respect. As already indicated, I will focus on two 
important domains, namely the life sciences and literature (“belles-lettres”), 
although on more than one occasion other domains of intellectual activity (such as 
philosophy, politics or architecture) will be involved in the analysis as well. In the 
case of philosophy, this is more or less inevitable of course, since philosophy as a 
discipline has the ambition to articulate the spirit of its time in a more or less gen-
eral and comprehensive way – in a way that transcends and at the same time clari-
fies more specific and context-dependent manifestations of the Zeitgeist in other 
cultural domains.
Comparative epistemology is philosophy, rather than history. Although I will 
make ample use of the archives made available by historical research, my basic 
questions and interests remain philosophical. Although I use historical data, it is my 
objective is to address epistemological rather than historical issues. The basic issue 
to be addressed concerns the epistemological status of the life sciences. To what 
extent do they further our understanding of nature? To what extent are they able to 
produce a reliable and truthful account regarding the living world? In order to 
answer this type of question, a confrontation is staged between scientific forms of 
discourse on the one hand and literary forms of discourse on the other.
The starting point of my research is the rather obvious experience (already 
referred to above) that, in order to learn something about particular animals, plant 
forms or natural sites, we may sometimes prefer literary documents to scientific 
ones, in the same way as it is obvious that someone may learn more about human 
psychology from reading Tolstoi or Ibsen than from reading academic journals or 
manuals that have the term “psychology” in their title. This “obvious” fact raises a 
number of epistemological concerns. Apparently, the scope, the truth value of scientific 
research is limited. What kind of knowledge is provided by biologists (or psycholo-
gists), and where do poets or novelists “take over”? Can the insights that are 
 communicated by literary authors really be considered as “knowledge”? For example, 
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can their insights be tested somehow, in terms of their truthfulness and epistemo-
logical robustness, can they be replicated? How are their insights produced? 
Producers of literary documents will study animals, plant forms or landscapes in 
ways that may be completely different from what biologists usually do, but their 
actual working patterns of the latter are usually more transparent. In order to dis-
cern the methods of literary authors, we have to submit their output to a process of 
close reading. It is not very helpful to content ourselves with saying that biologists 
present us with an “objective”, novelists or playwrights with a more “subjective” 
version of reality. This is a far too easy answer. Literary documents may set out to 
describe the natural world in ways that are remarkably convincing and “true to 
life”. They may sincerely try to convey the ways in which nature is experienced 
under certain conditions. They may even invite readers to follow-up and “repli-
cate” the findings as they are presented. Up to a certain point, scientific and literary 
sources have the same objective: to present us with a truthful view of life. The dif-
ference is in the methods used. And although these methods are bound to be dis-
similar – and sometimes remarkably so – we may discover striking similarities as 
well. Moreover, we cannot deal with these questions simply by voicing a number 
of armchair generalizations about “science and art”. The only option available, 
from a philosophical point of view, is to revert to careful case studies, comparative 
readings of scientific and literary materials, belonging to the same historical set-
ting, but different in terms of tools, methodology and mind-set. Both types of docu-
ments will try to convey basic “truths” regarding nature. Is it possible to define 
what kind of knowledge these sources communicate and contain? How reliable are 
their methods, how valid are their results?
Occasionally, we will come across literary documents that are of special impor-
tance because they are exercises in comparative epistemology in their own right. 
They deal with some of the epistemological questions mentioned above explicitly 
in the sense that they stage a confrontation between scientific forms of knowledge 
and rival genres. These documents, highly relevant to comparative epistemology as 
a project, will be further discussed in Section 1.5. First, a number of  methodological 
issues has to be addressed.
1.4 Going Through the Archives: Preliminary Issues
A bewildering proliferation of textual materials has been produced dealing with 
nature and natural entities, such as ecosystems, mammals or microbes. They belong 
to various genres. Strategies of classification will allow us to produce some kind of 
order in these archives of overwhelming proportions, but will at the same time 
prove hazardous undertakings, as the boundaries between the genres involved will 
often be far from clear and, above all, historically fluid. What all these documents 
have in common is that, some way or another, they all try to tell us something about 
nature, or natural entities. Somehow they all allow nature, or natural entities, to 
become visible in a certain way. They try to convey certain basic insights about the 
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living world. A comparative analysis of these various types of discourse on living 
nature will not primarily focus on what is said, but rather on how it is said. All these 
insights regarding nature, how are they obtained, how are they elaborated, tested 
and refined, how are they disseminated?
Documents that try to inform us about nature can be read in various ways. As a 
rule, readers consulting scientific materials will focus on the data, the information, 
the “discoveries”, the knowledge claims as such. But as soon as these materials are 
confronted with other types of documents, a shift is likely to occur. The focus will 
then no longer be on the data as such, but rather on the concepts and metaphors 
used, on the techniques that authors rely on in their efforts to obtain, analyse and 
communicate the information. In other words, in the context of a comparative epis-
temology, the focus will not be on the scientific discoveries as such, but rather on 
the vocabularies at work, the experimental technologies and conceptual frames of 
reference that guide the ways in which nature is perceived and understood.
A huge part of the written documents that try to shed some light on nature 
belongs to the realm of science, but there also exists a wealth of written materials 
on nature that comes from other domains, such as “belles-lettres”. In many cases, 
it will be difficult to make out with certainty whether a particular text belongs to 
literature or science. Although these domains have a tendency to distance 
 themselves from one another, and documents may sometimes emphatically 
endorse a particular identity (be it scientific or literary), the reader may not always 
share the author’s views and there are always substantial boundary zones, espe-
cially if we focus on literary documents that are driven by epistemological desires 
similar to the ones that are discernable in more scholarly forms of writings: the 
desire to describe nature (or natural entities) in a truthful manner; to make living 
nature visible and accessible, to pass on to readers certain basic experiences 
 concerning nature; to ask and answer a number of questions with regard to nature. 
Sometimes, the difference between science and literature seems obvious and the dis-
tinction easy to make. After reading merely a few words, perhaps a few lines, it 
will be clear what we are dealing with: literature or science. On other occasions, 
however, it may be rather difficult to tell whether a certain document belongs to 
the one category or the other, even after we have closely studied it. It may well 
depend, in such a case, on our perspective, on the way we look at it. If we insist, 
a classification in terms of either/or can always be made, of course, but in some 
cases it may seem a rather arbitrary decision, perhaps even a violation. Many 
 treatises on natural history written in the nineteenth century, for example, are 
likely to be classified as “literary” by the great majority of scientists living today, 
rather than as scientific. Even Darwin’s Origin of Species, although undoubtedly 
a scientific classic, has indisputable literary qualities and characteristics,3 while 
the works of his grandfather Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802) are even more difficult 
to classify as “either” literature “or” science. His famous The Temple of Nature 
(published posthumously) is a long poem containing a theory of evolution. His 
3 This will be discussed more extensively in Chapter 3.
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work is reminiscent of the fact that there have been times when poets wrote about 
science and scientists choose to disseminate their scientific views through poetry. 
In ancient Greece, the first authors who took to text-writing in order to disseminate 
their insights concerning nature were actually poets.
Around 475 BC Parmenides of Elea wrote a poetical treatise called Pερι ϕυσεος 
(“On Nature”). Herakleitos (‘‘the Obscure”) of Ephesus wrote a work with a similar 
title in verse. Indeed, Pερι ϕυσεος is not the title of a book, but rather the title of 
a genre. Many other Greek philosopher-scientists wrote treatises under this head-
ing, for example, Anaximander (611–547 BC), Empedocles (495–435 BC), 
Anaxagoras (c.500–c.428 BC) and Epicurus (341–271 BC). These works discuss 
the nature of nature, its basic, elementary structure. They convey theoretical, rather 
than practical or empirical knowledge. In the early days, philosophy was more or 
less identical with the philosophy of nature and expressed itself in poetic formats. 
In the beginning, a clear differentiation between philosophy, science and literature 
had not yet established itself. Outstanding philosopher-scientists like Herakleitos 
and Parmenides were writers of poetry.4
The situation started to change, however, when a new generation of philoso-
phers stepped forward, the Sophists who, together with Socrates, shifted the focus 
of attention from nature to man, from object to subject, from that which is known 
to the mind that knows. In order to understand nature, we must first of all under-
stand ourselves. We have to put our methods, our mind-sets and our senses to the 
test. We have to engage in a critical enquiry concerning the possibilities and limita-
tions of human knowledge, the reliability of human understanding. The conditions 
of knowledge, the various forms of knowledge, rather than nature as such, became 
the subject matter of philosophical research. When Protagoras claimed that man is 
the measure of all things, he basically meant that nature presents itself to us, that 
nature becomes accessible as an object of reflection and discourse through human 
understanding.
This shift of focus from object to subject, from “nature” to “human understand-
ing” is something which seems to violate a natural inclination, an inherent tendency 
of our will to knowledge. We may compare it, I guess, to shooting pictures. 
Initially, we tend to focus on the objects, the things or scenes we want to retain. 
Gradually, however, we will start to ask ourselves how we may change and influ-
ence the way in which a certain object is bound to appear on a photograph. We will 
critically reflect on the way we use this high-tech contrivance called “camera”. The 
same shift of attention is visible in the study of nature. It is our initial desire to 
understand the phenomena, the world around us. It is only after an epistemological 
crisis, an upsurge of deep suspicion concerning our mental faculties and senses, an 
experience of discontent with what human reason can achieve (such as the crisis 
that emerged in the days of Socrates), that the urgency is recognised of analysing 
ourselves rather than the world around us. If we want to achieve reliable knowledge 
4 Although “poetry” should not be used here in its modern sense. Hegel wisely said that the sayings 
of these early philosophers precede the distinction between poetry and prose (1986 III, p. 250).
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of nature, a rigorous program of self-analysis is indispensable. And this is likely to 
incite the authors involved in scientific enquiry to “purify” their methods, their 
language even, to become linguistic ascetics, and eventually to do away with vari-
ous stylistic and methodological “contaminations”. In the works of Aristotle as they 
came down to us, for example, we are confronted with a corpus that presents itself 
as “pure” science rather than as literature. Occasional literary references are explic-
itly presented as such.
Yet, rigid boundaries between philosophy, poetry and science remain difficult, 
if not impossible to draw. This also goes for the difference between science and 
philosophy. Until 1800, the distinction was more or less non-existent. Isaac Newton 
regarded himself as a philosopher of nature. And the farther we go down the track, 
the more arbitrary the distinction tends to become. Aristotle, one of the most out-
standing philosophers in history, was also a “biologist” in the sense that he was the 
author of the first important scientific treatise on animals that came to be known as 
Historia Animalorum, in which he described and classified about 520 different spe-
cies.5 His pupil Theophrastus, as a result of a “division of labour” so to speak, 
focused on plants and wrote a Historia plantarum. “Natural history” became the 
title of a genre at the boundary zone between philosophy and natural science, con-
taining a mixture of both scientific observations and philosophical views. That 
there are insurmountable difficulties involved in trying to demarcate unequivocally 
philosophy from science is underscored by the fact that, historically speaking, the 
term “scientist” is of a remarkably recent date. The neologism was introduced by 
William Whewell in 1833 in order to distance experimental science from medieval 
scholasticism, and modernity from the Middle Ages. This distinction, however, 
was ideological rather than historical. Instead of doing justice to the way in which 
these types of discourse actually evolved, the distinction endorsed and reinforced a 
number of prejudices about medieval science that were prevalent in the nineteenth 
century.6 Be this as it may, deliberations over the question whether Aristotle’s 
books on animals, for example, belong to the realm of philosophy or science, are 
meaningless in the sense of anachronistic. It will depend on the way we read his 
work. And even today, in the post-Kantian era, countless examples of “hybrid” 
documents can be cited. Although differentiation has increased, the use of category 
headings such “philosophy” and “science” remains far from unproblematic. The 
impossibility of clearly demarcating science from other forms of discourse (such as 
philosophy and poetry) does not undermine the prospects for a comparative 
epistemology – far from it. One could say that it is precisely the objective of compara-
tive epistemology to undo the “harm” that has been done by problematic strategies 
of classification, because it brings to the attention of philosophy once again several 
types of discourse on nature that have previously been discarded as “unscientific”. 
Nonetheless, comparative epistemologists must be well aware of the vulnerable and 
often anachronistic nature of forms of classification that are likely to be used as 
“provisional labels” on various occasions.
5 “History” in these titles means so much as “factual knowledge”.
6 I will come back to this issue in Chapter 9.
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In the eighteenth century, philosophy of nature (directed towards understanding 
nature as a kind of meta-“object”) began to give way to epistemology (directed 
towards understanding the “subject” rather than the “object” of inquiry), not as a 
temporary critical detour, but as a more or less definitive “division of labour” 
between philosophy and science. After a series of dramatic epistemological crises, 
philosophers consciously began to abandon the ambition to produce a “master dis-
course” on nature. This is still clearly noticeable in the philosophical discourse of 
our own time. At present, unlike Parmenides or Aristotle, most practitioners of 
philosophy will no longer speak about nature directly. The desire to understand 
nature from a purely philosophical perspective is called “metaphysics”, and in the 
course of centuries immense libraries have been devoted to this field of research, 
but in the eighteenth-century philosophers like David Hume (1711–1776) and 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) convincingly argued that philosophy should be a crit-
ical assessment of human understanding rather than a metaphysics of nature. 
According to Hume, we should examine ourselves, “with a narrow scrutiny” 
(1777/1975, p. 6), in order to find the principles that regulate our understanding, 
rather than the principles that regulate nature. Causality, for example, is in the eye 
(or mind) of the beholder. It is the way nature is disclosed and made understandable 
by us. Kant is basically in agreement with this claim. Human understanding, the 
framing of our mind, determines the ways in which nature presents itself to us. 
Philosophy is no longer a discourse on nature as such, but rather a discourse on our 
understanding of nature, on the extent to which authors (scientific or otherwise) 
may produce legitimate and reliable knowledge claims. Nature as such is de-listed 
from the agenda of philosophy. Scientific research should be left to the scientists as 
experts, while philosophers should from now on regard themselves as experts of 
subject-oriented forms of reflection (such as epistemology and ethics). From now 
on, the principal subject matter of philosophy is not nature itself, but natural science. 
Philosophers will study the work of astronomers, zoologists and botanists, rather 
than heavenly bodies, animals or plants as such. In other words, philosophy was 
forced to abandon its original object (nature), but received something in return, a 
new and fascinating topic, namely the scientific inquiry of nature.
Thus, Kant and other “critical” philosophers have successfully transformed 
 philosophy into a critical, reflective endeavour, a discourse that is interested in 
 science, in the interaction between science and nature, rather than in nature per se. 
Philosophers now analyse and write about discourses on nature, instead of producing 
discourses on nature themselves. They write about nature indirectly, so to say, by 
analysing, supporting or challenging the views and methods of those who write 
about it more or less “directly”. In other words, the philosophy of nature became 
the philosophy of natural science. Philosophers may write about microscopes, for 
example, and may occasionally gaze through one, but they are not expected to use 
this type of apparatus to further our understanding of what is happening in a partic-
ular cell line or in a pond. Basically, philosophers are readers. Philosophers may 
use their eyes and ears, of course, but usually they will do so in order study the ways 
in which others (preferably scientists and poets) perceive or understand the natu-
ral world. Philosophy became epistemology, the critical analysis of our various 
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ways to know about, and interact with, nature. How are knowledge claims produced 
in laboratory environments, in experimental gardens, in libraries and in various 
other research sites? Comparative epistemology itself is part of this tendency 
toward self-reflection. The objective of this book is not to contribute to our knowl-
edge of nature or natural entities as such, but rather to critically reflect on the vari-
ous ways in which they become visible in various forms of discourse.
Another preliminary issue to be addressed in this section is the issue of norma-
tivity. Philosophers will not merely describe the knowledge production process, but 
rather assess it in a critical manner. They will try to determine the reliability and 
validity of the knowledge claims evolving from various research efforts. With nor-
mative questions and considerations in mind, they work their way through the files 
and archives of scientific enquiry in order to write down their – solicited or unsolicited 
– judgements and recommendations. As Kant explains in his Streit der Fakultäten 
(1798/1959), producing critical comments on scientific practices has become a 
legitimate philosophical occupation. And indeed, in the slipstream of Kant’s work, 
epistemology, philosophy of science and science ethics have become major 
branches of philosophy today.
It is the conviction of comparative epistemology, however, that epistemologists 
and philosophers of science should not exclusively be interested in the scientific 
analysis of nature, but should also devote a substantial part of their attention to 
other forms of obtaining and transmitting valuable insights concerning the natural 
world. Literary sources have a special role to play in this respect. They may notably 
convey and capture informal and uncodified forms of knowledge concerning 
nature, describing nature and natural entities as they are encountered in the “life-
world”, that is, outside laboratories. Quite often, literary authors write and observe 
in a more or less systematic manner, not completely unlike the way scientists 
work.7 I do not deny that, as a rule, scientific knowledge is remarkably accurate and 
precise in comparison to informal, experiential knowledge. Indeed, to adhere to a 
scientific stance basically means that we refuse to take informal and anecdotal 
knowledge, obtained in various practical contexts, for granted. And often, scientists 
will demonstrate that informal knowledge is biased or imprecise. But although we 
have to be aware of the limits and restrictions of informal knowledge, it is nonethe-
less clear that in various contexts it will remain a usable and legitimate source of 
insight. Experimental and experiential, formal and informal knowledge are often 
seen as conflicting, but from the point of view of comparative epistemology we 
may well see them as complementary. Even in a world enlightened by Copernican 
astronomy, sunrise is still a meaningful experience. Everyday knowledge must be 
regarded as different rather than as deficient, a body of knowledge with its own 
criteria of reliability and precision. Rather than disqualifying informal knowledge 
beforehand, because it lacks the rigorous precision of scientific knowledge claims, 
we may take another course and recognize that various forms of knowledge can at 
7 This is underscored by the fact that contrivances developed for scientific research at times emerge 
in the titles of literary works. A famous example in Dutch is the literary classic entitled Camera 
obscura by the nineteenth-century poet-theologian Nicolaas Beets (1839/1880).
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least be of relative value. They have their own standards of validity. And, finally, 
informal experiences of nature as expressed in poems and novels may sooner or 
later function as a source of inspiration for scientific activities, similar to the way 
new scientific fields may grow out of informal knowledge practices. The field of 
genetics, for example, now a highly formalised and technology-driven laboratory 
science, grew out of practical experiences, assembled in the course of centuries in 
gardens, orchards and farmyards. Gregor Mendel (1823–1884) was not yet a 
geneticist (genetics as a research field had not yet come into existence), but rather 
a figure of transition diligently working in the boundary zone between traditional 
forms of horticulture and modern genetics, the first human being to apply the con-
cept of an experimental trial (with which he had become acquainted during the 
physics courses he had taken at the University of Vienna) to growing garden peas.8 
It is one of the functions of literary sources to remind us of the value and signifi-
cance of everyday experience. When it comes to elucidating the ways in which the 
natural world is experienced under normal, “real life” circumstances, literary docu-
ments such as novels and plays may well be consulted. Insights obtained in a labo-
ratory setting can be used to criticise “common sense” knowledge, but it can also 
work the other way around: literary sources are often used to challenge the 
“restricted” or “impoverished” views of science. From a life-world perspective, 
scientific accounts may often be seen as one-sided or even flawed. In laboratories, 
nature is studied under highly artificial conditions and natural entities are manipu-
lated by means of technical contrivances. Literary sources may then be used as 
archives containing more “authentic”, less “violating” views. Somehow, literary 
authors have developed their own skills to write about nature and natural entities 
without the help of scientific equipment, relying on “softer”, literary techniques, 
based on careful observation, but also on discernment and empathy. Yet, how valid 
and reliable is their output, and what we can we learn from it? Those are the kind 
of questions a comparative epistemology sets out to answer. They are normative 
questions, but the standards of judgement on which we may build our judgements 
are not readily available, not external to the fields involved.
As was already indicated above, there is a special category of literary documents 
that try to mutually expose scientific and non-scientific views of nature or natural 
entities to one another. These documents explicitly compare the various ways in 
which insights regarding nature are obtained, articulated and processed. Rather 
than fleshing out one particular possibility of experiencing nature, they reflect on 
the epistemological profiles of various strategies for viewing nature. In short, they 
are exercises in comparative epistemology in their own right. Moby-Dick, for 
example, exemplifies what Bakhtin (1988) has referred to “heteroglossia”: a liter-
ary document in which various discourse forms are confronted with one another 
and played out against one another. This includes a number of scientific genres, but 
also religious writings, literary sources as well as the verbal and informal dialects 
of human beings involved in the practice of capturing whales. In short, it is an 
exercise in comparative epistemology. Jack London’s The Call of the Wild on the 
8 His work will be analyzed extensively in Chapter 9.
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other hand may be seen as a document in which one particular way of understand-
ing dogs is fleshed out. Although rival ways of seeing dogs are present in the novel 
as well, they remain marginal more or less, so that the novel retains a clear episte-
mological identity and focus. A classical example of a heterogeneous novel is Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein.
1.5 Epistemological Neurosis in Frankenstein
On May 4, 1818, Percy Bysshe Shelley (1872, p. 450) wrote the following poem:
Passage of the Apennines
Listen, listen, Mary mine,
To the whisper of the Apennine.
It bursts on the roof like the thunder’s roar;
Or like the sea on a northern shore,
Heard in its raging ebb and flow
By the captives pent in the cave below.
The Apennine in the light of day
Is a mighty mountain dim and grey
Which between the earth and sky doth ly;
But, when night comes, a chaos dread
On the dim starlight then is spread,
And the Apennine walks abroad with the storm.
In this poem, in which Shelley addresses Mary Wollstonecraft, his travel compan-
ion and future wife, a landscape emerges under particular meteorological circum-
stances. What the poem tries to immortalise is perhaps not so much nature per se 
as a particular experience of nature, namely nature as sublime. It conveys an atmos-
phere of stillness and openness to nature, a sense of awe. Two years before, on June 
23, 1816, Shelley had written a similar poem about the Mont Blanc (pp. 436–439). 
From the third stanza, the following lines are taken:
Far, far above, piercing the infinite shy,
Mont Blanc appears – still, snowy, and serene.
Once again, a landscape becomes visible and a particular experience of nature – 
nature as fascinating and immense – is voiced. In this serene context, however, 
another element is suddenly introduced:
Some say that gleams of a remoter world
Visit the soul in sleep – that death is slumber …
Has some unknown omnipotence unfurled
The veil of life and death? …
The landscape becomes an entourage for a scientific project of dramatic epistemo-
logical dimensions. Attention now shifts from the landscape as such to human 
beings that dwell in this sublime environment, and are apparently visited by unset-
tling dreams. The dream that is hinted at in this poem by Shelley was actually dreamt 
by Mary. And it inspired her to write the novel for which she is still famous, set in 
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the Mont Blanc area, about a scientist who, as her friend Shelley phrases it, “lifted 
the veil of life and death”. This is how she herself described her famous dream:
I saw the pale student of unhallowed arts kneeling beside the thing he had put together. 
I saw the hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, and then, on the working of some 
powerful engine, show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, half-vital motion. 
(1818/1968, p. 263)
While travelling through the Mont Blanc region, both the poet and the future novel-
ist became enthralled by a scientific dream, the possibility of transcending the 
boundary between life and death, and this vision was eventually transformed into 
the novel Frankenstein. It is a work of art that tries to determine the epistemological 
as well as the ethical profile of the new science of life that was emerging at the 
time, evoking a combination of enthusiasm and unease, of fascination and horror.
From the point of view of comparative epistemology, Frankenstein is a fascinat-
ing novel because in a challenging manner, completely different visions on nature 
are confronted with one another, played out against each other, namely the poetic 
view on the one hand and the scientific view on the other. Each view, each genre 
has an epistemological profile of its own.
The poetic view on nature as fleshed out in the novel is reminiscent of and akin to 
the poems by Percy Bysshe Shelley cited above. In her novel, Mary Wollstonecraft 
Shelley describes a sublime landscape, composed of a grand deep lake amidst huge 
snowy mountains: “palaces of nature”, beautiful yet terrific. The novel speaks 
about the magnificent valleys, the “awful majesty” of the Mont Blanc and the 
“ sublime, mighty Alps, whose white and shining pyramids and domes towered 
above all” (p. 358). It idolizes the solemn silence of imperial nature as well as the 
solemnizing effect everything awful and majestic in nature is bound the have on the 
human heart and mind. The language in these passages is poetic. Issues of life and 
death, origin and destiny are formulated in lofty terms.
It is not the purpose of Mary Shelley’s novel, however, only to evoke this atmos-
phere of the sublime. Quite the contrary, this poetic vision of nature finds itself 
challenged and disturbed by a rival view, fascinating in its own right, namely the 
scientific one. Rather than voicing aesthetic experiences by focusing on nature’s 
beauties, this view really wants to unravel her grand mysteries, her “hidden 
causes”. But science is not a monolithic unity in the novel. On the contrary, two 
basic strategies, apparently incompatible with one another, the one no less ambi-
tious than the other, present themselves to novices, to newcomers, such as Victor 
Frankenstein, namely alchemy and modern chemistry.
Initially, Victor Frankenstein immerses himself in the writings of the early mod-
ern alchemists, or “necromancers” as they are called in Mary Shelley’s work. He 
reads and studies authors from the early modern era like Cornelius Agrippa, 
Paracelsus and Albertus Magnus with delight. Their grand, fantastic theories still 
seem to correspond with and to do justice to the overwhelming mysteries of nature. 
Alchemy constitutes an intermediate view, so to speak, between poetry (focusing 
on the sublime dimensions of nature) and modern science (relying instead on 
detachment and objectification). The poetic and the alchemistic view are not really 
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in conflict with one another. On the contrary, to a certain extent they seem to rein-
force one another, they seem congenial to one another.
The scientific view to which Victor Frankenstein finds himself exposed at the 
University of Ingolstadt, however, is quite different and, above all, much less toler-
ant. At first glance, it is an unassuming style of research in the sense that its scope 
is rather limited. It only takes into consideration those questions that a scientist can 
reasonably be expected to be able to answer through experimental research. Yet, 
this unassuming aura is only an epidermal surface. Beneath it, the new science is 
driven by a will to knowledge so powerful that eventually it will inspire a relentless 
desire to manipulate and control. At heart, this new science is extremely ambitious 
and Faustian.
Initially, Frankenstein is deeply disappointed by what modern science has to 
offer. In some of the early chapters, Mary Shelley describes his discontent in the 
mind-set of modern research. He is disappointed by the achievements of the “recent 
enquirers” in comparison to the grand theories and dreams of the “forgotten 
alchemists”:
The ambition of the [modern] enquirer seemed to limit itself to the annihilation of those 
visions on which my interest in science was chiefly founded. I was required to exchange 
chimeras of boundless grandeur for realities of little worth. (p. 306)
Soon, however, Frankenstein allows himself to be “converted” to the new scientific 
mode of thought. Modern chemistry becomes his sole occupation. He begins to 
conduct physiological research using chemical instruments. After “incredible 
labour and fatigue” he finally experiences his Eureka. And at that point, the grand 
ambitions lingering in the unconscious realms of modern science become unmis-
takably apparent:
How dangerous the acquirement of knowledge is! When I found so astonishing a power 
placed within my hands, I hesitated a long time concerning the manner in which I should 
employ it. (p. 313)
Finally, he manages to return human bodily parts back to life, using equipments that 
produce electricity. Terrified by the spectacular results of his experiment, he flees 
from his laboratory and suffers a nervous breakdown. He recovers, but it is a partial 
recovery only. From then on, he is completely unable to continue his scientific 
work:
I had conceived a violent antipathy even to the name of natural philosophy [i.e. science]. 
When I was otherwise quite restored to health, the sight of a chemical instrument would 
renew all the agony of my nervous symptoms.… I had acquired a dislike for the room which 
had previously been my laboratory. (p. 328) 
Frankenstein gives up his research and desperately tries to resume the poetic and 
romantic way of life of his more youthful days; centred around reading poetry and 
wandering through sublime landscapes. But he is no longer able to appreciate and 
enjoy the romantic aspects of nature any more. It is as if the scientific view has 
irreversibly infected him. The poetic atmosphere is dead to him and does not come 
to life again, not even in these sublime surroundings. The result is a depressing 
epistemological deadlock. Both views on nature, both possibilities of experiencing 
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nature, the poetic and the scientific one, are from now on denied to him. He can 
neither appreciate the one, nor endure the other. He succumbs to a chronic “episte-
mological neurosis” that paralyses him intellectually as well as erotically and 
socially.
In other words, Mary Shelley’s novel is an exercise in comparative epistemol-
ogy in its own right. The poems Percy Bysshe Shelley had written about their com-
mon experiences had been much more homogeneous. They strived to articulate and 
evoke one particular experience of nature, the poetic or romantic one that allows 
nature to emerge as the sublime. From the point of view of comparative epistemol-
ogy, these poems are interesting precisely because they allow us to study this par-
ticular experience in a more or less pure and “uncontaminated” form. Mary 
Shelley’s novel, however, is clearly heterogeneous. It stages a confrontation 
between different visions of nature: poetry, alchemy (a more or less “intermediary” 
form of discourse) and modern science. The scientific view is not depicted as a 
coherent whole. Rather, the scientific ego (young Frankenstein as a pioneer in the 
field of modern chemistry) is accompanied by an epistemological alter ego, an 
epistemological unconscious so to speak: the theories of the necromancers he 
unsuccessfully had tried to repress. Basic ideas borrowed from alchemy have a 
decisive, albeit more or less unconscious impact on Frankenstein’s work and mind-
set. As he enters the University of Ingolstadt, where the new paradigm of modern 
chemistry flourishes, he is forced to undergo something of an epistemological con-
version. Indeed: Wo Es war soll Ich werden, the outdated, fantastic theories of the 
necromancers must almost violently be replaced by the more exact, reliable and 
verifiable theories of modern chemistry. But Frankenstein’s conversion (his episte-
mological “therapy” so to speak) was apparently unsuccessful. His therapists did 
not do a very good job. Eventually, the novel stages a dramatic return of the 
repressed: a resurge of alchemy, disguised as and armed with the powerful equip-
ment of modern chemistry. Indeed, one could say that the epistemological morale of 
the story is that in order to become a true and reliable scientist, the struggle against 
obsolete modes of thought is never really completed and should therefore be con-
tinued indefinitely. In Freudian terms, the edification of a scientist calls for an 
interminable self-analysis – unendliche Analyse.9
What makes Mary Shelley’s novel so highly interesting is that all the views 
involved (the poetic, the alchemistic and the scientific view) are worked out in a con-
vincing way. They are represented as fascinating in their own right, but at the same 
time as problematic. The poetic view is fascinating because of its enchanting visions, 
but problematic because it lacks the precision and objectivity of modern science; the 
alchemistic view is fascinating because of its grand ambitions to uncover the primal 
but secret tendencies that are at work in nature itself, but it is problematic because it 
hinders the individual from really entering and identifying himself with the newly 
emerging scientific mode of thought; the scientific view certainly has its strengths 
(the reliability and replicability of its knowledge claims), but is problematic because 
it estranges the scientist from the sublimities and dignities of nature.
9 This is precisely the conviction of Gaston Bachelard, whose ideas will be discussed in Chapter 2.
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Heterogeneous novels can be seen as exercises in comparative epistemology, 
although they employ literary instead of philosophical techniques. A genuinely 
“heterogeneous” novel (or poem, or play), such as Frankenstein, will try to do jus-
tice to all the views that are represented in it. It will not start from an epistemologi-
cal bias or prejudice on the part of the author against one particular view or genre. 
Although of course the basic views or genres involved will be challenged and criti-
cised in the novel, the author herself remains more or less aloof. Instead, one par-
ticular form of discourse finds itself criticised by one of the others. The author 
directs or “conducts” this process, this epistemological “game”, but refuses to act 
as a critic herself. Indeed, Mary Shelley is like the director of a play (Bakhtin 1973, 
1988). All genres are given a fair chance to present and defend themselves. A final 
verdict is suspended. The moral message conveyed by heterogeneous documents 
will be that all the genres or modes of thought involved will to a certain extent 
reveal as well as obscure important aspects of nature, although in the end they may 
perhaps contribute to a more or less comprehensive view, as complementary 
perspectives – but not without dramatic episodes of epistemological struggle and 
conflict. In other words, the focus of such a novel is not on describing or depicting 
nature as such, but rather on describing and critically assessing the various strate-
gies human subjects have at their disposal for devoting their life to the project of 
immortalising, analysing or manipulating nature.
1.6 Outline
This volume consists of three parts. The first part is an introduction to comparative 
epistemology. Whereas in the present chapter the basic idea has been outlined, 
Chapter 2 presents a concise overview of the theoretical backdrop or “genealogy” 
of a comparative epistemological approach. A number of philosophers (Kant, 
Hegel, Husserl, and Bachelard) are presented as the proverbial giants on whose 
shoulders comparative epistemologists may stand, although it is clear that more 
than one pathway may lead to comparative research.
Part II contains the first series of case studies. It is a comparative epistemologi-
cal analysis of scientific and literary discourses on animals (notably horses, whales, 
frogs, dogs and ducks). Chapter 3 begins with a historical (“diachronic”) overview. 
The fable literature on animals is confronted with the Historia animalorum tradi-
tion (the art and science of classifying animals). In addition, a number of other 
genres and perspectives on animals (comical, tragic, biblical) are taken into consid-
eration. In some of these genres, animals are “objectified”, in others they are 
“anthropomorphised”, and in still others they emerge as epistemologically privi-
leged beings. It is not my objective to give an exhaustive historical description, but 
rather to define a number of prominent positions that will allow me to ask a series 
of epistemological questions: to what extent do these discursive genres do justice 
to the “animality” of animals? To what extent do they allow animals to emerge as 
animals? Finally, the focus will shift to the nineteenth century. From now on, the 
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“synchronic” approach will remain dominant. From a comparative epistemological 
viewpoint I will discuss the work of scientists such as Georges Cuvier, Charles 
Darwin, Claude Bernard, Douglas Spalding, Conwy Lloyd Morgan and Ivan 
Pavlov. Their research efforts will be compared to and contrasted with literary 
documents on animals and animal research from the same period, written by 
authors such as Melville, Dickens, Turgenev and Ibsen. They will be regarded as 
literary counterparts to the scientific domain, mirroring and challenging the ideas 
that are emerging in scientific practices. The two types of document have some-
thing in common: they both try to move beyond the confines of traditional “natural 
history” and its literary counterpart, the fable literature. In science, this is done 
along two lines: by introducing the idea of evolution (Darwin) and by introducing 
the experimental method in research with animals (Claude Bernard). Both have 
their literary counterparts. While Melville’s Moby-Dick will be regarded as a liter-
ary counterpart to Darwin’s The Origin of Species, Emile Zola explicitly positions 
the modern “naturalistic” or “experimental” novel as a literary counterpart to 
Claude Bernard’s in vivo animal research.
As was already explained above, however, a word of caution is in place here. 
The classifications used above must be regarded as provisional. To say that novels 
such as The Call of the Wild are animal novels is a simplification, of course. As will 
be explained in more detail later on, London’s novel could also be called a novel 
about a particular landscape, namely the Yukon region, just as Melville’s novel is 
about oceans as well as about whales. It is perfectly possible to read and treat 
London’s book as a landscape novel, or as a historical novel, rather than as a dog 
novel. Likewise, writings by Ivan Pavlov on laboratory dogs are as much about 
laboratories as they are about dogs. It is through the animal-subject (whale, dog or 
otherwise) that a particular world (the Pacific Ocean or the sub-Arctic wilderness) 
is opened up to us. And the animals themselves always emerge as beings-in-an-
environment. We could even go a step further and emphasise that novels, plays, 
poems, scientific textbooks and journal articles are never about landscapes or flow-
ers or dogs as objective entities, but rather about the ways in which human beings 
perceive them, write about them, address and assess them.
In Part III, the second series of case studies will be presented, now focusing on 
the vegetative dimension of nature: plant forms and the landscapes (or ecosystems) 
they represent. Attention will be given to the writings of scientists such as Mendel, 
Pasteur and Koch and their literary counterparts. As was the case in Part I, Chapter 7 
is much more “diachronically” structured than the subsequent ones. Starting point 
is the idea of Alexander von Humboldt, Franz Bratranek and others that particular 
landscapes are represented by typical plant forms that give them an identity, a 
“face”. In Chapter 7 this idea will be used to identify a series of landscape types 
that have emerged in the Netherlands from the dawn of history up to the present. 
We will analyse how scientific and literary authors have contributed to the shaping 
of this landscape. It is indicated that a landscape consists of two dimensions: a 
dominant and a recessive (or repressed) one. As landscape history evolves, dra-
matic changes and reversals may be interpreted as instances of repression or as a 
“return of the repressed”.
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In Chapter 8, the focus will shift from landscape to environment and from plant 
forms to microbes. A play by Henrik Ibsen (“A public enemy”) on microbes and 
the environment is analysed in a comparative epistemological manner, through a 
confrontation with its scientific counterpart: the rediscovery of microbial life in the 
1880s by Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch.
In Chapter 9, the focus is once again on plants. Its main character is Franz 
Bratranek’s famous colleague Gregor Mendel. The plant forms he has studied 
(notably the garden pea) are placed in their proper cultural environment, so to 
speak, on the basis of a comparative epistemology. Scientific and literary views on 
plants are presented as “epistemological hybrids” (combinations of dominant and 
recessive elements). A comparative epistemological approach will be developed to 
explain why Mendel’s work was virtually ignored in his own lifetime, but enthusi-
astically rediscovered in 1900.
Finally, in Chapter 10, the focus will be on mobility and travel, rather than on 
place and site. The concept of a journey has always played a major structuring role 
in both literature and science. In scientific discourse, for example, key publications 
of prominent authors such as Alexander von Humboldt and Charles Darwin are 
basically the results of scientific journeys. Also in literary documents on nature and 
natural science, journeys have been crucially important, from Swift’s Voyage to 
Laputa (discussed in Chapter 3) and Melville’s Moby-Dick (discussed in Chapter 4) 
up to the writings of Jules Verne, to whose work this final case study is devoted. In 
his novels, journeys are undertaken to test scientific ideas or to perform experi-
ments under extreme circumstances. By stressing the importance of technology-
based mobility, it also emphasises the extent to which the modern world has 
widened in terms of scale. In ancient Greece, science was devoted to animals 
(Aristotle) and plants (Theophrastus), as entities that were visible to and analysable 
by the “naked”, unsupported eye. They were accessible for a research practice that 
was not yet a technoscience. In Chapter 8, it is described how microscopes open up 
the world of micro-organisms on the micro-level. In the case of Jules Verne, many 
of his novels are about technologies that open up previously inaccessible macro-
dimensions of the natural world for research and mobility.
This volume ends with Chapter 11, recapitulating and consolidating the analyses 
and pointing out directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Antecedents: Comparative Epistemology 
as an Outcome
2.1 Epistemology as Therapy
As was indicated in Chapter 1, “comparative epistemology” developed against the 
backdrop of a number of developments and reversals in the history of philosophical 
thinking. As Kant (1781/1975) points out in his Introduction to the second edition 
of his Critique of Pure Reason, at least two important turning points must be identi-
fied. Both begin with an epistemological crisis, a paralysing epistemological 
malaise, but eventually result in a scientific revolution, putting scientific inquiry on 
a completely new and promising footing. These “happy endings”, however, presup-
pose significant “therapeutic interventions” in the form of thorough reconsidera-
tions of the epistemological conditions for producing reliable knowledge.
The first crisis occurred around 400 BC and challenged the “naïve” epistemo-
logical basis of the philosophy of nature that had been articulated in a more or less 
poetic style by the “physicists”. The consequences of this reversal were significant. 
Scholarly research began to evolve in a completely different direction. Poetry and 
meditation gave way to mathematics as the “royal pathway” towards reliable 
knowledge, building on concepts such as geometrical proof, deduction and hypoth-
esis. The scientific mode of thinking distanced itself explicitly from other forms of 
discourse, as was exemplified by the famous passage in Plato’s Republic describing 
the expulsion of the poets from the science-based city. And this was not a purely 
fictional event, but rather an extrapolation and justification of the process of 
curriculum-development actually taking place in the Academy – the educational 
facility Plato had established in Athens (Jaeger 1959). A new type of philosopher-
scientist was produced on this suburban site, replacing the older type: the poet-thinker. 
Plato’s approach not only produced a new type of knowledge, but also a new type 
of researcher, a truly “academic animal”. Although in his Dialogues Plato demon-
strates his remarkable competence in literary genres, within the walls of his 
Academy (the suburban sports park in which he and his colleagues and pupils met) 
only scientific genres were allowed. The Dialogues were written for a broader audi-
ence. For true academics, a thorough introduction into the rigorous mind-set of 
Greek mathematics was a prerequisite. The end-product, so to speak, of this process 
was the oeuvre of Aristotle: built upon a conceptual scheme so impressive that it 
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was to provide intellectual guidance as well as an intellectual lingua franca for 
many centuries to come, both in the East and in the West. As was explained in 
Chapter 1, the differentiation between science and philosophy had not yet occurred. 
The same intellectual rigor was apparent in the “philosophical” as well as (e.g.) in 
the “biological” writings of Aristotle and his team.
The second crisis described by Kant occurred in the eighteenth century as a 
result of the impressive achievements of the natural sciences (exemplified by the 
work of Newton) in comparison to the malaise of metaphysics. As was already 
indicated in Chapter 1, the impact of this crisis was enormous, notably in terms of 
agenda-setting for philosophy. It led to an “epistemological turn”, a decisive shift 
from object to subject, from nature to consciousness, from metaphysics to episte-
mology. Philosophy became subject-oriented. Rather than describing the basic 
structures of nature, philosophy from now on devoted itself to reconstructing and 
assessing the ways in which knowledge concerning nature was produced. Initially, 
during the first decades of the nineteenth century, this epistemological therapy 
proved extremely beneficial. It gave rise to German idealism, exemplified by the 
works of Schelling and Hegel. Building on a critical reflection on the basic struc-
tures of the transcendental subject (Geist), this generation of philosophers eventu-
ally decided to reconquer the “lost terrain”, so to speak, by once again elaborating 
a full-fledged philosophy of nature, in which consciousness or the subject (the basic 
structures and dynamics of thinking) played a decisive, constitutive role. Moreover, 
whereas Kant had developed an epistemological statica, Hegel can be credited for 
engendering an epistemological dynamica, analysing the dialectic self-realisation 
of the intellect through history. Hegel’s philosophy thus gave rise to a comprehen-
sive approach, incorporating the concrete findings of empirical and experimental 
research by putting them in a broader intellectual and cultural perspective. Hegel’s 
Naturphilosophie can be regarded as the final outcome of this dramatic epistemo-
logical revolution, comparable in significance to Aristotle’s Physics.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, the intellectual landscape 
changed dramatically again. The hubris conveyed by Schelling’s and Hegel’s 
Naturphilosophie met with strong countervailing forces. Notably the life sciences 
felt a profound desire to emancipate themselves from philosophy as “master dis-
course”. Although several prominent biologists and chemists in the nineteenth cen-
tury were educated in the philosophies of idealism and some of them (e.g. Lorenz 
Oken 1779–1851) were even profoundly influenced by Hegel’s ideas, the rise of 
positivism and the growing confidence in experimental approaches were symptoms 
of the extent to which and the pace in which the speculative philosophy of German 
idealism was losing ground. Moreover, this move away from philosophy proved 
very beneficial to science, at least in terms of productivity. The experimental 
method proved to be a much more powerful instrument for natural research than 
philosophical dialectics.
In response to this development, philosophy once again experienced a dramatic 
crisis, a loss of self-confidence. The response was twofold. On the one hand, 
branches of philosophy emerged that restricted themselves to propagating and clar-
ifying the logic of scientific research. Eventually, this type of philosophy (from 
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neo-Kantianism via logical positivism to contemporary analytical philosophy) 
became more or less subservient to science. Besides this development, however, 
there was also a more “philosophical”, indeed: more self-conscious response: 
namely phenomenology. This philosophical movement can be seen as an effort to 
reflect on and overcome the situation of malaise that dominated the second half of 
the nineteenth century, an epoch during which (unlike before and after) influential 
philosophers (e.g. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard) tended to work far removed from 
university infrastructures. Within continental philosophy, phenomenology became 
the most influential philosophical approach during the first half of the twentieth 
century. It prepared the ground for a comparative epistemology of knowledge 
forms. Although the thinking of its founder Edmund Husserl (1935/1977) still 
maintained a high level of abstractness, comparable to Kant and the neo-Kantians, 
his followers became more and more interested in the concrete epistemological 
quandaries emerging in various scientific research fields, such as psychology. In 
other words, not so much Husserl himself, but rather the phenomenological “move-
ment” he initiated prepared the ground for a comparative epistemology.
The first philosopher who explicitly fleshed out a philosophical research pro-
gramme that can be regarded as comparative epistemology strictu sensu was Gaston 
Bachelard (1884–1962). Although he joined the phenomenological movement (albeit 
at a relatively late stage in his career),1 his view of science, and of the relationship 
between science and everyday knowledge, is rather unique. He was the first philoso-
pher to divide his attention more or less equally between literature and science.
In this chapter devoted to the “antecedents” of comparative epistemology, four 
philosophical positions will be assessed explicitly as developments that cleared the 
field for a comparative approach: Kant, Hegel, Husserl (or rather, the phenomeno-
logical movement he inaugurated) and Bachelard.
Kant’s Critique of Judgement already amounts to a comparative epistemology 
of various possibilities for experiencing nature (such as physics, biology and art), 
although he still tends to identify knowledge exclusively with science. Hegel, how-
ever, explicitly regards art as a form of knowledge (“denkende Betrachtung”), and 
he believes that notably modern literature is an art form that may be seen as evolv-
ing in the direction of a more or less scholarly and intellectual discourse.
Phenomenology is the “next step”. In response to nineteenth-century positivism, 
this movement acknowledges the possibility of other knowledge forms besides sci-
ence, for example by rehabilitating the types of knowledge that structures our “life-
world”. Indeed, phenomenologists have indicated how science evolves from certain 
presuppositions that can be challenged, thus opening up avenues for alternative 
possibilities of perceiving and understanding our world.
Finally, special attention will be given to Gaston Bachelard. Although he did not 
yet use the term himself, he can be regarded as the true founder of comparative 
epistemology as a philosophical research field. In important respects, his works 
differs from Husserl’s. It is part of the “empirical turn” in philosophy, exemplifying 
1 It was only in his later work that Bachelard explicitly associated himself with phenomenology 
(1957, p. 2).
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a shift from abstract thinking to case studies, from deductive strategies (“more 
geometrico”) to more or less “inductive” forms of epistemological inquiry. Whereas 
Kant and Husserl raised important questions concerning the epistemological profile 
of science, they preferred to do so in abstract terms. They were reluctant to apply 
their views to real-life cases (rather, they preferred the use of fictitious cases or 
thought experiments). Historical detours undertaken in their work (such as in 
Kant’s introduction to the second edition of his first Critique and Husserl’s reflec-
tion on Galileo’s impact on the development of physics in his Crisis of the 
European Sciences, 1935/1977) are the exceptions that confirm the rule. And even 
these exceptions remain relatively abstract. Indeed, although Kant mentions some 
scientists by name in his brilliant description of the intellectual “revolution” from 
which the natural sciences originated (the “Umänderung der Denkart” that gave rise 
to modern, experimental research, B XVI), the analysis is still framed in fairly gen-
eral terms. Bachelard was the first to address epistemological issues concretely, 
namely by a close reading of the documents and files that constitute the archives of 
science and comparing them to other areas of culture, notably the belles-lettres.
2.2 Kant: Why a Third Critique?
According to Immanuel Kant, human beings inhabit not one, but two worlds: 
the world of causality (as studied by physics) and the world of freedom (as studied 
by ethics). Insofar as we belong to the natural world, our behaviour is determined by 
physical laws, but insofar as we are moral agents, we are responsible and free. 
Kant’s first two Critiques correspond to this basic demarcation. His first Critique, 
the Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1781, is devoted to our understanding of 
the world in terms of space, time and causality. His second Critique, the Critique 
of Practical Reason, published in 1788, is devoted to our understanding of ourselves 
in terms of freedom and obligation. The question now is: why did Kant venture to 
write a third Critique?
This question has been raised by various commentators and has been answered 
in various ways. Apparently, there is something about human beings on the one 
hand and nature on the other which the first two Critiques fail to address in a satis-
fying manner. But the third Critique is problematical for a number of reasons. 
Unlike the other two Critiques, the Critique of Judgement does not form a coherent 
whole. Rather, it is something of a hybrid. It consists of two parts, a Critique of 
Aesthetical Judgement and a Critique of Teleological Judgement and the connec-
tion between the two is – again – an issue that is far from clear and therefore has 
not failed to occupy the minds of a large number of Kant experts.
To my mind, Kant’s reasons for writing his third Critique basically come down 
to the following. In his first Critique, he had tried to assess the philosophical sig-
nificance of Newton’s physics as a paradigm for scientific research. It outlines the 
basic epistemological profile of this exemplary scientific way of experiencing the 
world. But Newton’s world is a world of inanimate objects and inanimate forces – 
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an abiotic universe so to speak. What is addressed by Newton is not nature as such, 
but rather nature insofar as it can be studied within the confines of this (tremen-
dously accurate and successful, but at the same time rather limited) approach. 
Subsequently, the second Critique is rigorously subject-oriented, emphatically 
emphasising that the subject as subject is not a part of nature. It deals with a subjec-
tive, mental struggle between abstract and unconditional moral obligations on the 
one hand and natural or psychological “drives” and “inclinations” on the other. 
Neither Critiques allows us to understand human beings as concrete living entities, 
existing within and interacting with a dynamic natural environment. In both 
Critiques, concrete human experiences with regard to nature as such, and with living 
nature in particular, seem to have no place. Notably, experiences concerning the beauty 
and sublimity of nature cannot be adequately addressed, neither in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, nor in the Critique of Practical Reason. They cannot be meaningfully 
articulated, neither in terms of the deterministic worldview of Newtonian physics, 
nor in terms of the anthropocentric worldview of deontological ethics. A third 
Critique was necessary in order to come to terms with “remainders” such as these, 
in order to address the epistemological profile of aesthetical and biological under-
standings of the world.
In other words, in the third Critique, certain non-physical forms of experiencing 
nature are being addressed (where “non-physical” basically means: falling outside 
the scope of the deterministic worldview of classical physics). The third Critique is 
devoted to possibilities of experiencing nature that cannot adequately be addressed 
within the range of Newtonian science (as a paradigmatic example of what should 
count as science). The aesthetical and the teleological, as dimensions of experience, 
are devoid of meaning from a purely physical perspective, but emphatically 
present in what a phenomenologist would call a life-world view of nature. 
These “leftovers”, these unarticulated dimensions of our experience of nature are 
 convincingly elaborated in artistic views of the natural world.
It is in this context that Kant fleshes out a critical analysis of two rather impor-
tant experiences of nature: the beautiful and the sublime. Nature in the form of the 
sublime – nature as “uncivilised” nature so to speak – evokes in us a rather complex 
experience: a mixture of anxiety (“Angst”) and respect (“Achtung”). According to 
Kant, sublime nature emerges as something that is both fascinating and frightening 
(like an ocean or a mountain range). It is beyond measure, as well as beyond good 
and evil. Sublime nature is nature as it is represented and experienced by poets 
(such as Shelley, cf. Chapter 1) and painters, rather than by natural scientists. In 
order for this experience of nature to be possible, however, in order for nature to 
emerge as sublime nature, certain conditions have to be fulfilled. Notably, it is only 
possible to experience nature in this manner if we feel sufficiently safe. In a purely 
natural world, a wilderness, nature will rather be experienced as frightening and 
threatening. A certain level of technological and cultural development has to be 
realised in order for the experience of sublime nature to emerge – I will come back 
to this issue in Chapter 7.
The experience of nature as beautiful likewise involves a particular relationship 
with nature. It refers to a humanised and anthropogenic nature, to a much greater 
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extent than the experience of sublimity does. In order for a natural entity, such as a 
garden or a flower, to appear as beautiful, human intervention and cultivation seem 
absolutely indispensable. The beautiful is natural and artificial at the same time. It 
is a highly cultivated form of nature. It not only refers to a particular kind of object, 
but also presupposes a particular kind of subject, a cultivated and civilised one – or 
rather, it presupposes a particular kind of subject–object relationship.
Kant emphasises that sublimity, for example, is not an attribute of nature itself. 
It is our way of experiencing nature, under certain circumstances (and the same 
goes for the apparent goal-orientedness of nature). Confronted with the grandeur of 
nature, we eventually experience our own uniqueness, precisely because we realise 
that we (unlike other life forms) are not completely embedded in the natural world, 
determined by physical and biological laws. We have the possibility, in principle at 
least, to formulate and realise values and objectives of our own. A congenial view 
on the relationship between man and nature had already been articulated by 
Sophocles in his tragedy Antigone. In a famous chorus, nature is represented as 
δει′νος – that is, frightening, overwhelming, grand, immense. Yet, mightier even 
than nature itself is man. Due to human technology and culture, nature (overwhelm-
ing as it is) will in the end be overcome by man. Thus, in the case of Sophocles, as 
well as in the case of Kant, the experience of sublimity eventually refers to man 
himself as the rational entity that is able to subdue the overwhelming magnitude 
and force of pristine nature, relying on the power of his intellect.
In short, the Critique of Judgment analyses intimate connections between 
 objectivity and subjectivity, between experiences of nature and certain forms of 
human understanding. And this is precisely what the third Critique has in common 
with the Critique of Pure Reason: the awareness of the omnipresence of human 
understanding in our experiences of “nature”. Nature is never experienced as such. 
We ourselves are present in our representations. Human understanding determines 
the epistemological conditions that allow nature to assume a certain appearance. 
The human agent constitutes particular forms of objectivity. We determine the ways 
in which nature is allowed to present itself to us and to enforce itself upon us. We 
determine the format, so to speak, that allows nature to emerge in a certain way. 
And this is as true for the artistic experience of “sublime” nature (the third Critique) 
as it is for the scientific experience of “objective” nature (the first Critique). 
According to Kant, we cannot say that art (by definition) is “subjective” and science 
“objective”. In both cases, “nature” is a synthesis of the subjective and the objective 
pole.
Kant’s Third Critique may therefore be regarded as a pivotal preliminary step 
towards the emergence of the philosophical horizon that allows comparative epis-
temology to position itself. Science and art are seen as two different possibilities 
for understanding nature. At times they will stimulate or reinforce one another, on 
other occasions they will conflict with one another, but a comparative epistemology 
of these two strategies for disclosing nature is bound to prove a rewarding exercise. 
At the same time it is clear that although Kant’s critical philosophy prepared the 
ground for a comparative epistemology, it is not yet a comparative epistemology 
in itself, because epistemological issues tend to be dealt with on an extremely 
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abstract level, but also because eventually he denies that art can really engender 
knowledge. Yet, he acknowledges that scientific knowledge is conditional, that the 
modern sciences are the result of the introduction of experimental methods, that is, 
of the basic idea that we can understand something (nature) by changing and 
manipulating it (albeit under controlled conditions). The experimental method basi-
cally claims that, whereas in former Aristotelian times it was believed that human 
understanding should adapt itself to (become adequate to) its objects, the modern 
mind has finally understood that, in order to entice nature to reveal her secrets, we 
must compel the objects of research to conform to – to become adequate to – our 
formats of experience. Comparative epistemology is basically in agreement with 
this view, but takes this line of thinking to its inevitable conclusion by saying that, 
if it is true that the use of experimental methods engenders particular forms of 
knowledge, than it is at least possible to expect that other strategies for disclosing 
nature may exist as well and may in their own way contribute to our knowledge of 
nature, revealing different aspects of nature or natural entities. This conclusion 
becomes inevitable as soon as we leave the abstract realm of Kantian thought and 
study research practices in more concrete and detailed manners. Comparative epis-
temology will then reveal how, in the context of laboratory research for example, 
the adaptation of nature to the formats of human understanding can be witnessed. 
Laboratory researchers will indeed modify nature to such an extent that the object 
will comply with our research strategies, with our methodologies, our contriv-
ances, our research apparatus. A laboratory is a basic framework that allows 
nature to present itself in a certain way. Human subjects (human ideas and arte-
facts) are emphatically present in experimental “observations”. Research facilities 
determine the ways in which nature becomes visible to us. Thus, the scientific way 
of experiencing nature relies to a significant extent on our experimental mind-set, 
our research technologies, our technological tools for disclosing nature. Outside 
laboratories, a completely different experience of nature may emerge.
In conclusion, comparative epistemology agrees with the basic implication of 
Kant’s critical writing, namely that science does not tell us something about nature 
as such. We cannot speak meaningfully about nature “in itself”, beyond (and inde-
pendent from) the possibilities of experiencing nature provided by human under-
standing (and the facilities we actually erect for making our experiences 
reproducible and more precise). Starting from this, however, comparative episte-
mology sets out to assess and clarify in much more concrete terms the epistemo-
logical profiles of the various ways we have at our disposal for disclosing nature, 
the various manners in which we allow nature to present itself. Kant himself calls 
attention to a number of scientific possibilities (notably Newtonian physics, in his 
first Critique) as well as certain artistic possibilities (such as the experiences of the 
beautiful and the sublime in his third Critique) for understanding nature, and here 
comparative epistemology will follow in his footsteps. But these epistemological 
possibilities can be fleshed out in much more detailed ways, confronting us with 
various possibilities (either promising or problematic) for understanding nature. In 
the life-world, outside our laboratories, outside the reach of “experimental reason” 
so to speak, nature may present itself to us in a completely different manner than 
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in an experimental context. But these “outdoor” experiences can be analysed in a 
more or less systematic manner as well. Under various conditions, nature may 
assume completely different aspects, and these aspects, together with the epistemo-
logical conditions that evoke them, will be described and critically assessed by a 
comparative epistemology.
2.3 Comparative Dialectics
Another important “antecedent” of comparative epistemology is the work of Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) who begins his Lectures on Aesthetics 
(1970/1986) with asking the question whether poetry and other art forms genuinely 
deserve to be a subject matter for philosophical reflection at all. At first glance, he 
argues, in comparison to science, art clearly seems deficient. It is an amusing, but 
trivial play, relying on fancifulness and capriciousness. Moreover, art is about appear-
ances, rather than about the real. Yet, Hegel argues, although such verdicts may apply 
to certain forms of art, they do not pertain to true art. For there is knowledge in true 
art. And indeed, art is about appearances, but this should rather be taken in a positive 
sense: poems, novels and paintings allow the human world to appear. The problem 
is not that we are dealing with appearances. The question rather is whether the way 
in which art allows the world to appear can be regarded as truthful (“wahrhaft”). 
According to Hegel, art must be taken quite seriously in this respect. Her objective is 
to articulate our deepest insights, our highest interests and truths (1970/1986, I, p. 21). 
True art never merely imitates the natural world. Poets and painters (to the extent that 
they are true artists) never merely try to represent a particular landscape or object. 
Rather, the focus is on the way in which they (or we) perceive and experience this 
landscape, the thoughts and moods a landscape evokes in them (or us). In art, the 
world always appears as it is experienced by human subjects under certain historical 
and cultural conditions. Art does not imitate nature, but invites us to consider and 
reflect on nature.2 True art really belongs to the realm of thought. Yet, in the case of 
art, a philosophical reading more or less has to actively recover this conceptual 
dimension, embedded in detailed descriptions of things, feelings and ideas.
The objective of art is neither merely to imitate, nor merely to articulate so-called 
hidden feelings. Although it is true that artists (notably poets and novelists) will 
often explore the less accessible dimensions of human experience, they do not do 
so merely to show that nihil humani a me alienum puto (“nothing human is strange 
to me”). Rather, their labour is directed towards furthering human self-understand-
ing. We can learn something from art. Not only in the trivial sense that there is a 
moral to every story (“fabula docet”), but rather in the sense that a certain truth 
about human existence is revealed. Art in general, but notably dramatic literature, 
is devoted to trying to reconcile apparently irreconcilable conflicts (such as the 
conflict between the natural and the spiritual, or between individual freedom and 
2 “Die Kunst lädt uns zur denkenden Betrachtung ein” (1986, I, p. 26).
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the power of the state). There is truth in literature, and in art in general, but in art 
(as compared to philosophy or science) this truth becomes visible in a rather con-
crete fashion. Literature is in many ways a special form of art. It is that art form that 
has begun to move away from a purely artistic perspective. It is an intermediary 
form that is already evolving in the direction of more scholarly and intellectual 
forms of writing (1970/1986, III, p. 234).
In saying this, Hegel seems to anticipate the way the modern novel will develop 
in the nineteenth century when, according to Zola and others, novel-writing 
becomes an experimental practice more or less comparable to science (cf. 
Chapter 5). Yet, Hegel’s lecture on aesthetics is backward-looking. It is an 
immense retrospect that begins with the “symbolic” era (art in Egypt, India and 
Iran), proceeding with classic art (art in ancient Greece) and then moving on to 
romantic art (art in early-modern Europe), reaching its completion with a thorough 
assessment of the significance of the “dramatic” work of art. The novel is more or 
less absent from Hegel’s retrospect. And this explains why the truth embedded in 
most of the dramatic works of art mentioned by Hegel is of an ethical and political, 
rather than of an epistemological nature. These dramas are devoted to the issue of 
how to harmonize, in concrete situations, apparently irreconcilable moral forces. 
For Hegel, literary dramas contain important philosophical insights. Sentences 
taken from dramatic authors (such as Sophocles) are treated by Hegel with the same 
amount of respect as the profound sayings of pre-Socratic philosophers are handled 
by Heidegger. They are food for thought, but notably on the ethical level.
For Hegel, the exemplification of modern dramatic art is Goethe’s Faust, and in 
this play the ethical and the epistemological dimension seem to be equally impor-
tant. It is a play about ethics (the will to act, the desire to experience), but at the 
same time it is a play about knowledge (the will to know). Faust is subject to a 
mid-life crisis. He masters all the disciplines of his era, only to realise that the 
dreary and bookish forms of knowledge in which he excels do not provide any 
insight whatsoever concerning the real living world outdoors. In order to explore 
the great inviting world beyond the confines of his scholarly cell, his camera 
obscura so to speak, the scholar has to be ready to accept the use of more dangerous 
forms of research, such as the “Faustian” (or “Mephistophelean”) experimental 
method that was beginning to emerge as a generic research method exactly at that 
time. Faust is, no doubt, one of the most intellectual works of art, a scholarly explo-
ration of the world in rhyme. But it is backward-looking, a grand retrospect, 
devoted more to ancient research practices (such as alchemy) than to modern ones, 
and devoted more to the humanities than to science. Its counterpart, Frankenstein 
by Mary Shelley, is forward-looking, devoted to the sciences rather than to the 
humanities. Moreover, and this is no coincidence, it is not a drama but a novel. One 
could say that the novel is the literary counterpart of experimental science, more or 
less as the historical drama is the literary counterpart of philosophical idealism. 
Indeed, comparative epistemology takes off where Hegel’s idealism came to a stop. 
It is a sequel to his work. His epistemological reflection on science and literature 
ended with Faust [1808]. Comparative epistemological reflection begins with 
Frankenstein [1918].
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2.4 Phenomenology: Science and its Discontents
Today, perhaps even more so than in the times of Kant, it is beyond doubt that 
experimental research is an extremely fertile, reliable, effective and productive 
research strategy. It basically consists of carefully determining the conditions under 
which nature is to be observed and studied. Moreover, experimentation entails 
“active” observation in the sense that, in an experimental setting, modification pre-
cedes perception. Experimenters use their “hands” (in combination with protheses 
of various kinds) before they use their “eyes” (again supported by various kinds of 
equipment). Indeed, in most cases, the words “hands” and “eyes” must be under-
stood as a figurative way of speaking in the sense that, rather than physically using 
their hands and eyes, experimental researchers will preferably rely as much as pos-
sible on sophisticated contrivances for modifying and observing (or rather measur-
ing) nature. Instead of looking at nature with the naked eye and interacting with 
nature with bare hands, researchers will rely on instruments that will generate quan-
titative data, lending themselves to mathematical analysis.
This way of experiencing nature, productive and reliable as it is, is not without 
certain adverse effects, however. There is a chronic complaint of long standing, 
articulated in literary as well as in philosophical (notably phenomenological) 
sources that the experimental approach basically consists of violating the phenom-
ena, of forcing them into certain rigid and pre-structured research formats. Other, 
softer, more gentle, less invasive skills must sometimes be applied if we want to 
allow nature to emerge in a more truthful manner, producing what Goethe referred 
to as “soft” rather than “hard” data (“sanfte Empirie”). Examples of such less eva-
sive skills can be found in literary documents. Like experimental researchers, liter-
ary authors use various techniques for allowing natural phenomena to become 
visible and recognisable to us in a plausible and convincing manner. The world as 
evoked by literary documents may appear as more “real”, more authentic than the 
world of science. The art of writing novels and other literary documents entails a 
repertoire of techniques – techniques of “finesse”. In literary documents, natural 
entities and their behaviours may be perceived and interpreted with precision, albeit 
a different kind of precision than we are likely to encounter in scientific sources.
An interesting example of such a “soft” approach to nature is provided by Jean-
Jacques Rousseau in his Reveries of a Solitary Wanderer (1782/1965). Here he 
describes how, during his extended walks on the island of St. Pierre in Lac de 
Bienne, he set out to map the plant life flourishing on his favorite sites, collecting 
and identifying specimens, studying the details of vegetable life in a systematic, but 
non-violent way: an “innocent” occupation, a “disinterested” form of contemplation. 
Whereas the study of minerals or animals would involve equipment and (in the case 
of research animals) even violence and pain, the systematic analysis of plant life 
provides peace, quiet and meditation, as we encounter them in their own natural 
environment. It produces as well as presupposes a certain type of human being, 
someone who has given up societal interaction and societal ambitions for a solitary 
existence of self-reflection. I will come back to this example in Chapter 7.
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A similar “soft” attitude, a similar reluctance to inflict harm, can be encountered 
in descriptions of Mendel’s work who, rather than questioning nature in an aggres-
sive manner, is said to have applied more intricate skills, painstaking brushwork, 
caressing rather than torturing nature, carefully moving his paintbrush among the 
delicate petals in order to fertilize his plants, proving that nature reveals her secrets 
when she is stroked (Mawer 1998, p. 61). His work constitutes an intermediate 
stage between horticulture and biotechnology – from which it is still far removed. 
I will come back to this example in Chapter 9.
The idea that research violates nature is notably triggered by animal research. 
From a phenomenological perspective, it seems that the “animality” of animals is 
erased and obscured by experimental analysis. Organisms are violated when being 
dissected, classified or experimented upon. They cease to exist as living organisms, 
dwelling in a world of their own. They are modified, transformed into a mecha-
nism, an object of research and will no doubt respond by behaving accordingly. 
Physiologists “prove” that animals are machines by actively reducing them to a 
special kind of research apparatus. A similar criticism can be encountered in some 
literary documents on animal research. The basic objective of this volume is to rec-
ognize the epistemological significance of this dispute, over and beyond its merely 
ethical dimension. Phenomenologists have articulated the epistemological concerns 
involved in this quite pointedly.
Phenomenology is a philosophical genre that explicitly questions whether 
experimental research allows us to produce an authentic and truthful experience of 
nature. In his famous lecture on the “crisis” of science, Husserl (1935/1977) already 
questioned the meaning of scientific research for concrete human experiences in the 
life-world. The term “crisis” does not refer to the achievements of the sciences as 
such, but rather to their significance for human existence. In earlier writings 
Husserl had articulated the phenomenological desire to return to “the things them-
selves”, to restore our original experience of them, and this ambitious project was 
taken up by a considerable number of followers. Phenomenology became the philo-
sophical movement par excellence that developed a critical view towards the 
experimental sciences and their methods. But phenomenologists also tried to 
develop epistemological alternatives. Other forms and formats of experience were 
developed or rehabilitated, notably those that wanted to break away from the 
“impoverished” and “reduced” ways in which reality was allowed to emerge within 
the confines of laboratory knowledge. Criticism of the various reductionistic and 
deterministic tendencies within laboratory science became a favourite theme of 
phenomenological writings.
Thus, besides criticising (laboratory) science, phenomenology had a positive 
ambition as well. It wanted to develop alternative methods for analysing and clari-
fying authentic experiences of natural or psychic phenomena. Husserl himself 
engaged in this kind of research on a very abstract level, but some of his followers 
began to analyse more concrete possibilities of experience. And in order to elabo-
rate and articulate concrete experiences in the life-world (i.e. the world outside 
laboratories) a considerable number of phenomenologists preferably relied on liter-
ary sources. Novels and poems were seen as efforts to give voice to concrete and 
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authentic life-world experiences in a fairly accurate manner. They were regarded as 
valuable starting points for phenomenological analysis. Literary writers, novelists 
and poets were regarded as voices that prepared the way and allowed other aspects 
of nature to emerge than the restricted forms of objectivity acknowledged and 
accepted in laboratory settings.
Like other phenomenologists, the Dutch psychologist Jan Hendrik Van den Berg 
(1952/1963) was suspicious of the results of laboratory research with animals. He 
argued, for example, that Pavlov’s research strategies resulted in a rather impover-
ished and (therefore) unreliable view of what it means to be a dog. According to 
Van den Berg, Pavlov’s views on dogs’ behaviour were valid only insofar as the 
research animals were kept within the confines of a laboratory setting and submit-
ted to the conditions of laboratory life. Pavlov was successful in establishing con-
ditioned reflexes simply because his laboratory settings forced animals to behave 
in a stereotypical and predictable manner. Outside the laboratory, completely dif-
ferent patterns of behaviour would emerge, and extrapolation of research findings 
acquired in laboratory settings to the real, extramural world was extremely prob-
lematic. The dubious nature of Pavlov’s knowledge claims became painfully clear 
when one day his laboratory premises in St. Petersburg were flooded by water from 
the river Neva. The research animals had to be evacuated. Human strategies of 
behavioural control were temporarily suspended by the overwhelming force of 
(“δει′νος”) nature. As a result of this event – that could be interpreted as a “phe-
nomenological experiment” – the laboratory dogs spontaneously “forgot” their 
conditional reflexes. The outcomes of months of painstaking conditioning where 
literally washed away by this exposure to these unforeseen conditions. According 
to Van den Berg, the outside world, enforcing itself upon the laboratory in the form 
of a river flooding, literally refuted and disproved the external validity of laboratory 
knowledge.
Yet, the phenomenological movement did not restrict itself to merely criticising 
science. Besides pointing out some of the methodological weaknesses of main-
stream experimental animal research, phenomenologists tried to work out alternative 
programmes for animal research and to initiate a phenomenological movement 
within biology. The intimate patterns of interaction between scientific observers and 
research animals that evolved in the context of these phenomenological research 
practices were more reminiscent of everyday interactions between humans and their 
pets than between mainstream experimentalists and their laboratory animals. Some 
of the phenomenologists used literary techniques to describe animal behaviour and 
their writings were often more congenial to literary documents than to mainstream 
laboratory reports. Their data were often anecdotal rather than experimental. The 
focus was on the ways in which animals experience, respond to and interact with 
their Umwelt. In terms of style these phenomenological research documents often 
seemed to convey a “literary” and informal atmosphere.
In the Netherlands, phenomenological biology was represented by authors like 
J.A. Bierens de Haan and F.J.J. Buytendijk, who were notably active in the field of 
ethology. Unlike biology proper, phenomenological biology amounted to the anal-
ysis of animal subjectivity (Bierens de Haan 1940). It tried to understand animal 
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behaviour “from within”, so to speak. As the possibility of verbal communication 
with animals is denied to us, the phenomenologist had to rely on studying animal 
behaviour, but as an expression of the animal’s internal subjective life. The phe-
nomenologist tried to interpret animal behaviour (either under natural or experi-
mental conditions) in such a way that he placed himself as much as possible in the 
animal’s position. Empathy and imagination were important tools for gaining 
access to the animal’s world. Animal phenomenology came to an end when 
Tinbergen and others “normalised” the study of animal behaviour and transformed 
it into a “legitimate scientific discipline”, a “respectable” science (Burkhardt 1997, 
pp. 1, 10). According to Tinbergen, animal subjectivity was not really open to 
experimentation. Thus, in order to place ethology on a more scientific footing, a 
shift was indispensable from subjectivity to behaviour, from interpretation to “nor-
mal” experimental science (i.e. experimentation under strict conditions). Intense 
communication between researcher and research animal gave way to detached 
observation. Biologists from now on refused to think of animals in terms of subjects 
of experience. As a consequence, the effort to understand animals from within, by 
means of anecdotal observation and “soft” emphatic methods and skills, was more 
or less removed from the realm of science and pushed back into the world of 
belles-lettres, although more recently, scientific authors have rediscovered and 
rehabilitated the possibility and significance of more interactive forms of animal 
research, notably in the case of primates.
An interesting example of an extensive and systematic but (to a certain extent at 
least) phenomenological description of the life and intelligence of bees is the book 
La vie des abeilles [The Life of the Bees] (1901) by the Belgian playwright Maurice 
Maeterlinck (1862–1949), who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1911. In 1907 
he published a book that is interesting for similar reasons, on the “intelligence” of 
flowers. Interestingly, these documents, usually regarded as “literature”, are remark-
ably similar to some of the later works of Darwin – a much more “unsuspected” 
source. Maeterlinck’s books convey an atmosphere quite similar to that of Charles 
Darwin’s study concerning the intelligence and industry of earthworms (1881).
2.5  Gaston Bachelard: Preparing the Ground 
for a Comparative Epistemology
Gaston Bachelard occupies a unique position in continental philosophy. Unlike main-
stream phenomenologists, he is interested in chemistry as his favourite research field 
rather than, for instance, human or animal psychology. Moreover, science as such 
fascinates him, its rigorous methodology greatly appeals to him, and he believes it is 
both legitimate and inevitable that scientists leave the world of everyday experience 
behind them in order to retire into the artificial environment of a laboratory setting. 
Rather than trying to rehabilitate life-world experiences as more truthful and authen-
tic than the “reductionistic” experiences of laboratory science, he firmly contends that 
an epistemological rupture inevitably separates the scientific style of thought from 
2.5 Gaston Bachelard: Preparing the Ground for a Comparative Epistemology 39
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
40 2 Antecedents: Comparative Epistemology as an Outcome
pre-scientific intuitions and the anecdotal empiricism of everyday existence. For 
Bachelard, the fact that science involves research under rigidly controlled conditions 
is not a reason for uneasiness or criticism, but rather something which he regards as 
positive and necessary (1938/1947). At the same time, he is intrigued by the structure 
of other forms of experience as well, and this induces him to gradually transform his 
research program from an historical epistemology of science (notably chemistry) to 
a comparative epistemology of incommensurable discourse forms.
In various writings, Bachelard points out that, whereas scientific knowledge 
results from a highly rational, methodical and disciplined way of looking at the 
world, more everyday and intuitive forms of knowledge are dominated by imagina-
tion. And this explains why literary documents are so important when it comes to 
elucidating everyday views. The images that are vaguely present in everyday set-
tings, are elaborated and fleshed out by literary authors in more precise and articu-
late ways. It is his aim to analyse the basic structures of both scientific (quantitative 
and formal) and pre-scientific (more or less imaginary) formats of experience. In other 
words, Bachelard is not only interested in the world of scientists, but also in works 
of literature. Like many phenomenologists, Bachelard regards literary authors as 
representatives or spokespersons par excellence of the way in which we perceive 
and experience the world under “pre-scientific” conditions, outside laboratories. 
Thus, literary sources can help us to understand the epistemological profile of eve-
ryday experience in comparison to the epistemological profile of science.
Because of his twofold objective, his view on the relationship between science 
and literature remains ambiguous. Initially, in an impressive series of publications, 
he carefully analyses and assesses the epistemological profile of experimental sci-
ence, notably chemistry. His aim is to reconstruct as concretely as possible the 
basic logic guiding experimental inquiry. Science emerges in his writings as a way 
of looking at and interacting with nature sui generis. According to Bachelard, the 
first and foremost challenge of scientists is to break away from pre-scientific views. 
This is a major task that in an exemplary manner imposed itself on scientific pio-
neers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but will continue to recur 
in scientific biographies. We could regard Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, analysed 
in Chapter 1, as a classical narrative of such an epistemological rupture, irrevocably 
changing the course of an individual’s life, a description of a violent and traumatic 
experience. After his conversion, Frankenstein will never again be able to identify 
himself with artistic and pre-scientific experiences of nature.
Gradually, however, Bachelard became more and more interested in the faculty 
of imagination, initially as a “disturbing” factor, an epistemological nuisance, but 
eventually as something of interest in its own right. In a second series of studies he 
analyses closely the ways in which literary documents address the material world 
(the world of chemistry). As a kind of complementary programme, so to speak, he 
sets out to analyse artistic ways of looking at and interacting with the elements. He 
discovers that, whereas science is guided by formal styles of thinking, the non-
scientific mind relies primarily on imagination and association.
According to Bachelard, the starting point for a philosophical analysis of imagi-
nation is a “Copernican revolution” similar to the one presented by Kant in his 
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Critique of Pure Reason. Initially, we tend to believe than imagination is a mental 
function that uses observations as its “raw material”. Observation (the accumulation 
of sense data) comes first, and on the basis of these observations we “use” our imagi-
native faculty in order to change and modify these observations. According to 
Bachelard, however, we have to drastically reverse this scheme. Imagination comes 
first. It allows us to structure our observations, to make sense of the world around 
us. It is at the heart of cognitive processes that enable us to perceive and think about 
the world. That is why becoming a scientist involves a true mental conversion, an 
effort on the part of the subject to liberate himself from the sway of imagination, the 
logic of imagination, firmly embedded in our cultures and our minds. Thus, the term 
“imagination” does not refer to the process of modifying and combining images that 
are borrowed from sense data. Rather, imagination starts from a limited number of 
basic images (“archetypes”) that logically precede our everyday perceptions. They 
are wired into our cognitive system as a priori images so to speak.3
The history of science reveals that a number of basic images tend to guide and 
pre-structure the way in which we perceive the world. These basic, “elementary” 
images are associated with the four elements (earth, water, air, and fire) out of 
which, according to ancient, medieval and early modern thinking, the world is 
composed. Examples of basic images associated with the elements of earth are the 
rock, the vein and the cave (Bachelard 1948a,b). Whereas the rock stands for 
robustness and solidity (solid grounds), the concept of the “vein” indicates that we 
tend to experience the earth as a huge living maternal body in which matter is 
slowly moving and circulating. Finally, the concept of the cave underscores the 
association of earth with obscurity and lack of mobility – an association on which 
Plato’s famous simile clearly builds.
Examples of fundamental images associated with water (1942/1964) are the 
clear stream, the profound lake and the immense waving ocean, but also the image 
of discovering new grounds, new worlds, breaking away from entrenched posi-
tions. Melville’s novel Moby-Dick, which we will discuss in Chapter 4, can be 
regarded as a classic elaboration of this archetypical vision of the ocean.
Basic images associated with air (1943) are blue or cloudy skies, gentle or stormy 
winds, as well as experiences of ascending, falling and flying, of freedom and 
unprecedented (but hazardous and technology-dependent) forms of mobility (cf. the 
Icarus myth). These archetypical experiences will be addressed in Chapter 10.
Finally, images associated with fire are purity, excitement, but also sexuality. 
This explains why early accounts of electricity abound with erotic associations and 
images. The strongest image associated with fire, however, is the image of the 
explosion. And this, the risk of explosion, is what lay people find both fascinating 
and frightening about chemistry, the science that uses fire in order to force the other 
elements to reveal their secrets.
These elementary images not only dominate (albeit in unconscious ways) eve-
ryday experience, but also ancient, medieval and early modern science, notably 
3 “Les images imaginées sont des sublimations des archétypes plutôt que des reproductions de la 
réalité” (1948a, p. 4).
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alchemy. Poets and novelist, as well as alchemists, have articulated them endlessly in 
countless varieties. In the eighteenth century, Bachelard argues, scientists finally man-
aged to free themselves from the pernicious influence of these elementary images. 
The imaginary logic of alchemy was finally repressed and a truly scientific view of 
the world was finally established. Yet, as Bachelard has demonstrated in his writ-
ings, in the unconscious dimensions of modern scientific practices, these hidden 
associations remain more or less active. The desperate struggle of scientific chem-
istry against alchemy still continues. Initially, Bachelard seems to put all of his 
epistemological and psychoanalytical equipment in its service. Gradually, however, 
his commitment with “objectivism” decreases, and Bachelard becomes more and 
more interested in imagination as a positive phenomenon. His epistemology 
becomes comparative rather than ascetic.
La psychanalyse du feu (“The psychoanalysis of fire”) is an important highlight 
in his oeuvre. In this essay, Bachelard (1938/1949) emphatically emphasises that 
science, in order to acquire objective knowledge, should break away from the 
“immediate” objects of pre-scientific, everyday knowledge – notably fire. Scientists 
should not study nature as it presents itself to us, but rather under conditions scien-
tists can control. Whereas poets and alchemists as well as lay people are fascinated 
by fire as an elementary phenomenon, it is not really a legitimate object for scien-
tific research. In order to study “fire”, scientists will redefine it in terms of combus-
tion, corrosion and others chemical or physical processes and finally the “immediate” 
phenomenon of fire will be successfully reduced to a set of abstract chemical for-
mulae that can no longer be associated with the time-old images connected with 
fire (such as the image of the rural family watching the flames in the fireside while 
being engaged in an endless exchange of fairy-tales and similar narratives). In order 
to become scientific and objective, Bachelard argues, we have to free ourselves 
from the seductive and intimate images that have persistently deformed the under-
standing of so many previous generations of researchers. Thus, science and poetry 
are seen as antagonistic forces. Poems and stories will continuously reinforce and 
rehabilitate “fireside” images, while an “iconoclastic” scientific approach will want 
to do away with them. Science and literature are bound to move in opposite direc-
tions.4 The best a philosopher can hope for is to see them as complementary ways 
of looking at the world. That is why Bachelard does not hesitate to speak of a “psy-
choanalysis” of fire. The ancient images have to be left behind in the course of an 
epistemological intervention: “Wo Es war soll Ich werden”. The scientific ego has 
to free itself from unconscious hindrances and unscientific attachments and beliefs. 
Bachelard sees it as his task to act as a kind of therapist, guiding scientific experi-
ence towards the promising road of “pure”, uninhibited science.5
Elsewhere he describes science and imagination as two intersecting axes, but at 
this point in his career he still regards it as his basic objective to minimise the sway 
4 “Les axes de la poésie et de la science sont d’abord inverses. Tout ce que peut espérer la philoso-
phie, c’est de render la poésie et la science complémentaires” (1938/1949, p. 10).
5 “Canaliser l’expérience dans une voie scientifique” (p. 12).
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of imagination, and to maximise the level of objectivity in science. For every scientific 
author a “diagnosis” can be formulated in terms of these two axes (p. 154). Some 
authors are still under the spell of the unconscious dimensions and the unresolved 
traumas of their field – again, we could point to Victor Frankenstein as an example 
of such a case. They will become hopelessly confused when it comes to working 
out the objective content of their research. They are perfect candidates for an epis-
temological psychotherapy. The scientific ego has to learn to be on its guard against 
alluring images and intuitions. Before long, they will develop into epistemological 
inhibitions blocking the road towards objective knowledge, or, as in Frankenstein’s 
case, giving rise to grand conjectures, not sufficiently supported by evidence.6 
According to Bachelard, science is basically iconoclastic. A demarcation has to be 
introduced between the world of poetry and the world of science. But in order to 
learn how to defend ourselves against the sway of imagination, we have to study it 
as closely as possible – just as Freud and Jung have studied the unconscious in 
order to allow the ego to emancipate itself from its influences. What are the basic 
images and intuitions associated with fire that have managed to confuse even the 
most “enlightened” minds?7 Indeed, according to Bachelard, there is an alchemist 
alter-ego hiding in the unconscious of every scientific ego, in the mind of every 
engineer (p. 13). Scientists and engineers are faced with the task of destroying the 
unscientific convictions that are still slumbering in their minds; they have to subject 
themselves to permanent self-criticism.
This is so to speak the “manifest” or “conscious” objective of Bachelard’s work. 
Yet, at a certain point, when he sets out to analyse these hidden images and convic-
tions it soon becomes clear that he finds them much more fascinating than he is will-
ing to confess. His essay on the Psychoanalysis of fire gradually moves away from 
its objectivistic starting point, as its author becomes increasingly preoccupied – not 
only in a negative (i.e. critical) manner – with the basic imaged associated with the 
element of fire. Notably, alchemy is bound to become a lifelong fascination. In short, 
a philosopher of science (who initially uses the techniques and concepts of psychoa-
nalysis in order to liberate the scientific ego from the fascinations of the past) 
becomes increasingly fascinated by the temptations of the Es. His work is like that of 
a moral theologian who becomes somewhat too preoccupied with describing and 
analysing the various forms of illicit erotic behaviour. The maxim Wo Es war soll Ich 
werden is eventually renounced. Iconoclasm and imagination are finally allowed to 
evolve as complementary epistemological tracks. Gradually, both axes become 
equally important. Eventually, Bachelard develops a profound and lifelong interest in 
the alchemist tradition for more than only diagnostic reasons – it becomes something 
of a fascination in its own right – he no longer regards it as an intellectual perversity.
6 “Les intuitions du feu sont des obstacles épistémologiques” (p. 121).
7 Bachelard points to the epistemological difference between Marat and Lavoisier. Whereas the 
latter truly thinks in a scientific way, the former is still a pre-scientific mind, beset with uncon-
scious, animistic ideas. That is why Lavoisier succeeds as a chemist, whereas Marat hopelessly 
fails in this profession. Out of frustration, he turns to politics and takes his revenge. Due to Marat, 
Lavoisier ends his life under the guillotine.
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This becomes increasingly apparent in subsequent essays devoted to the 
“elementary” imagination, of which Psychoanalysis of fire was intended to be 
the first part. Although these subsequent books were planned as a psychoanaly-
sis of air, water and earth, the term “psychoanalysis” is suddenly dropped from 
the title. On the first pages of Bachelard’s second essay in this series, dealing 
with basic images associated with the element water and published 4 years after 
his essay on fire, it is clear that his attitude towards imagination has changed. 
Apparently, during the 4 years that separate both publications, his basic objec-
tive has become less partisan. The ultimate goal of his program becomes hesitant 
and unclear. Instead of “A Psychoanalysis of Water”, he now opts for a more 
neutral title, namely L’eau et les rêves (“Water and Its Dreams”, 1942/1964). 
And this, of course, is not a trivial change. How can a rationalist philosopher 
spend so many pages on illusions, articulated in poems and novels on streams, 
lakes and oceans? The answer is that he has become aware of the fact that these 
images of water are more than just illusions. They structure our perceptions, 
they constitute our experiences. Although it is still his ultimate objective to 
become a rationalist, he confesses that the progress he made with regard to water 
is limited compared to what he had managed to achieve with regard to fire.8 
Through the uncanny imaginings of literary authors such as Edgar Allan Poe, he 
has become fascinated by these elementary images as a positive phenomenon, as 
something indispensable, a common cognitive heritage. In other words, Bachelard 
inadvertently moves away from a psychotherapy of science to a comparative 
epistemology, where literary representations of the fluid dimensions of reality 
are eventually seen as different, but not necessarily as deficient, compared to 
scientific views. Although The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket, 
for instance, may be regarded as quite implausible from a scientific perspective, 
there is a different kind of truth in it. Poe is an explorer of, a “genius” of the 
imagination (p. 63). His monotonous work is a “poetical chemistry”, a literary 
analysis of “heavy” water (p. 64).
L’air et les songes (“The Air and Its Dreams”, 1943) simply seems to have 
grown out of Bachelard’s fascination with images associated with air. It deals with 
basic experiences connected with this element such as mobility, ascension and fall. 
And the same goes for his two-volume essay on the elementary images connected 
with the earth. No longer are we told that these wonderful images, carefully col-
lected and analysed by Bachelard, are to be regarded as epistemological hindrances. 
Does he still regard the workings of the imagination as an epistemological block-
ade? The answer is No. Gradually, Bachelard has come to see the experimental 
view on the one hand and the imaginary view on the other as complementary ways 
of perceiving and constructing a world. Although they are incommensurable and 
mutually challenging one another, they are both interesting, as well as indispensa-
ble, ways of coming to terms with the real.
8 “La sincérité nous oblige à confesser que nous n’avons pas réussi le même redressement à l’égard 
du eau” (1942/1964, p. 10).
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So far we only looked at the elementary images as analysed by Bachelard. No 
less important are the basic images associated with the sciences themselves. 
According to Bachelard, a limited number of basic images (“archetypes”), together 
with the stereotypical expectations attached to them, determine the ways in which 
literary writers as well as lay audiences are likely to think about and respond to 
science. As was already indicated, the basic image or archetype associated with 
chemistry is the explosion. In literary documents (or movies) where chemistry or 
chemists play a role, a dramatic explosion is likely to occur sooner or later. The 
explosion is what both fascinates and frightens the non-scientific mind, for exam-
ple, in the case of the adolescent pupil who for the first time is exposed to a chemi-
cal demonstration. Gradually, scientists will train themselves into thinking that an 
explosion is simply one particular way for substances to interact, no more interest-
ing than, for example, the less spectacular process of corrosion.
The archetype of biology is the monster. The monster-type is the concrete mate-
rialisation of nature as frightening and overwhelming – in one word: δεινος– and 
lay audiences expect that science is driven by the basic desire to come to terms with 
the monstrous, the spectacular, the sublime. The most obvious exemplification of 
the biological monster is the dinosaur (deinos-saurus), a term coined by Richard 
Owen in 1840. It illustrates what lay people tend to find particularly fascinating 
about palaeontology: the discovery and excavation of enormous monstrous remains 
and, eventually, the visual reconstruction – preferably in full colour and large as 
life – of the extinguished monster.9 The same archetype can also materialize, how-
ever, into the micro-monsters of molecular biology. A more modern version of the 
monster is the genetically modified entity that sooner of later is expected to escape 
from the laboratory in order to become a serious threat to the outside world, as 
containment will prove impossible.
If Bachelard is right, the same seductiveness of the sublime “Leviathan” that 
inspired Melville to write his novel Moby-Dick (and made him accuse scientific 
authors of failing to capture the whale’s alluring and stupefying grandness) must be 
the ultimate source of inspiration that also motivated other novelists to write mon-
ster novels, such as Jules Verne’s Voyage to the Centre of the Earth (1864) – which 
will be discussed in Chapter 10 – Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Lost World (1912/1981) – 
not the title of a book, but rather the title of a whole genre – and, more recently, 
Michael Crichton’s Jurassic Park (1990/1991). Indeed, lay audiences expect biolo-
gists to produce monsters. And sometimes, of course, these expectations are 
 “confirmed”. Not, perhaps, in a way that is statistically significant, but then the lay 
mind tends to rely on an anecdotal rather than on a probabilistic manner of thinking. 
One spectacular confirmation may suffice to revivify the archetypical expectation 
for years to come.
According to Bachelard, the classical articulation of the monster-archetype is, 
of course, Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein (1818/1831). For Bachelard, this 
novel indicates the level of estrangement that already had begun to separate the 
9 According to Stephen Jay Gould, dinosaurs are interesting because they are “big, fierce, and 
extinct – in other words, alluringly scary, but sufficiently safe” (1996, p. 223).
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life sciences from their cultural environment at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. Experimental scientists had become professionals or science-workers 
rather than “amateurs” or gentleman-scientists, had begun to withdraw into labo-
ratories, where they spent long hours working with strange apparatus, thus black-
boxing the procedures and technologies of science. Indeed, the information Mary 
Shelley provides her readers concerning what actually goes on in Victor Frankenstein’s 
laboratory is remarkably sparse. To her, the laboratory is terra incognita. Her tal-
ent is not to describe and analyse the workings of laboratory life, but rather to 
articulate, in an extremely careful and convincing manner, the emotional responses 
this type of work evokes among lay audiences.
Bachelard’s work is an important source of inspiration for a comparative episte-
mology in the sense that he fleshes out in great detail the epistemological profile of 
two ways of framing our experience of nature, namely experimental science and 
literary imagination.10 What is remarkable and somewhat unsettling, however, is 
the fact that these two dimensions of Bachelard’s work, namely his epistemological 
assessment of science on the one hand and of artistic imagination on the other, are 
never really brought together. They exist side by side, as it were, as independent 
lines of research, as independent “fascinations”. Whereas his ego is interested in the 
epistemology and logic of experimental science, his alter ego explores the forgotten 
archives of elementary imagination. Whereas his early work is predominantly 
devoted to science, his later work mostly deals with artistic imagination. Some of 
his books emphasise the epistemological rupture that inevitably constitutes the 
beginning of truly scientific work, while others describe the inevitability and crea-
tivity of “elementary” imagination. None of his books endeavours to really connect 
them with one another. In other words, although his work prepares the ground for 
a comparative epistemology, he somehow hesitates to take the final step by explic-
itly staging a confrontation between these two modes of perceiving and interacting 
with the natural world.
Moreover, his world remains for the larger part an abiotic environment. 
Bachelard writes about the four elements (fire, earth, water, and air) as well as 
about the dimensions and experiences of space. That is, his epistemology prefera-
bly assesses the epistemological profile of chemistry and physics. His world is not 
completely lifeless, of course. In the context of the images of water, for example, 
he discusses the meaning of the swan (1942/1964, p. 50 ff.), while in the context of 
images associated with earth, attention is given to vegetation and the phenomenon 
of taking root (1948, p. 290 ff.). Finally, in the context of the experience of immen-
sity, attention is given to the intimate immensity of the pristine forest (1957, p. 170). 
Yet, he never really becomes a comparative epistemologist of the life sciences. This 
rather remains uncharted domain.
Bachelard’s work was not a creatio ex nihilo. His most important source of 
inspiration was psychoanalysis. In the case of Bachelard, however, this term refers 
10 Bachelard basically restricts his analysis of the imagination to literature (“l’imagination lit-
téraire”). It is a matter of competence: philosophers are readers. They feel less at home when 
working with other art forms (1948, p. 6).
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to the work of Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) rather than Freud. Whereas Freud 
was more interested in applying psychoanalysis to the humanities, his alter ego 
Jung preferably used psychoanalysis to analyse the scientific mind. First of all, he 
distinguishes between two modes of thinking: discursive thinking and imagination 
(1911/2001). Whereas the former evolves on the basis of logic and the causality 
principle, the latter relies on association. Historically speaking, discursive thinking 
is a fairly recent phenomenon. It was introduced by critical minds like Socrates (the 
founding father of logic as a philosophical discipline) and further elaborated by 
Plato, Aristotle and, eventually, by scholasticism. Without this intellectual achieve-
ment (the conversion of the Western mind to discursive thinking), the emergence 
of modern science would have been unthinkable, according to Jung. Subsequently, 
however, he developed a profound interest in styles of thought that were still domi-
nated by the “logic” of imagination, notably alchemy, as a research field that to a 
large extent relied on association rather than on causality. Gradually, moreover, he 
realised the extent to which modern sciences still remain under the spell of “uncon-
scious” and “forgotten” alchemistic ideas. Part of this research was carried out in 
the form of a correspondence with Wolfgang Pauli (who was awarded the Nobel 
Prize for physics in 1945) on the content of the latter’s dreams (Pauli and Jung 
1992). In other words, the case of Victor Frankenstein, a scientist who experiences 
a fatal “return of the repressed” in the form of alchemistic reminiscences is far from 
being an idiosyncrasy. Rather, his case may be regarded as “typical”. Many promi-
nent scientists (Keppler, Newton, Boyle, Kekulé, and others) have experienced 
instances of epistemological “relapse”. Like Bachelard, Jung devoted many years 
of study (in fact, the greater part of his research during the second half of life) to 
exploring the basic logic of alchemy. In Chapter 9, his views will be outlined in 
greater detail.
This may suffice as a genealogy of comparative epistemology. In Chapter 3, 
attention will shift to comparative epistemology “proper”, the first series of case 
studies. In four chapters of part II, we will turn attention to literary and scholarly 
sources dealing with animals and their worlds. Chapter 3 is an introduction to the 
themes, but the subsequent chapters all address particular “files” or “cases”.






What is an Animal? A Comparative 
Epistemology of Animals
3.1  Reasoning Animals: On the Truthfulness of Literature and 
Science
“Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts 
alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can 
only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts”. Those are the words of the 
horrible teacher Gradgrind in Dickens’s novel Hard Times (1854/1974) who, upon 
being informed that Sissy’s father is a horsebreaker, demands her to give him the 
definition of a horse. Although Sissy (due to her daily companionship with them) 
is intimately acquainted with horses, she is nevertheless startled by the question and 
unable to answer it. “Girl number twenty unable to define a horse! Girl number 
twenty possessed of no facts, in reference to one of the commonest of animals!”, 
Gradgrind exclaims, and passes the question over to a boy who perhaps never so 
much as touched a horse, but who produces the perfect answer right away: 
“Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-
teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in spring …” (1974, p. 5).
It goes without saying that “girl number twenty”, because of her silence, is 
Dickens’s heroine. She knows too much about horses, about their way of being-in-
the-world, to force her knowledge of them into a factual definition. That is, she 
refuses to become a “reasoning animal” in Gradgrind’s fashion, someone who 
defines the world in objective, factual terms. She seems to realize that such a lan-
guage will not allow us to articulate what horses really are. The animal’s way of 
being is obscured rather than brought to light by the restricted and impoverished 
language of facts, quantities and definitions. Rather than allowing us to understand 
them, it is bound to estrange us from them.
The comic nature of the scene resides in the fact that Gradgrind demands a certain 
speech genre (the objective, scientific language of facts and definitions) to be auto-
matically applied to any object whatsoever (cf. Bergson 1940/1969). Eventually, 
however, human beings rather than horses will find themselves impoverished by this 
ridiculous procedure. Indeed, in Dickens’s novel, the definition of the horse is pre-
ceded by a definition of man as a “reasonable animal”. In order to be able to perceive 
the world in factual terms, this is what we have to become, depriving ourselves of 
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other possibilities of interaction and coexistence. While defining animals in strictly 
“objective” terms, we deprive ourselves of the possibility of a more intimate and, 
according to Dickens, more genuine companionship with them. Gradgrind’s defini-
tion of a horse is as comic as the famous definition of man as a “featherless biped”, 
attributed to Plato and mocked by Diogenes the Cynic, who plucked a fowl and 
brought it into the lecture room with the words, “Here is Plato’s man”. As a result 
of this joke, “having broad nails” was quickly added to the definition (Diogenes 
Laertius 1925/1979, 6:40).
The reason for referring to this passage in Hard Times is that it points to some-
thing which, from the point of view of comparative epistemology, is obviously 
important, namely the claim, put forward in this novel, that the apparent self-evidence 
of a scientific (objective, factual) understanding of the world, advocated by 
Gradgrind, may decrease our ability to discern what animals really are. Relying on 
the strategies of this type of discourse, we may have estranged ourselves from the 
possibility of developing a more profound acquaintance with animals, a more pro-
found understanding of their way of being. Moreover, there is an intimate connec-
tion between knowledge and interaction, between the question what an animal is 
(the animal’s way of being-in-the-world) and the question how to approach them, 
how to treat them (the question of animal ethics). Science apparently has obscured 
our proximity to animals, but it has also obscured the fundamental difference 
between their way of being-in-the-world and ours. It has obscured our understand-
ing of the animality of animals.
This seems a truly philosophical concern. Yet, when it comes to rediscovering 
and unearthing the animality of animals, philosophy does not seem to have that 
much to offer. Only recently has the issue of animalhood been granted a reasonable 
amount of space on its agenda. It may safely be said that, during two and a half 
millennia of philosophical research in the West, philosophers have been by-passing 
this issue with remarkable stubbornness. Genuine philosophical interest in animals 
has been remarkably sparse, notably given the fact that we are animals ourselves. 
For centuries, philosophers were predominantly interested in reasoning animals, but 
mostly insofar as they were reasonable, hardly insofar as they were animals. 
Throughout history, philosophers have been obsessed, so to speak, with the issue 
of humanhood. And they tended only to speak or write about (other) animals in 
order to say something about humans, indeed, in order to distance ourselves from 
other animals.1 Animalhood as such was hardly ever at stake. The animal realm was 
basically used as a backdrop in order to emphasize the uniqueness of the animal 
rationale. Other animal species had only “instrumental” value, so to speak, their 
animality did not constitute a legitimate philosophical issue in its own right. The 
humanity of human beings was regarded as something we “possess” over and 
above our mere biological existence, our animality. Non-human species found 
themselves beyond the scope of epistemology almost by definition. And although 
1 Even the term “animal” is affected by philosophical anthropocentrism. Whenever animals are 
mentioned in philosophical writings, the term usually tends to refer to animals more or less similar 
to ourselves, preferably mammals, rather than insects or snails.
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philosophers did produce a number of highly influential claims concerning animals, 
such as the claim that they are basically machines, these claims evolved either from 
scientific research (cf. Chapter 5) or from reflections on what it means to be a 
human being (i.e. a rational subject who happens to occupy, and has been charged 
with the management of, an “animal” body). Hardly ever was animalness or ani-
malhood addressed directly.
Would it be possible to remedy this defect, to produce a genuine philosophy of 
animalness? As was already indicated in the first chapter of this volume, if we want 
to know something about animals as such, a philosopher is not the most likely 
expert to consult. An animal is a “piece of nature”, as Kant would phrase it, and 
philosophers are expected to critically reflect on disciplines dealing with animals, 
such as zoology and physiology, rather than on animal existence as such. It is no 
longer seen as the proper task and ambition of philosophy to speak directly about 
nature, or natural entities such as animal species. Rather, philosophy has become a 
critical reflection on the views and experiences brought forward by others, by other 
genres of discourse, notably scientific and literary ones. In these immense layers of 
discourse, animalhood has not at all been neglected. Indeed, for many centuries, 
both scientific and literary authors have been writing about animals abundantly, 
often in very detailed ways. In other words, if we are interested in addressing the 
long-neglected epistemological and ontological issues involved in animalhood, 
scientific and literary documents constitute our obvious point of departure. A com-
parative epistemology will have to follow these authors, take up the issues and 
questions raised by them, either intentionally or unintentionally. We will have to 
scrutinize and question these sources. To what extent do they allow us to determine 
what an animal is? To what extent do they shed light on the world and existence of 
animals? To what extent do they provide a clearing that allows animals to really 
become discernable?
In the course of history, humans have described and studied animals in various 
ways. A great variety of scientific, literary and other genres has emerged. As a rule, 
scientific research practices involving animals are documented quite accurately and 
extensively. The writings of researchers like Charles Darwin or Ivan Pavlov are not 
only important because of the wealth of research data they contain, but also because 
they include interesting details regarding the ways in which researchers and their 
research animals interacted, within the confines of an animal laboratory or in other 
research settings. Likewise, biographical and autobiographical sources may tell us 
something about relationships between humans and animals (wild or domesticated) 
in everyday life. Finally, novels, poems and plays may inform us about the lives of 
humans and animals, about the ways in which animals interact with their worlds or 
human–animal relationships evolve.
There is a chronic dispute of long standing, however, over the comparative value 
of these sources. Which of them represents animals in a more truthful and realistic 
manner? In certain respects, scientific sources seem more reliable and adequate, but 
in other respects literary sources can be seen as more revealing and true to life. It 
would be a mistake to try to answer this question once and for all in a general way. 
Several types of literary and scientific documents can be distinguished. They may 
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all in their own way shed some light on the question of “animalhood”, on what it 
means to be an animal, but they will all have their limits and restrictions as well. In 
order to determine their epistemological status, their relative value, concrete scientific 
and literary sources on animals will have to be assessed in a comparative manner, 
guided by the question to what extent they are able to produce a convincing account 
concerning the “animality” of animals, their being-in-the-world. It seems clear that 
animals, notably “higher” animals such as birds or mammals, are not simply “objects”, 
but living organisms, dwelling in a world of their own. They undoubtedly perceive 
and experience the world around them and interact with their environment. Is it 
possible for scientific or literary authors to somehow enter their world? Or is this 
something which is principally denied to us? Is it at all possible to try to imagine 
what the worlds of animals (e.g. whales, dogs or horses) look like “from the 
inside”? And what about the world of frogs and snails? In what kind of world do 
they dwell? Are their worlds impoverished in comparison to ours? Or is it also pos-
sible to imagine that, in certain respects, animals may have access to dimensions of 
reality far beyond our imagination and comprehension?
This chapter serves as an introduction to a comparative epistemology of animal-
hood. In the next section, scientific and literary views on animals will be placed in 
a broader, historical and, indeed, “diachronic” perspective. I will discuss a number 
of rather influential genres, articulating more or less typical views on animals. It 
will be indicated that both the scientific and the literary genres involved have 
remained remarkably stable during extended periods of time. Aristotle’s Historia 
Animalorum, set the stage for centuries of animal research, finding its literary coun-
terpart in the fable literature, that likewise originated in Greece. The various literary 
subgenres that have emerged in the course of centuries tend have something in 
common: they tend to represent animals in remarkably stereotypical and anthropo-
morphic ways. These discursive traditions of rather long standing, what do they tell 
us about animalhood?
This “diachronic” preview will serve as a backdrop for the subsequent sections, 
in which we will begin to develop a much more “synchronic” approach, focusing 
on the second half of the nineteenth century. Our motives for paying special atten-
tion to this period – in this volume, but also in this chapter – have already been 
addressed. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the life sciences 
“emancipated” from the sway of speculative philosophy (i.e. “German idealism”). 
Research concerning animals came to be placed on a firm scientific footing, on the 
one hand because biology increasingly became an experimental science, on the 
other hand because the concept of evolution dramatically changed our view of 
animals – and of ourselves in relationship to them.
Yet, from a comparative epistemological perspective it is certainly no coinci-
dence that this same period was also the “Golden Age” of the novel as a literary 
genre. In their descriptions of animals, nineteenth-century novelists went far 
beyond the restricted stereotypes of the fable literature as it still flourished in the 
eighteenth century. In other words, during this period, both scientists and novelists 
discovered animalhood as an important and fascinating object, and both scientists 
and novelists developed powerful techniques for producing truthful and accurate 
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accounts of animal life. This also explains why in the second half of the nineteenth 
century a number of documents were written that explicitly endorsed or challenged 
the truthfulness of either the literary or the scientific views. Science and literature 
were more or less in competition. In this chapter, some important positions in this 
debate are sketched in outline, to be developed more fully in subsequent chapters.
First of all, a number of literary documents appeared in which the claim was made 
that the scientific way of treating and describing animals was fundamentally flawed. 
Hard Times by Charles Dickens, already cited above, belongs to this trend. Indeed, in 
the 1850s and 1860s the epistemological dispute between literature and science on 
animalhood reached a climax. I will elucidate this by referring to one of the most 
famous animal novels of all time: Moby-Dick by Herman Melville. A short introduction 
to (the epistemological significance) of Melville’s novel in this chapter will serve as 
prelude to the much more detailed epistemological reading of this work in Chapter 4.
More or less during the same period, however, the opposite claim was also made. 
Protagonists of the scientific view (and this includes literary and philosophical 
authors besides scientists) stated that traditional literary forms tended to produce 
exaggerated or highly stylized representations of animals. These poetic representa-
tions, charming and edifying as they may be, are flawed and biased; they obstruct 
rather than enhance an adequate understanding of animal life. The poetic iconography 
of animalhood stands in the way of a more realistic and truthful rendering of the 
animal world.
Two literary authors are here presented as advocates of a more scientific view, 
namely Jules Verne and Emile Zola. Jules Verne (1828–1905) has written a series 
of novels (e.g. 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, 1870) that can be regarded as promi-
nent efforts to flesh out the epistemological significance of the scientific under-
standing of nature. Moreover, Emile Zola’s essay The Experimental Novel (Le 
roman expérimental, 1880) is also an important document from our perspective as 
it points to structural similarities between the ways in which literary and scientific 
documents are designed. His essay will also be briefly discussed in this chapter, as 
a prelude to a more elaborate discussion of the relationship between literature and 
experimental physiology in Chapter 5.
Subsequently, attention will be given to the writings of Charles Darwin. They 
are commonly regarded as scientific documents, and for good reasons of course, 
but clearly have a literary significance as well. They are situated on the borderline 
between science and literature, constituting a middle-position so to speak between 
some of the rival positions described above. To what extent does his work allow us 
to do justice to animals as animals? Again, this section is actually a prelude to a 
more extensive discussion (Chapter 6) of the type of animal practice encountered 
in Darwin’s later writings.
Finally, as was already emphasized, animals are not merely (scientific or liter-
ary) objects, they emerge as subjects in their own right, subjects of their own world. 
Therefore, in the final section I will draw attention to a number of documents that 
suggest that animals are, epistemologically speaking, privileged beings, subjects of 
a completely different kind of world than ours, who are granted access to dimen-
sions of experience that are principally denied to us.
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3.2 The Comical, the Tragic and the Biblical View
In 405 BC Aristophanes’ comedy The Frogs was performed for the first time. The 
first Chorus of the play begins as follows:
Brekekeke ko-ax ko-ax
Brekekeke ko-ax ko-ax
This is generally considered the first effort in history to capture animal sounds 
phonetically. In Aristophanes’ play The Birds a similar effort is made, a similar 
chorus line can be encountered:
Tio tio tio tiotinx
These plays constitute examples of the ways in which literary texts may contribute 
to our knowledge of animals and animal behaviour. The plays as such, however, do 
not seem very interesting for readers who are explicitly interested in animals, 
because the frogs and bird are depicted in a remarkably anthropomorphic fashion. 
They are human beings in bird-like and frog-like costumes (both literally and figu-
ratively). They speak a human language and are guided by human motives and 
desires. We hear their animal voices very briefly – but alas, before long they switch 
to a human tongue. Thus, in Aristophanes’ plays, animals enter into a truly “human” 
dialogue with humans. The birds in his play are not nesting in the clouds, but rather 
involved in establishing a polis, a Greek colony in the air. In short, they are not at 
all behaving in an animal-like or bird-like fashion.
Whereas these literary documents hardly distinguish between humans and ani-
mals, some prominent philosophers, working in the same period, tended to emphasize 
the difference as much as possible. The branch of philosophical discourse initiated by 
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle stresses the uniqueness of man. Dialogue, reasoning and 
polis-building are possibilities (or lines of action) that are principally denied to animals. 
In his book on politics, Aristotle claims that, of all animals, only man is by nature a 
political animal in the sense that man alone of all animals possesses speech 
(1932/1967; 1253 a 3). Although animals are able to produce sounds, they do not 
have a voice. Although they are able to shriek and howl and bellow and whistle and 
wail, they do not produce meaningful words. Although they are able to signal pain or 
fear, the possibility of conveying meaning is denied to them. From an Aristotelean 
perspective, rather than truly describing human behaviour, the “animality” of animals 
is erased and obscured in Aristophanes’ plays. Aristophanes voices a popular, pre-
scientific view on animal behaviour and human–animal relationships.
Aristotle is not only the most important philosopher of his time, but also the 
most important biologist, who did much to enhance the scientific practice of clas-
sifying animals. While his teacher Plato had already introduced the dichotomous 
technique of classification in terms of species and genera that is still in use today 
(providing all species with a first name and a surname so to speak), Aristotle 
described and classified some five hundred and twenty species (notably marine 
animals) in his writings. These classifications are based on anatomical research. 
Rather than viewing animals from a distance, as typical images, the scientific 
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gaze really tries to enter the hidden intimacies of animal life, in search for basic 
structures. This gaze is not purely empirical, it is pre-structured, in the same way 
as Aristotelian philosophy is. Aristotle starts from, and discovers a series of, 
influential dichotomies that still make sense to biologists today, such as the dis-
tinction between warm-blooded and cold-blooded animals. A dichotomous logic 
is guiding his observations and pervades his work. Gradgrind’s practice of clas-
sification is a parody, a “degeneration” so to speak of a type of discourse that was 
inaugurated by Aristotle and still dominated the life sciences in the eighteenth 
century as the core business of animal science.
The fact that Aristotle combined scientific research with philosophical contem-
plation was typical for the period. Philosophical and scientific views on animals 
tended to think along similar lines. Indeed, the distinction between both types of 
discourses can only be made in retrospect. Aristophanes’ plays constitute a popular 
antipode (non-academic in an emphatic way) to this type of science-philosophy, 
this academic “master discourse” on animals. Indeed, in one of his plays, he explic-
itly derides Socrates, clearly assessing his work from a lay person’s perspective. 
From an academic point of view, Aristophanes was clearly an outsider. His work is 
part of a much broader literary context and, as far as his method of depicting ani-
mals is concerned, akin to the literary genre of the fable – a genre that more or less 
began with the fables of Aesopus, 620–560 BC. Although some of the stereotypical 
character traits of fable animals may have been borrowed from the actual behav-
ioural repertoires of the species they represent (e.g. the proverbial cunning of the 
fox), the animals involved tend to act and think like human beings, rather than ani-
mals. Insofar as their stereotypical features are based on observation at all, it must 
have been observations of an incidental and anecdotal nature, highly dependent on 
observer biases as well as cultural traditions and expectations. The result can hardly 
be expected to correspond in a recognizable manner with animal behaviour as it is 
studied and described by professional ethologists today. Fables contain moral les-
sons for humans, concerning the way we humans should behave, not with regard to 
animals, but among ourselves.
The “fable view” on animals continued to exist during the Christian era and far 
beyond. A well-known legend, that became rather popular in its Christian version, 
namely Androcles and the Lion, is written along these lines. It is set in the Roman 
Empire during the early Christian period. Androcles, a meek Christian, encounters 
a lion in the desert who is suffering from a painful thorn in his paw. Androcles 
removes the thorn, and thus the lion becomes his friend. Later, Androcles is cap-
tured and taken to the Colosseum with a group of Christian prisoners. He is sent 
into the arena to face a lion, who turns out to be the same lion he befriended. The 
lion joyfully licks Androcles’ face in recognition. It is a charming and no doubt 
edifying story, but at the same time it is clear that, rather than describing real-life 
interactions, it conceals and prettifies extremely violent human–animal relation-
ships. In the real Colloseum, thousands of animals (among them, lions) were 
slaughtered, and the real animal contemporaries of this friendly but imaginary lion 
suffered a much bleaker fate than his. Real animal practices did not display much 
caritas in those days.
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Another highly influential genre was tragedy, the antipode of comedy and 
apparently much more realistic, originating in ancient Greece as well. Antigone by 
Sophocles contains a famous chorus devoted to the basic attitude of human beings 
to nature in general, and to animals in particular. In this chorus, nature is repre-
sented as δεινος – that is, frightening, overwhelming, grand, immense. Yet, might-
ier even than nature is man. According to Sophocles, our relationship with animals 
will always and by necessity contain an element of violence. We behave violently 
and aggressively towards nature and natural entities, and cannot do otherwise. We 
force animals to do things they would not do on their own accord and in the end 
our relationship usually ends with killing them. Even animals that are superior to 
us in terms of physical agility or strength (e.g. horses or bulls) are captured and 
subdued by us.2 For thousands of years, the relationship between humans and ani-
mals has been dominated by cunning and aggression, by clubs, whips, nets, knots 
and ropes. This is, so to speak, the tragic view on human–animal interaction. 
Although domestication involves patience, observation and experience as well it is, 
in the end, not a very friendly process. In short, there is a profound contrast between 
the cordial (but anthropomorphic) attitude of Androcles towards his frightening 
(i.e. ‘δει′νος’), but eventually friendly lion, and the grim picture of human–animal 
relationship that is outlined by Sophocles in his chorus.
A much more friendly and congenial account of human–animal interactions can 
be encountered in Genesis. In the beginning of this first Bible book, man is 
appointed as a resort manager in Paradise, which is depicted as an ideal, tranquil 
zoo. An important follow-up to the Paradise narrative is the story of the Arc, in 
which man emerges as the great saviour of animals, safeguarding their survival in 
the face of an immense environmental catastrophe, due to an acute climate change 
(brought about by unsustainable human lifestyle patterns – unsustainable that is in 
the eyes of God). Notwithstanding the level of drama in the story (which after all 
is a story of mass extinction) the basic message is that animals depend on human 
beings for their well-being and, eventually, for their survival. We, as stewards, are 
responsible for their extinction as well as for their flourishing. According to 
Genesis, animals entered our Arc from the very outset, long before some of them 
were formally recognised and stamped as “endangered species”. This status merely 
exemplifies a more profound and fundamental form of dependence.
The Christian idea of a peaceful coexistence and fellowship between animals 
and humans (as their caretakers) can be encountered in countless documents emerg-
ing in the context of Christian discourse on animalhood, not only in legends and 
stories, but also in works of art. In the landscapes of Paulus Potter, to mention just 
one example, only happy and contented animals can be encountered. They are well 
cared-for and simply want to be left in peace. This understanding (more or less 
Genesis-based) of human–animal relationships in terms of harmony and peaceful 
2 “Master of cunning he: the savage bull, and the hart
Who roams the mountain free, are tamed by his infinite art;
And the shaggy rough-maned steed is broken to bear the bit” (Sophocles 1962, p. 340, 
341–352).
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coexistence still flourishes in the nineteenth century, when biology is often prac-
ticed by theologians and generally regarded a form of applied theology, a “clerical 
hobby”, a practical form of religious reverence – until Darwin makes his appear-
ance. Suddenly, nature is perceived in a completely different light, in terms of 
 violence and relentless struggle – I will come back to this later.
The fable literature described above is based on a moral classification of ani-
mals, highly stylised and conventional as a rule. It involves a limited number of 
species, displaying fixed character traits determined by literary conventions. These 
animals have more in common with heraldic representations of animals on shields 
and banners than with the animals one is likely to encounter in the real world. The 
classification strategies used in fables do not seem able to do justice to animals as 
they really are. And yet, this type of literature continued to flourish during the 
medieval period, that is, in a period when many people, notably in rural areas, must 
have been involved in intense, daily relationships with animals (notably farm animals) 
and must have acquired a fairly extensive knowledge repertoire of animal behaviour. 
This knowledge was usually tacit knowledge, however, passed on to subsequent 
generations in oral formats.
Yet, more realistic forms of written discourse on animals were produced as well. 
Often, they relied on practical experiences with animals, on human–animal interac-
tions of long standing. An interesting example of this genre is De arte venandi cum 
avibus (“On the art of falconry”) by Emperor Frederik II von Hohenstaufen (1194–
1250). The falcon was a courtly animal par excellence, the symbol of nobility, and 
hunting with falcons was for centuries a favourite pastime of medieval aristocrats. 
It was an intricate and refined art, however, involving patience, knowledge and 
skill. Frederik II von Hohenstaufen, moreover, was a gifted artist and scientist. His 
book on falconry contains important information on the behaviour and bodily 
design of birds of prey and can be regarded as a highlight of medieval ornithology. 
It goes far beyond a heraldic or fabulous representation of the falcon.
Frederic’s courtly science was the scholarly counterpart of the medieval fable lit-
erature. Yet, the fable-perspective on animals continued to flourish for many centu-
ries to come. In the medieval era, the fable literature, with its depiction of animals 
as moral exemplars, or as strange monsters dwelling in far-off regions, was often 
reinforced rather than challenged by more scholarly forms of discourse. Medieval 
classifications of animals relied on written sources rather than on first-hand observa-
tion. Fabulous animals such as the unicorn were processed and described with the 
same amount of earnestness and scholarship as ordinary species. This applies to 
literary works such as Der naturen bloeme by the Flemish medieval poet Jacob van 
Marleant (c.1225–c.1300) as well as to more scholarly writings, such as De animali-
bus (1999) by Albertus Magnus (1193–1280). The fable-atmosphere remained 
intact, in popular as well as in courtly circles. As Morus (1953) points out, the fable-
like view on animals was reinforced rather than weakened when, during the dawn 
of the modern era, wealthy Europeans began to explore the world on a larger scale. 
Reports written by these early explorers contain many fabulous accounts of gigantic 
whales, sharks and sea-snakes, for example. Apparently, they were based on tradi-
tional cultural stereotypes rather than on observation. And when in the seventeenth 
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century the French courtier La Fontaine (1621–1695) composed his charming poetic 
stories, he was writing about animals he hardly knew from personal experience. His 
“zoology”, so to speak, built on literary traditions and literary sources, rather than 
on personal observation or anything like systematic research. For centuries moreo-
ver, popular as well as literary zoology continued to believe in the existence of fabu-
lous animals such as monstrous sea-snakes or unicorns, long after these fictitious 
species had been rejected by professional naturalists as legitimate objects of reflec-
tion. Three powerful scientific movements eventually dethroned the fable perspec-
tive, dispelling it to the realm of children’s books, and replacing it by a more 
research-based view on animal life, namely the philosophy of mechanicism, the 
technology of classification and the emergence of experimental physiology.
3.3 Classifying, Dissecting and Slaughtering Animals
One particular philosophical answer to the question what animals really are has been 
very influential, namely the idea that an animal is basically identical to a machine. 
According to Nietzsche, Descartes was the first who, with a remarkable audacity, 
dared to think of animals this way. Ever since, as Nietzsche sees it, physiologists 
have been working hard to verify this proposition.3
While dwelling in the Netherlands, Descartes (besides occasionally attending 
anatomical lessons involving human corpses) was very much engaged in the prac-
tice of dissecting and analyzing bodily parts of animals, such as eyes and legs. He 
was accustomed to pay regular visits to slaughterhouses in order to collect interest-
ing material to be anatomized at home (Lindeboom 1979). In 1629–1630 he lived 
in the Kalverstraat (Calf Street) in Amsterdam, a street of butchers. “There was one 
winter in Amsterdam”, he wrote in one of his letters, “when I went almost every 
day to the house of a butcher to see him kill the animals and to have carried to my 
lodgings the parts that I wanted to anatomize more at my leisure” (Watson 2002, 
p. 166). The result of his diligence was the elaboration of an ontology built on the 
basic contention that animals (as well as human bodies) are basically machines, 
automata.4 They are not like machines in the sense that the machine merely serves 
as a metaphor. To Descartes, the animal really is a machine. The way of being of 
an animal is basically identical to that of a machine, an instrument manufactured 
by man. This implies that the phenomena of animal (as well as bodily) life can be 
understood in strictly mechanistic terms.
Nietzsche is mistaken, however, in presenting Descartes’ basic proposition as an 
unprecedented and modern view. To a considerable extent, Descartes’ ontological 
ideas still rely on the very mode of thought he set out to challenge and replace – 
3 “Was die Tiere betrifft, so hat zuerst Descartes, mit verehrungswürdiger Kühnheit, den Gedanken 
gewagt, das Tier als machina zu verstehn: unsre ganze Physiologie bemüht sich um den Beweis 
dieses Stazes” (Nietzsche 1980, 13, § 14).
4 Despite the fact that for some time he owned a dog named Monsieur Grat (Watson 2002, 167).
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scholasticism. In fact, the idea that animals are basically similar to human artifacts 
can be encountered in the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas, one of the principal 
highlights of scholasticism. In Pars 1a 2ae of this summa, the second article of 
Quaestio XIII is devoted to the issue whether animals are endowed with the faculty 
of free choice (“Utrum electio conveniat brutis animalibus”), that is, whether they 
display resoluteness and goal-oriented behaviour. At first glance, Thomas argues, 
this seems to be the case, for it looks as if they intend to realize certain goals in a 
conscious and active manner. Moreover, they do seem to have the ability to choose. 
A cow, for example, will devour certain kinds of herbs, while avoiding others. At 
times, moreover, animals are said to display remarkable signs of sagacity. A dog 
tracking a deer seems to choose between different options in a syllogistic, calculat-
ing manner. Yet, Thomas maintains that eventually we must recognize that animal 
behaviour is completely determined. They are by nature equipped with a rather lim-
ited set of options, and in a given situation it is rather predictable what they will 
choose. The faculty of free choice is denied to them. Although they are sensitive, the 
objects of their sensitivity are predetermined by nature, rather than purposively and 
self-consciously chosen in view of some good. The movements of animals, Thomas 
argues, can be compared to those of arrows. Although one might have the impres-
sion that it is the arrow itself that tries to strike the target, it is of course the archer 
who is responsible for it and who makes the arrow take its course. Indeed, the move-
ments of animals are like those of horologia – clockworks – or similar contrivances,5 
with the difference that whereas horologia are artifacts manufactured by man, natu-
ral entities are divine artefacts.6 Although animals seem to move on their own 
accord, and even seem to display a certain amount of intelligence, they are in fact 
pre-ordained to act the way they do. The wisdom and sagacity apparently displayed 
by animals themselves, is actually the wisdom and sagacity of the divine Creator 
who manufactured them and brought them into existence.
By taking this line of reasoning, Thomas not only distances himself from every-
day experiences with animals (“at first glance it seems as if …”), but also from the 
fable perspective in which animals are depicted as reasoning and choosing.
Mechanicism not only remained important for centuries, it also remained 
emphatically in opposition to what could be called a “life-world” perspective on 
animals. Indeed, from a life-world perspective the idea of the animal body (and this 
includes the human body) as a machine remained so uncanny that it inspired a 
whole series of horror stories, such as for example E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der 
Sandmann [The sandman (1817/1957)]. The gothic atmosphere of these stories 
indicates that the idea of the animal body as a machine was never really accepted 
outside scholarly (scholastic) circles. It remained an abstract image that evoked 
5 “Sic enim sagitta directe tendit ad signum ex motione sagittantis, ac si ipse rationem haberet diri-
gentem; et idem apparet in motibus horologiorum et onmium ingeniorum humanorum quae arte 
fiunt” (Summa Theologica, Prima Secundae, Quaestio XIII, Art. II, p. 82).
6 It is no coincidence that Thomas uses the clock to elucidate his argument, since the clockwork 
technique was developed precisely in his own time, the thirteenth century (Cipolla 1967/2003), as 
a product of gothic techno-science (to be discussed in Chapter 9).
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uneasiness and even – apparently – fear. The body as an apparatus remained an idea 
so fundamentally strange (ξενος) that it inspired horror, while the blurring of the 
distinction between body and artifact tended to be experienced as unheimlich 
(Freud 1919/1947) even in modern times.
Notably in the twentieth century, philosophers have made serious efforts to lib-
erate themselves from this mechanistic conception of animals, prepared by scholas-
ticism and elaborated by the philosophy of neo-classicism (from René Descartes up 
to Julien Offray de La Mettrie). Notably phenomenologists have tried to exorcise 
mechanicism in order to bring scientific and philosophical views of animals closer 
to forms of understanding that guide our daily interactions with the animal world.
Besides mechanicism, another scientific discourse gained tremendous impor-
tance during the era of neo-classicism, namely the neo-classical revival of the 
Aristotelian animal practice of classification already addressed above. In the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, naturalists really began to study the fauna of old 
and new continents in a systematic manner. Linnaeus (1707–1778) and others pro-
duced a scientific classification of animal species, much more detailed and precise, 
much more “critical” and realistic so to speak than the popular fable view. 
According to Foucault (1966) the life sciences were suddenly inspired by a new 
type of curiosity, an unprecedented longing for “precision” (p. 136).7 They wanted 
to restore order in a quickly proliferating, indeed: overwhelmingly proliferating 
animal world – a proliferation that was partly due to the influx of newly discovered 
species from far off continents, and partly because of the introduction of new con-
trivances such as the microscope. How to organize these immense domains of liv-
ing beings? How to represent the animal world in an orderly, reasonable fashion? 
The issue was solved by introducing a rigorous epistemological framework, a rigor-
ous taxonomy, spatially organized in the form of a table or matrix, exemplified by 
zoological collections and Jardins des Plantes. Species were described and determined 
in terms of a neutralized and extremely technical language, in accordance with 
prescribed formats and procedures. These procedures were rigorously iconoclastic: 
the visual image, the visual impression of animals, that had been so important for 
their representation in fables, was eclipsed in favour of countable, quantifiable ele-
ments. The new taxonomy relentlessly ignored and erased all the countless legends, 
stories, nicknames, emblems, moral lessons, epic reminiscences and coagulated 
anecdotes that had come to be associated with various animals. For the first time in 
history, more or less, scholars really began to study natural entities in a careful way, 
paying attention to the smallest details.8 Indeed, these systems of classification 
were based on specific morphological features rather than on literary conventions. 
7 Michel Foucault (1926–1984) regards Gaston Bachelard as one of his teachers (1994, 4, p. 56). 
Although his archeology of knowledge (notably his publications in the 1960s) can be regarded as a 
comparative epistemology, it does not entail a comparison between different knowledge forms (such 
as literature and science), but rather between discursive formations separated from one another in time 
(comparisons, for example, between the Renaissance and the neo-classical period).
8 “L’âge classique donne à l’histoire [naturelle] un toute autre sens: celui de poser pour la première 
fois un regard minutieux sur les choses elles-mêmes, et de transcrire ensuite ce qu’il recueille dans 
des mots lisses, neutralisés et fidèles” (Foucault 1966, p. 143).
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Their point of departure was a dramatic, iconoclastic gesture of exclusion.9 
Therefore, they seemed more objective compared to previous research strategies as 
well as more able to deal with the prolific richness of animal life.
In fact, the technology of classification quickly gained a certain amount of popu-
larity. It began to disseminate throughout the life-world. Lay naturalists began to 
explore and classify animals (as well as plants) along the lines Linnaeus and his 
colleagues had set out. As we have seen in Chapter 2, even Rousseau became 
addicted to the practice of “herborisation”, although in his case the practice was 
confined to the vegetable realm – until the “epidemic” finally reached individuals 
such as Gradgrind, the stereotypical teacher. It was precisely because of these tech-
nical and detached methods for classification and description that this type of 
scholarship became the object of literary discontent in the nineteenth century. The 
technical language of classification seemed to entail an impoverishment of the real-
life animal world, a kind of epistemological violence. Animal nature as such, brim-
ming with creativity, with life, seemed subdued and eclipsed by a life-less system 
of formal distinctions.
In 1851, Herman Melville published his novel Moby-Dick in which the classifica-
tory view on animals is rigorously criticized as being untrue to life. The concepts 
and classifications of scholarly biological discourse (on animals in general and on 
whales in particular) are explicitly challenge by Ishmael, who claims to represent the 
whale-man’s point of view, based on experiential knowledge, indeed: on “the real 
living experience of living men”, on a life spent at sea rather than in a scholarly 
study. For it is “only on the profound unbounded sea”, Ishmael assures us, that the 
whale can be “truly and livingly” found out (Melville 1851/1931, p. 1032). 
According to Ishmael, only whale-men really and truly know what a whale is. Many 
are the men who have written of whales, but only a few of them ever really saw one 
(apart from the stranded whales they – or others – dissected). Indeed, the only way 
to do justice to a whale, to acquire reliable knowledge about whales, is to sign up as 
a sailor on a whale-ship in order to hunt them. A whale-ship, he tells us, was “his 
Yale College and his Harvard” (p. 826). These huge living organisms are violated as 
soon as they are taken out of their immense maritime environment to be dissected and 
classified. They cease to exist as truly living organisms, dwelling in their own world. 
They are ontologically injured and transformed into objects of research. Experiential 
knowledge is preferable to knowledge that is derived from reading books or dissect-
ing cadavers. The most excessive symptom of what scientific strategies lead to is the 
fact that scholars refer to the whale as a mammal rather than a fish.
On the other hand, it is highly questionable whether Ishmael’s alternative “cetology” 
(whale science) can be regarded, from an epistemological point of view, as a progression. 
For in order to produce his own, competitive view, Ishmael often resorts to the old stere-
otypical (or even archetypical) fabulous image of the giant whale, a species he addresses 
with names borrowed from traditional (notably Biblical) sources, such as Leviathan. 
Although at first glance Melville’s novel seems to convey a rather outspoken bias in 
favour of practical and experiential knowledge, at the expense of scientific expertise, a 
9 “Observer, c’est donc ce contenter de voir. De voir systématiquement peu de choses” (p. 146).
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closer analysis reveals that Ishmael’s presentation of the whale-man’s point of view is 
often ironical rather than wholeheartedly partisan. Indeed, his quasi-scholarly discourse 
on practical cetology is critical (of established science), but self-critical as well. He is 
clearly aware of the fact that, in certain respects, the information on whales accumulated 
and disseminated by whalers is highly unreliable. Whereas most whale-men display an 
astonishing disinterest in whales as animals (apart from their commodity value), others 
are quite willing to join the notorious inclination of sailors towards mystification and 
exaggeration, displaying a predilection for the marvellous, the legendary and the gro-
tesque. Still, Ishmael assures us, although a professional hunter’s account “may suffer 
from exaggerations”, the apparently fabulous is sometimes fully equaled by the over-
whelming realities of the great whales (p. 869).
Moreover, the human–animal relationship that provides us with these lively, 
concrete and (according to Ishmael) highly valuable insights concerning whale-
hood is an extremely violent animal practice, namely whaling, which entails a 
rather barbarous and merciless slaughtering of the sublime animals Ishmael claims 
to admire so much. In this respect, Moby-Dick rather seems to subscribe to the 
tragic view articulated by Sophocles. Experience tells us that basically, man and 
nature are at war with one another. The whale, this huge and fascinating animal, 
δεινος par excellence, is classified and dissected by scholars, transformed into lit-
erary stereotypes by poets, and eventually butchered by practical men. An over-
whelming animal is finally overwhelmed by human cunning and intelligence. And 
this raises several moral issues, such as the possibility of extinction, extensively 
discussed in Melville’s lively novel. Thus, Melville’s masterpiece is a document 
that contains ample material for comparative epistemology. In Chapter 4 we will 
subject this literary document to a closer reading.
It would be rather one-sided, however, to suggest that in the nineteenth-century 
science and literature were continuously at war with one another, as two completely 
estranged and incompatible “cultures”. Other literary authors of this same period 
were much more “science-friendly”. They take a much more sympathetic stance 
toward science. In Jules Verne’s novel Vingt miles lieues sous les mers (20,000 
Leagues Under the Sea), for example, published in 1870, the scientific way of 
understanding whales is treated with much more respect than is the case in Moby-
Dick. The first chapters of Verne’s novel are remarkably similar to Melville’s: they 
follow the same course so to speak. They tell us about an expedition that is destined 
to hunt down a particularly δεινος whale, a huge monster, an “enormous thing”, 
that bewilders the scientific world. Indeed, for the scientific view described by 
Verne, to only way to come to know and pacify this creature is by dissecting it.10 
The mysterious whale seems to trigger a return of the repressed. It seems a verifica-
10 In Verne’s novel, the world of science is dominated by the same authorities, the same modes of 
thought that are challenged in Moby-Dick: “Si c’était une cétacé, il surpassait en volume tout ceux 
que la science avait classés jusqu’alors. Ni Cuvier, ni Lacépède, ni M. Dumeril, ni M. de 
Quatrefages n’eussent admis l’existence d’un tel monstre (1870/1977, p. 10). Indeed, it is stated 
that the only way to gain reliable knowledge concerning the mysterious whale, the only way to 
reclaim the Es so to speak, is through dissection: “il fallait disséquer ce monstre inconnu” (p. 36).
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tion, after all, of the fabulous view on marine animals, an ichtyologie fantastique 
(p. 17). Yet, whereas whales as animals and the ocean as a natural environment play 
a tremendously important role in the novel, they are eventually described from an 
outspokenly scientific perspective. The Melville-like atmosphere of the first chap-
ters quickly gives way to a modern scientific approach. Biological, ichtyological, 
mechanical and oceanographic terms and concepts are used to frame literary 
descriptions and observations. Verne based the writing of the novel on a tremen-
dous amount of scholarly research. He prepared himself by rigorously studying the 
standard scientific discourses on oceans and their animal inhabitants as they flour-
ished in his epoch. This type of scholarly knowledge is represented in the novel by 
Professor Aronnax from Paris, a palaeontologist and oceanographer, an expert on 
the monstrous in nature, consulted whenever something excessively huge and 
strange (either alive or fossilised) is encountered.
More δεινος than any natural whale, however, is the artificial one, the giant and 
marvellous submarine built by the scientific genius Captain Nemo. Its strength, 
intelligence and rapidity greatly surpasses anything displayed by real living whales. 
In Verne’s novel, literary tales and mystifying stories about whales, although they 
dominate the first chapters, fall silent as soon as it becomes clear that the giant 
whale is actually a machine. They are discarded as primitive and untrue, whereas 
in the course of the novel the scientific way of understanding the world, apparently 
impotent at first, gains tremendously in prestige. Still, Verne’s novel constitutes an 
exercise in comparative epistemology. Various language games and knowledge 
forms (literary stereotypes, practical knowledge of whalers, insights and hypothe-
ses of scientific experts) are mutually exposed to one another.
Finally, an unequivocal advocate of the scientific view deserves to be mentioned 
here as well, namely Emile Zola, who in his essay The experimental novel [“Le 
roman expérimental”, 1880] underscores the basic epistemological congeniality of 
science and literature, of experimental physiology and novel-writing. Indeed, in this 
document, another scientific animal practice is described that gained tremendous 
importance in the nineteenth century (besides anatomy and classification), namely the 
art of conducting an animal experiment. In the context of experimental physiology, 
or “vivisection”, animals are neither classified, nor dissected, but experimented upon. 
The animal’s organism is damaged on purpose in order to observe the consequences 
of the damage. According to Zola, the structure of a novel should reflect the design 
and logic of a physiological experiment. Like an experimental physiologist working 
with research animals, a novelist will determine and vary the conditions to which 
human personalities are exposed, in order to observe what kinds of human behaviours 
are triggered or reinforced by these conditions. They are subjected to certain trau-
matic experiences in order to observe what kind of behavioural responses are likely 
to develop. Zola explicitly bases his views on the work of Claude Bernard (1813–
1878), the most prominent of all the vivisectionists, who in his youth had considered 
a literary career. Notably, Zola relies on Bernard’s famous Introduction to the Study 
of Experimental Medicine (1865/1966). We will return to Zola and Bernard in 
Chapter 5, devoted to physiological experiments with animals as described in scien-
tific and literary sources in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
3.3 Classifying, Dissecting and Slaughtering Animals 65
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
66 3 What is an Animal? A Comparative Epistemology of Animals
3.4 Darwin: Prelude, Climax and Aftermath
The epistemological polemic of Melville’s novel, challenging the lifeless, schoolish 
and technical procedures of academic classifications, constitutes an important part 
of the back-drop for what was perhaps the most dramatic scientific event of the 
nineteenth century, the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 
1859. What is interesting about Darwin’s book (from a comparative epistemologi-
cal perspective) is, first of all, that to a considerable extent it relies on experiential 
knowledge, on practical experiences with nature (e.g. in the context of pigeon 
breeding); secondly, that it is a tale of adventure, a narrative of a journey around the 
natural world (similar in many ways to Jules Verne’s Vingt milles lieus sous les 
mers or Meville’s Moby-Dick) and, finally, that it reads like a novel – a fascinating, 
carefully composed story, with a compelling story line, a hero and a plot – accord-
ing to Ilse Bulhof (1988) who emphasises the exceptional literary qualities of 
Darwin’s book. It is full of fresh air and the author takes his readers with him on a 
fascinating expedition through overwhelming landscapes, described in an inspiring 
way. It does not present the results of anatomic dissections or experimental 
research. Rather it is an exercise in scientific imagination. It starts from a wealth of 
observations, but eventually the reader is invited (or rather: compelled) to see the 
world in a new light. It recommends and fleshes out a new way of looking at natural 
entities. “The Origin gives a sense of nature in the open air rather than in the 
museum or on the dissecting table. It has a sensitivity to animals and their environ-
ment which was lost as biology became more professional and retreated into the 
laboratory” (Burrow 1985, p. 14). In this section I will put the literary qualities of 
Darwin’s best-seller in a broader perspective, positioning his oeuvre in the bound-
ary zone between scientific and literary discourse forms.
According to De Beer (1964/1976, p. 138) three stages can be distinguished in 
Darwin’s scientific biography, each with its own style, its own methodological 
profile. During the first stage, Darwin was an amateur naturalist who took a special 
interest in collecting beetles and a number of other hobbies typical of the clergyman 
he was supposed to become. He was invited to join the Beagle expedition because, 
besides being an experienced naturalist, he was a well-educated gentleman, that is, 
someone who would not only examine interesting sites (while Captain Robert 
FitzRoy and his crew would be carrying out their hydrographical surveys), but who 
would also be able to mess and converse with the captain in a civilised manner.
The second stage involved his travel around the world as a naturalist on board of 
H.M.S. Beagle. Darwin was overwhelmed by the sheer luxuriance of tropical vegeta-
tions, the bleak but sublime coastlines of Tierra del Fuego and the pristine conditions 
of the Gallapagos Islands. But first and foremost, the Beagle-experience entailed an 
epistemological leap in terms of scale. Before going on his journey, Darwin tells his 
readers, he had not realised how large the world is, in terms of space, but even more 
so in terms of time. Indeed, this is what he stresses in The Origin of Species time and 
again: human time pales into insignificance in comparison with the overwhelming 
amount of time nature has at her disposal. “Wide intervals of time …”, “Vast intervals 
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of time …”, “Vast lapses of time …” are phrases often used by Darwin in this context: 
“[The] lapses of time involved in the process of evolution are so great as to be utterly 
inappreciable by the human intellect” (p. 439). This is what Darwin means when at the 
end of his books he emphasises that there is grandeur in the new view of life he took 
home with him” (p. 459). In other words, Darwin’s book does not merely contain a 
large number of data or “facts”. Rather, it is an invitation to appreciate the full scale 
of nature and to view the natural world, not in terms of harmony and equilibrium any 
more, but rather in terms of millions of years of relentless struggle and competition. 
Even evolution itself is not a “fact”, but rather a perspective, a (highly revealing and 
challenging) way of looking at nature and its species. Nature is not a stable harmonious 
ecosystem, but an immense world, forever changing, where animals (individuals and 
species) are continuously struggling for survival. The view of nature as harmonious is 
only possible within the confines of a rather restricted timescale: the scale of human 
time, measured in days, years and centuries, millennia at best. As soon as we look 
upon nature in terms of its own proper temporal dimensions, the ontological profile of 
the natural world changes dramatically. In short, Darwin’s book does not simply con-
vey a large number of observations but rather invites us to look at the world in which 
we live in a certain manner. And for this reason, we can read it like a work of art. It 
opens up new and astonishing possibilities for experience. Reading Darwin’s book 
amounts to being trained in a new style of perception. It is an epistemological event 
that makes certain forms of experience, a certain style of research possible. Darwin’s 
best-seller does not contain a theory strictu sensu, but rather a research programme, a 
way of viewing the natural world. And this is an important epistemological condition 
for accepting the idea of evolution. The timescale of human action is too limited (com-
pared to the temporal dimensions of nature) for the idea of evolution to be credible. 
Although it is possible in the life-world to produce new varieties, it is beyond our 
power to produce novel species. Species as such remain what they are – they appear 
as immutable, and a pigeon will always remain a pigeon, whatever its colours. It is 
only on a much more expanded scale, on the timescale of nature, that the idea of evolu-
tion becomes feasible.
Finally, there is a third stage in Darwin’s work, completely different from the 
previous one, again: notably in terms of scale. The large world of his Beagle adven-
ture gives way, once again, to a micro-cosmos, a house and garden: his Down 
estate, where he came to spend decades of research on species like barnacles and 
earthworms, while taking part in practices such as keeping pigeons and cultivating 
flowers that were popular in his social environment, the English leisure class.
These different practices and settings are reflected in The Origin of Species, as 
well as in his subsequent publications. In the first chapter of his book (“Variation 
under domestication”) Darwin stresses the practical and experiential nature of the 
type of knowledge on which he relies. The data presented in this chapter are assem-
bled during the “third” stage of his career: “I have kept every breed [of pigeons] 
which I could purchase or obtain.… I have associated with several eminent fanci-
ers, and have been permitted to join two of the London Pigeon Clubs …” (p. 82). 
The experience gained from these and similar animal practices would not have suf-
ficed to undermine the long-standing faith in the immutability of species.
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Chapter 4, however, is devoted to “Variation in nature”. And it is here, as well as 
in subsequent chapters, that the difference in scale becomes important. Nature has 
millions of years at her disposal and this explains how even minute changes, accu-
mulated in the course of countless generations, may eventually lead to astonishing 
results. Thus, whereas humans working in their pens and gardens are only able to 
produce new varieties, nature is able to produce new species. Nature grants “vast 
periods of time for the work of natural selection” (p. 147). Indeed: “incomprehensi-
bly vast have been the periods of time that produced new species” (p. 293).
When his book was about to be published, there was a difficulty over the title. 
Darwin wanted it to be called An Abstract of an Essay on the Origin of Species and 
Varieties Through Natural Selection (De Beer p. 155), but the publisher objected. 
Nonetheless, it was Darwin’s firm intention to devote the remainder of his life to 
the elaboration of this mere “abstract” into a series of extended studies.11 Because 
of his worsening health, however, only the first part of this huge and ambitious 
project was finished. In 1868 he published Variation of Animals and Plants Under 
Domestication, basically a follow-up of the first chapter of The Origin of Species. 
From a comparative epistemological point of view, however, a much more plausi-
ble explanation for his failure to complete his ambitious project (i.e. more plausible 
than ill health) was the fact that the setting of his research had so drastically 
changed: English countryside again instead of the vast uncultivated horizons of 
immense untamed nature. Darwin is now interested in animal behaviour evolving 
in a homely context. He now lives in a very small world again and his object of 
study is no longer evolution on a grand scale, but rather the behaviour of modest, 
unspectacular organisms, such as earthworms in his own garden.
“The subject may appear an insignificant one”, Darwin (1881) acknowledges in 
the Introduction to his monograph on earthworms, but eventually he concludes that 
these unassuming animals have played “a more important part in the history of the 
world than most people would at first suppose”. The vegetable mould has past 
many times through, and will continue to pass many times through the intestinal 
canals of worms. Indeed, without this labour of the worms the earth would become 
sterile. In this treatise, Darwin’s world has once again become an extremely calm, 
serene, small-scale and peaceful place. It lacks the stylistic grandeur and drama of 
The Origin of Species, but still has the power to invite us to view and explore the 
world in a certain manner. Interestingly, in the course of his work on anthrax, 
Pasteur also highlights the role of earthworms, but in his case struggle remains the 
perspective and the earthworms are depicted as the “vector of death” (Debré 
1994/1998, p. 317).
Darwin’s somewhat naive enthusiasm when it comes to praising the intelli-
gence, dedication and zeal of earthworms is likely to raise an occasional smile in 
contemporary readers. Yet, this type of discourse has literary qualities in its own 
right. It breathes the atmosphere of common, practical, everyday experiences with 
animals, at times systematic, at times anecdotal. Whereas The Origin of Species is 
the scientific counterpart of huge and impressive books of travel written in the 
11 Cf. Chapter 9.
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nineteenth century (by literary as well as by scientific authors) such as Moby-Dick, 
his book on the life and significance of earthworms is the scientific counterpart of 
similar studies written by men of letters, such as the famous monograph on the life 
of bees by Maurice Maeterlinck (1901), already mentioned in Chapter 2. Like 
Darwin, Maeterlinck is intrigued by phenomena that bear witness to the zeal and 
intelligence of bees. Indeed, the intelligence of his favorite species is emphasized 
throughout the book as a source of enthusiasm. Why? Whenever we discover the 
existence of intelligent organisms anywhere in nature, Maeterlinck tells us (1901, 
p. 133), we seem to experience an emotion similar to the one that befell Robinson 
Crusoe when he discovered a human footprint on the beach. It means that we, as 
intelligent human beings, are not as exceptional (and therefore not as lonely) as we 
had expected.
Thus, both Darwin and Maeterlinck, the scientist and the poet, set out to tran-
scend the time-old understanding of animals in terms of deficiency: animals as 
bodily mechanisms, lacking intelligence, deprived of consciousness. From here, 
two lines of further research evolve. The first line of research is ethology, the sys-
tematic study of animal behaviour. This line will be further explored in Chapter 6. 
Although it can be regarded as a refinement of some of the techniques and methods 
introduced by Darwin and Maeterlinck, it increasingly opts for an “external” and 
“objectivistic” view on animals. The other line of research moves in the opposite 
direction. It opts for an “internal” view on animals, regarding animals as subjects 
of their world and preparing the ground for an inquiry into the question in what 
kind of world animals dwell. Rather than portraying animals in terms of deprivation 
and deficiency, the possibility is considered that their modes of experience are 
different, rather than impoverished. It may well be that animals are dwelling in 
worlds we ourselves may never enter. In other words, the deficiency might be on 
the part of the beholder. It is our deficiency that we cannot truly understand them. 
This idea, that animals are different rather than deficient, and perhaps even episte-
mologically privileged in the sense that they are open to worlds of experience 
denied to humans, is brought forward in a number of literary documents that will 
be briefly discussed in Section 3.5.
3.5 Animals as Epistemologically Privileged Beings
Tacitus (1958) tells us that ancient Germanic tribes kept bands of horses in sacred 
forests. Priests on special occasions visited these mysterious sites, these sacred nat-
ural living quarters in order to observe their neighing and snorting. These horses 
were regarded as confidants of the gods and on no other revelation more reliance 
was placed. On holy days, priests, kings and chiefs of state came there to study 
them (1958, p. 279). Apparently, the archaic mind believed that horses were dwell-
ing in an openness denied to humans, a clearing which somehow surpassed their 
own way of standing out towards the world. They carefully observed these privi-
leged beings, who apparently were granted an intimacy with the grander forces of 
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being and nature, one that transcended the restricted boundaries of the human 
realm. By observing them and accompanying them on holidays, they allowed them-
selves to go beyond the restricted horizons of human experience and to cast a 
glance into possibilities of being and experience with which these animals seemed 
to be intimately acquainted. Although in a way these ancient priests can be regarded 
as proto-ethologists, as ethologists avant la lettre so to speak, their way of studying 
animal behaviour greatly differed from the ways in which animal behaviour is 
studied by modern biologists. Horses are nowadays no longer seen as intermediar-
ies. Their behaviour no longer conveys a “higher” meaning, is no longer regarded 
as containing important pieces of information for humans, such as weather-
forecasting. It is studied for its own sake.
In order to clarify what actually took place – from an epistemological point of 
view – in these ancient Nordic forests of Tacitus’ days, the work of Martin 
Heidegger (1889–1976) may be of some assistance. To a certain extent at least, his 
work really is a philosophy of the forest, notably of forest clearings. And in various 
ways he has made efforts to bring to life again archaic ways of experiencing the 
world, articulated by philosopher-poets, from Herakleitos to Hölderlin. Moreover, 
Heidegger is a philosopher who claims that scientific fields like biology will never 
really be able to lay out an animal’s way of being. In the context of biological 
research, an animal is bound to become an object of physiology, anatomy or ethology. 
But, according to Heidegger, these disciplines do not really succeed in opening up 
for us the world of living beings. To live, Heidegger stresses, is not a characteristic 
of animals, but rather their basic way of being. The question regarding an animal’s 
way of being cannot be posed (let alone be answered) by biology. Notably, according 
to Heidegger, biology fails to discern the fundamental difference between humans 
and animals. This difference does not reside in empirical characteristics, such as the 
“superior intelligence” of humans or the absence of fur on their skin. Man is not an 
extremely intelligent animal, or something like that, he is not an animal at all. The 
basic difference between man and animal is something beyond biology. The differ-
ence resides in the human way of being in the world.
What does Heidegger himself tell us about an animal’s way of being? He does not 
address this issue directly. Rather, his philosophy is post-Kantian in the sense that it 
entails a critical reflection on the ways in which animals emerge in scientific and liter-
ary forms of discourse, in biological treatises and in poems (notably a number of 
poems by Rainer Maria Rilke). Building on these sources, he sketches (rudimentary 
as it may be) a provisional ontology of animalhood. Whereas an anorganic entity – a 
stone, for example – does not have a world at all, Heidegger (1983) argues, animals 
do have a world. Yet, they seem to dwell in a rather poor and restricted world com-
pared to ours. Animals, so it seems, do not really ex-ist, do not really stand out 
towards other things, towards being as such. A cow, for example, will notice the 
grass, but the beauty of the meadow escapes her. The animal hears the sound and tone 
of a voice, but does not understand the meaning of the words. Heidegger agrees with 
Aristotle that, although an animal is able to bellow, neigh or bray, it will never master 
a language, will never really understand or convey meaning (cf. Aristotle 1967, 1253 
a 3). Whereas humans are basically responsive (reacting out of an understanding of 
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what is perceived by them), animals are basically impulsive. Moreover, the possibility 
of truly becoming involved with things is denied to them – the grass will always 
remain grass to them and a prey a prey, it will never become something funny or 
lovely, charming or beautiful, disgusting or pitiful. Objects which cannot be some-
how connected with the animal’s vital interests and needs are not perceived at all and 
remain insignificant to them. Moreover, an animal’s world will never change. Human 
beings build their own world, uncovering aspects of being which to animals remain 
forever hidden. Animals however inhabit a world, forever incomparable with ours. 
An impoverished world – at least from a human point of view.
Elsewhere, however, Heidegger acknowledges that the animal produces a par-
ticular interpretation of the world, albeit a rather limited one (p. 243). The environ-
ment is interpreted from a certain perspective, namely in terms of possibilities for 
absorbing things, for life-enhancement. The animal only perceives what can be 
absorbed or used in order to enhance life. All things which cannot be interpreted in 
such terms, or which do not allow the animal to further its own existence or the 
continuation of its species, will simply not be perceived at all.
In his book on Nietzsche, Heidegger (1961) brings forward a similar point of 
view. The animal does not know what it wants, one cannot even say that it really 
wants something (p. 66). An animal is merely urged or driven by impulse. To will 
something involves an understanding of what is desired. Hunger, for example, 
urges the animal to feed himself, but according to Heidegger we cannot say that the 
animal has a representation of food as such. His appetites are deprived of under-
standing. In short, Heidegger’s ontology of animalhood seems to remain safely 
within the beaten tracks of traditional ontology. The animal emerges as deprived of 
the possibility of really understanding the world.
Certainly, this view on animality is something of a disappointment. For an 
author driven by the ambition to completely revise and revitalize traditional onto-
logical discourse, to go beyond the traditional conception of man as an animal 
rationale, something more innovative should have been expected. His analysis does 
not take us very far, in comparison to traditional ontological discourse on animals 
as epistemologically “maimed”. Rather than really reflecting on what scientific or 
literary sources tell us about animals, Heidegger builds on and reaffirms (albeit in 
his own Heideggerian dialect) the established dichotomies of traditional ontology. 
Indeed, from the perspective of comparative epistemology, Heidegger’s reflections 
are disappointing. They are interesting in the sense that they consider the possibility 
that animals dwell in a world of their own, and that their way of being is quite 
beyond the scope of biological research. Although biology is highly informative 
and reliable, not all dimensions of animality are accessible to science. On the other 
hand, however, Heidegger’s views remain firmly in line with the Western meta-
physical tradition. He continues to define the animal’s world (as well as the ani-
mal’s possibilities of interacting with this world) in terms of deficiency.
This seems a rather premature judgment. Apparently, he already answered the 
question of animalhood before really raising it. In order to be really able to com-
pare our being-in-the-world with an animal’s way of being, we will really have 
to ask ourselves what it means to be an animal (a horse, a whale, a bat or a frog). 
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By immediately framing the issue in terms of poverty and deficiency, Heidegger 
seems to opt for a rather traditional and predictable line of reasoning. He joins the 
chorus so to speak, instead of really allowing the question of animality to emerge. 
Only humans are granted the possibility of being susceptible in a genuine sense 
to what surrounds them. They build a world, rather than interacting impulsively 
with an environment composed of a rather limited set of relevant objects. 
Compared to ours, the animal’s world seems profoundly obscure. They will never 
experience the enlightenment for example that may occasionally befall us when 
we read poetry or are involved in scientific research. Although Heidegger seems 
to agree that it cannot be excluded that animals dwell in an openness of their own, 
we cannot know or say anything meaningful about it.
Heidegger’s views are critical insofar as he criticized biology for being “biolo-
gistic”, that is, blurring the ontological difference between humans and animals. In 
order to reaffirm this difference, Heidegger develops a line of thinking that is more 
or less similar to traditional ontology. Should we really intend to explore the world 
of animal experience from “within”, from the perspective of an animal’s way of 
being, should we really want to explore the possibility that animals develop an 
openness towards the world of their own, that their way of standing out towards the 
world is different rather than deficient, an obvious point of departure for a compara-
tive epistemology would be to reflect on the ways in which the animality of animals 
is described in literary sources. Although elsewhere Heidegger often makes use of 
the possibilities of poetry for surpassing and leaping beyond seemingly inescapable 
but unsatisfactory trajectories of discourse, Blans (1996) emphasizes that this is not 
the case where animals are concerned. Heidegger even refuses to enter the over-
tures that emerge in some of the poems of Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926). In one 
of his elegies, Rilke assigns an openness to animals which surpasses our objectiv-
istic way of perceiving things, and he adds that, by reflecting on the mysterious 
gaze of animals, we ourselves might regain a susceptibility now lost to us. This 
possibility for interpreting the animal’s gaze is bluntly rejected by Heidegger. He 
criticizes it as the expression of a “biologistic” kind of metaphysics which prefers 
animal impulse to human understanding. Let us have a closer look.
Rilke has written at least two important poems on animalhood. The first one is 
his famous poem entitled Der Panther [The Panther, 1903]. It describes a caged 
animal in the Jardin des Plantes in Paris. It is an animal that is more or less the 
victim of a scientific practice, an inhabitant of a scholarly zoo. For our purposes, 
the first stanza is the most important one:
Sein Blick ist vom Vorübergehn der Stäbe His gaze has, from the passing of these bars,
so müd geworden, dab er nichts mehr hält. Grown so weary that it can hold no more.
Ihm ist, als ob es tausend Stäbe gäbe To him it is as if there are thousand bars,
und hinter tausend Stäben keine Welt. beyond these thousand bars, there is no world.
The animal inhabits an impoverished, obscured and empty world. This is not his 
authentic way of being, it is a consequence of ontological violence, depriving him 
of the possibility to really interact with his environment. It is something which is 
enforced upon him, it is not a defect which stems from the animal’s own way of 
being. Obviously, the poet suggests that, if the animal was allowed to dwell in his 
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own world, he would experience his surroundings in a completely different light. 
His world would surely open-up to him. The poverty of the animal’s world is an 
effect of a particular human–animal relationship, of a particular disposition. He is 
reduced to being a living element in a project of classification. His boredom is a 
symptom of the ontological violence to which this animal is subjected. The opening 
lines of Rilke’s Eighth Duino Elegy, a second important poem on animalhood, takes 
a completely different perspective. In this poem he addresses the animal’s way of 
being-in-the-world in much more general terms:
Mit allen Augen sieht die Kreatur The creature discerns openness with all
Das Offene. Nur unsre Augen sind Its eyes. Our human eyes, however, are
Wie umgekehrt und ganz um sie gestellt as if reversed. And all-surrounding it
Als Fallen, rings um ihren freien Ausgang. As barriers, preventing its free passage.
Was draussen ist, wir wissens aus des What is outside, we know it from the animal’s
Anlitz allein… Face only….
Rilke’s poem (1991, p. 470), of which only the opening lines are cited here, is an 
effort to enter and reflect upon the animal’s world “from within”. The numbness, 
the poverty of the panther’s world really was an artifact. In principle, animals tend 
to dwell in an openness denied to us. We may only enter it indirectly, namely by 
studying the animal’s face and gaze. Heidegger’s comment on this poem, his deci-
sion to denounce Rilke’s effort as “biologistic”, seems remarkably defensive and 
traditional, almost like a metaphysical “reflex”. From someone like Heidegger, 
something else would have been expected. Although a certain amount of vitalism 
is certainly present in Rilke’s lines, there is more to it than that. Heidegger repro-
duces and reinforces the time-old distinction between animals on the one hand and 
the “animal rationale” on the other. The fact that it is phrased in a Heideggerian 
ontological dialect does not conceal the prejudiced nature of his view, the continu-
ity between traditional metaphysics and Heidegger’s position. He could (and no 
doubt should) have taken another route. He could have based his views of animal-
hood on a more phenomenological understanding of animals, informed for example 
by literary sources. In his efforts to uncover what has happened to the Rhine River, 
he was quite willing to rely to a significant extent on the poetry of Hölderlin. Why 
is Hölderlin’s work acceptable (even indispensable) as a valuable source of philo-
sophical input, whereas Rilke’s poetry is rejected?
Agamben (2002/2004) has tried to open up the controversy by confronting the 
poetic description of “the open” in Rilke’s elegy with the concept of the open as it is 
elaborated in Heidegger’s work, notably in terms of αληθεια – the uncovering force 
of art. Whereas according to Rilke the animal sees the open “with all its eyes”, our 
human eyes have been “turned backward”. They are placed like traps or barriers 
around us. Whereas humans never enter the “pure space” outside, the animal genu-
inely moves into the open. This “reversal of the hierarchical relationship between man 
and animal” (p. 57) is precisely what Heidegger calls into question. As a consequence 
of nineteenth-century biologism, he argues, Rilke succumbs to an anthropomorphiza-
tion of the animal and a corresponding animalization of man. Heidegger maintains that 
the animal is unaware of the open, in the sense of the unconcealed. An animal remains 
shut out from the very experience of openness. Both Rilke and Heidegger preserve the 
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distinction between humans and animals, but while Rilke does this by describing 
animals as epistemologically privileged beings, Heidegger firmly rejects it as a “hom-
inization” of the animal. The animal is only open towards an unconcealed, undisclosed 
world. Therefore, animal existence can be regarded as a fundamental form of bore-
dom. According to Heidegger, human freedom, our ability to break away from the 
concealing closures in which all creatures are firmly embedded, is achieved through 
language. Following in the footsteps of Plato and Aristotle, Heidegger traces the gap 
separating humans from animals back to language. But once again, this analysis only 
seems to reaffirm the traditional nature of Heidegger’s view.
According to Oudemans (1996), however, a further reflection on Heidegger’s 
understanding of animals may lead to other, less disappointing possibilities. To begin 
with, he argues, it is not Heidegger’s intention to draw a comparison between humans 
and animals. Rather, it is when speaking about “world” that the animal’s way of being 
is addressed. Primarily, Heidegger is interested in human existence. To stand out 
towards the world means to experience it as something completely astonishing to us. 
And it is here that the animal presents itself to us and reveals its mysterious gaze, 
which calls for wonderment rather than disdain. For apparently, they have their own 
way of standing out towards the world, one we cannot enter. We cannot really image 
what their world looks like. We are deprived of the possibility to really understand 
them. If we want to describe an animal, we are likely to revert either to anthropomor-
phism, or to a mere biologistic understanding. And this is our poverty, Oudemans 
argues. The possibility of existence open to animals such as horses or whales is for-
ever denied to us. It may well be that these animals have their own way of standing 
out to things, of becoming involved with things, and perhaps their world merely 
seems poor because it is obscure to us, because it is a world into which we will never 
really be able to follow them. Due to their mysterious gaze, Oudemans claims, ani-
mals allow us in an unfathomable way to turn away from our own susceptibility to 
the world and become, to a limited extent, involved in theirs. Heidegger’s contention 
regarding the poverty of animals should therefore not be interpreted in terms of dep-
rivation, with the implication that our way of standing out towards the world should 
be regarded as a standard compared to which all other forms of life stand out as defi-
cient. We cannot really know what the animal’s world looks like. The possibility of 
really following them into their world is denied to us. The enigmatic aspect of animal 
existence, their unfathomable way of standing out to things calls for wonderment and 
awe, and Oudemans refers to a poetic passage in Heidegger’s writings where it is 
suggested that the floating, singing and calling of a bird in the summer sky calls us 
and brings us into the open (Heidegger 1979, p. 95). Both man and animal stand out 
to the world as openness, but each in a way that is inaccessible to the other.
I guess this is also what Wittgenstein was pointing at when, in his Philosophical 
Investigations, he claims that, should a lion be able to speak to us, we would not be 
able to understand him – we would not really be able to follow him into his world 
(1984).12 In short, although Heidegger initially seems to adhere to a rather traditional 
understanding of animals in terms of deprivation and lack (lack of discernment and 
12 “Wenn eine Löwe sprechen könnte, wir könnten ihn nicht verstehen” (p. 568).
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understanding, lack of true involvement), his reflection on the animal’s way of being 
eventually, on closer reading, seem to point to more promising possibilities. 
Unfortunately, even if Oudemans is right, we must conclude that Heidegger himself 
never really followed his own lead.
It is not my objective, however, to determine whether Heidegger was “right” or 
“wrong”. The question rather is: what kind of sources did Heidegger use to articu-
late his views? From the point of view of comparative epistemology, the disap-
pointment is not caused by Heidegger’s conclusions as such (his reflections on the 
“poverty” of animals), but rather by the fact that he refrains from really using liter-
ary sources as pathways that may allow us to increase our proximity to the animals’ 
world. According to Heidegger, this epistemological possibility is principally 
denied to us, regardless of whether we rely on biological or on literary sources. 
Science and literature suffer from a fundamental “poverty” in the sense that, 
according to Heidegger, they both obscure rather than clarify the ontological differ-
ence between humans and animals, the former because of the “animalization” of 
humans, the latter because of the “hominisation” of animals. From a comparative 
epistemological perspective it would be unsatisfactory to view this deadlock as 
given. The basic conviction guiding comparative epistemology is that we can fur-
ther our understanding of these philosophical issues by considering concrete exam-
ples of literary and scientific efforts that set out to analyse the extent to which 
animals can really be said to be open towards the world.
A comparative epistemological approach to this issue of animalhood urges us to 
start from a scientific or literary document in which animals are presented as epis-
temologically privileged beings. In 1726 Jonathan Swift published his famous book 
Gulliver’s Travels. One of these travels, to the land of the horses, seems a promis-
ing point of departure.
The first two voyages, to the land of the dwarfs and the land of the giants, are 
by far the best known. Yet, from the point of view of comparative epistemology the 
third and the fourth voyage are much more important. The third voyage (to Laputa) 
takes Gulliver to the Academy of Lagado. It is a literary analysis of the epistemo-
logical status of experimental research as it was emerging in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries (the “scientific revolution”). Actually, it is a parody on the 
Royal Society of London. Researchers are involved in hilarious research projects – 
although for those readers who are prepared to see through the exaggerated descrip-
tions, the projects involved are not all that ridiculous, at least not in retrospect. For 
example, the efforts of research “fellows” who are involved in producing artificial 
cobwebs, or in distracting energy from biomass, are less ridiculous if seen from the 
perspective of current research on biomaterials and biofuels. The ridicule is, to a 
certain extent at least, in the eye of the (uncomprehending) beholder.
Far more important for our present purposes, however, is the fourth voyage, to 
the land of the Houyhnhnms – a population of noble horses. When Lemuel Gulliver 
is left behind by pirates on the shore of an unknown land, he meets with an intelli-
gent and generous race of quadrupeds, surpassing human beings in their way of 
standing out to the world in all respects. In fact, the island is inhabited by two 
prominent species: the Houyhnhnms and the Yahoos. The latter are described as 
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disgusting brutes, but actually they are remarkably similar to humans. In short, we 
are faced with something of a reversal. The horses are considerate and wise, the 
humans filthy and dumb. Never did Gulliver behold such disagreeable animals, 
such ugly monsters, such deformed creatures. The worst thing about them is their 
aggressive behaviour and their offensive smell. The horses, however, are decent 
and competent animals, wise governors, patient interlocutors and teachers. 
Gulliver’s first encounter with this remarkable species is described as follows: “The 
horse started a little when he came near me, but soon recovering himself, looked 
full in my face with manifest tokens of wonder.… I would have pursued my jour-
ney, but he placed himself directly in the way, yet looking with a very mild aspect, 
never offering the least violence. We stood gazing at each other for some time …” 
(Swift 1967, pp. 270/271). Subsequently, after another horse has joined them, the 
two Houyhnhnms start neighing to one another, using various gestures: “like per-
sons deliberating upon some affair”, indeed: “not unlike those of a philosopher, 
when he would attempt to solve some new and difficult phenomenon” (p. 272).
Swift’s story is a satirical articulation of the basic sense that there is something 
to animals such as horses that prevents us from describing their way of being merely 
in terms of deficiency and lack. Yet, when we ask ourselves to what extent this novel 
really allows us to open-up the world of these noble animals, to understand their life, 
we must confess that, from the point of view of comparative epistemology, Swift’s 
analysis is rather disappointing. Although at first glance the Houyhnhnms’ gaze of 
wonder seems to convey the possibility that they are epistemological subjects in their 
own right, subjects of experience, dwelling in a world of their own, they actually 
emerge as “governing, rational animals” (285), that is, as idealised humans. Swift 
uses the time-old strategy of homonisation, along the lines of the fable genre. The 
author wants to tell us something about humans and is not really interested in 
animals at all. Rather than addressing the question what horses are, Swift is describ-
ing “noble savages” disguised as horses. They represent a rationalistic, enlightened 
ideal for humanity, but they are completely unconvincing as animals. Instead of with 
real animals we are confronted with imaginary beings, displaying features that are 
recognizably human. Although some traits and features of real horses are retained 
(the Houyhnhnms do have tails), Swift basically confronts us with a rather anthro-
pomorphic version of this species. His story is the English counterpart – in prose – of 
Fontaine’s poetry. The inclination to describe animals in a human-like fashion, dis-
playing human characteristics, has infected literary discourse as a kind of chronic 
epistemological epidemic. It has not really encouraged literary authors to really 
focus their attention in the animality of animals.
Therefore, we apparently have to move further down the track. We have to enter 
the nineteenth century, notably the era of realism. The literary counterpart of 
Darwin’s realism, of Darwin’s desire to describe the world not as an idealised har-
monious arcadia, but rather as a violent, proliferating wilderness, a world of relent-
less struggle, is the realistic novel. It is in this context that we may be expected to 
find literary sources on animals that are epistemologically more convincing. We 




What is a Whale? Moby-Dick, Marine Science 
and the Sublime
4.1 Why Moby-Dick? An Introduction
Moby-Dick (1851/1931) is a magnificent novel, an American epic, a literary encyclo-
paedia, a monument of language. Jean-Paul Sartre (1941/1977) called it a Summa, a 
gigantic, monstrous, antediluvian book. One may read Moby-Dick for several reasons, 
and from several perspectives: as a novel of adventure, a psychological case history 
casting an obsessed sea captain, an anthropological study of nineteenth-century 
 maritime life, or a fascinating example of Bakhtinean “heteroglossia”.1 Whenever 
 reference to Moby-Dick is made, the first thing that will come to mind, no doubt, is the 
novel’s fantastic plot, more spectacular than tragic, when the great White Whale at last 
destroys the destroyer of its species. Indeed, Moby-Dick can be read as an affidavit, a 
persistent effort of Ishmael – its narrator – to convince us of the fact that things like 
that can really happen – although in the end hardly anyone will believe him.
In this chapter, however, Moby-Dick will be read as a literary document that sets 
out to tell us something about maritime nature, about the wide, unshored, oceanic 
expanses and its most eminent inhabitant, the whale – the great Sperm Whale to be 
exact. Melville’s novel constitutes an important file, a chapter in animal history, 
written in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Darwin was about to publish 
his Origin of Species. Moby-Dick is a document that pretends to answer the ques-
tion What is a whale? Or rather, it stages a struggle between several incompatible 
answers, yielded by incompatible perspectives on marine life, mutually challenging 
and criticizing one another. Moreover, these answers entail different ethical judge-
ments on the moral status of the whale and on the moral propriety of whaling.
Three perspectives, three ways of answering the question of the whale, as fle-
shed out in the novel, will be taken into consideration in this chapter: that of the 
whaler (or “whaleman” as Melville calls him), the scientist, and the philosopher. In 
this introduction I will sketch them in broad outline, before submitting them to a 
more careful examination in subsequent sections.
1 According to Bakhtin (1988), a true novel is a polyphonic, multi-voiced interplay of languages, 
accents and dialects. This is exemplified by the following quote taken from Moby-Dick: 
“Something of the salt sea yet lingered in old Bildad’s language, heterogeneously mixed with 
Scriptural and domestic phrases …” (p. 813).
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To the nineteenth-century whaler, whales and their environment offered ample 
opportunity for a life of adventure and hazardous encounters. But first of all, they 
provided him with a source of income. The sordid, time-consuming business of 
whaling basically came down to transforming incredible amounts of organic blub-
ber into merchantable oil. In his magnificent head, the Sperm Whale kept the pre-
cious substance from which he derived his name, spermaceti, that used to be 
manufactured into medicinal products.2 Finally, whale bones and teeth were used 
as raw materials for contrivances of various kinds.
To the nineteenth-century scientist, the sea and the whale basically constituted 
an enigma. In the 1850s, marine scientists were still struggling with obscure phe-
nomena such as tides and currents,3 the existence of deep sea life and the chemical 
composition of sea water (Deacon 1971). As for whales, naturalists from Aristotle 
onwards had clearly been puzzled by them. Aristotle noticed that whales and dol-
phins were viviparous and that they had breasts and lungs (489b4, 521b24) and 
therefore, he set them aside from other sea-animals. Yet, although he recognized 
several similarities with terrestrial quadrupeds, it was Linnaeus himself who finally 
decided to associate these life forms with one another – an important decision, 
because it resulted in a change of name: mammals instead of quadrupeds 
(Nordenskiöld 1928/1946, p. 213). But precisely how such a gigantic mammal was 
able to survive and find its way in the depths and immensities of the oceanic world, 
remained utterly incomprehensible.
Finally, from a philosopher’s perspective, the ocean functioned as a powerful 
image, as in the case of Kant, who incorporated the image of the wide, maritime 
expanses into his theory of the sublime. In the case of Nietzsche, who regarded 
himself a spiritual descendant of Columbus (Janz 1978, p. 247) and compared his 
philosophical project with a sea journey,4 the ocean functioned as a metaphor for 
widening one’s perspective and expanding one’s horizons, as exemplified by his 
aphorism “Embark” in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft [“The Gay Science”]:
[W]hat is needful is a new justice! And a new watchword. And new philosophers. The 
moral earth, too, is round. The moral earth, too, has its antipodes. The antipodes, too, have 
the right to exist. There is yet another world to be discovered – and more than one. Embark, 
philosophers!5
2 Spermaceti literally means “whale sperm”, which was what “landlubbers” (incorrectly) believed 
the white, greasy, odorous substance to be.
3 “The secrets of the currents in the seas have never yet been divulged, even to the most erudite 
research …” (p. 869).
4 See for example his Letter to Erwin Rohde of February 22, 1884: “In the meantime, I pursue my 
course. It is really a journey, a sea journey …” (“Inzwischen gehe ich meinen Gang weiter, 
eigentlich ist’s eine Fahrt, eine Meerfahrt …”).
5 “[E]ine neue Gerechtigkeit tut not! Und eine neue Lösung! Und neue Philosophen! Auch die 
moralische Erde ist rund! Auch die moralische Erde hat ihre Antipoden! … Es gibt noch eine 
andere Welt zu entdecken – und mehr als eine! Auf die Schiffe, ihr Philosophen!” [Die fröhliche 
Wissenschaft, § 289]. The same basic image is present in § 124 (“We have left the land and have 
embarked …”), § 283 (“Live dangerously.… Send your ships into uncharted seas …”) and 
Appendix (“Toward new seas.… Without plan, into the vast open sea I head my Genoese ship” – 
note that Columbus came from Genoa).
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This summons clearly resonates with the “archetypical image” associated with 
water as a basic element, discussed in Chapter 2, water as the element of freedom, 
of mobility, of widening one’s horizon. Although Nietzsche himself refrained from 
doing what he summoned others to do, scientists like Darwin and novelists like 
Melville actually went to sea. Darwin, although regarded by Nietzsche as an arid 
and mediocre mind,6 exposed himself to the experience of a long-term trans-oceanic 
voyage in the course of which he did discover new worlds, new justifications, new 
moral watchwords even (“struggle for life”) that were to have a tremendous impact 
on science, philosophy and even culture at large.
Other perspectives are present in Moby-Dick as well, such as the theologian’s 
one, depicting the whale as the biblical Leviathan and the ocean as that part of the 
world where the great flood never abated. Indeed, the interpretation of marine phe-
nomena in Biblical terms is more or less omnipresent in the novel and also resounds 
in the views and language of the philosophical sailor and story-teller Ishmael.
But what about the novelist’s whale? Actually, there is not one novelist’s whale. 
Ishmael-the-narrator unmistakably sides with the whaler’s point of view, but 
Melville-the-author is interested in, and tries to do justice to, a plurality of voices. 
Various idiolects are allowed entrance into his multi-lingual novel. On some occa-
sions, for example, the whale is viewed from a purely economic aspect, and the 
novel informs us about the incredible quantities of oil that may be extracted from 
one whale, while the whale’s head is called the Heidelbergh Tun, a great “tierce” 
replenished with five hundred gallons of spermaceti (p. 963/964). At other times, 
however, the whale emerges as an aesthetical phenomenon, and we find the specta-
tors allured by the “gentle joyousness”, the “mighty mildness of repose in swift-
ness” with which the gliding great whale is invested (p. 1086). Even within a 
particular perspective, such as the scientific one, the novel’s language tends to 
oscillate between, for example, a mechanistic account (telling us that the aorta of a 
whale is larger in the bore than the main pipe of the water-works at London 
Bridge7) and a more or less vitalistic one, explaining how by breathing, the whale 
withdraws from the air a certain element imparting to the blood its vivifying princi-
ple; and how, during his sojourn in the depths, he carries “a surplus stock of vitality 
in him” (p. 982).
As for the novel’s dramatis personae, Ishmael is initially a light-hearted adven-
turer who wants to see the world and find out by experience what whaling is. He is 
enlisted on the Pequod, with Ahab for a captain: an introvert, demonic maniac, who 
lost a leg while trying to capture Moby-Dick on a previous voyage and is now 
obsessed with this one desire: to “dismember his dismemberer” (p. 860). Queequeq, 
one of the Pequod’s harpooners, is casted as a noble savage. We are told, for 
instance, that his head is reminiscent of George Washington’s head: “Queequeg 
was George Washington cannibalistically developed” (p. 789). The Pequod takes 
6 “For scientific discoveries of the type of Darwin’s a certain narrowness, aridity and industrious 
diligence … may not be a bad disposition” (Nietzsche 1980, § 253).
7 The water roaring in its passage through that pipe is “inferior in impetus and velocity to the blood 
gushing from the whale’s heart” (p. 754).
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sail from the famous East-Coast whaling port of Nantucket. Its inhabitants, we are 
informed, are outstanding whaling experts who for centuries cruised the oceans to 
give chase to the great Leviathan. In the case of the Pequod, however, the whaling-
voyage is transformed into a disquieting crusade against Moby-Dick, a white Sperm 
Whale of astonishing magnitude, the most appalling of all brutes, notorious for his 
intelligent malignity. In the meantime a considerable number of whales are cap-
tured, but Moby-Dick remains the Pequod’s “final and romantic object” (p. 887). 
When, in the tropical Pacific, the fatal encounter finally takes place, it all ends with 
a fantastic, incredible catastrophe. After killing Ahab, Moby-Dick manages to sink 
the vessel. Ishmael is the sole survivor, the last human being in a flooded world.
But Ishmael’s account is not simply another fantastic whaling-story. From the 
very outset it purports to be a quasi-scientific manual on whaling and on whales, a 
monograph on cetology – Cetus being the Latin name for whale.8 Similar cetologi-
cal works had been published in previous years, such as Thomas Beale’s Natural 
history of the Sperm Whale and (above all) William Scoresby’s Account of the 
Arctic Regions with a History and Description of the Northern Whale Fishery. 
Melville knew most of these books and extensively borrowed from them (Vincent 
1992; Parker 1992). Moby-Dick is in fact a literary parody on this genre that was 
quite popular at the time.9 From an epistemological point of view, these documents 
constitute an intermediary genre between official science and the “folk biology” of 
practical men. In the writings of Beale, Scoresby and others, two contemporary 
ways of acquiring knowledge on whales – namely practical experience and system-
atic research – tend to converge into documents that can be regarded as epistemo-
logical hybrids. In Moby-Dick, however, the basic tension between scientific and 
practical knowledge is amplified, intensified. For its narrator it is clear that a whaler’s 
understanding of the whale is of a completely different nature than the scientific 
one. Whereas whalers draw from their personal acquaintance with the phenomena 
of maritime life, the scientist relies on careful, systematic observation (notably 
dissection of stranded whales). Ishmael unmistakably acts as the whaler’s advocate. 
His practical cetology is emphatically anti-scientific.
This chapter aims to be an analysis in depth of the epistemological aspects of 
Melville’s novel. In Section 4.2, the whaler’s epistemology of self-exposure will be 
confronted with the scientist’s epistemology of self-restraint. To what extent can 
science truthfully disclose the wondrous phenomena of maritime life in general and 
of a whale’s life in particular? Most notably, I will focus on Ishmael’s criticism of 
the scientific practice of classification, building on our discussions in Chapter 3.
8 The order of the cetaceans includes whales, dolphins and porpoises and is taxonomically 
 subdivided into odontocetes (toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises) and mysticetes (baleen whales). 
The sperm whale is a toothed whale, notorious for hunting giant squid in the deep, dark, 
 inaccessible ocean regions.
9 At times, he uses lofty scientific formula – “It will have been seen that …”, “as has been 
 elsewhere set forth …”, etc. – but the general mood is one of parody and laughter. Indeed, “Moby-
Dick reads like a formal essay, except that Melville’s tone is mocking and his procedure 
high-spirited” (Vincent 1992). Moby-Dick provides ample material in support of Bakhtin’s theory 
that the novel parodies official speech genres, including that of science.
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Subsequently, I will turn to philosophy and its epistemology of meditation. Most 
notably, I will focus on the way the experience of the sublime is represented in the 
novel. Gradually, however, this comparison will reveal the extent to which episte-
mological choices and differences also determine our moral experiences and 
assessments concerning whales. Indeed, Moby-Dick reveals the close affinity 
between epistemology and ethics. Melville’s novel allows us to understand how the 
whaler’s appreciation of the whale differs from that of the scientist, not only in 
terms of epistemology, but also in terms of ethics. The conditions created by the 
practical, the scientific and the philosophical way of perceiving and experiencing 
whales are bound to generate diverging moral affinities. This is quite apparent, for 
example, when the issue of the possible extinction of the whale is raised. What we 
may learn from Moby-Dick is that our position regarding such issues is determined 
to a large extent by our epistemological convictions, as well as by the sources and 
practices we tend to rely on when answering the question “What is a whale?” In 
other words, Melville’s novel can be read in various ways, but it is first of all an 
exercise in comparative epistemology.
4.2  What is a Whale? The Epistemology of Self-exposure 
Versus the Epistemology of Self-restraint
As already indicated in Chapter 3, the whaler’s knowledge of whales and their 
environment is characterized in Moby-Dick as “the real living experience of living 
men” (p. 869). Only whalers really and truly know what a whale is, and only a 
whaler’s picture of a whale conveys a truthful idea of the living animal as seen by 
his living hunters. Scientists are basically regarded as inexperienced. Most of them 
have seldom seen, let alone hunted whales. The basic epistemological stance of 
practical cetology is self-exposure. The only way to get to know the whale is to 
expose oneself to the experience of a whaling voyage:
How vain and foolish, then, thought I, for timid untravelled man to try to comprehend 
aright this wondrous whale, by merely poring over his dead attenuated skeleton.… No. 
Only in the heart of quickest perils; only when within the eddyings of his angry flukes; only 
on the profound unbounded sea, can the fully invested whale be truly and livingly found 
out. (p. 1032)
A whale-ship, Ishmael assures us, was his Yale College and his Harvard (p. 826). 
And although he agrees that a professional hunter’s account may suffer from exag-
gerations, he nonetheless emphasizes that on certain occasions, the apparently fab-
ulous will be “fully equalled by the realities of whaling” (p. 869).
Ishmael claims to have read a substantial amount of official zoological publica-
tions on whales, but he seldom finds them very helpful when it comes to understand-
ing whales. Utter confusion exists among the natural historians of this animal, he 
argues, and they themselves quite readily admit it – an “impenetrable veil” is said to 
cover all knowledge of the cetacea (p. 838). For Ishmael, the cause of this confusion 
is not difficult to point out. Many are the men who have written of the whale, he tells 
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us, but only a few ever saw living whales, and only one of them (William Scoresby) 
was a professional harpooner and whaler. Most landsman (and this includes most 
naturalists) are completely ignorant of some of the plainest and most palpable won-
ders of the oceanic world. Of a particular species of whales (namely the Killer 
Whale) Ishmael tells us that “little is known to the Nantucketer, and nothing at all to 
the professed naturalist” (p. 844). As to the great Sperm Whale, he assures us that 
his is still an “unwritten life” (p. 839). It even seems impossible to visualize the 
whale. The great Leviathan defies any representation. He is that one creature in the 
world which remains unpainted. There is no earthly way of finding out precisely 
what the whale looks like. Again, the only mode in which even a tolerable idea of 
his living contour can be derived, is “by going a-whaling yourself” (p. 921). And the 
only genre that may be able to convey this type of knowledge truthfully is the novel. 
Like Ibsen in The Lady of the Sea, Melville seems to subscribe to the idea that there 
are forms of knowledge about the sea and its inhabitants that are more intimate and 
natural somehow than formal knowledge and cannot be articulated in scientific 
terms. Only literary genres can document them in a sensitive and convincing way.
Thus, according to Ishmael, cetology can only achieve its aims by abandoning the 
epistemology that entails careful, protracted scholarly work in favour of self-exposure. 
After having ascertained that a picture of a whale contained in a book by the naturalist 
Frederick Cuvier is seriously flawed, Ishmael pardons the author by pointing out that 
he never had the benefit of a whaling voyage. All pictures in “a scientific systemized 
whale book” by Lacépède are judged as incorrect (p. 920). And when in another 
volume a surprisingly correct engraving is encountered, Ishmael concludes that the 
person responsible for it “was either practically conversant with his subject or else 
marvellously tutored by some experienced whaler” (p. 922). Still, some serious fault 
might be found with the anatomical details of this whale, Ishmael admits, “but let 
that pass” (idem.). Official science, taking its drawings mostly from stranded speci-
men, is a deficient practice. For Ishmael, even the carefree pictures of whales painted 
by retired sailors on boards, boxes and whale-teeth are usually more adequate than 
the most careful drawings in scientific publications.
Thus, self-exposure is the royal path to knowledge. To Captain Peleg, who 
enlists him on the Pequod, Ishmael explains that he wants to find out by experience 
what whaling is, that he wants to see the ocean with his own eyes (p. 802). Peleg 
suggests that he might step forward and take a peep over board, where the open 
ocean can readily be seen: an unlimited prospect, exceedingly monotonous. “Well, 
what’s the report?” Peleg asks him, “what did ye see?”. Not much, is Ishmael’s 
answer, nothing but water and the horizon. But in order to really see the ocean, one 
has to dwell on it for months, for years preferably.
The lives of whales are obscured by the methods of “professed naturalists” and 
scientific “cetologists”. As soon as a scientific stance is taken, the real living whale 
seems to disappear. As soon as we are informed about the number of vertebrae in 
the whale’s vertebral column, or about the exact latitudes and longitudes of the 
whale’s migratory routes, the real living whale seems lost. The epistemology of sci-
ence is one of self-restraint, rather than self-exposure. From a scientific point of 
view, sailors (particularly whalers) are to be regarded as a notoriously unreliable 
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source of information on whales.10 Their basic flaws are capriciousness and (above 
all) a tendency towards exaggeration. They all too readily allow themselves to be 
fascinated by the marvellous. “In maritime life”, Ishmael assures us, “far more than 
in that of terra firma, wild rumours abound, wherever there is any adequate reality 
for them to cling to. And as the sea surpasses the land in this matter, so the whale 
fishery surpasses every sort of maritime life, in the wonderfulness and fearfulness of 
the rumours which sometimes circulate there” (p. 867). As whalers are “by all odds 
the most directly brought into contact with whatever is appallingly astonishing in the 
sea” (idem), Ishmael acknowledges that their reliability should be counted even less 
than that of the other sailing professions. Face to face, they eye the sea’s greatest 
marvels. Therefore, it is only by exaggerating the factually known that one can 
approximate something like the real living experience of whalers. Thus, conjectures 
are readily turned into possibilities, and possibilities into established facts.
In Chapter 45 Ishmael presents us with a formal Affidavit regarding the question 
whether a sperm whale can really destroy a whaling vessel. He begins by saying 
that he cares not to perform his task methodically, like a “professed naturalist” 
would, but contents himself with producing the desired impression by citing a lim-
ited number of citations, practically or reliable known to him as a whaler. From 
these citations, he takes it, the conclusion aimed at will naturally follow of itself (p. 
881). His subsequent argument is indeed worked out in accordance with this pro-
cedure. One of the problems facing the whaler is that his experiences may often 
seem incredible to landlubbers. People ashore only vaguely surmise what an enor-
mous creature a Sperm Whale really is. In order to establish that a member of this 
species may be sufficiently powerful, knowing and malicious to destroy and sink a 
large ship, several items of evidence are cited. In the year 1820 the ship Essex of 
Nantucket was attacked by a huge Sperm Whale. “I read [the captain’s] plain and 
faithful narrative”, Ishmael assures us, “and conversed with his son, and all this 
within a few miles of the scene of the catastrophe” (p. 883). An extract from the 
captain’s own account runs thus:
At all events, the whole circumstances taken together, all happening before my eyes, and 
producing, at that time, impressions in my mind of decided, calculated mischief, on the part 
of the whale (many of which impressions I cannot now recall), induce me to be satisfied 
that I am correct in my opinion. (idem)
Mention is made of other evidence “one way or another known to me” and finally 
Ishmael points out that the marvellous event is not only corrobated by present facts, 
but that similar marvels occurred in previous ages. Procopius, sixth century AD, by 
the best authorities considered a most trustworthy and unexaggerating historian, 
testified how a great sea monster destroyed vessels in the sea of Marmora. 
According to Ishmael, this certainly must have been a whale, and he is even 
“strongly inclined” to think a Sperm Whale. For although Sperm Whales are never 
seen in the Mediterranean, further investigation brought out that not so long ago a 
Commodore Davis found a skeleton of a sperm whale on the Barbary coast. Ergo, 
10 “All sailors of all sorts are more or less capricious and unreliable” (p. 887).
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Procopius’ sea-monster must in all probability have been a sperm whale. In this 
manner, Ishmael gives us an impression of a whaler’s method of argumentation.11
From a Bachelard-like point of view, it is not too difficult to subject Ishmael’s 
account to a “psychoanalytical” assessment. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, 
Bachelard follows Jung in his distinction between the two modes of thinking: formal 
(or discursive) and imaginative thinking. Whereas the former evolves on the basis 
of formal logic and the causality principle, the latter relies on association and anec-
dotal information. It is obvious that Ishmael’s cetology belongs to the second for-
mat. This means that his epistemological differences with the various forms of 
scientific academic discourse are of a very fundamental nature indeed. Starting point 
of his cetology is a typical image (τυπος, ειδος, ιδε′α), namely the monster arche-
type, the icon of an incredibly huge and even veracious whale. It is an obstinate idea: 
the biblical Leviathan, that is also emphatically present in various pre-modern 
scientific sources, such as Procopius, and in the stories of sailors of all times. 
Ishmael’s treatment of empirical data is clearly in accordance with this imaginative 
mode of thought. He eagerly cites sources that support his basic idea, while ignoring 
others. Contradictory evidence simply cannot be true. It is at odds with the very basic, 
ineradicable idea that inspires him, that imprinted itself in his psyche – his basic truth. 
Scientific discourse can never live up to, never do justice to this basic, inviting, 
indeed: alluring image. From the point of view of imagination, as a mode of thought, 
science is bound to disappoint us. Indeed, as an iconoclastic practice, it remains 
suspicious towards the images of the marvellous, aiming to replace them with quan-
titative data, numbers, biological terminology, chemical nomenclature and so on. 
Ishmael is disappointed by nineteenth-century zoology much as Victor Frankenstein 
was disappointed by nineteenth-century chemistry. Take for example Victor’s lam-
entation already cited in Chapter 1: “The ambition of the [modern] enquirer seemed 
to limit itself to the annihilation of those visions on which my interest in science was 
chiefly founded. I was required to exchange chimeras of boundless grandeur for 
realities of little worth” (p. 306). Ishmael’s experience is remarkably similar. Yet, 
unlike Victor, he stubbornly refuses to subject himself to an epistemological conver-
sion. Or perhaps we should say that, given his working-class background, he simply 
was not granted the privilege to really expose himself, other than in a toilsome and 
autodidactic manner, to the ideas of modern science. He was exposed to conditions 
(the world of manual, industrial labour) that differed significantly from those of 
Frankenstein (the bourgeois world of books, poetry, cultural travel and refined expe-
rience) and this may have resulted in their diverging epistemological trajectories.
In her impressive and superbly documented history of the marine sciences, 
Margaret Deacon (1971) elaborately reflects on the epistemological tension between 
11 Jules Verne wrote a novel that shares some similarities with Melville’s (Les histoires de Jean-
Marie Cabidoulin, published in 1901) – although in Verne’s case the narrator sides with the sci-
entific view, rather than with the stories and anecdotes of whalers. Nonetheless, the same types of 
discussion on sea-animals of monstrous proportions are addressed, against the backdrop of the 
same epistemological conflict between formal and factual lines of thinking versus imaginative and 
narrative ones, between practices of classification versus story-telling.
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
scientific and practical knowledge, tracing it carefully through history, although (quite 
unlike Ishmael) Deacon rather sides with the scientist’s point of view. From Pliny and 
his contemporaries onwards, Deacon argues, throughout the roman and medieval 
period, and even during the Renaissance, marine scholars used to taken what she calls 
a “literary” approach to maritime phenomena, reading, citing and assembling extracts 
from various sources, producing encyclopaedic compilations of views borrowed from 
various documents, with the result that knowledge of natural phenomena such as cur-
rents and tides was usually much more accurate among (illiterate) seamen than among 
scholars. The people who practically used the sea, however, often did not transfer their 
accumulated knowledge to paper. While medieval sailors were often well informed 
about those features of the sea which were relevant to their profession, medieval and 
early modern writers seldom had any practical knowledge of the phenomena they dis-
cussed. The limited number of “solid facts” that were introduced from time to time, 
were invariably derived from the practical experience of sailors.
It was not until the seventeenth century that marine scientists began to appreciate the 
importance of first-hand examination and observation. A collaboration between schol-
ars and sailors ensued. Sailors were now asked to collect and record information con-
cerning marine phenomena in the journals of their voyages. At several occasions, the 
Royal Society published Directions for Seamen, counting on the scientifically oriented 
sailor to collect and record oceanographic information. Such measurements would 
gradually allow the mapping of so amorphous an element as the ocean (p. 84).
Initially, Beacon tells us, scientists tended to distrust the ability of sailors to 
make objective observations, almost as much as sailors scorned the complacency 
of landlubbers. But half-way the nineteenth century – the era of Moby-Dick – the 
prospects for overcoming this tension became more favourable. Gradually, the col-
laboration between scientists and sailors improved.
Already in 1769 (or 1770) the importance of a dialogue between scientists and 
sailors became evident. In that year, Benjamin Franklin noticed that mail packets 
sailing from Plymouth to New York were taking 2 weeks longer than the American 
merchantmen sailing from London to Rhode Island. He mentioned this to Captain 
Folger, of Nantucket, and was told that this was because the packet boats were 
unaware that they were sailing against the Gulf Stream. American whalers who 
hunted the whales on both sides of the current had done their best to enlighten them, 
but their advice had been disregarded. At Franklin’s request, Folger marked the 
course of the current on a chart, and with the publication of it, people at last became 
familiar with the concept of the Gulf Stream.
Several concrete examples of collaborations between sailors (including whalers) 
and scientists are pointed out in Deacon’s book. Captain William Scoresby, who 
also figures in Moby-Dick, was a whaler who published extensively on meteorol-
ogy – his Account of the Arctic regions has already been mentioned. This book was 
a whaling manual written by “a genuine whaler gifted with scientific caution and 
restraint” (Vincent 1992).12 Other sailors who greatly contributed to the develop-
ment of marine science were, for example, Robert Fitzroy of H.M.S. Beagle, who 
12 In Moby-Dick, Scoresby’s scientific exactitude is ridiculed.
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systematically recorded observations in a geographical journal, and John Murray, 
who joined a whaler as a surgeon and later became an expert on deep sea biology. 
Sailors were allowed to contribute to science insofar as they adhered to its basic 
epistemological premises and educated themselves in viewing the ocean in accord-
ance with scientific methods. It took some time before they had familiarized them-
selves with the protocols and procedures recommended by modern science. By and 
by, the logbooks and journals were emptied of their narrative content and filled 
instead with columns, tables, measurements, coordinates – in short: with symboli-
cal data, with numbers.
Ishmael’s cetology can perhaps be regarded as a protest against this recruitment of 
whalemen for the scientific cause, and as a rehabilitation of precisely those forms of 
knowledge that are bound to be erased by these new types of registration, new tech-
niques for keeping records. Moby-Dick is, one might say, an epistemological mutiny.
From an epistemological point of view, at least one claim made by Ishmael 
seems highly questionable, namely the claim that his cetology is based on “the vis-
ible whale”, on on-site experience. Rather his methodology seems to fit into 
Deacon’s description of the “literary” approach, building huge collections of 
extracts and anecdotes, complemented with a limited amount of direct observation. 
I will follow up on this in Section 4.3.
4.3 On Classifying Whales
One particular scientific issue receiving ample attention in Moby-Dick is that of 
classifying the whale. Ishmael distances himself from the uninspiring output of 
official science, containing so little “original matter”, in order to work out a “popu-
lar comprehensive classification” of his own (p. 839). A ponderous endeavour 
indeed, amounting to “the classification of the constituents of a chaos” (p. 838). 
But, he assures us, “I have swam through libraries and sailed through oceans; I had 
to do with whales with my visible hands, and I will give it a try” (p. 839).
The basic question is whether a whale is a mammal or a fish. Two official ceto-
logical definitions of a whale are cited: Cuvier (“The whale is a mammiferous 
animal without hind feet”, p. 754), and Linnaeus (“I hereby separate the whales from 
the fish; on account of their warm bilocular heart, their lungs, their moveable eye-
lids, their hollow ears, and penem intrantem feminam mammis lactantem”, p. 839). 
To a whale-wise practical cetologist, this – the identification of the Sperm Whale as 
a mammal – is unacceptable. How can the most eminent of all sea animals be some-
thing other than a fish? In fact, Ishmael consulted Simeon Macey and Charley 
Coffin, both of Nantucket, for their judgement, and they united in the opinion that 
the reasons set forth by official science were altogether insufficient, or even humbug 
(p. 839). Ishmael himself takes “the good old fashioned ground” that the whale is a 
fish, and calls upon “holy Jonah” to back him. This is how he defines a whale and 
labels him “for all time to come”: “A whale is a spouting fish with a horizontal tail. 
There you have him …” (p. 840). And he adds: “By the above definition of what a 
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whale is, I do by no means exclude from the leviathanic brotherhood any sea crea-
ture hitherto identified with the whale by the best informed Nantucketers; nor, on the 
other hand, link it with any fish hitherto authoritatively regarded as alien” (idem).
Ishmael admits that his “contracted” definition, said to result from “expanded 
meditation”, lacks “minute anatomical descriptions” (p. 839). It relies on the imme-
diate, visual aspect of the whale as such, in his entire bodily volume, on Anschauung, 
so to speak. It constitutes what could be called a phenomenological alternative to 
the dissecting practices of official science. Yet, on closer examination, Ishmael’s 
definition cannot be said to result from “uncontaminated” experience alone. On the 
contrary, more than on first-hand experience, on “the living experience of living 
men” as he calls it, it relies on written documents, on theories, on the opinions of 
authorities, such as the Book of Jonah and the witty “experts” from Nantucket – 
and, eventually, it relies on a basic idea, a basic image. Confirmed more or less by 
a number of dramatic experiences, but not based on systematic research. In order 
to find support for his idea, Ishmael’s cetology borrows from literary sources, such 
as Procopius and the Bible – a way of practicing natural science that had been ren-
dered obsolete by Linnaeus, Cuvier and others. His cetology may be called pre-
Linnaean. It adheres to the epistemological premises, the “historical a priori” as 
Foucault (1966) called it, of a previous epoch, namely the Renaissance. Indeed, the 
similarities with pre-Linnaean documents, as analyzed by Foucault, are remarkable. 
The typical set of items listed in natural histories before Linnaeus and Cuvier, can 
be found in Ishmael’s account as well: the names of whales in different languages 
(Hebrew, Greek, Latin, etc.), references to the whale in the Bible (Jonah, Job, 
Isaiah, Ezekiel) as well as in outstanding works of art (Hamlet, King Henry, 
Rabelais, Paradise Lost, etc.), stories about famous, fabulous whales (Rinaldo 
Rinaldini, Timor To, New Zealand Jack, Morquan, Don Miguel)13 and other litteraria, 
emblematic representations of whales,14 information about medical properties of 
certain whale products (such as spermaceti), anthropomorphic descriptions (“the 
Hump Back Whale is gamesome and lighthearted”, “the Black Fish carries an ever-
lasting Mephistophelean grin”, etc.). As Foucault points out, this method for defining 
natural entities relies to a significant extent on imagination and association, i.e. on 
the logic of similarities and resemblance.15
As a typical pre-Linnaean document, Ishmael’s account fails to make a clear 
distinction between the various sources he uses, such as first-hand observation, 
hearsay and literary documents. All these materials are simply piled together. From 
the point of view of science, Ishmael’s cetology constitutes a regression, so it 
seems. It eagerly borrows from literary sources, quite in accordance with the “liter-
ary method” that had been in vogue until the middle of the eighteenth century. 
From Linnaeus onwards scientists had been working hard to strip their object of its 
13 These are whales “as well known to the students of Cetacean history as Marius or Sylla to the 
classic scholar” (p. 882).
14 Cf. “les blasons où ils figure” (Foucault 1966, p. 141).
15 “[L]a ressemblance se situe du côté de l’imagination ou, plus exactement, elle n’apparaît que par 
vertu de l’imagination” (1966, p. 83).
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textual layers, allowing it to appear naked as it were, collecting factual data rather 
than texts.16 Ishmael, however, persists in unsystematically combining personal 
observations with extracts of all sorts. In the libraries of whaling he recovers the 
sediments and residues of centuries of Historia animalorum, in combination with 
input from the fable literature. With his exegetic readings of Jonah and other 
canonical (or less canonical) works, Ishmael’s cetology comes much closer to the 
biblical zoology (zoology as a special branch of theology and biblical studies) as it 
still flourished far into modernity – even up to “Paley’s theology”, quoted by 
Ishmael – than to the marine biology of his day.
Modern science is basically iconoclastic. It destroys the image of the object as a 
whole, as a Gestalt, in order to replace it by series of numbers and measurements 
(Foucault 1966, p. 150; Lacan 1981, 1994). But Ishmael clings to his fascinating 
image of the whale, which in many respects remains a very traditional icon, the 
biblical Leviathan of old. One cannot say that the whaler’s whale in Moby-Dick is 
the real whale. Rather, like the snow-white quadruped in the royal standard of Siam 
and the Hanoverian flag (p. 873), Ismael’s heroic whale is a more or less imaginary 
animal, a fabulous heraldic iconization, rather than a biological species.
4.4 Whaling and Philosophy: The Meditating Sailor
While Ishmael’s attitude towards natural science is outspokenly hostile, his attitude 
towards philosophy is much more sympathetic. The philosophy he has in mind, 
however, is of a (pseudo)-platonic, mystifying, meditative type: “Meditation and 
water are wedded for ever”, he tells us (p. 760). Going to sea is Ishmael’s way of 
becoming a philosopher.17 All deep thinking is but “the intrepid effort of the soul 
to keep the open independence of her sea; while the winds of heaven and earth 
conspire to cast her on the treacherous, slavish shore” (p. 823) – the shore of offi-
cial science and of the “cosmopolite philosopher” (p. 824). In the howling infinite 
landlessness resides “the highest truth, shoreless, indefinite” (p. 823). Again, 
Ishmael’s view of philosophy reflects the elementary images associated with water, 
such as freedom of movement and openness of thought.
Of special interest in this respect are his reports of his experiences in the mast-
head. The mast-head is described as a “contrivance” (p. 852) for meditation. It is to 
a philosophical sailor what the laboratory is to a scientific landsman. To a medita-
tive man, the mast-head is simply delightful. There you stand, lost in the infinity of 
the sea, amidst a sublime uneventfulness. Standing in the mast-head, a place 
deprived of all comfort, is an ascetical technique for temporarily isolating oneself. 
Indeed, the basic epistemological maxim of Ishmael’s philosophical practice is 
16 “Toute le language déposé par le temps sur les choses est repoussé … C’est la chose elle-même 
qui apparaît” (Foucault 1966, p. 142).
17 His pagan friend Queequeg does not need such an experience, for he is always content and equal 
to himself, a (Stoic) philosopher from birth (p. 789).
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isolation, as a basic condition for meditation. Thus, the sailor becomes a “Platonist” 
(p. 853), an absent-minded philosopher. He even runs the risk of losing his identity, 
taking the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, bottom-
less soul, pervading mankind and nature (p. 854) – a description in which again an 
elementary, archetypal image can be recognised. The mast-head is the place where 
the via practica of whaling imperceptibly passes over into the via contemplativa of 
philosophy.18 But alas, the truth as it is discerned by a meditative sailor hardly 
allows systematic articulation. The wisdom of the mast-head is bound to cloak 
itself in silence. “Wonderfullest things are ever the unmentionable” (p. 823).
Moby-Dick is, if anything, a philosophical novel. A considerable number of phi-
losophers are mentioned: Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoics, Seneca, Melanchthon, 
Hobbes, Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Pascal, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, 
Kant. The whale’s magnificent head is compared to the heads of Plato, Locke and Kant, 
its skeleton to that of Bentham. Sailing with a Sperm Whale’s head hoisted on the 
starboard, and a Right Whale’s on the larboard side, it seems as if the Pequod had 
hoisted in Locke’s head on one side, and Kant’s head on the other (p. 957). But like 
all true philosophers, the captured and hoisted whales remain deeply silent. Their 
front displays utter indifference towards the world. “Speak, thou vast and venerable 
head”, Captain Ahab mutters one night, “speak, mighty head, and tell us the secret 
thing that is in thee. Thou hast dived the deepest. There, in that afwul water-land, 
there was thy most familiar home. In deep midnight, O head, thou hast seen, and 
not one syllable is thine” (p. 947). But even if a whale’s head could speak, this type 
of experience cannot be articulated in a discursive manner. It is the experience of 
the real (Lacan), “das Es” (Freud), of diffuse, unstructured nothingness. The whale 
really seems to belong there. He remains self-possessed, in tropical as easily as in 
polar waters, thus constituting something of a philosophical ideal: “Oh, man! 
admire and model thyself after the whale!”, Ishmael exclaims, “Do thou, too, live 
in this world without being of it. Like the great dome of St. Peter’s, and like the 
great whale, retain, O man! in all seasons a temperature of thine own” (p. 945). The 
whale is both an exemplification and a symbol of the sublime.
A considerable number of philosophical issues are being addressed. A promi-
nent one, discussed on more than one occasion, is the question whether the whale 
(most notably Moby-Dick himself) is simply to be regarded a “dumb brute” (pp. 
857, 876, 972), or rather an “intelligent agent”. On the one hand we find it stated 
that Moby-Dick is an active, knowing whale, an animal acting with aforethought, 
out of intelligent malignity, a judiciously malicious agent, inflicting decided, cal-
culated mischief on his foes, with deliberate designs of destruction. On the other 
hand we are told that the whale is a dumb brute who acts out of blind instinct and 
rage. Apparently, the latter view is corrobated by anatomy, that is: by the “wonder-
ful comparative smallness” (p. 970) of his cortex. For under the long floor of the 
crater of his skull reposes “the mere handful of this monster’s brain” (p. 969). Some 
18 A certain Captain Sleet used the mast-head as a contrivance for systematic scientific experi-
ments (p. 853), notably for examining compass deviations. But to Ishmael, much more a philoso-
pher than a scientist, it is a place for meditativeness.
4.4 Whaling and Philosophy: The Meditating Sailor 89
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
90 4 What is a Whale? Moby-Dick, Marine Science and the Sublime
experts from Nantucket even deny that Sperm Whales have a brain. Besides having 
so small a brain, the whale seems to have no nose, no olfactories, and no voice.19 
He does not seem to have the power of smelling (p. 982). And as for his ears, they 
are so astonishingly minuscule that they are hardly detectable. Add to this the fact 
that he has such disproportionally small eyes and it becomes questionable whether 
he has any sensitive awareness at all. This huge, black, massive front simply has no 
face.20 The front of the Sperm Whale’s head is a dead, blind wall. His tiny eyes are 
located at either side of his prodigious head. He cannot see the world in front of 
him. How does he manage to integrate his (extremely restricted) sensitive impres-
sions, or to concentrate on any particular visible item? But then, he spends most of 
his lifetime in the bottomless deep where utter darkness reigns.
How does the whale experience his world? In what kind of world does he dwell? 
What is it like to be a whale?21 Such are the questions that puzzle Ishmael the philo-
sophical sailor. The whale’s world simply seem inaccessible, his experiences unim-
aginable. We must not forget, of course, that at the time Moby-Dick was written, 
nothing at all was known about the sonar system or echolocation by means of which 
whales find their way about, quite unlike anything we humans can experience or 
imagine.22 The nineteenth-century sailor was faced with a fundamentally alien form 
of life. But even with the knowledge of today, it seems utterly impossible for man 
to experience what a whale experiences – and he might therefore just as well keep 
his silence, for no vocabulary whatsoever can make this type of world-experience 
accessible to us. To a certain extent, the whale can be regarded an “epistemologi-
cally privileged being”, as it was phrased in Chapter 3, having access to dimensions 
of the world far beyond our imagination and reach, and developing forms of experi-
ence in inaccessible regions that are totally unknown to us. Man simply lacks the a 
priori conditions for entering or experiencing a whale’s world. From a human 
perspective, the whale’s gloomy, silent world seemed an extremely impoverished 
one. A surviving glimpse of “that shuddering period, ere time itself began, when 
Saturn’s grey chaos swayed through Polar eternities” (p. 1033). On the other hand, 
the nineteenth-century whaler was utterly amazed by the methodical, regular way, 
the remarkably reliable uniformity with which whales followed their migratory 
19 Cetologists nowadays will disagree with this of course. The sperm whale’s brains are now con-
sidered to be large and complex, even comparable (in terms of size and complexity) to those of 
primates (Scarff 1980; McIntyre 1974). They are social, communicative animals that produce 
extremely loud, explosion-like sounds (Kooyman et al. 1975).
20 “How comprehend his face, when he has none? Thou shalt see my back part, my tail he seems 
to say, but my face shall not been seen” (p. 987). This in contrast to seals, who display an almost 
human look in their round, peering heads and seemingly intelligent faces (p. 1071). The other 
extreme is the giant octopus encountered by the Pequod one day: “No perceptible face or front did 
it have” (p. 927).
21 A similar question is addressed by Thomas Nagel (1974).
22 Ishmael has it that the whale’s communicativeness is concentrated in his tail. The peaking of the 
whale’s dignified flukes is perhaps “the grandest sight to be seen in all animated nature” (p. 986). 
“There are gestures in it, wholly inexplicable, mystic gestures” (p. 987), and there are hunters who 
declare that through these flukes the whale “intelligently converses with the world” (p. 987).
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routes amidst the widest expanses of water.23 While whaling vessels were sprinkled 
in a disorderly way over the entire watery circumference, Sperm Whales continued 
their way along a given ocean-line “with such undeviating exactitude, that no ship 
ever sailed her course, by any chart, with one tithe of such marvellous precision” 
(p. 879).24 The whale lives “systematically” (p. 982), ascending to the surface at 
regular intervals, always taking the same number of breaths. The Sperm Whale 
blows as a clock ticks, with the same undeviating and reliable uniformity (p. 889), 
as predictable as “the mighty iron Leviathan of the modern railway” (p. 1090).
4.5  And God Created Great Whales: The Philosophy 
of the Sublime
Ishmael’s philosophical practices converge into one basic experience, that of the 
sublime. The very sight of open water already turns him to admire “the magnanim-
ity of the sea which will permit no record” (p. 795) and his prolonged exposure to 
the unshored, harborless immensities and oceanic expanses only intensifies this 
experience. The sea, Ishmael tells us, is the anonymous element per se, encompass-
ing everything, but impossible to demarcate. When standing in the mast-head, with 
a view on the limitless expanses of water around him and his thoughts dwelling on 
philosophical themes, he experiences the sublime, the astonishing immensity of the 
world in terms of time and place: Columbus sailed over numberless unknown 
worlds to discover his one superficial western one (p. 925); Noah’s flood is not yet 
subsided: two thirds of the fair world it yet covers (p. 926).
And yet, apparently, Ishmael has spent enough time in the mast-head, and 
became enough of a philosopher to understand that the experience of the sublime is 
not a pure, immediate event, but rather a conditional one. Certain conditions have to 
be met in order for this experience to occur. If we were to be exposed to the ocean 
unshielded, we would simply be struck with terror. It is only gradually that man loses 
his sense of “the full awfulness of the sea which aboriginally belongs to it” (p. 926). 
The sea is perceived as sublime by us, but our perception is already marked and 
shaped by certain concepts and ideas. For one thing, it is prerequisite that, up there 
in the mast head for instance, we feel reasonably safe, that we somehow stand above 
23 “The hidden ways of the Sperm Whale when beneath the surface remain, in great part, unac-
countable to his pursuers; and from time to time have originated the most curious and contradic-
tory speculations regarding them, especially concerning the mystic codes whereby, after sounding 
to a great depth, he transports himself with such vast swiftness to the most widely distant points.… 
The Nor’West Passage, so long a problem to man, was never a problem to the whale” (p. 869).
24 “So assured, indeed, is the fact concerning the periodicity of the sperm whale’s resorting to 
given waters”, Ishmael tells us, “that many hunters believe that, could he be closely observed and 
studied throughout the world; were the logs of one voyage of the entire whale fleet carefully col-
lated, then the migrations of the sperm whale would be found to correspond in invariability to 
those of the herring-shoals or the flight of swallows. On this hint, attempts have been made to 
construct elaborate migratory charts of the sperm whale” (p. 878).
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it. Under such conditions, a sailing philosopher may not “feel one whit more of ter-
ror than though seated before your evening fire” (p. 930). The basic element (water, 
fire) has been subdued by human technology: still fascinating, but no longer terrify-
ing. Yet, the real sea, experienced immediately so to speak, is simply terrible – a 
masterless commotion. Man is alien to it. “No mercy, no power but its own controls 
it. Panting and snorting like a mad battle steed that has lost its rider, the masterless 
ocean overruns the globe. Her creatures carrying on an eternal war since the world 
began. Consider all this …” (p. 926). When seen from the mast-head, the ocean 
appears sublime, but when Ishmael, at the time of the final catastrophe, suddenly 
finds himself floating in the middle of the ocean, with no sign of humanity in sight, 
then the ocean is still enormous and immense, but utterly terrifying. Under such 
conditions, the experience of the sublime has completely vanished and is replaced 
by sheer terror and despair. The ocean now seems nothing but emptiness, and the 
one time philosopher becomes a perishable living being, about to disappear in the 
frightful abyss without a trace. “The wild, the watery and the unshored” (p. 1050) is 
δεινος beyond comparison, it is pure indifference, referred to by Levinas as the il y 
a, a world disappearing in darkness, utterly insensitive to human suffering. It is the 
dreadful sea as it emerges in the dream reported by Clarence in Shakespeare’s King 
Richard III, about stumbling, or being pushed, overboard, “into the tumbling billows 
of the main:/Lord, Lord! methought what pain it was to drown”. The same indiffer-
ence is signified by the Sperm Whale – the animal without a face. The sublime is an 
experience that will occur under the condition that we somehow remain part of the 
human world.
To what extent can Ishmael’s meditations on the sublime be considered Kantian? 
At first glance, both authors seem to refer to, and to be fascinated by, one and the 
same basic image. Indeed, one could say that, while Kant’s Critiques (notably the 
first two) are so utterly dominated by the formal, discursive mode of thought, his 
phenomenology of the sublime is remarkably imaginative, “un-Kantian” perhaps, 
guided by and responsive to an elementary image.25 The ocean, Kant tells us, is 
called sublime – erhaben – because the idea of infinity is conveyed by it, but certain 
conditions have to be met in order for such an experience to occur at the sight of 
something which, if experienced as such, could only produce in us fear and abhor-
rence.26 So far, Kant and Ishmael seem to agree.
Moreover, not only to the sea itself, but also its most eminent inhabitant, the whale, 
seems to evoke this experience of the sublime. According to Kant, the mathematically 
25 “So kann der weite, durch Stürme emporte Ozean nicht erhaben genannt werden. Sein Anblick 
ist grässlich; und man muss dat Gemüt schon mit mancherlei Ideen angefüllt haben, wenn es durch 
eine solche Anschauung zu einem Gefühl gestimmt werden soll, welches selbst erhaben ist.… 
Wer wollte auch … die düstere tobende See erhaben nennen? … Der grenzenlose Ozean, in 
Empörung gesetzt … [I]hr Anblick wird nur um desto anziehender, je furchtbarer er ist, wenn wir 
uns nur in Sicherheit befinden …”
26 Cf. Nietzsche: “Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, it does not always 
roar, and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness. But hours will 
come when you will realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing more awesome than infinity” 
(1974, § 124).
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sublime refers to that which is immeasurable and great “beyond comparison”,27 and these 
are precisely the terms in which the experience of spotting living whales is articulated by 
Ishmael. In a quotation he extracted from a book on natural history it is said that “if we 
compare land animals in respect to magnitude, with those that take up their abode in the 
deep, we shall find they will appear contemptible in the comparison. The whale is doubt-
less the largest animal in creation” (p. 753). Indeed, chief among Ishmael’s motives for 
going to sea was “the overwhelming idea of the great whale himself” (p. 762). On enter-
ing a whaler’s inn, he discerns on a primitive, soot-coloured painting of a black mass of 
“unimaginable sublimity” – a whale. The Sperm Whale is referred to as “the mightiest 
animated mass that has survived the flood; most monstrous and most mountainous! That 
Himmalehan, salt-sea Mastodon, clothed with such portentiousness of unconscious 
power.… Living in the bottomless deep …” (p. 797). He is, without doubt, “the largest 
inhabitant of the globe; the most formidable of all whales to encounter; the most majestic 
in aspect …” (p. 840). Leviathan is of a mighty magnitude. The most imposing view to 
be had is that of the full front of his head: this aspect is “sublime” (p. 967). When hunting 
the whale, the whaler competes with what seems grand beyond comparison, a mighty 
monster, absorbed in incommunicable contemplations, an animal of “great inherent dig-
nity and sublimity”, both ponderous and profound (p. 984). His head is comparable to 
“Melanchthon’s forehead” (p. 968), but in the great Sperm Whale, the “high and mighty 
godlike dignity inherent in the brow is so immensely amplified, that gazing on it, in that 
full front view, you feel the Deity and the dread powers more forcibly than in beholding 
any other object in living nature” (idem.). The grandeur of his head incites the idea of 
genius. “But how? Genius in the Sperm Whale? Has the Sperm Whale ever written a 
book, spoken a speech? No, his great genius is declared in his doing nothing particular 
to prove it. It is moreover declared in his pyramidical silence” (968).28 In Moby-Dick, the 
Sperm Whale is described by the very images Kant himself uses to allude to the sublime: 
pyramids, St. Peter’s Dome.
Yet, according to Kant, eventually we must recognise that neither the ocean itself, 
nor the whale as such should be regarded as sublime. Rather, he follows Sophocles: 
more overwhelming even than nature is man. The experience of the sublime eventu-
ally refers to our own ability to conquer and subdue maritime nature. For Ishmael, this 
cannot be true. The sea itself, and the whale itself remain what is truly sublime and we 
become insignificant in comparison with it. Although we slaughter whales, Ishmael 
seems to believe that we cannot really destroy these animal as such, not their basic 
image or idea. The pre-Adamite whale survived the great Deluge without the help of 
man, and dwells ever since in an antediluvian world unknown to us. He steered clear 
27 Ishmael, visiting a whale’s skeleton worshipped by the inhabitants of an island, marvels, but also 
seized the opportunity for doing some anatomical research. How now!, the priest shouted, “Dar’st 
thou measure this our god!” (p. 1030). Here, apparently, Ishmael is doing what on other occasions 
he blames scientists to do, namely reducing the sublimity of the whale to quantitative data. It also 
shows Ishmael’s flexibility in terms of methodology. He may occasionally resort to more or less 
scientific methods.
28 More sublime than any other whale is of course Moby-Dick himself: “Not the white bull Jupiter 
… not Jove, not that great majesty Supreme! did surpass the glorified White Whale as he so 
divinely swam” (p. 1086).
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of the Ark, went his own way, survived the Flood by becoming a sea animal. In that 
wondrous period, the gloomy epoch of Saturn, all the world was the whale’s (p. 1033), 
when in shuddering polar eternities he lived his undocumented life. He is the gliding 
great demon in the seas of life, defying the unimaginable cold and blackness of the 
deep. As an apparition, in his full terribleness, when breaching from the farthest 
depths, the Sperm Whale is of all cetacean the most sublime, inspiring both awe and 
wonder, and the list of names for the whale in thirteen languages with which Ishmael 
begins his cetological account reads like a series of incantations, pronounced in order 
to adjure something terrible. He is marvellously adapted to the most extreme of cir-
cumstances, but at the same time out of place, both as a sea-dwelling mammal and as 
the sole survivor of the prehistoric monsters that roamed the earth in distant times. In 
the end, all efforts to represent the whale’s sublimity are bound to fall short. Not only 
will his life remain unwritten, he is also, as we have seen, that one creature in the world 
that must remain unpainted to the last. No portrait can hit the mark with any consider-
able degree of exactness (p. 921). A painting will be most like a whale when it is diffi-
cult to imagine that this really is what his living contours look like.29
But Moby-Dick is not an unequivocal monologue on sublimity. Ishmael both 
mocks and venerates the whale, for example when he points out that the absence of 
a nose is a deficiency that only adds to the animal’s grandeur. Moreover, in spite 
of all veneration, whales are still being captured, hoisted and butchered, and their 
bodies are ruthlessly desecrated in the course of a demolishing procedure during 
which every trace of dignity is completely erased. One whale, about to be captured, 
is said to produce “an enormous wallowing sound as of fifty elephants stirring in 
their litter” (p. 895). A red tide pored from all sides of another gigantic whale, 
whose tormented body wallowed in a crimson pond, abating in his flurry, while 
spasmodically dilating and contracting his spout-hole, until finally “gush after gush 
of clotted red gore shot into the frighted air” (p. 932/933). Like Dionysos himself, 
the great whale – “that big god aloft there somewhere in yon darkness” (p. 866) – is 
cut to pieces in the end. “Every whaler is a butcher” (p. 942), involved in a bloody, 
greasy business, using whales as raw material for his trade, spilling tonnes of 
Leviathanic matter. They constitute the rank and file in an appalling and uneven 
battle between the technologically equipped bipeds of industrial society and the 
giant but defenceless mammals of ante-deluvian nature. One of the Pequod’s crew 
members is said to be so utterly lost to all sense of reverence for the whale’s majes-
tic bulk and mystic ways, that in his poor opinion, “the wondrous whale was but a 
species of magnified mouse” (p. 830). The experience of sublimity can easily give 
way when man finds his inferiority in terms of bulk and physical strength more than 
compensated by his superiority in terms of technical equipment and cunning.
This struggle between veneration and disregard also applies to the ocean as such. 
Yet, in the case of Moby-Dick, maritime nature ultimately gets the best of it. Eventually, 
29 Cf. Wolf, 1986. One illustration, although calculated to excite the scepticism of landsmen, is 
judged by Ishmael as “admirably correct and lifelike in its general effect” (p. 921). But Captain 
Scoresby, in his eagerness no doubt to comply with the epistemological principles of science, 
drew his pictures on too small a scale to convey the desirable impression.
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the human world is shown to be only a transitory phenomenon. Barometers, quadrants, 
charts and other equipment cannot subdue the helplessness and fragility of humanity 
before the shrieks of the ocean and the madness and gladness of her demonic waves. 
It is certainly no coincidence that, shortly before his fatal encounter with Moby-Dick, 
Ahab destroys his quadrant, shouting: “Science! thou vain toy!” (p. 1058). In the end, 
all collapses, “and the great shroud of the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years 
ago” (p. 1102). Melville’s masterpiece not only addresses the issue of the disappear-
ance of whales. His novel is also about the inevitable disappearance, sooner or later, of 
man himself. Melville seems to take a “grim pleasure” in showing our insignificance 
before the magnitude of nature (Kazin 1960, p. 59). Moby-Dick constitutes an attempt 
to present us with nature as it might be conceived with man entirely left out. In the end, 
all that is left is the trackless, fathomless “nothing” that has been there from the begin-
ning, a beginning that just was, with no one present either to deplore the extinction, or 
to rejoice at the survival, of magnificent species such as the whale, or humankind. And 
no doubt, as we disappear, it will seem as if all these events have never happened, as 
human beings are no longer available to record their traces.30
4.6 Will the Whale Perish? The Ethics of Moby-Dick
In Moby-Dick whaling is perceived as a highly dubious animal practice. To the whaler, 
the whale is either an object of exploitation (the whaler as a butcher) or an opponent in 
a contest (the whaler as a hunter). To Ishmael’s mind, however, the scientist’s objective 
is no less disturbing. For science aims at reducing the unknown to the known. Thus, the 
living animal becomes a lifeless object. By dissecting the whale, by harming his vitality, 
his dignity and integrity, science hopes to put him in his zoological place. Apparently, 
it is only the philosopher, or rather the philosophical sailor, who appreciates the inherent 
dignity and sublimity of the whale. But there is a prize to be paid: this philosophical 
upgrading of the whale seems to rest on mystification and idealization.31
That there are certain drawbacks to Ishmael’s idealistic overestimation of the 
whale, becomes clear when the question whether the whale will eventually perish 
is explicitly addressed (Chapter 105). Can Leviathan long endure so wide a 
chase? Will he not at last be exterminated from the waters? Can he escape speedy 
extinction? Ishmael agrees that the prospects seem disquieting, especially if we 
look at the vicissitudes of other large species: “Though so short a period ago – not 
a good lifetime – the census of buffalo in Illinois exceeded the census of men now 
in London, at the present day not one horn or hoof of them remains in all that 
region …” (p. 1035). Will not the whale befall a similar fate? Here, however, the 
sailing Platonist assures us that this will not be the case. The waning whale can 
30 Cf. Nietzsche: “Es gab Ewigkeiten, in denen der Mensch nicht war; wenn es wieder mit ihm 
vorbei ist, wird sich nichts begeben haben” (Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne, 
1873, Nachlass).
31 See for example Ishmael’s denial of the fact that the breath of a whale is attended with an 
“insupportable smell” (p. 752).
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always resort to its eternal December in some polar citadel, impenetrable to man. 
“We account the whale immortal in his species, however perishable in his indi-
viduality” (p. 1037). He despised Noah’s ark, and if ever the world is to be again 
flooded, the eternal whale will still survive.
But present-day readers may not that easily be reassured. Rather, we tend to rely 
upon scientific research to provide us with statistics and facts. After carefully count-
ing whales and diligently monitoring populations, scientists will tell us that the 
prospects are rather bleak. In the middle of the nineteenth century, a sensitive whaler 
could perhaps still afford to calm his presentiments with the help of platonic reflec-
tions on the imperishability of such an amazing species – of the indestructibility of 
whales as a basic image or idea – but nowadays the whale has finally entered the 
Ark, that is: the sphere of human responsibility, and it is only by an active policy of 
protection that the shrinking “herds” of ante-diluvian monsters may be preserved.
Yet, as a novel, Moby-Dick basically deals with epistemological problems of 
representation rather than with ethical issues of extinction. Moby-Dick analyzes a 
number of epistemological strategies for perceiving and describing whales. In the 
case of the sailor-philosopher, the strategy used is idealization. Notwithstanding the 
poetic beauty of the panegyrics that at times descend from Ishmael’s idyllic mast-
head, they serve an ideological function insofar as they do not interfere with the 
brutal butchering that is going on at sea-level and on deck. While calmly reflecting 
on the platonic, idealized whale, the real whale is allowed to extinguish. A similar 
ideological function can be discerned in some of the poetic, Biblical metaphors 
employed by the Pequod’s whaling crew, while in their very hands, the mysterious 
whale is speedily transformed into the raw material of their grubby trade. 
Nineteenth-century scientists may well fall short in doing justice to the living expe-
rience of the living whale, and may well have failed to keep their objects alive and 
intact, but their dissecting practices (usually of stranded whales) constituted a much 
more refined form of demolition than those of whaling proper.
What we may learn from Moby-Dick, insofar as ethics is concerned, is that our 
position on moral issues depends on our epistemological stance and on the episte-
mological nature of the sources we rely on in answering the question “What is a 
whale?” As for the issue of extinction, the Pequod’s crew, much like their modern 
colleagues, seem utterly unaffected by such a prospect, while the philosopher’s 
stance in Moby-Dick is one of disavowal and denial. In Melville’s time the scientific 
knowledge concerning whales was too limited to be of much help in this matter, 
while modern scientists may take various positions. While some of them provide 
us with disquieting statistics, others argue that extinction is a natural phenomenon 
and whales are apparently an evolutionary dead end (cf. Slijper 1962).
4.7 Concluding Remarks
This chapter was devoted to a case study: the epistemological significance of one 
of the most important animal novels ever written. In Chapter 2 it was indicated that, 
for centuries, the literature on animals has been dominated by two very influential 
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genres: the “history of animals” tradition, initiated by Aristotle and based on dis-
section and binary classifications, and the fable literature, relying on remarkably 
stable and typical images of animals. In the nineteenth century, in Darwin’s era, a 
much more realistic approach emerged in literature, philosophy and science. 
Animals suddenly became alive so to speak.
Interestingly, in Moby-Dick all these lines of development seem to converge. 
First of all, as a fabulous animal, a kind of sea monster, the great white whale seems 
to adhere to and revivify the fable literature. On the other hand, practices of classi-
fication are emphatically present and fiercely discussed. Sometimes, Ishmael him-
self reverts to techniques of classification and dissection, investigating the remains 
of stranded whales for instance, or describing their brains and sense organs with 
some precision, while on other occasions he firmly rejects these techniques as 
inadequate. That is: the time-old tension between “science” and “literature”, 
between classification and imagination, as two basic epistemological orientations 
when it comes to knowing animals is fleshed out in a polemical manner in this 
novel. Which of the two will prove a dead end? Which of the two will show itself 
to be the fittest approach in this epistemological “struggle for survival”? Ishmael’s 
decision to align himself with the whaler’s whale, so overtly loaded with the logic 
of the fabulous, does not seem a very promising option, from an epistemological 
point of view that is. Melville’s book contains a very realistic version of both tradi-
tions, however. The whale as an animal is no longer a type or caricature, it is no 
longer an anatomical oddity, but really seems to come alive.
Chapter 5 will likewise be devoted to practices of dissecting and demolishing 
living animals, but in a rather different context. In Moby-Dick, science was pre-
dominantly represented by practices of classification and taxonomy. In the course 
of the nineteenth century, however, the experimental approach became increasingly 
important. Evolution theory and experimentation are the two manifestations of real-
ism in biology, counterparts of the realistic novel. That is why, in Chapter 5, the 
focus will shift from classification as a scientific “animal practice” to experimenta-
tion. In terms of species, the focus will be on experiments with dogs. In the case of 
Moby-Dick we started with the literary document and looked at scientific discourses 
from that perspective. In Chapter 5 a different approach will be taken. First of all, 
we will describe the emergence (notably during the second half of the nineteenth 
century) of realism in both science and literature. Subsequently, we will focus on 
scientific discourse (animal experiments, notably dog physiology), while the final 
sections are devoted to its literary counterparts (notably the dog novel).
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Chapter 5
What is a Dog? Animal Experiments 
and Animal Novels
“What do you want frogs for, mister?” one of the boys asked him.
“I’ll tell you”, answered Bazarov.… “I shall cut the frog open to see what goes on inside 
him, and then, since you and I are much the same as frogs except that we walk about on 
our hind legs, I shall know what is going on inside us too.”
“And what do you want to know that for?”
“So as not to make a mistake if you’re taken ill and I have to treat you.”
“Vasska, d’you hear that? The gentleman says you and me are the same as frogs.”
“Go on, into the water with you, my young philosophers!” said Bazarov [Ivan Turgenev].
In everyday life, men do nothing but experiment on one another [Claude Bernard]
5.1 Prelude: The Year 1859 and the Triumph of Realism
The lines quoted above come from Ivan Turgenev’s famous novel Fathers and 
Sons, published in 1861, but describing a series of events set in the year 1859, when 
Charles Darwin published his scientific best-seller. As was indicated in Chapter 3, 
Darwin’s Origin of Species entails a triumph of a realistic view on nature over the 
(then dominant) romantic view. The same tendency towards realism was omnipres-
ent in Melville’s whaling novel – notably in the relentless descriptions of the vio-
lence of whaling as an “animal practice” – and it is precisely this shift from 
romanticism to realism that is at the heart of Turgenev’s novel as well.
The book sets out to analyze a generation conflict. The “fathers”, notably 
Nikolai Kirsanov and his brother Pavel, are the romanticists: Russian landlords 
who value art, culture, French and English novels, good manners, in short: an aes-
thetic and educated, but rather idle and melancholy lifestyle. In their youth, they 
visited the university, not in order to become physicians or scientists, but in order 
to be educated as “gentlemen”. The new generation of the realists, however, is rep-
resented by Nikolai Kirsanov’s son Arcady (a science student at the university of 
St. Petersburg), but especially by his friend Bazarov, a young and ambitious physi-
cian who is interested in natural science, notably physiology and chemistry. 
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Bazarov spends most of his time dissecting frogs. He despises everything that has 
to do with sentimentalism, romanticism and aestheticism. He visits the Kirsanov 
estate during the summer holidays, not because he wants to expose himself to the 
mysterious charms of provincial sunsets, but in order to look for, and experiment 
on, frogs – his favourite animal model. The struggle between romanticism and real-
ism is reflected on the ethical level as well, namely as the conflict between (romantic) 
“idealism” and (realistic) “nihilism”. Indeed, in order to characterize Bazarov’s 
position, it was Turgenev who coined the term “nihilist”. Bazarov is the prototypi-
cal nihilist: not in the sense of being someone who sees everything in a negative 
light, but in the sense of being a man who “looks at everything critically”, who does 
not take anything for granted, not even moral ideals. All men are similar, from a 
scientific point of view, he claims, and slight individual variations (i.e. “character”) 
are of no great importance. Bazarov is someone who has no faith in (moral) princi-
ples, only in frogs (i.e. in systematic experimental research). While Nikolai and 
Pavel Kirsanov read the lofty works of Goethe and Schiller, Bazarov prefers 
Liebig, Büchner1 and the German physiologists, claiming that even a mediocre 
chemist is twenty times more useful than the greatest poet. Bazarov emphatically 
relies on the methods of science and views the aesthetical lifestyle of the older 
generation as a waste of time. He even denies the possibility of romantic love, 
although tragically enough he eventually cannot resist the appeal of a mysterious 
lady and falls madly in love with her, thereby counteracting his own maxims. If we 
read Turgenev’s novel as an experiment, one could conclude that as far the erotic 
content is concerned, Bazarov’s “realistic” (i.e. physiological) theory of love is 
refuted by his personal experiences. From the point of view of comparative episte-
mology, however, it is important that Turgenev, like Melville in the previous chap-
ter, refuses to take sides in this epistemological generation conflict (Troyat 
1985/1988). Both perspectives are treated with fairness, both are allowed to present 
themselves, both are fleshed out in a credible and convincing way – both are chal-
lenged by untoward events.
Turgenev’s novel reflects a conflict of generations, or rather: of worldviews, that 
was really taking place on a rather broad scale throughout Europe. In England, as 
was already described in Chapter 3, Darwin’s The Origin of Species conveyed a 
new way of looking at the world. Nature was viewed in a realistic, post-romantic 
way, not in terms of balance and harmony, but in terms of a relentless, continuous 
struggle – between species and variations in Darwin’s case, but it was not difficult 
to extrapolate this scheme to a conception of life as a struggle between human 
individuals (liberalism), classes (Marxism), nations (nationalism) or races (racism). 
In the same year as Darwin, Samuel Smiles had published another best-seller, 
called Self-Help, preaching the gospel of self-discipline and labour. Smiles encour-
aged individuals, notably from the lower social classes, to prepare themselves for a 
life of competition, a social struggle for survival. His heroes were self-made men, 
1 Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899) was the author of Kraft und Stoff, a gospel of the emerging sci-
entific worldview, quite popular at that time. Justus von Liebig (1803–1873) was the father of 
organic, applied and agricultural chemistry.
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engineers and scientists, usually of humble descent, who adhered to a realistic and 
practical view on life. Through hard work and temperance, Smiles tells his readers, 
upward social mobility can be achieved, as the world is highly in need of a new 
type of human being: realistic, hard-working and – above all – eager to learn. The 
book conveyed a strong aversion towards the idealization of idleness and aestheti-
cism, in vogue among the higher social strata. Indeed, the heroes of the realistic age 
are no longer the painters and poets of romanticism, but rather inventors and other 
representatives of science-based practices. This is the human variety that will be 
able to maintain itself in the struggle for survival under the conditions of 
modernity.
In France, writers such as Balzac, Flaubert and Zola represent a similar trend, 
but now in the domain of literature – as was already mentioned in Chapter 1 – by 
giving rise to a new literary style called “naturalism”. They propagate the realistic 
or naturalistic novel. Novel-writing is regarded by them as basically congenial to 
physiology or other forms of scientific research. In 1829, Balzac had already pub-
lished his Physiology of Marriage (1829/1997). Love should no longer be treated 
in a romantic fashion, he assures us. In this century, in which the exact sciences 
play such a prominent role, there is a need for “keen observation and for facts” 
(p. 20). Indeed, the book abounds in observations and statistics. Marriage is seen as 
a relentless struggle, a continuous battle of the sexes, even as a “disease”, and his 
book reads like an epidemiological survey devoted to this widespread affliction 
(p. 21). In his many novels, Balzac likewise tends to take a more or less realistic 
and even scientific outlook. He sets out to produce a classification of human types, 
similar (to some extent) to the way in which naturalists had been classifying animals 
and plants.
In naturalistic novels, authors begin to study the responses of their characters to 
various circumstances (usually adversities) – more or less as if they were research 
subjects in an experiment. An important example of a “naturalist” is Flaubert, who 
based his novels on extensive research and site-visits. Instead of depicting highly 
exceptional individuals (preferably “heroes”), as was usually the case during the 
Romantic era, the work of the new novelists was devoted to the careful analysis of 
the daily lives of ordinary people, notably their love life and their working life. 
Emile Zola, in order to define the basic profile of his work, used terms like “natural 
history” and “physiology”. In Section 5.3, I will consider more thoroughly his 
claim, already mentioned in Chapter 3, that novel-writing is basically similar to 
conducting an experiment. Finally, in 1890, Ernest Renan more or less summed it 
all up in his book L’avenir de la science (The Future of Science) in which it is 
argued that the basic intellectual tendency of the nineteenth century is the replace-
ment of philosophy by the natural sciences, notably physiology.
As far as the life sciences themselves were concerned, the most important event 
during this period in France was no doubt the publication of Introduction à l’étude de 
la médecine expérimentale (Introduction to the study of experimental medicine) by 
Claude Bernard in 1865 (1865/1966). Bernard is generally known as one of the 
“champions” of vivisection who, in the context of both research and education, sub-
jected large numbers of animals, notably dogs, to painful and often fatal experiments. 
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Although as a youth he had tried his hand at playwriting (Romantic style), at a certain 
point he decided to abstain from writing belles-lettres completely and to devote him-
self to science instead. He called his method “experimentation by destruction” 
(“expérience par destruction”, p. 37). According to Bernard, the logic of experimenta-
tion basically consists of two steps: destroy or remove a particular part of the animal’s 
body (e.g. an organ, a tube, and a nerve), and observe the effects of this destruction 
in the living organism.2 In this manner he was able, for example, to discover the func-
tion of the liver in the context of metabolism. Whereas for centuries anatomists had 
been unable to understand the role of this large mysterious organ, Bernard showed that 
an experimental approach could solve the riddle. “Passive” observation (i.e. describing 
nature without interfering with it) gave way to a much more active and even aggressive 
stance. According to Bernard, experimental scientists deliberately act upon nature, 
damage nature, in order to observe the effects of their own doing. They artificially 
produce the phenomenon they want to study. In his Introduction, Bernard explains 
how the hand of the experimenter must actively intervene in order to allow the 
phenomenon under study to emerge (p. 27). Indeed, the success of experimental work 
greatly depends on technical dexterity and the devices scientists have at their disposal 
to manipulate the organism. Eventually, the experimenter wants to acquire full mas-
tery over his object (“modifier pour maîtriser”, p. 104). Sentiments concerning 
research animals, sympathy or compassion with warm-blooded animals, with his 
numberless rabbits or dogs, are completely absent from his text. Indeed, he refuses to 
say anything about his rabbits and dogs at all. His book conveys an extremely profes-
sional, detached and down-to-earth attitude. Written after his retirement (actually a 
systematic recapitulation of the scientific method he had elaborated and refined in the 
course of a lifetime), his textbook became quite popular, not in the least among novel-
ists, as is evident from Zola’s euphoric review – to be discussed in Section 5.3.
Turgenev’s novel already indicated that the same shift from romanticism to real-
ism was noticeable in Russia. One of the voices heralding the dawn of the new real-
istic era in the 1860s in Russia was Dmitrii Pisarev (1840–1868), editor of the journal 
The Russian Word. Several statements made by Bazarov in Turgenev’s book are actu-
ally quotes taken from this work (sometimes literally, but usually slightly altered), 
such as the phrase that nature is not a temple but a workshop.3 Another important 
representative of the new era, one of the rising scientific intellects of the 1860s, was 
I.M. Sechenov, the author of Reflexes of the Brain [1863].4 In fact, according to 
Frolov (1938/1970), Bazarov as a character was modelled after him, although Troyat 
2 “On supprime un organe sur le vivant par la section ou par l’ablation, et l’on juge … de l’usage 
de l’organe enlevé. Ce procédé expérimental … est mis tous les jours en pratique en physiologie” 
(p. 16/17).
3 Pisarev actually used the word “cathedral” instead of “temple” (Todes 2000, p. 19). Turgenev’s 
variation is perhaps a blending of Pisarev’s quote with the title of the book The Temple of Nature, 
a romantic view on nature published by Erasmus Darwin in 1803. Another famous quote by 
Pisarev, paraphrased by Bazarov, is that a bootmaker is of more use than Shakespeare.
4 Sechenov had wanted to publish his report in a widely read monthly review, but the censor would 
only permit publication in a medical journal. This medical journal, however, suddenly became 
very popular (Todes 2000, p. 20).
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(1985/1988) claims that Bazarov was modelled after an English physician. The issue 
is of some relevance, as Sechenov, in his role as professor of physiology at the 
University of St. Petersburg, was actually Ivan Pavlov’s teacher. He had studied 
abroad with prominent physiologists such as Müller and DuBois-Reymond in Berlin, 
Funke in Leipzig, Ludwig in Vienna and Helmholtz in Heidelberg, while much of his 
early work was done in Claude Bernard’s laboratory. Pavlov later called him the 
father of Russian physiology. After experimenting with frogs he became convinced 
that all psychological activities of human beings (including love) can be explained in 
physiological terms, that is, as complicated reflex arcs.
The most famous proponent of Russian physiology, however, was Ivan Pavlov 
(1849–1936) of course. He studied at the University of St. Petersburg (as did Bazarov) 
where Sechenov was one of his teachers. Subsequently, he carried out research in 
Breslau and Leipzig, where he worked with Heidenhain and Ludwig and learned how 
the best laboratories of the time were organized. After returning to St. Petersburg he 
became professor of physiology at the Medical Academy and director of the 
physiological department of the Institute of Experimental Science. His early work 
dealt with blood circulation and digestion. For his book Lectures on the Work of the 
Digestive Glands, published in 1897, he received the Nobel Prize in 1904.
It is important to emphasise, however, that this shift from romanticism to real-
ism, occurring throughout Europe, did not entail a shift from “literature” to “sci-
ence”. Rather it was a shift that occurred within both domains, simultaneously. The 
Romantic poet is replaced more or less by the scientifically oriented novelist. Both 
novelists and scientists become interested in physiology and experimentation. 
Indeed, the second half of the nineteenth century not only sets the stage for the rise 
of the modern laboratory and the breakthrough of experimental research on an 
unprecedented scale (carried out in a systematic and professional manner), it also 
sets the stage for the emergence of the “experimental” novel – a concept that will 
be explained in more detail in this chapter. In other words, we will analyse the 
experimental style of thinking in science as well as in literature. What is a literary 
experiment – or even: a literary “animal experiment”? What kind of knowledge 
does it produce? Is it “really” an experiment? Can we use the logic of the experi-
mental design to clarify the structure of the realistic or naturalistic novel? And what 
about the scientific experiment? Does it display similar structures as these literary 
works, or are we rather confronted with different kinds of genres, producing differ-
ent kinds of insights into living nature, notably animals such as dogs? These are the 
questions to be addressed in this chapter.
The chapter consists of three “steps”. First of all, we will analyse scientific experi-
ments with animals. Our focus will be on the experimental work of Claude Bernard 
and Ivan Pavlov, two prominent exponents of the new animal science that emerged in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Moreover, both researchers experimented 
extensively with dogs. Yet, I will emphasize that their views on animals, notably 
dogs, and on conducting experiments with dogs, were quite dissimilar – to put it 
mildly. Whereas Bernard subjected his research animals to “acute” experimentation 
(often with fatal results), Pavlov’s experimental style become known as the “chronic” 
method, which basically meant that he allowed his dogs to recover after being 
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operated upon. Indeed, interest in the health and well-being of his experimental dogs 
became an inherent part of his approach.
Subsequently, I will analyse how dogs are presented in novels of this period. 
I will regard these texts as literary experiments. To begin with, I will explain Zola’s 
idea of the experimental novel, notably his view that physiology and novel-writing 
are basically identical. As a case study, I will apply this idea to a classic dog novel: 
The Call of the Wild by Jack London. On the basis of a close reading of Bernard 
and Pavlov on the one hand and London on the other, a comparative epistemology 
of these two genres (scientific experiments with dogs versus dog novels) will be 
fleshed out.
Yet, in order to put the research practices of Bernard and Pavlov in their proper 
historical (i.e. “diachronic”) perspective, I will first of all present a short history of 
experimental research with animals. This will serve as a backdrop for the syn-
chronic (episodic) approach that will be adopted in the later sections. Writing about 
the history of animal experimentation is a hazardous task. In the course of time, a 
variety of (more or less scientific) animal practices has emerged. When should we 
refer to a particular animal practice as “scientific research”, and to particular forms 
of scientific research with animals as “animal experiments”? Experiments with 
animals are often referred to as “vivisection”, but there are many possible forms of 
animal experimentation and vivisection (the dissection of living bodies) is merely 
one of them, while not all forms of vivisections are experiments: notably in antiq-
uity, vivisection was a public demonstration, a spectacle even, rather than an 
experiment – the experimental design (hypothesis, control group, manipulation of 
conditions, etc.) was usually lacking. Be this as it may, the diachronic backdrop 
will set the stage for a more detailed synchronic analysis. It will allow us to define 
what the concept of an “animal experiment” entailed in the era of Bernard and 
Pavlov, in scientific as well as in literary works.
5.2 A Short History of the Research Animal
In his short treatise On respiration Aristotle makes the remark that animals 
such as have spongy lungs need breathing less than others. The frog and the 
tortoise, he tells us, can remain under water for a long time, but “if one holds it 
down too long, an animal of this kind is drowned” (p. 431/470 b 23/24). This is 
something that does not happen in the case of fishes, “try as we will” (p. 435, 
471 b 1–5).
We do not know whether Aristotle really performed (or supervised) such an 
“experiment”, but if he did, it will be one of the first recorded animal experiments 
in history. Yet, Aristotle’s extensive knowledge of animals was predominantly 
based on the dissection of dead animals. It was in ancient Alexandria, the “new” 
Athens founded by his pupil Alexander, that researchers went a step further by 
introducing vivisection: the dissection of live animals. The Greek physician 
Herophilus (330–260) and his younger colleague Erasistratus (304–245) consciously 
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decided to open up living bodies of mammals in order to see what goes on inside 
– and they preferably did this in public. Their argument was that, while anatomy 
of cadavers may tell us something about the internal structure of a body, it is not 
very informative when it comes to the living function of organs (Guerrini 2003, 
p. 7). As was already indicated above, their research cannot really be regarded 
as animal experimentation. Rather, it was a particular branch of anatomy, namely 
“anatomy of living beings” – or anatomia animata as it later came to be called 
in Latin.
Although the work of Herophilus and Erasistratus was influential, opening up 
new prospects for research, the true champion of ancient vivisection was Galen 
(129–216) no doubt, who performed many public dissections on live animals, 
apparently without much pity or compassion – the medical equivalent of gladiato-
rial combats, but now between scientific combatants (Guerrini 2003, p. 13), armed 
with a scalpel rather than a gladius, who stepped forward to put the relative strength 
of competing views to the test before a lay audience. Galen described his views and 
methods in a manual entitled De anatomicis administrationibus (On Anatomical 
Procedures). The rediscovery of this work in 1531 prompted a revival of vivisec-
tion in early modern times (Guerrini 2003, p. 26).
The epistemological importance of vivisection became evident when, in the 
third decade of the seventeenth century, René Descartes and William Harvey pro-
duced conflicting accounts concerning the circulation of the blood in human and 
animal bodies. Whereas Descartes relied on deductive reasoning (more geomet-
rico), Harvey had recourse to experimentation, that is, active intervention, directed 
at achieving replicable results. Descartes was not really and experimenter. He per-
formed very few experiments, spent much time dissecting dead animals, but sel-
dom experimented on live ones. Although occasionally he dissected living animals 
such as rabbits and dogs (Watson, p. 167), the bulk of his work in this area was 
anatomical research performed on cadavers. On this type of research (quietly ana-
lysing bodily parts, e.g. eyes and legs) he based his famous conviction that animals 
are machines. As Herophilus and Erasistratus had already argued, however, 
although anatomical data may provide us with important insights concerning the 
internal structure of the animal body, they are usually not very enlightening when 
it comes to determining the function of the structures and organs thus described. 
For that reason, Descartes’ contemporary William Harvey began to perform dissec-
tions on live animals – anatomia animata as it was then called. He sliced through 
the breast bone of a living animal, a rabbit, for example, exposing the heart, the 
aorta, or other veins and arteries, manipulating them by means of ligature, repeating 
his experiments many times over, preferably before an assembly of colleagues and 
students. This kind of procedure proved a significant epistemological advantage. 
Because of the animal experiments he performed, on rabbits, snakes, frogs, and 
other species, Harvey discovered that blood runs in one direction only – a decisive 
step on the way to his discovery of blood circulation. He could not have made his 
discovery had he restricted himself to dissecting the bodies of dead animals, as 
Descartes usually did. The virtual absence of systematic in vivo research in the lat-
ter’s work proved a fatal epistemological flaw. Important aspects of animal life can 
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only be observed in living animals. Anatomy (the analysis of structure) had to be 
complemented by physiology, or “vivisection”, the practice of dissecting living 
bodies. Yet, Harvey’s success did not silence the debate. For some time to come, 
sceptics would continue to argue, for instance, that vivisection was unreliable 
because it significantly impaired the object of research, causing severe damage in 
the organism, so that less violent, more refined forms of research, for example, with 
the help of a microscope, were preferable – with a focus on observation rather than 
on manipulation. Experimentation involves an active, often even a violent stance 
towards the object of research. It entails deliberate manipulation and, epistemologi-
cally speaking, there are both tremendous benefits and substantial drawbacks 
involved in such a procedure.
Albrecht von Haller (1707–1777), one of the most prominent physiologists of the 
eighteenth century, wholeheartedly accepted Harvey’s epistemological axioms. He 
performed lengthy series of experiments on live animals in the early 1750s. By doing 
so he discovered that Descartes was wrong, not only concerning the circulation of 
the blood, but also on a more fundamental, ontological level. Animals are not 
machines. The properties of muscle tissue, for example, cannot be explained in a 
purely mechanical manner. It displays an intrinsic tendency to react when it is exci-
tated (a phenomenon Von Haller referred to as “irritability”). Its behaviour is not 
completely determined by external forces acting upon it, and therefore it is mislead-
ing to compare muscle tissue to a spring. Yet, this important insight confronted Von 
Haller with an ethical dilemma. In order to explore animal life, and to do away with 
philosophical prejudices (e.g. the scholastic idea that animals are machines), experi-
ments had to be performed on living animals. But by doing so, one is likely to dis-
cover that animals (notably mammals) are sensitive living beings, capable of 
experiencing pain and distress. In others words, in order to uncover the animal’s 
“animality”, vivisection was both necessary (from a methodological point of view) 
and problematic (from an ethical point of view). Initially he argued that, although 
performing experiments on live animals is inevitably revolting, in the interests of 
truth it could not be avoided (Nordenskiöld 1946, p. 236). Yet, in one of his publica-
tions he explicitly confessed that, after having examined a hundred and ninety ani-
mals, he experienced great reluctance concerning this kind of “cruelty” (Guerrini 
2003, p. 65). The vivisections which he performed increasingly began to trouble his 
sensitive mind. Finally, they became too repugnant to him (Nordenskiöld 1946, 
p. 235). Unable to solve his problem, he eventually decided to leave the field of 
physiology altogether and to devote himself to theology, botany and verse-writing 
instead – the passions of his youth, uncovering and documenting the beauty and 
richness of Alpine nature, both as a botanist and as a poet. Thus physiology lost one 
of its most outstanding and productive pioneers. His colleague Stephen Hales 
(1671–1761) had made a similar decision. After experimenting on horses in the con-
text of his research on blood pressure, he eventually turned to studying plants because 
of the “disagreeableness” of experimenting on animals (Guerrini 2003, p. 58).
Throughout the nineteenth century, physiologist continued to wrestle with this 
problem, especially in Germany. Some German physiologists, such as Johan Conrad 
Brunner, whose experiments involved the removal of the pancreas from the bodies 
of living dogs, apparently was not troubled by a bad conscience very much, but his 
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talented colleague Carl Asmund Rudolphi decided to abstain from animal experi-
mentation altogether. This, of course, greatly restricted the agenda of his research as 
well as the reliability of his results. After Rudolphi’s retirement, Johannes Peter 
Müller became the most prominent German physiologist of his generation. His 
career reflects the typical shift described earlier, in Chapters 1 and 2, from specula-
tive natural philosophy along the lines of Hegel and Schelling towards physiological 
research (Nordenskiöld, p. 382). By doing so, he inevitably had to face the dilemmas 
described above. He tried to alleviate the problem by performing his experiments on 
frogs rather than on dogs. This had methodological benefits as well, as frogs are of 
a more enduring nature and therefore lend themselves to more careful observation 
(p. 384). Furthermore, insofar as he continued to work with mammals, he decided to 
use anaesthetics to mitigate the pain experienced by his research animals. Indeed, 
when in the 1840s anaesthetics were introduced (ether, morphine), this opened up 
prospects for applications in physiology. In fact, it changed the relationship between 
animal and experimenter (Guerrini 2003, p. 78). Curare was also applied, although 
it merely immobilises the body without removing the pain. Anaesthesia eliminated 
some major objections to vivisection, notably by reducing animal suffering, but pre-
cisely because it made vivisection less disagreeable, it also led to an increase in 
invasive experiments. Moreover, researchers like Müller clearly recognised the 
methodological problems involved. A benumbed animal is not a normal animal, it 
cannot be expected to respond in a normal or natural manner and for that reason it can-
not be regarded a reliable model. In other words, although laudable from an ethical 
point of view, the use of anaesthetics was highly problematic from a methodological 
standpoint. Like his predecessors, Müller was unable to solve his problems in a sat-
isfactory manner. Eventually, he also gave up physiology. According to his own 
statement, he shared Rudolphi’s dislike of experimenting on live animals. Clearly 
realizing that physiology could not be carried any further without it, he went over 
entirely to comparative anatomy (Nordenskiöld, p. 386). It is at this point in the his-
tory of animal research, more or less, that Claude Bernard steps in.
5.3 Claude Bernard: The Epistemology of Destruction
Claude Bernard’s life and work reflect the shift from romanticism to realism in 
various ways. As a provincial youth, it had been his desire to become a romantic 
playwright and it was this desire that had brought him to Paris. He had had no for-
mal training in the natural sciences at all, but some experience as an apothecary 
assistant. As a novice playwright, he had met with some success, receiving a fee for 
his first vaudeville comedy La rose du Rhône (now lost). Encouraged by this suc-
cess, he began to write a historical drama called Arthur de Bretagne in Romantic 
fashion (published posthumously in 1887). When at the age of 21 he went to Paris 
to discuss his work-in-progress with a prominent literary critic called Saint-Marc 
Girardin, the latter managed to persuade him to abandon his literary aspirations 
altogether and to take up the study of medicine instead. The fact that his scholarly 
writing is so emphatically beyond anything that could be called “sentimentalism” 
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may perhaps be explained in terms of this epistemological as well as biographical 
“rupture”, his decision to repress the “softer” career alternative he had considered 
so seriously in his youth. And although his research practices were perhaps not as 
sadistic and sinister as is sometimes suggested by his many critics, they were cer-
tainly at odds with the moral sensitivity towards animals that began to emerge 
among the educated public – to which also his wife and two daughters belonged, 
who fiercely criticized him for what he was doing to his research animals, through-
out his married life. Indeed, his marriage was anything but Romantic. It was a fierce 
struggle between the sexes, with the debate on the moral status of dogs as its major 
battlefield. Domestic disagreements over animal experimentation were so intense 
that they actually ruined his marital life. The staunch detachment evident in his 
style may well have evolved from his effort to draw a firm epistemological demar-
cation between his work as a scientist and the type of debate in which he was (rather 
reluctantly no doubt) involved in private. As in the case of Victor Frankenstein, it 
was simply impossible for him to discuss his work and views with his relatives at 
home. Indeed, from an epistemological point of view one could say that Bernard’s 
problems were quite reminiscent of those of Frankenstein. A romantic poet allows 
himself to be converted to modern science and becomes involved in research prac-
tices that are so much at odds with the “delicacy”, the moral sensitivities of his cul-
tural environment, that he desperately conceals them from others, as they would 
certainly produce something of an outrage among the uninitiated.5
This does not mean that Bernard neglected the ethical dimensions of his animal 
practice, quite the contrary. In a famous passage in his Introduction he explained 
that scientists have an unconditional right, a duty even, to perform experiments on 
animals for the benefit of future human patients.6 Physiology is inevitable if we 
want to transform medicine into an evidence-based practice and physiology neces-
sarily involves vivisection. It is immoral to perform an operation on patients, or to 
subject patients to certain treatments that have not been tested on animals before, 
preferably on mammals. Moreover, he urgently advises his students never to enter 
into a discussion with lay persons on the moral aspects of animal experimentation. 
The public at large, he tells them, may well be invited into the drawing room of 
science, where the achievements of scientific research are proudly displayed, but 
they should never be allowed to enter the secluded, damp “kitchen” where the dirty 
work is being done. Whereas scientists have come a long way to acquire their sci-
entific attitude of detachment, untrained visitors cannot be expected to understand 
the importance and inevitability of this type of research.7 In the case of lay persons, 
5 In fact, also humans suffered. Bernard spent long days of hard work in a cramped laboratory that 
eventually made him ill.
6 “Il est essentiellement moral de faire sur un animal des expériences, quoique douloureuses et 
dangereuses pour lui, dès qu’elles peuvent être utiles pour l’homme” (Bernard 1965, p. 153).
7 “[La science de la vie, c’est] un salon superbe tout resplendissant de lumière, dans lequel on ne 
peut parvenir qu’en passant par une longue et affreuse cuisine” (p. 28); “Il faut avoir été élevé et 
avoir vécu dans les laboratoires pour bien sentir toute l’importance de tous ces détails de procédés 
d’investigation” (p. 44).
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the spectacle of (often severe) animal suffering will cause uneasiness or even bewil-
derment. Therefore, uneducated visitors are likely to react in a sentimental manner, 
while scientists performing the experiments are trained to ignore (or to become 
insensitive to) the research animal’s distress.8 Unlike Galen, or, in later times, the 
“showman” Vesalius (Guerrini 2003), he abstained from public demonstrations, 
firmly closing the doors of his esoteric laboratory.
According to Bernard, to conduct an experiment basically means that a living 
animal is destroyed step by step in a way similar to how a machine is dismantled if 
one wants to study its inner mechanism.9 Moreover, in order to acquire reliable sci-
entific knowledge, a considerable number of research animals have to be sacri-
ficed, and experiments have to be repeated over and over again. When Claude 
Bernard lectured on animal physiology at the Collège de France, a research animal 
(usually a dog) would be brought into the room and tied to the operation desk. His 
vocal cords would be cut and subsequently, sinews would be severed or organs 
would be removed, in order to observe the physiological effects of the injuries thus 
inflicted, until the animal died (during or shortly after the lecture). Bernard, a 
workaholic, dissected over and over again, working for long hours, at times sup-
plementing dissection by administering chemical substances. Poisonous substances 
became his favourite research tool during his later years. Although according to 
Olmsted and Olmsted he began to use anaesthetics in his laboratory “as soon as 
[they] were introduced” (1952, p. 114), Guerrini claims that he did so not to relieve 
pain, but primarily to increase his power over the animal’s body.
Important discoveries (e.g. the functions of the liver and the genesis of diabetes) 
resulted from his research, but throughout Europe his work met with moral indigna-
tion and protest from outsiders, notably in England. According to Ryder (1975), 
Bernard, more than any other researcher of the nineteenth century, was responsible 
for determining the public image of vivisection as a method (p. 174/175). 
Vivisection became a public pejorative – and an important cause of the growing 
estrangement between lay audiences and the world of science. Poets of the 
Romantic school such as Alfred Tennyson and Robert Browning supported the 
anti-vivisection movement. Yet, public and literary aversion was far from unani-
mous. Besides outraged critics, there were enthusiastic supporters as well, not only 
in biomedical circles, but also among literary authors. The most enthusiastic liter-
ary supporter was Emile Zola, who regarded Bernard as an example for novelists 
and introduced the idea of the experimental novel.
In the context of literary writing, the term “experiment” may well be a source 
of confusion. Usually, the term “experimental novel” refers to texts that try to go 
8 “Le physiologiste n’est pas un homme du monde, c’est un savant, c’est un homme qui est saisi 
et absorbé par une idée scientifique qu’il poursuit: il n’entend plus les cris des animaux, il ne 
voit plus le sang qui coule … il n’aperçoit que des organismes qui lui cachent des problèmes 
qu’il veut découvrir.… Nous considérons comme oiseuses ou absurdes toutes discussions sur 
les vivisections” (p. 154).
9 “Il faut en quelque sorte décomposer successivement l’organisme, comme on démonte une 
machine pour en reconnaître et en étudier tout les rouages (p. 111).
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beyond any established standards of literary discourse – something like “beyond 
method” or, anything goes. But when Emile Zola (1880/1923) introduced the 
concept of an experimental novel in 1880, he had something completely different 
in mind. Indeed, he was rather thinking of a very methodical type of novel. 
According to Zola, the concept of an experimental novel would put the art and 
practice of novel-writing on a scientific footing, more or less as Bernard had done 
with the art and practice of medicine. He claimed that, in Bernard’s text one only 
had to replace the word “physician” by the word “novelist” and the manifesto of 
experimental literature was already written.
Bernard was not his only source of inspiration. His model was Flaubert’s 
Madame Bovary – an exact reproduction of life in which every trace of Romanticism 
was absent, a monument of exact art as well as of exact science. This type of author 
was no longer a moralist, but an “anatomist” (p. 129), relying on careful research 
and observation. Bernard’s text allowed Zola to articulate the methodology behind 
this type of novel. Rather than describing the world as it presents itself to us, the 
experimental novelist should actively intervene in order to expose his characters to 
specific circumstances and events. Subsequently, like a real experimenter, he must 
carefully study their responses. According to Zola, the naturalistic novel is an 
experiment, in a strictly scientific, Bernardian sense of the term. The novel is a labo-
ratory setting where physical, psychic and social phenomena may be studied system-
atically. Naturalistic novels must display the same level of detachment and precision 
as scientific research reports. In short, he saw Bernard’s Introduction as a manual for 
novelists. In his novel La bête humaine (The Human Beast) for instance, published 
in 1890, the principal character is a man with a paralysing psychic problem, appar-
ently of a hereditary nature. Whenever erotic interests for women is aroused in him, 
he finds himself overwhelmed with an uncanny desire to strangle or otherwise kill 
the woman in question. This makes it impossible for him to become involved in love 
relationships. Beset with this psychic complex, Zola exposes him to a series of con-
ditions. Eventually, he manages to contain his aggression, and becomes involved in 
an intricate love affair, namely when he happens to encounter a woman who is – a 
murderess herself. But before going into the experimental novel in greater detail (in 
the final sections of this chapter), I first want to introduce a second key character in 
the history of animal research, someone who took a completely different approach 
to experimentation with animals – notably dogs – namely Ivan Pavlov.
5.4  Research Animals as Partners? Ivan Pavlov’s 
Chronic Method
Ivan Pavlov criticizes Bernard and other vivisectionists by stressing that a dog who 
is subjected to “acute” experimentation (“vivisection”) cannot be regarded as a reli-
able animal model. Rather than with normal physiological processes, the scientist 
is confronted with the effects (upon the maltreated animal) of his own doings. An 
animal is a complex organism and severe injuries or stress may result in a plethora 
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of unforeseen physical consequences.10 Pavlov therefore initiated a new style of 
laboratory research, of which concern for the research animal’s welfare constituted 
an integral part.
Ivan Pavlov (1849–1936) studied physiology at a time when this was a rather 
strategic discipline: the field of research that was going to replace a more philo-
sophical view on man. As recommended by Smiles and exemplified by Bazarov, 
Pavlov opted for a life of prolonged and disciplined scientific work, spending long 
hours in his laboratory. Although now famous for his later publications on condi-
tioned (or acquired) reflexes, he initially made his name with a series of experi-
ments he conducted (or rather designed and supervised) on digestion (and out of 
which the research concerning reflexes evolved as a kind of side effect). At the 
university of St. Petersburg, his most important teachers were Cyon (or Tsion), who 
had studied with Bernard, famous for his technical skill as an experimenter, and 
Sechenov, already mentioned above. Although the latter’s Reflexes of the Brain 
(first published in 1863) was more speculative than experimental (he only very 
reluctantly performed vivisection on animals and limited himself mostly to using 
frogs), it provided Pavlov with a sense of direction (Todes 2000, p. 20). But it was 
Cyon who demonstrated before his students how to perform vivisection on large 
animals such as rabbits and dogs in a truly Bernardian fashion.
At the age of 41 Pavlov was given his own “laboratory”: a small wooden bath-
house, poorly equipped and with hardly any funds to buy animals for experiments 
– one of his reason for taking good care of his dogs. He loved to work extremely 
hard and liked the heavy labour that the new science involved (Frolov 1938/1970). 
He simply had a taste for laboratory work, which involved a combination of man-
ual (technical) and intellectual (theoretical) activities. Throughout his life, he 
designed, performed and/or supervised an incredible number of experiments, well 
aware of the fact that in physiology, experimental work has to be repeated, 
checked and improved continuously. According to Pavlov, the best place to learn 
how to think scientifically was the scientific laboratory. He worked almost exclu-
sively with dogs.
In 1891 Pavlov, who until then had been a lone investigator, became a labora-
tory chief, the director of a large and productive research group, the Physiology 
Division of the Imperial Institute of Experimental Medicine in St. Petersburg 
(Todes 2000, 2002). His laboratory changed from a small-scale “workshop” to a 
highly efficient knowledge “factory”. In this laboratory, he and his collaborators 
often developed long-term affectionate relationships with their dogs. Pictures taken 
in Pavlov’s research premises show animals and researchers exchanging friendly 
glances. Eventually, a monument for the experimental dog was erected at the 
Institute of Experimental Medicine, bearing the following quotation: “Let the dog, 
10 According to Pavlov, the research animal should be seen as a complex chemical factory. When 
one of the elements is damaged, the researcher can never be certain how and where the system at 
large will be affected. Even the slightest injuries may have serious and unpredictable results. 
Therefore, the researchers should take care to cause as little damage as possible to the animal’s 
body (1955, p. 84).
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man’s helper and friend since prehistoric times, offer itself as a sacrifice to science. 
But our moral dignity obligates us to ensure that this always occurs without unnec-
essary pain” (Todes 2000, p. 100). Pavlov headed his laboratory for decades. 
During the Russian Revolution, as his co-workers left for the front and his dogs 
were dying of starvation, he wrote a famous letter to Lenin. The Russian authorities 
sympathized with his work (seeing themselves as experimentalists working with 
human subjects on a grand scale, conditioning them for future times) and decided 
to build a special scientific village near St. Petersburg (at Koltushy) for Pavlov, his 
staff, and their research animals. In this isolated scientific village, every aspects of 
the life of an experimental dog could be completely controlled and monitored.
Pavlov rejected the methodology of destruction (“acute experimentation”) as 
practised by Claude Bernard, dismissing it as crude and unscientific. He regarded 
it as unsuitable for studying the intricate workings of digestive glands or of the 
nervous system. An animal that experiences severe pain and whose body is seri-
ously damaged, can no longer be regarded a reliable research model. Yet, he had 
similar problems with alternative solutions, notably the use of chemical compounds 
such as curare to alleviate the suffering (or to make animals more easy to handle). 
According to Pavlov, anaesthetics will have a distorting effect on the actions of the 
organism. A benumbed animal does not constitute a realistic model. He insisted on 
studying the functions of an intact animal under normal conditions. In order to 
achieve this goal, he began to construct (by way of highly skilled surgery) openings 
or “windows”, such as a manometer or a fistula, that allowed the researcher to study 
the normal functioning of blood circulation or of a particular digestive gland for an 
extended period of time. He explicitly contrasted his “chronic” (or surgical) method 
with the “acute method” of the Bernard school. He wanted to interfere as little as 
possible with the normal, healthy functioning of the animal (Wells 1956, p. 18) and 
did this by training experimental dogs to lie calmly on the operating table to 
undergo (without narcosis if necessary) all the manipulations of an elaborate and 
lengthy experiment, incising the skin and surface tissues, disclosing arteries and 
connecting them with instruments for registering blood pressure, and similar pro-
cedures (Wells 1956, p. 17). In other words, he educated his dogs to act as coopera-
tive research animals, as partners in the research, as members almost of the team11 
– as the researcher’s best friend.12 Indeed, in publications he expressed his gratitude 
to his dogs, formally thanking them for their assistance.13 In a public lecture he 
states: “We must painfully acknowledge that, precisely because of its great intel-
lectual development, the best of man’s domesticated animals – the dog – most often 
11 According to Pavlov, the dog was “almost a participant in the experiments conducted upon it, greatly 
facilitating the success of the research by its understanding and compliance” (Todes 2002, p. 52).
12 Pavlov’s favourite dog, whose cooperative behaviour “contributed” greatly to the writing of his 
Lectures, was called Druzhok (“Little Friend”).
13 “[T]his method was adopted as a result of a hint given by one of the dogs subjected to the opera-
tion. We (dr. Kuvshinski and I) gratefully acknowledge that by its manifestation of common sense 
the dog has helped us as well as itself ” (1955, p. 89/90). Elsewhere, Pavlov emphasizes that 
“physiology in general owes much to the intelligence of the dog” (p. 104).
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becomes the victim of physiological experiments.… During chronic experiments, 
when the animal, having recovered from its operation, is under lengthy observation, 
the dog is irreplaceable.… It is almost a participant in the experiments conducted 
upon it, greatly facilitating the success of the research by its understanding and 
compliance” (Pavlov 1893; cited in Todes 2000, p. 52). Elsewhere he writes: “Our 
healthy and happy animals did their laboratory work with real gusto; they always 
rushed from their cages to the laboratory and readily jumped on the tables where 
our experiments and observations were conducted. Believe me, I am not exaggerat-
ing one iota. Thanks to our surgical method in physiology we can demonstrate [the 
phenomena of digestion] without a single scream from the animal undergoing the 
experiment” (1955, p. 132).
His praktikanty (research associates) were in the habit of petting and caressing 
their dogs, taking them for strolls on the laboratory compounds. Pavlov devised 
ingenious and delicate operations that made the normal internal functioning of 
organs accessible for continuous observation, while impairing the organism as little 
as possible. In order to obtain gastric juice from a dog during an extended period of 
time, for example, an artificial “miniature” stomach was produced, but Pavlov 
assures his readers that “this operation does not cause any serious discomfort to the 
animal and does not endanger his life” (1955, p. 98). Pavlov and his co-workers 
claimed in their publications that they performed their research work on entirely 
happy and healthy animals. Indeed, “Pavlov’s laboratory consistently represented its 
experimental dogs as normal – happy, energetic, and long-lived” (Todes 2002, p. 87). 
In short, in his laboratory, Pavlov seemed to have succeeded in developing a 
completely new and rather animal-friendly research practice in which the relationship 
between researcher and research animal had dramatically changed. Concern for the 
long-term well-being of the research animal became an important and inherent 
aspect of his approach, a policy in which ethical and methodological considerations 
seemed to converge. Animals should be subjected to the most advanced surgical 
techniques that were also applied to humans,14 in order to allow them to fully return 
to post-operative normalcy: “I regard the promotion of our surgical technique to be 
a matter of greatest importance, because the usual method of simply vivisecting the 
animal in an acute experiment is … a major source of error, since the act of crude 
violation of the organism is accompanied by a mass of inhibitory influences on 
the functions of the different organs. The organism as a whole, the realization of 
the most delicate and most expedient linking of an enormous number of separate 
parts, cannot, in the nature of things, remain passive to destructive agents” (p. 101).
Whoever compares Bernard’s Introduction with the writings of Pavlov will be 
struck by the differences in the way the research animals are represented. In Pavlov’s 
work, the research animal is emphatically present. In various instances, he describes 
14 “The desire … to spare our experimental animals as much as possible made us strictly observe 
all the precautions taken by surgeons in respect to their patients” (1955, p. 132); “Pavlov’s dogs 
were operated upon and cared for almost as if they were human patients in a good hospital (Todes 
2000, p. 51).
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the behaviour of his dogs, as well as the human–animal interactions as they 
developed within his laboratory, in detail. From his writings it is clear that Pavlov 
was sensitive and alert to the behaviour and attitude of his dogs, paying attention to 
signs of uneasiness and restlessness. Indeed, whereas his praktikanty remain anony-
mous – human beings without a face – some of his research animals acquire a dis-
tinctive identity of their own – notably Druzhok, Pavlov’s favourite research animal, 
his own “best friend”. As a consequence, Pavlov’s text becomes something of an 
epistemological hybrid: a research report containing stories and anecdotes on recog-
nisable dogs, besides technical and scientific data on his laboratory endeavours. The 
dogs are presented as partners, as “heroes”. To a certain extent Pavlov’s texts can be 
read as novels in which dogs play a decisive part – as dog novels.
This makes proper treatment of his research animals a rather natural thing to do. 
Although Pavlov concedes that experimental treatments will always cause some 
damage to the animal’s organism, he stresses that “after remaking the animal’s 
organism after our design”, he would always try to find a modus vivendi that would 
eventually ensure a normal and long life for it (p. 132) – as well as the development 
of a normal and lifelong relationship between a human being and his dog, the latter 
accompanying the former on his difficult path to sustainable scientific knowledge 
claims. All forms of animal suffering should be remedied as much as possible. In 
order to perform a particular experiment in which Pavlov anatomically separated 
the mouth and stomach cavities of some of his research dogs, he pointed out that 
“animals subjected to this operation fully recover if well cared for” (p. 95).
Yet, Pavlov’s research practice was not always as idyllic and animal-friendly as 
is suggested in his own writings. He did perform mutilating experiments, for exam-
ple by extirpating the cerebral hemispheres of dogs, after which they became 
complete invalids, no longer able to look after themselves, to lead a “normal” life, 
unable to survive without intensive care (p. 185). He even continued to perform 
acute experiments, for example, to study the nerves of the heart.15 And although 
Pavlov took great pains to cultivate the image of normal and happy laboratory dogs, 
the reality was often somewhat different (Todes 2002, p. 98). Many dogs died and 
survivors would often develop chronic health problems or even fatal conditions. In 
the end even Druzhok became ill.
Gradually, the focus of his research shifted from physiology to animal behaviour. 
He designed an entirely new type of laboratory, known as the “Towers of silence”, 
affording the researcher “maximum control over the environment of animals” (Todes 
2002, p. 349). In these new facilities, the friendly interaction between researcher 
and research animal became somewhat disturbed. An extreme simplification of 
 experimental conditions could be ensured (Pavlov 1955, p. 192), a maximum of con-
15 In 1904, at the height of his career, when he was under attack by the Russian Society for the 
Protection of Animals, Pavlov formulated a personal, but at the same time rather conventional 
confession, in the line of Von Haller, Müller and others: “When I dissect and destroy a living ani-
mal, I hear within myself a bitter reproach that with rough and blundering hand I am crushing an 
incomparable artistic mechanism. But I endure this in the interest of truth, for the benefit of 
humanity” (Babkin 1949, p. 162; Todes 2000, p. 65).
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trol over even the smallest details could be achieved (Todes 2000, p. 78) – but at the 
expense of the former researcher–animal partnership. The animal became an anony-
mous object, rather than a research participant. Even in Pavlov’s animal practice, the 
dog was finally reduced to a functional element in a circuit, in which his presence as 
a dog was neutralized as much as possible (p. 192). As a consequence, in Pavlov’s 
research reports the narrative, story-like elements begin to disappear.
From a Foucauldian perspective, the genealogy of the power relationship 
between Researcher and research animal as it developed in the course of the nine-
teenth century displays a recognisable pattern. The public demonstrations of the 
early modern days of animal experimentation are similar to the public executions 
described by Foucault (1975) in the first chapters of his Surveiller et punir 
(“Discipline and Punish”). In the context of these public spectacles, the living body 
(of research animals as well as of convicted criminals) was opened-up, dismem-
bered, mutilated. In animal experimentation as well as in human torture, pain was 
regarded as inevitable in order to allow the tortured body to produce reliable 
answers to a series of questions. At a certain point, however, these atrocious prac-
tices were replaced by more humane forms of inquiry. Care for the well-being – of 
animals and of prisoners – becomes an integral part of the regime. The trials to 
which animals and prisoners find themselves subjected are meant to educate them, 
to condition or recondition them. Yet, there is another side to this as well. A new 
power regime emerges, granting the researcher almost complete control over the 
research animal’s behaviour. Ideally, in the “humane” facilities of the new power 
regime, all aspects of behaviour (of prisoners as well as of experimental dogs) can 
be monitored and controlled. Moreover, although the punishments applied are less 
severe, less damaging, less acute, the number of animals to be tested upon (as well 
as the number of human individuals subjected to practices of behavioural modifica-
tion) increases exponentially.
To what extent are Pavlov’s publications really comparable to animal novels? To 
a much greater extent than Bernard’s. In retrospect, it is rather astonishing that Zola 
developed his concept of the experimental novel after reading Claude Bernard. The 
latter’s writings do not resemble novels at all. The dog as a dog is virtually absent. 
Subjecting his research animals to “acute” experiments, from which (as a rule) it was 
impossible to recover, the life stories of his experimental dogs were fairly predicta-
ble and dramatically short. The experiments conducted by Zola himself, as an 
“experimental novelist”, were of a much more chronic kind. There was some 
amount of damage done, but the individual involved was usually given the opportu-
nity to recover – to a certain extent at least. Indeed, although the characters in his 
novels occasionally suffer psychological or physical injuries, or even traumas, their 
lives usually continue for some time, so that the novelist can patiently study what 
effects the inflicted injuries have on the future course of the character’s biography, 
in the light of various environmental and hereditary factors. More often than not, the 
injury will not be lethal. For the typical Bernardian dog, on the contrary, experimen-
tation usually entailed a horrible – short – story. If we follow Zola’s logic, Ivan 
Pavlov, rather than Claude Bernard, should be regarded as the model scientist, the 
model scientific writer after whom naturalistic novelists should want to fashion 
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themselves. Zola’s euphoric identification with his hero Bernard was, epistemologi-
cally speaking, a misunderstanding. Indeed, it is rather difficult to regard Bernard’s 
research practice as a model for novel-writing. His dogs remained completely anon-
ymous, they were simply research “material”, without a name or a life of their own. 
The animal experiment was the final moment of their life and no relationship what-
soever developed between researcher and research animal. These dogs were com-
pletely passive, deprived of every opportunity to interact with their environment or 
to respond to the situation. In the case of Pavlov, on the contrary, we are faced with 
a completely different story. Now, being an experimental dog becomes a substantial 
chapter in the dog’s biography, and many dogs spent the larger part of their lives in 
Pavlov’s research facilities. A real interaction between the experimenters and their 
dogs developed and the typical Pavlovian dog really had the opportunity to respond 
to what was happening to him. These conditions constitute, so to speak, the minimal 
requirements for an experimental novel.
So far, we have compared Zola’s conception on the one hand and Bernard’s and 
Pavlov’s writings on the other merely on a conceptual level. Interestingly, however, as 
Pavlov was conducting his experiments with dogs, novelists had begun to write experi-
mental novels featuring dogs as well, as a complementary effort so to speak. Notably 
during the first decade of the twentieth century, at a time when Pavlov became increas-
ingly interested in the psychological and behavioural (rather than the physiological) 
characteristics of his research animals, the dog novel as a genre came in vogue. This 
makes it possible to flesh out our comparative analysis with the help of case studies, 
analysing documents that coincide in terms of time. A similar experimental desire seems 
to have inspired Pavlov as well as some of his literary contemporaries. What happens 
if dogs are exposed to a variety of settings? How will the animals respond? This is the 
type of question that can be answered by means of a scientific experiment, but also 
through novel-writing. The most important dog novelist among Pavlov’s contemporar-
ies was, beyond doubt, Jack London (1876–1916). To his experimental dog novels the 
larger part of the remainder of this chapter will be devoted.
5.5 Animal Experiments in Literary Documents
The basic structure of an experiment can be articulated in the form of a rather 
straightforward question: “What happens if?” This is the basic sentence that guides 
experimental scientists in their laboratories as well as literary authors in their nov-
els. Research subjects in an experimental setting, as well as principal characters in 
a novel, are exposed, by scientists and novelists alike, to a variety of circumstances 
and events in order to provide their readership with a viable answer to the question 
What happens if? Although novelists usually work with human subjects, they may 
decide to work with animals at times. In that case, their novels and stories become 
similar to animal experiments, to some extent at least.
One of the fairy tales by Hans Christian Andersen, for instance, called The Ugly 
Duckling [1844] may be regarded in this manner. To begin with, the “research 
animal” is exposed – at a very early age – to a particular environment, namely the 
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nest of a species other than that to which he himself belongs – experiments of this 
kind have been conducted in animal laboratories. Subsequently, he is exposed to a 
variety of meteorological conditions, referred to as “summer”, “winter”, etc. What 
kind of responses will be triggered, what kind of behavioural repertoires will be acti-
vated, under such circumstances? Thus, the author tries to capture the impact of the 
conditions in question on the research animal, in combination with other variables, 
such as age and gender. The effects of weather, age and various untoward experiences 
are determined experimentally, more or less. Thus, Andersen studies the impact of 
age, for instance, on behaviour patterns such as sociability – the subject’s interactions 
with other members of his species, or with members of other species, in various 
seasons.
An important difference between a “real” experiment and its literary counterpart 
is, no doubt, that whereas in the first case the experiment is documented from a 
“third person” or “outsider” perspective, in the case of Andersen the swan’s experi-
ences are recorded “from within”, so to speak. The author tries to place himself in 
the swan’s position in order to see and experience the world through the research 
animal’s own eyes. This element does not eliminate, however, the basic experimen-
tal structure of the story. Moreover, there are epistemological benefits as well as 
risks involved in such a procedure. In terms of benefits one might argue that 
Andersen’s method may be a viable strategy for producing a recognisable and read-
able account. In a laboratory setting animals are usually deprived of their “animal-
ity”. They are reduced to the status of “research material” – the animal as a test tube 
for producing vaccines, or as a receptacle for studying the effects of particular 
chemical compounds on various kinds of tissues. As a rule, the laboratory researcher 
is not interested in the ways in which the animals themselves experience their 
world. Rather, the researcher is interested in their behaviour insofar as it is triggered 
by environmental cues emerging from within the laboratory setting. The animal is 
taken out of its own environment. In the case of Andersen, however, the experiment 
is conducted in a more or less natural setting, allowing the animal to display its 
species-specific patterns of behaviour. On the other hand, there are evidently some 
risks involved as well. The most important one is the risk of producing an anthro-
pomorphic account. In such an account, the animal will once again disappear from 
view, it’s “animality” will once again be lost.
This is the case, for example, in Anna Sewell’s famous story Black Beauty, pub-
lished in 1877 (1877/1954). Let me just quote the story’s opening lines:
My Early Home
The first place that I can well remember was a large pleasant meadow with a pond of clear 
water in it. Some shady trees leaned over it, and rushes and water-lilies grew at the deep 
end. Over the hedge on one side we looked into a plowed field, and on the other we looked 
over a gate at our master’s house, which stood by the roadside; at the top of the meadow 
was a grove of fir trees, and at the bottom a running brook overhung by a steep bank.
While I was young I lived upon my mother’s milk, as I could not eat grass. In the daytime 
I ran by her side, and at night I lay down close by her. When it was hot we used to stand 
by the pond in the shade of the trees, and when it was cold we had a nice warm shed near 
the grove. As soon as I was old enough to eat grass my mother used to go out to work in 
the daytime, and come back in the evening.
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Sewell’s story is often regarded as one of the first animal novels. Moreover, it is a 
novel with a mission: the author’s purpose in writing it was to induce sympathy and 
understanding for horses among its readers. Yet, epistemologically speaking, there is 
a prize to pay. Charming as it is, Sewell’s narrative suffers from a fatal epistemologi-
cal flaw. The animal as animal disappears. The experiences described in the first lines 
of the novel – and in the rest of the novel as well – are human experiences. It is not 
very plausible – to put it mildly – that this is how horses themselves experience their 
world. It is how we would experience it – if we were to be a horse, but we are not.
Although there are novels devoted to horses, cats, rabbits and other animals, a 
relatively large number of literary experiments with animals involve dogs. This will 
not come as a surprise, of course. Under real life circumstances, the daily interac-
tions between humans and their dogs already contain both narrative and experimen-
tal aspects. Dog owners tell stories, life stories – about their dogs. But they also 
expose their dogs to a variety of conditions in order to modify their behaviour, or 
simply to test their responses, often in a playful manner. Literary experiments can 
be seen as systematic elaborations, building on these everyday, quasi-experimental 
practices. Many humans who become involved in a relationship with a dog really 
try to understand how the animal experiences its world and what determines its 
responses. Literary documents can be seen as extrapolations and elaborations, 
building on these typical, daily interactions and behaviours.
From a scientific point of view it will be difficult to regard novels and other liter-
ary documents – as well as the life-world practices on which they build – as 
“experiments”. An important issue in this respect is the tendency of both pet-own-
ers and novelists to describe the dog’s behaviour in a more or less anthropomorphic 
fashion. Scientists and other critics of everyday knowledge tend to deplore the ten-
dency towards “hominization” in life-world accounts. But before addressing this 
complaint in more detail, we will have to ask ourselves what a literary experiment 
involving animals (notably dogs) actually looks like. How is it structured, how is it 
worked out? What kind of insights does it claim to produce? How are the pitfalls 
of anthropomorphism avoided? Again, as in other chapters, in order to answer these 
questions we will opt for a case study approach. We will analyse one particular 
example (indeed, a particularly famous and ground breaking example) of a literary 
experiment involving a dog, namely Jack London’s novel The Call of the Wild writ-
ten and published in 1903, at a time when Ivan Pavlov was about to receive his 
Nobel Prize and had just launched his extended series of experiments on condi-
tional reflexes. Indeed, I intend to read Jack London’s animal experiment as the 
 literary counterpart of Pavlov’s research.
5.6 An Experimental Dog Novel
The dog in London’s novel (1903/1981) is a huge, sturdy animal called Buck. At 
the beginning of the book, he lives the easy life of a “country gentleman” in the 
“sunny state” of California (p. 22). But he is kidnapped and shipped to Alaska, in 
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order to serve as a sledge dog at the time of the Klondike Gold Rush. In other 
words, his life (as well as the language in the novel) reflects a rather abrupt shift 
from sentimentalism towards grim realism. The change is sudden and dramatic. He 
finds himself exposed to a completely different set of conditions: to the snow, cold 
and frost of the Arctic darkness, the sad and lonely North, the ghostly calm of a 
white and silent vastness, and (last but not least) to the incredibly hard labour of the 
sledge dog. Under these circumstances, he encounters a new type of animal and a 
new type of man, adapted to these conditions. All of a sudden, he finds himself 
“jerked from the heart of civilization and flung into the heart of things primordial” 
(p. 30). His new life is one of continuous peril, where both man and animal must 
be constantly on the alert. It is a “retrogression” (p. 38) and his civilized self is 
gradually erased. This new and rather demanding world is ruled by a completely 
different set of moral laws. The Californian ethic of love, fairness and mercy gives 
way to the law of primordial life, the struggle for survival, as well as for suprem-
acy: master or be mastered, kill or be killed.
Buck, the experimental dog, quickly accommodates to his new life. The novel 
describes the “inevitable” disintegration of his canine morality. He learns how to 
fight and steal, learns how to be patient and how to sustain hunger. He develops a 
completely new behavioural repertoire. Everything about him changes: his habits 
of sleeping and eating, his senses even. His body changes, from his muscles to his 
feet, and he develops a much keener sight and scent, while his hearing acquires a 
new acuteness. The effect of his prolonged exposure to this new set of circum-
stances is dramatic. It entails a complete metamorphosis. His moral sense, a handi-
cap in the ruthless struggle for existence, quickly decays (p. 37), until eventually 
his decivilisation is complete. At the end, the repressed “primordial beast” in him 
becomes dominant again. His doggish ego gives way, so to speak, to his alter ego, 
the primitive Id. Instincts long dead become alive again. Millennia of domestica-
tion disappear step by step. In the stillness, the cold, and the dark of his new envi-
ronment he vaguely begins to remember the life and world of his prehistoric 
ancestors. Scenes and habits from times long ago come to his mind. As London 
tells his readers, instincts are simply the memories of forebears becoming alive 
once again, becoming habits once again. There is even a vague image of a primal 
domestication scene, the diffuse vision of a primitive man, a kind of “missing link”, 
short-legged and with a furry skin, who does not yet stand erect and still feels him-
self at home in the trees, and who is utterly terrified by darkness. As London 
phrases it, the most salient feature of this dim, lost world, in which the first steps 
towards domestication took place, was fear. The hominisation of man and the 
domestication of the dog took place simultaneously, in a fearful environment. They 
coincided in time.
The novel describes how day after day the claims of civilization and of mankind 
become weaker. In the end, only one tie still attaches Buck to the civilized world, 
the love for a man (Thornton) who saved his life and whose companion he became. 
For some time, this man restraints him from decivilising completely. When 
Thornton is killed, however, the transformation is complete. In other words, when 
in the context of the experiment this one decisive factor is modified, the effect is 
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immediately visible, resulting in a significant behavioural change. Buck had 
already become increasingly aware of a strange call sounding in the forest, the “call 
of the wild”. It filled him with strange unrest and wild desires. An irresistible 
impulse had begun to seize him. Vague and indistinct at first, it finally takes the 
shape of the howl of a wolf. After Thornton’s death, he is finally able to answer it. 
The last tie is broken. He really becomes a “thing of the wild”. And this is an ata-
vistic strain noticeable in several others of London’s books as well. Buck is not the 
only protagonist who reverts to the savage stage of remote ancestors. This is a basic 
idea in London’s work: the return to a prehistoric past, when the subject is placed 
under extreme conditions.
In the context of the broader experimental design that dominates the novel, a 
number of smaller experiments are carried out as well. For example, at a certain 
point Thornton literally conducts an experiment in order to demonstrate Buck’s 
complete loyalty and obedience to him:
John Thornton was sitting near the edge [of a cliff], Buck at his shoulder. A thoughtless 
whim seized Thornton, and he drew the attention of Hans and Pete to the experiment he 
had in mind. “Jump, Buck!” he commanded, sweeping his arm out and over the chasm. The 
next instant he was grappling with Buck on the extreme edge, while Hans and Pete were 
dragging them back into safety. “It’s uncanny,” Pete said, after it was over and they had 
caught their speech. Thornton shook his head. “No, it is splendid, and it is terrible, too. Do 
you know, it sometimes makes me afraid.” (p. 78)
At various occasions in the novel, Buck is put – quite literally – to some kind of test.
If, against the backdrop of the history of animal experimentation, the question is 
asked what kind of experiment Buck is actually subjected to, the answer clearly is that, 
first of all, London describes a chronic rather than an acute experiment. Although the 
research animal suffers a trauma at the beginning of the experiment (Buck is knocked 
unconscious before being kidnapped and transported to Alaska), he is treated more or 
less professionally by his first owners and he is allowed to recover, to restore his health 
and vigour. His owners have an interest in his well-being. The author tries to determine 
(in a literary way) the effects which the new “experimental” conditions are likely to 
have on a healthy animal – over the course of time. After having recovered from his 
injuries, Buck becomes a normal animal once again, in the sense that the changes that 
eventually occur (the bodily and behavioural changes that develop in the course of the 
experiment) can be attributed to experimental variables (e.g. the climatologic and 
social circumstances) to which the animal is exposed. Therefore, in this respect at least, 
London’s experiment can be regarded as a true counterpart to Pavlov’s experimental 
work with dogs.
Furthermore, we can say that, although London’s novel is in part an experiment 
in animal physiology, it is for the greater part an experiment in animal psychology. 
Indeed, there is a gradual shift in emphasis, in focus, from the physiological to the 
psychological dimension – as was the case in Pavlov’s work as well. Initially, the 
focus is on the physiological changes, the effects the new environment has on the 
dog’s senses (sight, scent and hearing) as well as on his body (his fur, his body 
weight, his muscular strength, etc.). Eventually, however, the focus shifts to animal 
psychology, notably when the author describes the resurgence of visions and 
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images that are part of his collective “species memory”. This shift from physiology 
to psychology mirrors Pavlov’s experimental trials.
In terms of theoretical framing, however, the differences are significant. 
Whereas Pavlov restricts himself as much as possible to describing and analyzing 
behavioural changes, in a more or less “behaviouristic” fashion, London’s work 
can be regarded as an example of animal psychoanalysis – albeit in a Jungian rather 
than a Freudian sense – as the focus is on the collective, rather than on the individ-
ual unconscious.
The idea that a novel can be, or even should be, structured as an experiment was 
already worked out by Zola, as described above. In fact, his most famous “experi-
mental novel”, La bête humaine (The Human Beast, already mentioned above), is 
remarkably similar in many ways to London’s famous story, notably insofar as the 
psychological content is concerned. Its male protagonist is haunted by (to use Jack 
London’s term) the “primordial beast”, hidden in his unconscious, taking the form 
of the uncanny, unconscious desire to kill any women that arouse his sexual desire.16 
The protagonist himself is firmly convinced that this pathological longing goes back 
to some kind of traumatic injury, suffered by his forebears very long ago, during the 
dawn of humanity.17 He tries to fight this terrible longing desperately, as unlike Buck 
he remains part of the civilized world, so that his ego remains in place more or less, 
but Zola nonetheless exposes him to a series of circumstances that are bound to bring 
his strange desire to life again. Zola’s novel is, one could say, a parallel experiment, 
involving a human instead of an animal subject, but devoted to the same idea, 
namely that we are driven by unconscious desires fuelled by ideas lingering in our 
collective memory, dating from the obscure era of domestication and anthropogene-
sis, the first chapter in the history of co-evolution of humans and dogs, as well as of 
women and men – that is, the era of the cave dwellers and fire-makers.
Jack London’s story was not a creation ex nihilo, but rather a contribution to – as 
well as a criticism of – a genre already flourishing and quite popular at the time, 
the genre of the dog story. Other authors, such as Ernest Thompson Seton,18 had 
been writing stories with the explicit goal of increasing public awareness of the life 
of animals (wild and domesticated), often telling their stories from the animal’s 
point of view. The dog stories by Nobel Prize winner Rudyard Kipling, notably Thy 
Servant a Dog (1930/1960), may also be mentioned in this respect. Although there 
is accuracy and realism in these tales, the authors involved were nonetheless 
accused of sentimentalism and anthropomorphism, notably because of their ten-
16 “[C]e tressaillement involontaire, qu’il tâchait de maîtriser, chaque fois qu’il abordait une 
femme” (1890/1953, p. 43).
17 “[C]’était comme une soudaine crise de rage aveugle, une soif toujours renaissante de venger 
des offenses très anciennes, dont il aurait perdu l’exact mémoire. Cela venait-il donc de si loin, du 
mal que les femmes avaient fait à sa race, de la rancune amassée de mâle en mâle, depuis la pre-
mière tromperie au fond des cavernes (p. 65).
18 Although tales such as “Bingo: the story of my dog” or “Thy servant a dog” contain elements 
that can be found in Jack London’s version as well, these charming, anecdotal, domestic stories 
clearly lack the grandeur and scope of The Call of the Wild.
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dency to identify themselves with their animal protagonists, but also because they 
tended to ascribe human emotions and human deliberations to dogs. John 
Burroughs, a naturalist of some renown and a personal friend of President 
Roosevelt, published an article in the Atlantic Monthly in 1903 entitled “Real and 
sham natural history” in which he tried to substantiate these accusations: literary 
authors produce a view of animals, notably of dogs, that is quite at odds with sci-
entific evidence (Burroughs 2003, cf. Lutts 2001). Roosevelt himself joined the 
debate, nicknaming these authors “nature-fakers” (Clark 2007). He did not object 
to writers like Kipling who (in The Jungle Book and similar writings) remained 
within the fable tradition more or less, but he did object to authors who feigned 
realism. Although Jack London also was involved in this dispute, he did not 
respond immediately. His formal defence appeared in 1908 under the title “The 
other animals”, an interesting piece of work because it focuses on the epistemologi-
cal issues and problems involved in the writing of dog novels.
According to London, rather than suffering from anthropomorphism, The Call of 
the Wild was actually written as a protest against the tendency to “humanize” animals 
displayed by some of the other “animal writers”. At the same time, however, he criti-
cizes Burroughs for his view that animals are basically automatons, only able to pro-
duce mechanical and reflexive behaviour. According to London, Burroughs’ view 
that only humans are reasoning animals, whereas all other animals are deprived of 
reason and solely motivated by instinct, is a medieval and scholastic view that can no 
longer be regarded as credible in the light of evolution.19 Human reason is the out-
come of a long evolutionary trajectory and, notwithstanding our impressive intelli-
gence as a species, we are still similar to other animals in many ways. In The Call of 
the Wild London already emphasized that Buck, in his responses, was mostly moved 
by instinct and emotion, but he regarded it as untrue to life to deny that animals such 
as his protagonist share at least a rudimentary ability to reason. According to London, 
Burroughs’ view was not based on scientific facts, but rather on a pre-Darwinian, 
“homocentric” and narcissistic conviction, namely that humans are absolutely special 
and unique, quite unlike other animals.20 London explains that, in his novel, he 
intended to transcend a number of established dichotomies, such as between science 
(speaking about “facts”) and literature (speaking about “emotions”) as well as 
between animals (acting on the basis of instinct and impulse) and humans (acting on 
the basis of reason). His dog novel is an effort to analyse the ways in which a dog 
experiences his world that surpasses not only previous animal novels but also the kind 
of scientific literature Burroughs was referring to. And London even goes a step 
19 “[Burroughs asserts] that all animals below man are automatons and perform actions only of two 
sorts – mechanical and reflex – and that in such actions no reasoning enters at all. They believe 
that man is the only animal capable of reasoning and that ever does reason. This is a view that 
makes the twentieth-century scientist smile. It is not modern at all. It is distinctly mediaeval” 
(London 1908).
20 Interestingly, London (the “dog psychoanalyst”) elaborates a line of argument here that will be 
taken up later by Freud himself in his famous essay “Eine Schwierigkeit der Psychoanalyse” 
(1917). Scientific breakthroughs such as the theory of evolution contain a “narcistic offense”.
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 further. Burroughs’ views are not science-based, he argues, but rather symptoms of 
the author’s anthropocentric ego. Although London agrees that many instances of 
animal behaviour can be explained on the basis of instinct alone, he also (in a more 
or less anecdotal fashion) sums up a number of personal experiences with animals 
that obviously seem to indicate that, although instincts evidently play a role, dogs are 
nonetheless able to learn and reason, to some extent. The divide between man and 
animals is not impassible. Burroughs’ view of rationality is far too abstract, too 
restricted, it fails to appreciate the evolutionary continuity between humans and other 
animals – animals whose history is part of our history. In other words, whereas sci-
entists like Burroughs are more or less metaphysically conditioned to think along the 
lines of Cartesian scholasticism, some of the animal authors indeed represent the 
other extreme: they depict animals in a much too sentimental and anthropomorphic 
fashion. London, however, believes his own book steers a middle course, sensitive to 
the continuities as well as the discontinuities between humans and animals. Only in 
this manner, a truthful and credible view of animal life is possible.
In 1906 London wrote White Fang, a sequel that perfectly mirrors The Call of 
the Wild. Whereas the latter novel is a story of regression, a migration to the primi-
tive sub-Arctic world, describing a return of the unconscious and the repressed, 
White Fang is a story about domestication, compressed into the biography of one 
single dog. Wild Fang is transformed from a wild wolfish state into a civilized ver-
sion of himself. The first chapters have all the characteristics of a nature documen-
tary, faithfully documenting the growing up of a wolf cub, whose mother happens 
to be half wolf – half dog. The inevitable clash with civilization, however, presents 
itself in the form of the Klondike Gold Rush, adding drama to the story and putting 
it within a larger frame.
The first chapters tell the tale of a more or less natural development, a coming 
of age, without any “intervention” on the part of the author. The efforts to domesti-
cate the young wolf in an Indian settlement are described as a reiteration (more or 
less) of the primal domestication scenes that must have occurred continuously dur-
ing times long ago. It is only in the final chapters, when the animal protagonist 
finds himself exposed to rather unusual circumstances, that the contours of an 
experimental setting really emerge. The book is interesting mainly for three rea-
sons. First of all, it contains (in its final chapters) the story of an experiment: the 
sudden introduction of a semi-tamed wolf into a civilized, Californian environ-
ment. Secondly, the novel contains reflections on dog intelligence, as compared to 
that of the “man-animal” – intensified perhaps by London’s dispute with Burroughs 
as described above. Indeed, much more explicitly than in The Call of the Wild, 
London tries to address the issue of the “animality” of animals. And finally, there 
is the issue, already referred to above, of a dog’s “collective unconscious”.
In contrast to The Call of the Wild, London’s sequel begins in the desolate cold and 
silence of the Arctic Northland and ends in the sunny and easy climate of the 
Californian Southland. It depicts, so to speak, an animal’s biography in which the 
sequence of events (or rather: the sequence of experimental conditions) has been 
reversed. When White Fang encounters human beings for the first time, they appear to 
him as exceptionally powerful, as δεινος, as superior beings, notably as “makers of 
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fire”. His experiences reiterate those of his distant forebears. He hears another call than 
Buck: the call of fire and man. A great awe descends upon him. He perceives them, 
not only with his own eyes, but “out of the eyes of all his ancestors” (168). There is an 
immediate awareness of the fear and the respect born of the centuries of struggle and 
the accumulated experience of generations. His willingness to submit himself to 
human power comes from a compelling unconscious “heritage” (168). Much more 
awe-invoking even than the Indians he initially encounters are the white men – who 
build huge forts and monstrous steamers. A representative of this race, a civilized 
human being, decides to take White Fang with him to California. The latter’s “civiliza-
tion” is explicitly referred to as an “experiment” (267). White Fang is clearly a com-
panion piece to The Call of the Wild. The civilization of a dog as described in this book 
is a “reverse angle on the same theme” (O’Connor 1964, p. 234).
As was the case in The Call of the Wild, the story is written “from within”. The 
author identifies himself with his protagonist and sees the world through his eyes. 
Yet, this does not amount to a complete “humanization” of the animal involved. 
When White Fang begins to explore the outside world, for example, his mental life 
is described in the following terms:
In fact, the gray cub was not given to thinking – at least, the kind of thinking customary of 
men. His brain worked in dim ways. Yet his conclusions were as sharp and distinct as those 
achieved by men. He had a method of accepting things, without questioning the why and 
wherefore.… Logic and physics were no part of his mental makeup. (p. 150)
After successfully catching his first prey, London once again described the wolfish 
nature of his mental processes:
In his own dim way he learned the law. Eat or be eaten. He did not formulate the law in 
clear, set terms and moralize about it. He did not even think the law; he merely lived the 
law without thinking about it at all. Had the cub thought in man-fashion, he might have 
epitomized life as a voracious appetite. But the cub did not think in man-fashion. He did 
not look at things with wide vision. He was single-purposed. (p. 166)
In these and similar sections, London adheres to the view that the mental life of dogs 
is different, even deficient, in comparison to humans. The mental life of animals is 
characterized by dimness, by a “lack” of ideas such as causality. Although in his 
actual descriptions London often depicts his hero as sensitive, acute and intelligent, 
this impression is corrected more or less in “disclaimers” such as the ones just men-
tioned. Indeed, when describing White Fang’s perfect feel for timing, he writes:
Not that he did this consciously, however. He did not calculate such things. It was all automatic. 
His eyes saw correctly, and the nerves carried the vision correctly to his brain. The parts of him 
were better adjusted than those of the average dog.… His was a better, far better, nervous, 
mental and muscular coordination.… His was a more perfected mechanism. (p. 213/214)
Eventually, after a number of difficulties and drawbacks, as is usually the case in 
experimental work, the trial becomes a great success. Due to the chronic exposure to 
his new, friendly environment, White Fang manages to suppress his natural impulses 
and to control his aggressive instincts. By becoming tame, he actually qualifies him-
self for civilization. He learns to master himself. When badly wounded by an escaped 
and armed convict, a “human beast” who had wanted to murder the judge who had 
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sent him to prison, White Fang is treated with the utmost respect, almost as a human 
being, a human patient. Indeed, he is treated much more humanely than the violent 
convict himself, the subject of a manhunt. A man and a wolf change places, so to 
speak. While the convict is shot off like a wild animal, White Fang is operated upon, 
by the best available surgeon, and the most advanced technologies are put to use, such 
as an x-ray. A medical expert is summoned by means of a telegraph to San Francisco. 
He is nursed as one would nurse a human being, a hospital patient, a family member 
– a Pavlovian dog. He is given the best available surgery so that he may survive the 
most hazardous phase of the experiment to which he was subjected. While recover-
ing, he takes to dreaming and in this manner, reminiscent of a psychoanalytical ses-
sion, he works out the story of his life, a compressed version of the collective 
narrative of domestication and civilization of his species as such.
In important respects, The Call of the Wild and White Fang are literary counter-
parts to Pavlov’s animal practice. Experimenters and their dogs interact patiently in 
experimental settings. Dogs are trained to adjust to new environments and although 
the experiment implies a certain amount of suffering, the researchers take a keen 
interest in their well-being. But, as I said, in terms of theoretical framing, London’s 
view on animals is psychoanalytical (Jungian) rather than behaviouristic (Pavlovian). 
Buck and White Fang are animals with a “soul”.
5.7 The Experimental Animal-self
The vicissitudes of Buck and White Fang, Jack London’s most famous “experimen-
tal dogs”, mirror (in a variety of ways) the author’s own life. Besides The Call of 
the Wild and White Fang, London wrote a number of other dog stories, and he 
clearly identified himself with his dog-protagonists. He called his self-built house 
Wolf House, signed some of his letters with “Wolf” and clearly liked to compare 
himself with this hardy animal, at home in a desolate landscape, the atavistic alter 
ego of the domesticated dog.
Like Buck, Jack London grew up in California, from where he plunged himself 
into the desolate sub-Artic climate of the Klondike Gold Rush. In fact, in the course 
of his eventful life, London voluntarily exposed himself to a series of rather extreme 
conditions: from the Yukon region in wintertime to the Pacific Ocean on a sailing 
boat, from Korea during the Russo–Japanese war to the rural arcadia where he was 
to spend his final years. Indeed, his own biography can be regarded as a series of 
experiments, a test-ground for trying out the theories of a number of favourite 
authors, such as Marx, Darwin, Nietzsche and Jung. The effects of these experimental 
conditions are recorded faithfully and accurately in an impressive number of stories 
and novels. His most autobiographical novel is called John Barleycorn, describing the 
genesis and impact of his alcohol addiction. In a rather systematic manner, London 
analyses the disastrous long-term mental and physical effects of a chronic, more or 
less continuous exposure to large quantities of alcohol. In this novel, his life emerges 
as a chronic experiment, designed to study the consequences of living on alcohol.
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The first extreme climate to which he willingly exposed himself, using his own 
physical and mental being as a “research animal” so to speak,21 was the sub-Arctic 
stillness and whiteness of the Klondike region. Together with thousands compatriots, 
he all of a sudden decided to set out for this desolate wilderness, thousand miles from 
civilization, in order to subject himself to frost, melancholia and malnutrition. Yet, in 
this (rather exceptional) case, the adventure proved quite beneficial. The Klondike 
became his “goldmine”, but in an unexpected manner – his goldmine as an author. 
One winter in the Yukon area provided him with enough materials for years of writ-
ing. It allowed him to make a name for himself as an author. In an unprecedented way 
he described the immense stillness, silence and desolateness of the North, the terrors 
of extreme cold, darkness and starvation. It was an Odyssey towards self-discovery. 
All biographers agree that, had it not been for the Klondike experience, he probably 
would never have become a writer. In his Darwinian descriptions of the gold-rush 
epoch, the emphasis is on survival through adaptation. Some men and animals sur-
vive, whereas others fail, due to certain physical and psychic characteristics. All indi-
viduals involved are put to the test, in the context of a large scale experiment. His 
stories and novels can be read as protocols of these relentless trials, designed to test 
the theories of Darwin, Nietzsche and others. In London’s work, nature emerges as 
an infinite and overwhelming wilderness, as the sublime in the sense of das Erhabene, 
where only the exceptionally strong and confident can feel at home.
The influence of Nietzsche is clearly noticeable in a series of stories and novels 
set in a rather different environment: the sublime vastness of the Pacific Ocean. 
Again, these literary documents to a certain extent can be regarded as protocols of 
experimental trials with the author himself as the primary research subject. They 
are based on personal experience and observation: Jack London was Jack London’s 
own favourite research subject, his own favourite physiological and psychological 
“model animal”. The experimental nature of his own sea journeys is emphasized by 
the fact that it was done on a self-built boat, an artefact produced for the purpose 
of conducting a hazardous experiment – that all but ended with the death of the 
most prominent “research animal” on board. Although he once again managed to 
survive starvation and disease, the experiment further undermined his health. 
Before setting off on his sea voyage, Jack London had had rather romantic views 
concerning life in the Pacific and on the South Sea islands. Although these idealiza-
tions did not stand the test of time, the stories and novels he produced were only 
partly to profit from his experiences. They are mixtures of realism and romanti-
cism. Apparently he was not really willing to put some of his romantic expectations 
to the test.
Two other literary experiments deserve to be mentioned here, although they are 
“thought experiments”, rather than experiments in a strict sense, and the theories 
put to the test in these novels are those of Jung, rather than those of Darwin and 
Nietzsche. The first one is his novel Before Adam. It is an experiment in introspec-
tion, exploring human life during prehistoric times in the context of an inward 
mental journey. It is a mental effort to return to early human existence, before the 
21 Cf. F. Nietzsche: “Mein Leben ist Tierquälerei”.
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onset of civilization and domestication, the life of caves and firesides, already 
vaguely present in The Call of the Wild and White Fang. As London sees it, traces 
of world are stored somehow in our collective memory. Individuals who feel at 
home in these surroundings, rejoicing in the mental and physical challenges they 
provide, are bound to feel somewhat out of place in a modern world.
Another “thought experiment”, another experiment in introspection, is his novel 
The Star Rover [The Jacket] (1915/1915). A San Quentin prisoner finds himself 
exposed to solitary confinement for an extended period of time. In order to survive 
such a damaging condition, he learns that other prisoners have developed a psychic 
technique that can be employed in order to safeguard the individual Self from loneli-
ness, despair and mental degradation, namely: travelling backward in time by means 
of intense concentration, exploring the prehistoric layers in one’s own unconscious.
In all these experimental novels, two “conditions” are contrasted: life in a more 
or less original, free, natural and open world as compared to life under modern, 
urban circumstances. Although the wilderness is a highly demanding environment, 
both mentally and physically, some individuals who experience unhappiness and 
unease in a modern society (e.g. Jack London himself) are bound to flourish in 
more physically challenging, more primitive settings. At times, his novels take a 
Marxist position, depicting the effects of modern urbanization in terms of class, as 
in The People of the Abyss [1903]. In other novels, however, race rather than class 
becomes the “independent variable” – for although London was a man of left-wing, 
socialist convictions, he was also highly sensitive of ethnicity. This is the case, for 
example, in The Valley of the Moon (1913/1913), where a man and a woman sud-
denly recognize that they share the same ethnic descent. All of a sudden they realize 
that they are “Saxons”, a race of people described as “wild, like Indians”, but white, 
with blue eyes and yellow hair – “and they were awful fighters” (p. 21). In 
London’s novel, this common ethnic background reinforces (and explains) their 
mutual and unconscious erotic attraction. What the novel basically sets out to prove 
and explain, however, is why individuals endowed with such a genetic heritage 
could flourish during the pioneer days (happily migrating across the great plains), 
but are having such a hard time adapting to city life and industrial labour. Modern 
conditions are beneficial to some, but harmful to others.
The most important experiment to which Jack London relentlessly subjected him-
self, however, documented by him in a meticulous and faithful manner, lasted the 
greater part of his life, from his adolescence up to his final days, spent on his 
Californian ranch. This experiment consisted in the ongoing exposure (of mind and 
body) to severe and more or less continuous alcohol intake. Jack London was, 
throughout his adult life, a heavy drinker. According to O’Conner (1964) the novel 
John Barleycorn (1913/1914) describes how, eventually, he was “maimed” by alcohol. 
But it would be one-sided to depict alcohol merely as a damaging factor. It was both 
his poison and his fuel. Most of his novels seem to display something of an alcoholic 
curve: in the beginning they abound in energy and enthusiasm, but before long there 
is a decrease in creative power, a gradual onset of weary numbness. Indeed, one could 
say that this same alcoholic curve even structures his biography as such.
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Apparently, due to the self-revelatory frankness of the book, John Barleycorn, 
the autobiography of a heavy drinker, was recognized as true to life to such an 
extent that it became a major weapon in the anti-alcohol campaign that emerged 
shortly after his death and eventually succeeded in bringing prohibition to the USA. 
It also contained an answer to the question why, gradually but inevitably, London’s 
own talent died out. As O’Conner puts it, the book, in a clear and convincing man-
ner, describes (introspectively, from a first-person perspective) how continuous 
alcohol intake changes human behaviour as well as mental functioning (p. 333). 
Therefore, it is a scientific novel, the report of a lifelong trial. According to London, 
alcoholism is a slow form of suicide. Yet, although the book was apparently written 
to convert people with alcohol problems to switch to a more sober lifestyle, the 
writer himself was unmoved by his own admonitions. He remained faithful to his 
excessive drinking habits, even when they began to ruin his kidneys, bringing him 
bouts of severe pain and various other forms of physical disintegration. He commit-
ted suicide in 1916 by taking an overdose of morphine.
Comparing London’s dog novels with the story of his own life, one could say 
that his literary “Experiments with Dogs” are, to some extent, exaggerations and 
idealizations. In these novels, the adaptation of the research animal to the challeng-
ing new environments is somewhat too perfect. As far as Jack London himself was 
concerned, he never really adapted himself, neither to the sub-Arctic wilderness (as 
did Buck), nor to the healthy and happy life he had wanted to experience in his 
Californian arcadia (as did White Fang). London’s own case is reminiscent of 
“real” laboratory dogs. They are allowed to recover to some extent, but the damage 
cannot be completely undone. In the end, the trials prove too demanding. It is diffi-
cult to extrapolate the vicissitudes of his experimental dogs to real life biographies. 
Eventually, in real-life experiments, the research animal is bound to succumb to the 
adverse conditions to which he is exposed. It is beyond doubt, in short, that John 
Barleycorn is more realistic, more “scientific”, than The Call of the Wild.
The next chapter is a sequel to this one. Again we will analyse a literary docu-
ment that describes the effects of modern life on human beings, comparing it to the 
impact of domestication on wild animals. And once again, we will read a literary 
document as a literary experiment. Yet, whereas in this chapter our focus gradually 
shifted from science to literature, in the next chapter we will move in the opposite 
direction: we will begin with literature, gradually moving towards science. 
Furthermore, whereas the focus in this chapter was on physiology and, to a lesser 
extent, on behavioural research, the focus in the next chapter will predominantly be 
on animal behaviour (animal psychology, ethology). Finally, whereas this chapter 
was predominantly devoted to dogs, Chapter 6 will focus on the vicissitudes of a 
different kind of research animal – a wild duck.
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Chapter 6
The Birth of a Research Animal
Ibsen’s The Wild Duck and The Origin of a New 
Animal Science
6.1 Introduction
Ibsen’s play The Wild Duck was written and published in 1884. The initial response 
to it was one of bewilderment. It left the audience baffled and perplexed. 
Generations of critics continued to regard it as obscure, undefined, unfathomable, 
ambiguous, evasive – not in the least because of the mysterious symbol that held it 
together: an untamed bird in its close and miserable garret, captive to circumstances 
and with no hope of escape (Meyer 1985).
In this chapter, I intend to re-read the play in a particular manner, namely as a 
document that records an important event in the history of human–animal interac-
tion. The Wild Duck stages a new and unprecedented animal practice. If we read it 
in this manner, the play turns out to be remarkably coherent, and apparently futile 
details suddenly become important and meaningful. It is not my intention, however, 
to add yet another Ibsen interpretation to those already propounded. Rather, the 
purpose of this chapter is an epistemological one. I will emphasize that what is 
happening to Ibsen’s duck on the stage, is remarkably similar to what is happening 
to some of its contemporaries in a new type of animal research, emerging precisely 
at that time, destined to become one of the most important forms of animal research 
of the present.
In other words, the idea (already proposed in Chapter 5) that literary texts 
involving animals may often be seen as structured in a way that is similar to animal 
experiments, will be further elaborated in this chapter, but now applied to a play. 
Moreover, Pavlov’s work already displayed a gradual shift of focus from animal 
physiology to animal behaviour, or rather animal “psychology”. Also in this 
respect, the present chapter constitutes a sequel to the previous one. Notably, I will 
call attention to the work of two pioneer biologists, contemporaries of Ibsen, who 
initiated a new scientific animal practice, the experimental study of animal behaviour, 
namely Douglas Spalding and Conwy Lloyd Morgan. Their focus is on behavioural 
trials. My purpose is to show that in all the documents involved, both the scientific 
and the literary ones, one and the same event is being recorded – the birth of a new 
type of research animal. The import of Ibsen’s play for animal ethics resides in the 
fact that it stages the struggle between a romantic and a scientific perception of 
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animals and allows us to discern crucial aspects of our present moral relationship 
with animals. For indeed, the struggle between the scientific and the romantic view, 
acted-out in The Wild Duck, is still structuring the ethical debate on animals in the 
present.
Before submitting The Wild Duck to a close reading, I will briefly discuss the 
play that immediately preceded it and prepared the ground for it – An Enemy of the 
People, better known as A Public Enemy. For although a more thorough analysis of 
it will be given in Chapter 8, it can be regarded as a prelude to The Wild Duck. 
Therefore, I will briefly summarize the basic story line in this chapter. Subsequently, 
in my analysis of The Wild Duck, I will concentrate on the human–animal interac-
tion that evolves in it, noticing how closely this interaction coincided with pioneer 
initiatives that (towards the end of the nineteenth century) succeeded in inaugurat-
ing a new type of animal research. Finally, I will indicate how Ibsen’s play allows 
us to flesh out the moral dimension of this new practice – one that was to become 
a large-scale phenomenon in the course of the twentieth century.
6.2 Preliminary Remarks
Before publishing The Wild Duck, Ibsen had already paid attention to the emer-
gence of the modern scientific outlook, and its inevitable clash with other views on 
nature, such as romanticism. His most important effort to represent the rise of the 
scientific mode of thought is his play An Enemy of the People.
As will be explained more thoroughly in Chapter 8, An Enemy of the People is 
a play dealing with a rather modern theme, namely environmental pollution. Its 
principal character, Dr. Stockmann (who is repeatedly referred to as a man of science), 
had been working quietly a whole winter, analyzing the water at the public baths 
and sending samples of it to a university laboratory, in order to assure himself 
that the local health facilities were contaminated by millions of animalculae or 
infusiora – mysterious living beings that could only be detected with the help of 
scientific equipment. After a series of events, however, that we will deal with more 
thoroughly in Chapter 8, Stockmann publicly declares that the most dangerous 
enemy of science (besides authoritarian politicians) is common sense, accepting 
only those truths that are generally acknowledged, and therefore hopelessly out-
dated. Its stupidity and ignorance must be attributed to lack of oxygen in houses. In 
a dramatic lecture-scene, Stockmann poses as a free-thinker who, in a rather 
Nietzschean tone of voice, compares the difference between the majority of man-
kind and the “intellectually superior few” to that between mongrels and pedigree 
stock. The final act contains a number of Darwinisms – that is, quotes borrowed 
from popular Darwinism such as struggle for existence and survival of the fittest – 
and it all ends with Stockmann deciding to become a teacher for human mongrels: 
“Just bring me a few.… I’m going to try an experiment on some mongrels… there 
may be some excellent material among them” (p. 218). Many of these elements 
(popular Darwinism, the emergence of the scientific perception and the idea of 
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conducting an experiment, on animals as well as on human subjects) are further 
elaborated in The Wild Duck.
The principal character of The Wild Duck is Hjalmar Ekdal, a photographer, 
lazy, self-centred and sentimental, dreaming about an “invention” that will trans-
form photography from a mere handicraft into a true “science” (p. 167). His studio 
(also functioning as living-room) is an attic, opening into a loft whose interior is 
somewhat unusual. It is an artificial forest of chimneys and Christmas trees – in 
which Hjalmar and his father keep hens, rabbits and pigeons. Bored by his profes-
sion, Hjalmar becomes “active and purposive as soon as there is an excuse for 
tinkering in the loft” (Knight 1962, p. 56). Other important characters are his wife 
Gina, their daughter Hedvig and a former school friend (Gregers Werle) who pays 
an unexpected visit to the Ekdal family and decides to use Hjalmar as a research 
subject in a moral experiment, with the intention of “opening his eyes” and trans-
forming him into a free-thinking, independent human being. The bleak, distressing 
plot seems to convey the moral message that people simply cannot be improved.
Besides the species already mentioned, the loft is inhabited by a semi-domesticated 
duck. Various theories have been advanced as to what the bird is intended to stand for, 
Meyer tells us (p. 561). It is a strange creature that (unlike the birds and frogs in 
Aristophanes’ comedies) never appears on stage, never shows itself to the public. 
Apparently, she mirrors the fate of those who, in Ibsen’s own words, have forgotten 
what it means to live wild, have grown plump and tame and content with their basket 
(p. 562). The duck represents a primal domestication scene. Yet, besides being merely 
a moral image reflecting the dismal conditions of the human individuals around her, 
I believe that there is another, more “positive” side to this “strange creature of wild 
life, mysterious as life itself” (Knight 1962, p. 65). The duck must be regarded as 
a phenomenon in its own right, and my reading will concentrate on what goes on in 
the loft, where the animals dwell, rather than on what happens in the living-room (the 
human realm). Or, to put it differently, I will focus on the experiment with animals, 
rather than on the experiment with human subjects. Ignoring for a while the interesting 
dispute between Romanticism (represented by Gregers Werle) and Social Darwinism 
(represented by his successful father) in Act One, I will at once address the loft-scenes 
in Act Two and Three.
6.3 The Wild Duck: Close Reading 1
Act Two is set in the studio/living-room, with professional apparatus, instruments 
and tools. A conversation between Gina and Hedvig is evolving when, suddenly, 
Old Ekdal (Hjalmar’s father) appears on stage. He slides the door in the rear wall 
a little to one side, looks into the loft for a moment, closes the door carefully and 
utters the following line:
He, He!… she’s lain down in her basket. He, He!
As Hjalmar enters the attic, the following dialogue develops:
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HJAMAR. Have you looked in there this evening, father?
EKDAL. Yes, of course I have, she’s gone into the basket.
HJAMAR. Gone into the basket, has she? She is beginning to get used to it, then?
EKDAL. What did I tell you? Well, now, there are one or two little-
HJAMAR. Little improvements, yes.
Before pointing out the significance of these apparently trivial lines, let me pursue this 
scene a little further. An unexpected event occurs. Gregers Werle pays a visit to the 
Ekdal family, with the intention of initiating his moral experiment. He starts off by 
bluntly asking old Ekdal how he, a former hunter, manages to live under such depress-
ing conditions, “boxed between four walls”. What about the life in the forest, the wide 
open spaces? Ekdal smiles and says: “Hjalmar, shall we show it to him?” The latter 
hesitates, but Ekdal insists. Gregers finds the whole scene rather confusing. What are 
they talking about? Finally, the sliding doors are opened. A long and irregularly 
shaped loft can be seen, full of dark nooks and crannies, with a couple of brick chim-
ney pipes coming through the floor. Moonlight shines in on various parts of the loft, 
while the rest lies in shadow. “What is it, exactly?” Gregers asks. He is shown some 
chickens. “Why, you keep chickens!”, he exclaims. There are pigeons too, and rabbits. 
Finally, Ekdal says: “But now I’ll show you! This is really something …” (p. 150). He 
shows him the wild duck. “It’s a wild duck … that’s what it is”. Gregers, perplexed, 
does not know what to make of it and asks: “But can it live up here in this loft?”
What are we to make of it? What is happening here? Two important clues allow 
us to find at least the beginning of an answer. Francis Bull (1932) has suggested that 
Ibsen, in choosing the theme of his play, may have been influenced by Darwin’s 
account of how wild ducks degenerate in captivity. Darwin’s The Variation of 
Animals and Plants Under Domestication (1868/1988), already discussed in Chapter 
3, indeed contains the following line: “We have seen how soon the wild duck, when 
domesticated, loses its true character, from the effect of abundant food, or from taking 
little exercise” (p. 331). The fate of Ibsen’s duck, then, seems a dramatization of a 
quote borrowed from Darwin.1 The importance of this clue is underlined when it is 
brought into contact with a second one. Among the draft materials and notes, jotted 
down by Ibsen as he was designing his play, there is an awkward line, apparently 
without any connection to other entries. Nor can a trace of it be found in the final text: 
“It is illicit for scientists to torture animals to death. Let physicians experiment with 
politicians and journalists” (Arpe 1972, p. 109). The jeer in the second sentence, 
directed at politicians and journalist, is an entry belonging the problem-domain of An 
Enemy of the People, the play he was still preoccupied with at that time, and should 
not distract us here. More important is the remark concerning scientists torturing ani-
mals to death – one that must be given some further thought.
1 The issue of any direct influence from Darwin on Ibsen, who probably relied on secondary (nota-
bly newspaper) sources, is not relevant to my argument. Darwin was “in the air” in those days, 
and Darwinian ideas and phrases were collective cultural property, inciting intellectual discussion 
and comments in a variety of circles throughout Europe. An important aspect of Ibsen’s talent was 
his seismographic sensitivity for the major intellectual discussions of his era. For more details on 
Darwin’s influence on Ibsen see: Shideler (1997).
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As we have seen in Chapter 5, experimentation with animals was an important 
issue in the second half of the nineteenth century, described by Ryder (1975) as “the 
golden age of vivisection”. In Ibsen’s time, the issue had reached its climax 
(Breitschneider 1962). Whereas opponents accused researchers such as Claude 
Bernard of submitting large numbers of animals to atrocious experiments, the profes-
sional research community discarded public outrage as sentimentalism. Before The 
Wild Duck, Ibsen had written a series of problem plays, dealing with publicly dis-
puted issues like emancipation of women (A Doll’s House), euthanasia (Ghosts) and 
freedom of speech (An Enemy of the People). Apparently, he was considering the 
possibility of using vivisection as an element in his new play about contemporary life. 
Eventually, he must have rejected the idea, since the issue of animal experimentation 
seems completely absent from its final version. Unless – the duck itself can be 
regarded as an experimental animal. And this is indeed the case. The research animal 
is still present in the play, but rather than staging a debate about animal experimenta-
tion, Ibsen allows such an experiment to be actually conducted before our eyes – 
albeit as a new and somewhat unfamiliar type of experiment, less atrocious than 
vivisection, focusing on problems of animal behaviour (notably adaptation) rather 
than on animal physiology. Apparently, it must somehow have dawned on Ibsen that, 
besides the traditional form of experiments with animals (vivisection), a new animal 
practice was in the process of emerging, one no longer directed at dissecting animals 
alive, but rather at closely and systematically observing their behaviour under a vari-
ety of modifiable conditions. The play describes an experiment in domestication.
Now it suddenly becomes less obscure what father and son Ekdal are doing in 
their loft. Their apparently futile pastime actually constitutes a quasi-experimental 
activity. The line quoted above – He, He! … she’s lain down in her basket. He, He! 
– is actually an observation. Such observations (made by one observer and reported 
to the other) are made at regular intervals, in accordance with a quasi-scientific 
protocol (“Have you looked in there this evening, father?”, “Of course I have”). 
The remark “She is beginning to get used to it” is an interpretation, apparently a 
confirmation of a hypothesis (“What did I tell you?”). In this manner, they are con-
ducting an experiment in adaptation. The process of domestication, of adjustment 
to artificial circumstances, is monitored meticulously. Their remarks, their gestures 
are part of a behavioural pattern, a protocol, and become perfectly meaningful and 
reasonable, even typical. They are carrying out an experiment, whether they (or, for 
that matter, the author himself ) are conscious of it or not.
As I already indicated in Chapter 5, an experimental design or protocol is basi-
cally structured by a simple phrase – What happens if …? What happens if a wild 
duck is confined within a tiny artificial forest? Will she be able to live there? 
(Greger’s question) Will she get used to it? (Old Ekdal’s question) The behaviour 
of father and son Ekdal is guided by questions of this sort. Their time-consuming 
and apparently futile activities amount to something – they are manipulating the 
environmental conditions (independent variables) and subsequently observe the 
behavioural effects (dependent variables).
Older animal practices (such as hunting and husbandry) are also present in the 
play. The hens seem to be merely “kept”, and old Ekdal at times relapses in his 
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former practice by shooting rabbits, instead of observing them. But amidst these 
reminiscences, a new phenomenon emerges, a new mode of being for animals: a 
new type of research animal enters the scene.2 Father and son Ekdal witness the 
process of adjustment, the gradual erasure and extinction of natural behavioural 
patterns. While “fiddling” with and deliberating about contrivances such as a water-
trough, for example, they are in fact manipulating independent variables (such as 
“water”). They are accommodating the environment to the animal’s needs, in order 
to further adaptation. Interestingly, more or less at the same time, professional 
researchers are beginning to design precisely these kinds of experiments. It is the 
beginning of an important production line of knowledge claims, generating an 
increasing number of ethological, biological and psychological publications in the 
course of the next century. In short, the Ekdals are doing what a small number of 
professional contemporaries were also engaged in at that time.
In The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication, the book that 
perhaps “inspired” Ibsen to write his play, as we have seen, Darwin had collected a 
considerable number of observations on animal behaviour. His “successor”, George 
Romanes, continued this work by collecting and systematizing numerous data and 
stories about animal performances (Boakes 1984). From a methodological point of 
view, this type of research is often discarded as anecdotal rather than experimental. 
The first biologists to really submit animal behaviour to systematic observation and 
experimentation, were Douglas Spalding (1873) and Conwy Lloyd Morgan 
(1890/1894). In terms of publication dates, their papers are “flanking” as it were 
Ibsen’s play. Before highlighting some other details of the play, therefore, let us 
have a look at the kind of research reported in these publications.
6.4 The Emergence of a New Research Paradigm: 
Spalding and Morgan
The animal research described in Chapter 5 was done within university settings 
such as the College the France (Bernard) and the Imperial Institute of Experimental 
Medicine (Pavlov). The first initiatives towards commencing a new kind of animal 
research, focusing on the ethology of behaviour, were taken outside universities. 
Experiments with animals of this new type were done by amateurs, like the Ekdals, 
and took place in private settings, within the confines of family life. The new science 
emerged when, in 1873, Douglas Spalding published the results of his pioneer 
2 When in 1854 Darwin started to collect pigeons and ducks out of scientific interest, Desmond 
and Moore (1991) tell us, “it was hard to realize the novelty of his move. Most naturalists 
disdained pigeons and poultry. Science was not done in the farmyard. The gentry might have kept 
ornamental ducks on shooting estates … but such gamekeeping was a world removed from 
contemplative philosophy” (p. 426).
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trials, conducted in a private environment: the house of the famous Maberley family,3 
where he was appointed as tutor and where children, observers, lovers and research 
animals mixed (Boakes 1984). In other words, Spalding’s “research facilities” 
constituted a bourgeois version of the Ekdal attic. His research set the model for the 
new paradigm to be, demonstrating that animal behaviour could be studied and 
manipulated by isolating and controlling a limited set of conditions. In doing so, he 
“began an experimental science which was carried forward by … innumerable later 
investigators” (Gray 1962, p. 303).
In Spalding’s time, the “marvellous dexterity” displayed by animals was still gen-
erally regarded as an object of wonder (Spalding 1873/1993), but he sets out to sub-
ject some of these exceptional feats and “marvellous stories” to “careful experiment 
and observation”.4 He performed a series of experiments with chicks and ducklings, 
depriving them of, and then exposing them to, for example, visual stimuli (the famous 
“Hooding” experiments). He writes: “The conditions under which these little victims 
of human curiosity were first permitted to see the light were carefully prepared.… 
[E]very movement, with the date thereof, was put on record. Never in the columns of 
a Court Journal were the doings of the most royal personage noted with such faithful 
accuracy” (p. 283). Spalding thus invented a new science, but realized that “to the 
many who love more to gaze and marvel than to question and reflect, all this will 
seem miserably inadequate as a clue to one of the mysteries of life” (p. 293) – thereby 
hinting to the struggle between two ways of viewing animals – the romantic and the 
scientific view – that we also find fleshed out in Ibsen’s play.
Conwry Lloyd Morgan, friend and collaborator of Romanes, was sceptical and 
critical about the latter’s handling of anecdotal evidence and decided (like Spalding) 
to rely solely on experimentation and observation. He carefully distinguished 
between actual behaviour and human interpretation and introduced the famous 
“canon” for animal research,5 directed against our natural tendency to attribute mys-
terious faculties to animals (notably the “marvellous” and mystified phenomena of 
“instinct”). His favourite research subjects were chicks and ducklings. In one of his 
experiments, he constructed a small pen with newspaper walls, insecurely propped 
against various objects, and placed a one-week-old duckling in it, to study its efforts 
to escape (1890). In another series of experiments he tested the responses of research 
animals to various stimuli – notably the “stimulus of water” (1894/1993, p. 175).6
3 The house of the Maberley family was the parental residence of the philosopher Bertrand Russell. 
His mother actually assisted Spalding in some of his research.
4 The Dutch philosopher J.H. van den Berg (1961) defines modern science as a “struggle against 
marvellous” – a lutte contre le merveilleux.
5 “In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychological 
faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stand lower on the 
psychological scale” (1894/1993, p. 53).
6 Nonetheless, “romantic marvel” is not completely absent from his work: “Nothing is more 
 admirable than the skill of animals. One may watch by the hour with ever renewed delight the 
marvellously delicate adjustments involved in the sailing flight of sea-gulls” (p. 161).
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Spalding and Morgan had a predilection for chicks and ducks as animal models. 
One of the characteristics of the scientific literature that started to emerge at the 
close of the nineteenth century was that the bulk of it was inhabited by a limited 
number of favourite species, notably hens, pigeons, rabbits – the very inhabitants 
of the Ekdal loft. Indeed, more and more details of the play become recognizable 
all of a sudden, as soon as we read it against the backdrop of the emergence of this 
new animal practice.
6.5 The Wild Duck: Close Reading 2
Like Spalding and Morgan, the “Ekdal team” conducts its experiment not in an 
academic, but in a private setting. Their small-scaled, time-consuming experiment 
(N = 1) focuses on domestication and adaptation, while a rival, “romantic” com-
ment on their doings is provided by other characters, notably Hedvig and Gregers, 
the former is represented as an imaginative girl dwelling in a world of fantasies, the 
latter, having accused his father of social Darwinism, is characterized by him as 
being “over-sensitive” and “romantic”.
The Wild Duck contains a meticulous record of an animal trial which we will 
now analyse in more detail. Besides the emergence of a new scientific practice, the 
play faithfully documents the emergence of a new way of looking at animals, a new 
scientific gaze. Moreover, the new science not only transforms the object (the ani-
mal) into a particular type of research animal, but also calls for a drastic transforma-
tion on the part of the subject (the scientist) himself, affecting both his repertoire of 
behaviour and his modes of perception. The animal’s world is reduced to an experi-
mental environment (i.e. a setting composed of a limited number of stimuli or con-
ditions), and this applies to the human world (the family home) as well. Finally, 
Ibsen’s play stages an important cultural struggle, between the scientific and the 
romantic understanding of animals.
6.5.1 A New Scientific Practice
Father and son Ekdal have entered a new and as yet unfamiliar scientific scene. From 
an outsider or common sense perspective, they simply seem to indulge in “keeping” 
animals. Comparison with the writings of Spalding, Morgan and others, however, 
allows us to recognize the specific nature of their doings. Their pattern of action con-
tains typical gestures and techniques that are part of a coherent protocol. As we 
already noticed, the fact that the duck has “gone into the basket” is observed by 
Ekdal, reported to his son and interpreted in terms of adaptation – that is, regarded 
as a confirmation of a hypothesis. The many improvements made by them, notably 
concerning the water-trough, can be regarded as introducing, modifying and manipu-
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lating certain stimuli or controlling environmental factors (independent  variables). 
Thus, the mysterious loft is actually transformed into an artificial Umwelt, an impov-
erished world, reduced to a limited number of basic constituents that can be isolated 
and controlled independently from one another – notably water, lighting,7 time8 and 
a number of spatial conditions (such as “high” versus “low”9). Thus, with the help of 
a series of “contraptions”, “contrivances”, “gadgets” and “improvements”, an experi-
mental set-up is created that allows the research animal to develop certain behav-
ioural patterns, and the observer to closely observe the animal’s responses to his 
interventions. In short, a new scientific practice is staged in Ibsen’s play in statu nas-
cendi. The Ekdals have initiated a new science, apparently without realising what it 
is they are doing, still feeling rather embarrassed about it. The new and time-consum-
ing behavioural pattern has not yet established itself as a legitimate practice in its own 
right. We may say that, in the Ekdal loft, praxis precedes consciousness.
The duck is subjected to an experiment in deprivation. She is deprived of her 
natural surroundings, in order to observe whether she will manage to adapt to the 
new circumstances or not, whether and to what extent she will produce her usual 
behavioural repertoire, or rather a reduced and simplified version of it. Thus we find 
it reported that she (the research animal) is doing “extraordinarily well”, that she is 
nestling, growing fat, and so on. In this manner, the Ekdal experiment, as a follow-
up of observations reported by Darwin, not only coincides with the work of Spalding 
and Morgan, but anticipates the research on domestication done by Lorenz and other 
researchers of the twentieth century (Lorenz 1940; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1975).
6.5.2 The Scientific Gaze
The transition from a photographer’s studio, with its apparatus and instruments, to 
a scientist’s laboratory is not a difficult one to make. From the beginning, Hjalmar 
is obsessed with the idea of turning his work as a photographer into a science by 
making a “grand invention”. Yet, although his actions are already those of a scien-
tist, his mind remains that of a romantic. More precisely, his image of what is 
involved in making scientific discoveries is of a rather romantic sort. The projected 
invention is described as a heroic feat, as the outcome of a sudden “intuition” or 
“inspiration”. In order to bring this miraculous feat about, Hjalmar relies on intro-
spection and contemplation. This prevents him from short-circuiting the invention 
he is dreaming of with the simple, but nonetheless effective contraptions and con-
7 In his casting instructions, Ibsen placed particular emphasis on lighting and it is different in every 
act. The aspect of lighting is “far more subtly worked out than in any of the earlier Ibsen dramas” 
(Beyer 1978, p. 138). The light is brilliant (Act 1), dimmed (Act 2), bright (Act 3), declining (Act 
4) and grey (Act 5).
8 “Time has stopped in there with the wild duck”, Gregers notices (p. 162), a fact that can be inter-
preted both in romantic terms (adding to the mystic stillness of the loft) and in scientific terms 
(ordinary time is suspended, congealed, controlled).
9 It is observed that pigeons nestle in high, chickens in low places.
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trivances he is already introducing in the loft. His romanticism prevents him from 
apprehending that he already is an inventor, more or less, and that a real scientific 
practice might be something less spectacular that his romantic views suggest. At a 
certain point, for instance, he exclaims: “good heavens, you can’t expect me to 
work to a schedule. An invention is something that even the inventor himself isn’t 
completely master of” (p. 168). Apparently it escapes him that working to a sched-
ule is a crucial constituent of the organon of modern empirical science, Apollonian 
rather than Dionysian, requiring working methodically and punctually rather than 
intuitively. It is a science that involves active manipulation, rather than peaceful 
meditation. For example, Hjalmar could easily have short-circuited his dreams 
about “revolutionizing photography” with his daily fiddlings in the loft by taking 
pictures of the domestication process. Morgan, for example, used an innovative 
high-speed photography technique for producing a series of photographs with 
which he intended to prove that the transmission of nervous impulse takes time 
(Morgan 1894/1993; Boakes 1984). Hjalmar could have made himself into an 
experimental photographer.
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche distinguishes between truths that are best rec-
ognized by “mediocre spirits” and those that appeal to “spirits of a higher type”, who 
do things in a “grand style”. Indeed, “for scientific discoveries of the type of Darwin’s 
a certain narrowness, aridity and industrious diligence… may not be a bad disposi-
tion”, Nietzsche argues (1966, § 253). This is a typical example of the romantic view 
on science. Neither Hjalmar nor Nietzsche seem to appreciate the fact that the new 
protocols of science, emerging in the second half of the nineteenth century, not only 
transform the animal into a research animal, but have important consequences for the 
researchers themselves as well. The researcher has to become self-disciplined, has to 
become a certain type of human being. Not only the animal, also the human being has 
to change, both poles of the knowledge production process are affected by this trans-
formation. Without being aware of it, Father and son Ekdal are inaugurating a new 
type of science. The experiment not only affects the behavioural repertoire of the ani-
mal subject, but that of its conductors as well. A typical form of communication arises 
(a rather awkward one at first), in connection with this type of research. To give just 
one example: When Gregers says that he can hear the wild duck crying (interpreta-
tion), Hjalmar immediately corrects him by saying that she is quacking (observation), 
thus restricting himself to reporting what is audible. By behaving thus, the animal is 
bound to emerge in a certain manner, namely as a research animal, producing 
 behavioural sequences rather than meaningful messages.
Hjalmar’s fantasy of becoming an inventor is not all that ridiculous if we closely 
watch what he is actually doing. Indeed, “the loft … is the only thing that can extract 
any kind of constructive activity from the fundamentally lazy Hjalmar. Here, rather 
than in the world of photography, he is the inventor he images himself to be” 
(Støvegrud, p. 111). Had he submitted a report of his contrivances and findings to a 
scientific magazine, his name might have been recorded in the annals of science. 
From a romantic point of view, the new scientific practice is far too “mediocre”, no 
doubt, too laborious, too practical and down-to-earth to be recognized as such. His 
inability to grasp that he, by entering this new scientific practice, already made his 
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
grand invention, constitutes his “fatal flaw” so to speak. In Act Four he announces that 
“Tomorrow I intend to start working in real earnest.… From now on I shall never 
set foot in that loft again”. Apparently he fails to realize that his activities in the 
loft, not his “meditations” on the sofa, may actually be seen as scientific work. 
Father and son Ekdal engage in a novel animal practice, allowing an animal to 
emerge as a research animal of a new kind, but nobody really sees it. The research 
animal remains unseen. Instead of discerning the research animal, and himself as 
an experimenter, Hjalmar allows himself to be subjected to someone else’s 
experiment.
6.5.3 The Scientific and the Romantic Gaze
The problem of perception is important in Ibsen’s play. Images of sight and blind-
ness occur throughout the text (Reinert, p. 458) and Gregers Werle explicitly states 
that he sees it as his mission “to open Hjalmar Ekdal’s eyes”. How can someone 
be a  photographer and still be closing his eyes to what is happening right in front 
of him?
What is staged in The Wild Duck is basically the struggle between the scientific 
and the romantic perception of animal (as well as human) behaviour. It is, indeed, 
an exercise in comparative epistemology. The reduction of the animal’s Umwelt to 
a limited set of controllable factors clears the ground for the emergence of the sci-
entific gaze, while the scientific gaze in turn reduces the animal’s world to a limited 
number of stimuli (such as “water”), and the animal’s behaviour to a limited 
number of behavioural units (such as “swimming”). That is, a marvellous and fas-
cinating world becomes disenchanted, neutralized. The enigmatic is reduced to 
something controllable, a natural world is decomposed and transformed into a 
s cientific “environment”. Moreover, while the animal’s world is reduced to a lim-
ited number of environmental constituents (producing a limited number of behav-
ioural options), the human world (i.e. the modest Ekdal family home) gradually 
becomes transformed into a laboratory where experimental protocols are imple-
mented. Indeed, the duck mirrors the fate of the human inhabitants. In the end, 
Hedvig herself becomes the “little victim” (as Spalding calls it) of Greger’s effort 
to transform the world into an experimental environment. A life-world becomes a 
manageable environment that makes behaviour more or less predictable and 
modifiable.
The romantic mode of seeing, however, constitutes the antipode of the scientific 
one. In Ibsen’s play the romantic view is most apparent in the speech acts of 
Gregers and Hedvig. In their perception, water is not a stimulus, but a grand and 
mysterious force of life, referred to as “the sea”, “the vasty deep”, and so on. The 
Christmas tree is not a stimulus, allowing the animal to display certain patterns of 
behaviour (such as nestling or looking for shelter), but a miserable substitute for a 
grand and mysterious life force referred to as “the forest”, “the wide open spaces”, 
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and so on. The loft itself is a strange, mysterious, altogether different world, and the 
wild duck its most eminent inhabitant.10 Indeed, the romantic gaze allows the animal to 
emerge as enigmatic and awe-inspiring, because of its silence, its  wisdom, its intimacy 
with the basic forces of life. The wild duck is the “most eminent” inhabitant because 
she is still wild. “There’s so much that’s strange about the wild duck. No one knows 
her”, Hedvig tells us. And elsewhere she says that “If I suddenly – without thinking – 
remember what’s in there, I always think of it as being ‘the vasty deep’” (p. 163).
Spalding concedes that, from a romantic perspective, a truly scientific account 
of animal life must seem miserably inadequate. At the same time, he stresses that a 
“most royal personage” is not observed so meticulously as is the modern research 
animal, thus suggesting that the gaze of science adorns the animal with a new kind 
of splendour, rather than erasing its significance altogether.
On having seen the duck, Gregers makes the following (cynical) comment: “Just 
make sure she never gets a glimpse of the sky or the sea” (p. 152). Experimentally 
speaking, Gregers seems to hint at introducing a new variable: full exposure to the 
stimuli of light and water. His remark could thus easily be transcribed in accordance 
with the basic formula of science, What happens if …? What happens if a semi-
domesticated bird suddenly finds herself exposed to her natural state of life? Will 
the original repertoire of natural responses immediately release itself? From a 
romantic perspective, however, the sky and the sea are not seen as “stimuli”, but 
rather as basic forces of life, bound to reveal the superficial nature of domestication. 
Rather that exposing the research animal to an additional condition, Greger’s inter-
vention would entail the abolition of all limitations, of all “conditions”. It would 
constitute something of an experiment indeed, but of a romantic type, an anti-
experiment so to speak, introducing the one “condition” (i.e. “nature”, “the elemen-
tary forces of life”, ϕυ′σις) that puts an end to the logic, the methodology of 
scientific conditioning. It is the type of experiment that is conducted and docu-
mented in London’s Klondike novels discussed in Chapter 5. Strictly speaking, 
romantic experimentation goes beyond the confines of the scientific approach. 
Whereas scientific experimentation is basically directed at introducing limitations 
and disruptions, or at replacing natural conditions by artificial ones, romantic 
experimentation is basically directed at transcending all artificial limits, and at 
replacing an impoverished environment by a free and natural world.
In an entry entitled Anti-Darwin, dating from 1888, Nietzsche articulates 
such a romantic-experimental point of view by contending that, at least in the 
case of human beings, domestication is bound to remain superficial – one cannot 
dénaturer la nature (1980, p. 315) – and history is like a series of experiments 
that verify this claim. Or, to use Jack London’s term (an avid reader of 
Nietzsche), if exposed to the proper circumstances, human beings (or at leas a 
certain class of human beings), although they seem to have adapted themselves 
to a life as domesticated animal, may still respond to the call of nature, the “call 
of the wild”. This is the type of experiment described in London’s most 
10 [F]or vildanden er vel den aller fornemste derinde (Ibsen 1908, p. 268), the duck is without 
doubt the loft’s most eminent inhabitant.
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“Nietzschean” novel, The Sea Wolf [1904], where an apparently civilised human 
being is transformed into a “blond beast”, a more or less Nietzschean hero 
through exposure to nature as ϕυσις.
This romantic ideal is present in Ibsen’s play as well. The animal research, 
conducted by the Ekdals, is paralleled by an experiment with a human subject con-
ducted by Gregers. What happens if a human being suddenly finds himself deprived 
of his illusions and is exposed to the truth? Gregers is convinced of the fact that the 
person involved will become free and happy (much like the duck would be happy 
if she would somehow manage to escape). Sadly enough, however, he will find his 
romantic hypothesis refuted. Hedvig, his favourite research subject, will not sur-
vive his hazardous endeavour.
6.6 Ethical Dimension
The Wild Duck stages a struggle between two modes of perception, two important 
speech genres, two incommensurable types of knowledge claims, namely science 
and romanticism. The new science did not yet manage to establish itself as a legiti-
mate practice. The basic import of Ibsen’s play resides in the fact that it allows us 
to discern important aspects of the ethical dimension of this animal science to be 
in statu nascendi. Three aspects can be distinguished, namely: the well-being of the 
research animal, its integrity and finally the fact that as a rule, an experiment 
inevitably leads to the death of the research animal.
6.6.1 Well-being of the Research Animal
When Gregers asks Hedvig what her father and grandfather are doing with the 
duck, she answers that they care for it and build things for it. Apparently, the new 
science, emerging at the close of the nineteenth century, cares for its animals. In 
this respect, it constitutes a rupture with the traditional scientific practice of dissect-
ing animal – an atrocious practice marked by an astonishing disregard for the ani-
mal’s well-being. Laboratory ethology is the scientific discipline devoted to 
safeguarding or even improving the well-being of laboratory animals, reducing 
animal suffering and the side-effects of “laboratorification” (Fox 1986). A much 
more “humane” animal science, continuously on the alert as to whether the animal 
subject is doing well, gradually replaced vivisection – although acute forms of 
experimentation continued to exist – even today. On the other hand, whereas vivi-
section only affected the final hours of a research animal’s life, the “humanization” 
of animal research allowed experimental research to affect the animal’s complete 
life span. As the “acute” method of Bernard was replaced by the “chronic” method 
of Pavlov, long-term monitoring of animals replaced the nasty but short techniques 
of former times.
6.6 Ethical Dimension 141
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
142 6 The Birth of a Research Animal
As was indicated in the previous chapter, the transition from vivisection to more 
humane forms of systematic observation can perhaps be compared to the transition, 
described by Foucault (1975), from the gruesome penal practices of the early mod-
ern period to the more humane penal practices of modern time, with its elaborate 
techniques for closely observing and monitoring human subjects. The duck is a 
prisoner, and her prison a panopticon. Every aspect of her behaviour is subject to 
observation and modification. Thus, the new animal practice not only produces new 
forms of knowledge, it is also the emergence of a new form of power. Finally, it 
allows the human subject to constitute himself in a certain manner, namely as a 
researcher, involving new forms of responsibility, by allowing his behaviour to be 
guided by a protocol – by living (acting, perceiving) methodically. The experiment 
introduces new and carefully designed uses of space and time.
6.6.2 Integrity of the Research Animal
Even if physical well-being is secured, the animal may still be harmed in its integrity. 
From the scientific point of view, it will be difficult to see how integrity can be some-
thing else than well-being. The romantic position, however, insists. Even if the wild 
duck is reported to be doing “extraordinarily well”, the separation from its natural 
environment, from “all her family” as Hedvig phrases it, poses a violent intrusion 
upon the animal’s way-of-being. The romantic view stresses that the animal suffers 
from loss of dignity and grace, as mystery gives way to docility. By impoverishing 
the animal’s environment, by drastically reducing its behavioural repertoire to a lim-
ited set of basic constituents, the new science reveals that it is still a violent practice, 
although brute and physical violence has indeed been replaced by other, more refined 
forms of violence, such as separation, deprivation, domestication, and so on – that is, 
by a violence more humane, but more far-reaching and subtle as well. The animal 
subjects are still “victims” (Spalding). Whereas the scientific gaze aims at transform-
ing the animal into a research animal, the romantic gaze tries to restore and recover 
its status as an awe-inspiring, mysterious being, at one with its natural world.11
11 It would be a mistake, however, to think that sensitivity to mystery and marvel would be com-
pletely absent from the scientific research world. Cf., for example, this quote by Lorenz: “No man 
… could physically bring himself to stare at fishes, birds or mammals as persistently as is neces-
sary in order to take stock of the behavioural patterns of a species unless his eyes were bound to 
the object of his observation in that spell-bound gaze which is not motivated by any conscious 
effort to gain knowledge but by that mysterious charm that the beauty of living creatures works 
on some of us” (Ewer 1968, p. 2).
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6.6.3 The Death of the Research Animal
In The Wild Duck, the inevitable death of the research animal is alluded to at several 
occasions. Sacrificing the animal constitutes the final act of the standard protocol 
of animal research, an indispensable element of its inherent logic. “I’d like to wring 
the neck of that damned wild duck”, Hjalmar tells us in Act Five, for this would 
indeed have put an end to the experiment. From the scientific point of view, it is 
something which defies further explanation.12 From a romantic point of view, how-
ever, the inevitability of death has a more tragic import. It is the final consequence 
of the ontological violence inherent in the experimental approach as such. When 
Hedvig dies in the final act, this demonstrates that she really had become an 
“experimental animal”, subjected to a trial without her consent.
6.6.4 From Awe-inspiring Nature to Managed Environment
Rather than merely affecting the research animal as such, the experimental gaze 
affects its way-of-being-in-the-world. Out there, in the wild, the duck had been at 
one with nature. But now the duck’s life is reduced to a limited number of typical, 
predictable behaviours, while the natural world at large is being reduced to a lim-
ited number of manageable conditions or stimuli, all of them replaceable by artifi-
cial set-ups and contrivances (such as Ekdal’s water-trough, replacing the original 
lake). The well-being of the animal itself is not necessarily affected by these proce-
dures. The romantic view, however, will never accept such a conclusion. Nature is 
more than simply an enumeration of spatio-physical conditions, and the wild duck 
in captivity is bound to degenerate, whatever researchers do or devise in order to 
prevent it. On the other hand, notwithstanding the sultry atmosphere inside the loft, 
the radiance of life, the “eminence” of being the wildest inhabitant of the loft, the 
aura of having once been at-one-with-nature never leaves the duck completely. 
Rather, it remains sensible throughout the play, reminding visitors of the fact that 
the inconspicuous animal really belongs to another world, to a more natural envi-
ronment. The sense that something is disturbed or disrupted is never extinguished 
completely. In short, whereas the scientific perception stresses the importance of 
the research animal’s well-being, the romantic view rather points to the “ontologi-
cal” violence at work in this research practice, affecting the research animal’s 
integrity rather than its well-being.
12 Among the strange, unusual objects in the loft there is a book containing the picture of death 
with an hour-glass – perhaps an allusion to the inevitable death of the research animal.
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So far, we have been addressing important scientific animal practices of the 
nineteenth century (such as classification, vivisection and ethology) in terms of 
their epistemological profile, and in the context of a comparative epistemological 
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Chapter 7
Aquaphobia, Tulipmania, Biophilia: A Moral 
Geography of the Dutch Landscape
7.1 Introduction
In Genesis (1:9–10) it is stated that God gathered the waters into one place, in order to 
let the dry land appear, which He called earth, while the waters were called seas. In the 
Netherlands, this process took more than a single day, and it was the work of man. 
Gradually, a cultivated landscape emerged out of diffuse nature. In the course of cen-
turies, the Dutch were increasingly effective in determining the conditions that allowed 
coastal and wetland nature to present itself in a more domesticated version. In this 
chapter, I will assess this process in terms of a moral geography. Different types of 
landscapes are read as manifestations (or materializations) of different moral attitudes 
towards nature, while concrete landscape interventions are interpreted as instances of 
moral criticism directed towards the activities and values of previous generations. In 
order to flesh out such a “moral geography”, a comparative epistemological approach 
is taken. The moral profile of particular landscapes or of particular landscape interven-
tions will be determined by means of a systematic confrontation of a variety of 
sources, notably scientific and literary ones. For it is in the instances of conflict and 
convergence of these various sources that the moral profile of a landscape emerges.
The idea of a “moral geography” is adopted from the famous German geogra-
pher and naturalist Alexander von Humboldt (1808/1975). According to Von 
Humboldt, nature first of all manifests itself as landscapes. All landscapes convey 
a sense of nature as such, but they all do so in their own particular manner. In 
Ansichten der Natur (“Views of Nature”) he points out that every landscape has a 
distinctive character of its own. A peculiar “physiognomy” belongs to every region 
on earth, from the polar to the tropical zone. It impresses the visitor in a certain 
manner, conveys a certain Totaleindruck, calls forth a certain basic mood. According 
to Von Humboldt, the physiognomy of a landscape is determined by climatologic 
and geographical features of the area involved, but attaches itself to a typical plant 
form that gives the landscape at hand its identity, its face. The palm form, the 
banana form, the cactus form and the grass form are among Von Humboldt’s exam-
ples. In fact, sixteen different landscapes or regional types, associated with (and 
represented by) typical plant forms are distinguished, but Von Humboldt points out 
that other forms may be added to the list.
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At first glance it seems questionable whether Von Humboldt’s idea still applies 
to our present world. We are still inhabiting landscapes, of course, but many of 
them are (or have been) subject to drastic modifications. My own landscape, that 
of the Netherlands, may stand as an example. It is not one landscape, but rather an 
amalgam of landscape fragments that emerged during different historical periods – 
and they are all more or less man-made. Such a landscape is actually a mnemo-
scape, retaining the traces of human–nature interactions in various episodes. Yet, 
even in the case of cultural landscapes, covered with the footprints of cultural 
epochs, it can make sense to follow Von Humboldt’s suggestion. First of all, land-
scapes are never purely artificial of course. They still evolve within certain geo-
graphical and climatologic constraints. Furthermore, also cultural landscape may 
have a particular physiognomy and they also may be associated with certain typical 
plant forms. Whereas Von Humboldt (a Romanticist) preferably studied landscapes 
in their pristine state, unspoiled by human influence, the Dutch landscape must be 
studied from an historical perspective that emphatically includes the effects of 
human activity. The landscape of the Netherlands is the outcome of a long history – a 
moral history in fact, as the physiognomies of man-made landscapes reflect the 
moral attitudes of their creators towards nature.
The basic idea behind this chapter is that landscape types may be read as mate-
rializations of the moral ideas and values that guided their creation. I will regard 
the Dutch landscape as the outcome of a series of dramatic reversals in the interac-
tion between man and nature. As I said, a “moral geography” of a landscape will 
interpret landscape modifications as forms of moral criticism directed towards the 
values, choices and achievements of previous generations. In this chapter, I will 
focus on the decisive highlights, the most dramatic shifts that gave the Dutch land-
scape its present appearance. Notably, I will reflect on the transitions that occurred 
during two decisive turning points in the history of the Netherlands, two “Golden 
Ages”. The first Golden Age was the classical or early modern period, notably the 
seventeenth century. It will be discussed in Sections 7.3 and 7.4. This episode gave 
birth to the two most outstanding and enduring icons of the Dutch landscape: the 
windmill and the tulip. The second Golden Age roughly covers the period between 
1880 and 1920. Like the first Golden Age, this episode produced a relatively large 
number of scientists and artists of renown. While the domestication of coastal and 
fluvial nature was more or less completed, a new and more “romantic” vision of 
nature emerged as a competing ideological force. This episode will be discussed in 
Sections 7.5–7.7. Finally, I will indicate how the new vision just mentioned resulted 
in the remarkable landscape modifications that are taking place now, at this very 
moment, and that seem to invert the changes that were brought about during the 
early modern period or “classical age” (Section 7.8). As was already indicated, 
these developments will be studied from the point of view of a comparative episte-
mology, that is, a synchronic analysis of scientific and literary sources on coastal 
and fluvial landscapes. But in order to set the stage and define the proper context 
for such a comparative approach, I will summarize (in Section 7.2) the history of 
the landscape in broad outline and in a more diachronic manner.
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7.2 An Elementary History
The history of the Dutch landscape is first of all a prehuman, elementary history. 
Glaciers shaped its geological matrix, glacial winds and wandering rivers left their 
deposits, and sea-level fluctuations determined its coast line. But the most signifi-
cant “element” that effectively shaped the Dutch landscape was neither wind nor 
water, but mankind as an almost “elementary” force. We seem to be without a habi-
tat of our own. We create our habitat and for that reason we are able to live almost 
anywhere, from the polar to the tropical regions – even in the Netherlands, a densely 
populated area, 60% of which is actually situated below sea level. According to strict 
geological determinism, one would expect to find there nothing but wetlands and 
lagoons, sluggish streams and stagnant or brackish waters, the undisputed domain of 
sea fowl and migratory birds – not a very hospitable place for humans (Wagret 
1960/1968, p. vi). The Dutch landscape had to be created by its inhabitants and in 
this chapter I will indicate how its polymorphous physiognomy reflects their basic 
moral attitudes, and how these attitudes can be associated with a number of typical 
plant forms, serving as basic markers for a moral geography.
The geographical backdrop of the Dutch landscape is the elementary struggle 
between land, wind and water. Geographically speaking, the western and northern (or 
Holocene) parts of the Netherlands are slowly subsiding. The lateral moraine that 
once transected the area from east to west is still clearly visible in the East (near 
Nijmegen), where it forms a series of steep hills, but they gradually diminish in size 
towards the West and by the time Amsterdam is reached the sandy peaks have already 
disappeared 15 m below sea-level. Until recently, this process of subsidence was 
counteracted by periodical floods, covering the area with deposits. Since the Middle 
Ages, however, anthropogenic factors have undermined this balance of elementary 
powers. In the absence of intensive water management, the greater part of what is now 
called the Netherlands would be flooded and lost to the sea.
About twenty-three centuries ago the post-glacial rise of sea-level halted more 
or less and the present Dutch coast line emerged. It basically consisted of sand 
dunes, with extended mud-flats and tidal salt marsh areas (exposed to the sea by 
tidal inlets) right behind them, and intersected by the branches and estuaries of 
large rivers: Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt. Pliny (1945/1960) informs us that in 
Roman times, the northern and western parts of the country were regularly flooded. 
In some areas the sea was allowed to enter twice a day. In the eyes of Roman visi-
tors, it was difficult to tell whether this bleak, appalling, boundless, treeless land-
scape of coastal marshes, alternately flooded and exposed by the tides, should be 
called land or sea. Forest vegetation was nowhere to be found (p. 387/389). Pliny 
also noticed that the pitiful inhabitants sought their retreat on small artificial hum-
mocks of earth (the famous terps), where they warmed their limbs, numbed by the 
shivering North wind, at peat fires. The policy of building terps lasted until the 
eleventh century AD. It constituted a “passive” form of sea defence. The terp mate-
rialized a moral attitude of Gelassenheit so to speak. The inhabitants, whose deities 
were actually weather gods, simply waited until the overwhelming, demonic forces 
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of nature retreated of their own accord. Nature simply was beyond human control. 
Primal nature – júsiV – was still part of daily life and experience.
Around the year AD 800, the landscape of the Netherlands was still hardly influ-
enced by man. In the centuries to come, however, human inhabitants became the 
decisive factor in the formation and deformation of the land (Van de Ven 1993, p. 33; 
IDG-Bulletin 1996). Slowly but unrelentingly a major transition occurred. Building 
terps gradually gave way to a new and more active form of water management. The 
Dutch started to dig ditches and to construct small dikes. From around AD 800 
onwards they began to drain the vast peat-bogs to open them up for cultivation. 
Large peat areas were reclaimed and as a result, these lowlands became more vul-
nerable to flooding, by sea – as well as by river water. Man was not only a disturb-
ing, but also a consolidating factor, however, notably by building dikes. The first 
dikes were erected during the eighth century AD, although these two forms of water 
management, terp-building and dike-building, coexisted for some time. Eventually, 
however, the new, more active regime was to have dramatic ecological conse-
quences. Between the late tenth and the early fourteenth century, Tebrake (1985) 
tells us, the face of the Dutch landscape was drastically transformed. A wide 
expanse of wilderness, with small scattered patches of settlement and agricultural 
activity, was changed into a more or less continuous agrarian landscape. The greater 
part of the Netherlands was brought into the world of human affairs during that 
period. Huge quantities of previously unused lands were incorporated into the 
realm of culture. In the former peat-bog wilderness villages were founded and 
farms were built on parcels of standardized size and shape. The reclamation, by 
means of dikes and ditches, of formerly remote, impassable, soggy and swampy 
areas, where the imprint of human presence had been absent or slight, irrevoca-
bly altered the physical appearance of the Netherlands. The landscape was thor-
oughly humanized.
Until this time, human presence had merely produced patches of dry, arable land 
within a matrix of humid wilderness. But after AD 1000, a geometrization of the 
landscape took place at an increasing pace and the natural matrix was increasingly 
fragmented until only a few marginal leftovers remained. Gradually, through dili-
gent and skilful manual labour by generations of anonymous farmers, a diffuse, 
ambiguous, soggy and brackish landscape, in which clear boundaries between land 
and water (as well as between fresh and saline water) were absent, was replaced by 
a discrete, highly compartmentalized landscape. For indeed, whereas vague 
and gradual transitions are characteristic of natural landscapes, human influences 
tend to produce abrupt, discrete boundaries (Forman and Godron 1986). Yet, traces 
and patches of primal nature can still be found in the remoter areas, as marginalized 
remainders, such as the Wadden Sea in the North. As was already pointed out 
above, the reclamation activities had averse consequences, even from a purely 
anthropocentric viewpoint. Human cultivation was the main cause of the loss of 
large areas in the north and in the southwest to the sea, notably because of acceler-
ated subsidence.
From the perspective of moral geography it is important to note that these transi-
tions on the level of water management coincided with a transition on the spiritual 
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or ideological level, namely the Christianization of the northern and western parts 
of the Netherlands, that is, of the area beyond what once had been the border of the 
Roman Empire – the Rhine. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, only a few 
Christian enclaves survived in the South, notably in the Maastricht region. And 
when in the early Middle Ages the Franks were converted to Christianity, the 
Frisians, who inhabited the lower, Holocene parts of the Netherlands held to their 
pagan convictions. Shortly before AD 700, Anglosaxon missionaries began to 
arrive, but the conversion of the Frisians would prove a time-consuming process. 
Saint Boniface was killed by pagans defending their faith in 754. The conversion 
of the pagan elite during the eighth century AD did not imply that paganism was 
eradicated completely and immediately. Pagan ideas and attitudes lingered on for 
quite some time. A certain affinity may be discerned between the conversion to 
Christianity on the one hand and the transition from terp-building to dike-building 
on the other. Christianity entailed a more active stance towards nature. Christians 
regarded themselves as stewards appointed by God, as co-creators, taking active 
part in the management and restitution of fallen nature. Monasteries played a 
prominent role in the medieval transformation of soggy wilderness into a place 
more pleasing to man and God. They played a large part in reclamation projects, 
just as they did in forest clearance elsewhere in Europe (Wagret 1960/1968, p. 62). 
Only monastic orders were able to recruit and organize a sufficient number of 
“hands” in those days (Terra et Aqua 2001).1 It was in a charter of the Cistercian 
abbey of Middelburg dated 1219 that the word polder first appeared. The great 
abundance of Dutch villages created during this period with names ending in -kerke 
(“church”) or -kapelle (“chappel”) likewise testifies to prominent monastic and 
ecclesiastical involvement.
Christianity, as an ideology, rendered the erection of dikes and the reclamation 
of wetlands morally legitimate, or even obligatory. A demarcation was introduced 
between the “baptized” and humanized areas on this side of the dikes, and the dif-
fuse and unreliable realms beyond. The dike materialized a form of moral criticism, 
directed at previous generations of pagans who, faced with natural phenomena, had 
been overwhelmed by a mixture of fear and awe. They had regarded uncultivated 
nature as the abode of their gods and had settled for a more passive attitude. Time 
had come for the demystification of nature.
The diffuse, fluid, ever-changing boundaries between land and water, as they 
had existed since time immemorial, began to give way to more discrete and 
1 Elsewhere in Europe, major marshland reclamations were executed by the abbeys of Fulda 
(Germany), Saint Rémy (Reims), Saint Panthaleon (Cologne), Saint Armand (Tournai) and Saint 
Baafs (Ghent), while the Flemish Cistercian monks of Ter doest and Ter Duinen became famous 
for their hydraulic engineering in the Dutch province of Zeeland. Among the earliest recorded 
reclamations was that of the Bishop of Bremen who in 1103 had a huge marsh area east of the 
River Elbe drained and cultivated. And Finally, in draining activities by experienced Dutch colo-
nists in the North of Germany, the church played a similar, no less decisive role (Wagret 
1960/1968, p. 86).
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semi-permanent demarcations, while pre-Christian awe gave way to aquaphobia, 
to a long-term policy of building, maintaining and strengthening dikes. The con-
struction of dikes and ditches, however, was not the end but rather the beginning 
of a chronic combat. Christian reclaimers began to disturb a natural equilibrium 
between the elements that had developed over a long period of time. Their activi-
ties, directed at draining and reclaiming peat-bog marshes resulted in a substantial 
lowering of the ground level. The cultivation of the peat-bog wilderness initiated a 
process that would make the Dutch increasingly dependent on their hydraulic devices. 
Moreover, during the medieval period the sea level had started to rise again and this 
combination of anthropogenic and natural factors resulted in a late medieval  atmosphere 
of crisis. A series of dramatic floodings, known as the late-medieval transgressions, 
created a sea (the Zuyderzee) in the very heart of the country. The element of water 
literally gained ground. The sea advanced from the North as well as from the 
Southwest, while right behind the dune “line of defence” a series of pools, ponds and 
marshes gradually formed huge lakes (such as the Haarlemmermeer) that continued to 
expand. The increasing use of peat for fuel aggravated the situation even more. 
Gravity-flow drainage was no longer adequate. A still more active, more drastic form 
of water management became necessary. But this also called for a more active, more 
offensive ideology than traditional Christianity had provided.
7.3 Simultaneous Reformations: Shifting Physiognomies
The technical device that would make a more active, offensive and large-scale form 
of water management possible was the windmill. The first known use of a windmill 
to displace water was recorded in 1408 (Tebrake 1985; Van de Ven 1993). But this 
contrivance would evolve during the centuries to come into a very powerful device. 
The erection of batteries of windmills for the purpose of draining water proved very 
effective and allowed the Dutch to build polders of a much larger size during the 
Dutch classical (or “Golden”) age – the seventeenth century. In order for a polder 
to be created, lakes, marshes or coastal areas were encircled by dikes, while impres-
sive rows of windmills were constructed to pump the water out. These tools became 
the typical artefacts, the icons of a new Dutch landscape. Artificial canals, control-
led by sluices, transported the water to the sea. Dams and sluices were built to close 
off sea entries and to control the movements or rivers. But the impoldered areas 
subsided even more and this made the Dutch polder-dwellers even more dependent 
on their new technologies.
These new forms of water management were accompanied and stimulated by 
changes in other realms of culture. To begin with, practical expertise began to be 
written down and printed rather than transmitted orally. Practical hydraulic knowl-
edge began to migrate from the unwritten spheres of life to that of published schol-
arly discourse. During this period, science flourished in the Netherlands. Simon 
Stevin (1548–1620) and his followers introduced the paradigm of the Dutch 
mathematician-engineer. Stevin not only stimulated the rise of modern mathematics 
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in the Netherlands, but also successfully applied this new type of knowledge in the 
context of building dikes and sluices, designing wind-mills for land reclamation 
and other hydrological practices (Struik 1958/1979). Although Stevin is primarily 
known as a “pure” mathematician, he also took an interest in technical (notably 
hydraulic) problems. His many applications for patents testify to his hydraulic 
involvement. As early as 1584 he was granted a number of patents by the Dutch 
authorities on various inventions, most of them having to do with drainage (Struik 
1970, p. 5). He worked on mills, sluices and canals and with the help of extensive 
calculations he was able to improve the windmill, while his son Hendrik (a mathe-
matician in his own right) in 1667 devised a bold plan for the reclamation of the 
Zuyderzee. From 1588 onwards Simon Stevin, together with Johan Cornets (the 
father of Hugo) de Groot, built and improved a number of windmills, using a scoop 
wheel. But the windmill would be subject to further significant improvements dur-
ing the decades to come. In 1634 Symon Hulsebosch introduced the Archimedes 
screw, a device that replaced the scoop wheel and by means of which water could 
be lifted up to 4 m. From the late sixteenth century onwards, extensive reclamation 
projects were realized, such as the draining of the Beemster (1607–1612), the 
Purmer (1617–1622), the Wormer (1624–1626) and the Schermer (1631–1635). 
The drained areas were carefully parcelled out in a strictly geometrical pattern. 
Whereas Renaissance engineers such as Andries Vierlingh (1570/1920), dike mas-
ter to William the Silent, had opted for “persuasion” rather than force in dealing 
with aquatic nature, the new engineers of the classical age displayed a much 
stauncher attitude (Lambert 1971). One of them was Jan Adriaanszoon, a self-made 
man, born in De Rijp, a notorious waterland area, who nicknamed himself 
Leeghwater (“Empty-Water” in English) and who claimed involvement in all the 
important reclamation projects of his era (1641, p. 15), although in critical studies 
it is said that his contributions may have been overestimated (Struik 1958/1981). In 
1641 he published his Haarlemmermeerboek which contained detailed plans for the 
reclamation of Harlem Lake, some 4 m deep, covering an area of 18,000 ha of fer-
tile land, threatening agricultural areas as well as major towns (even Amsterdam 
itself ). Leeghwater described it as “a huge, harmful, pernicious water” and as “a 
wolf that eats away land” (1641/1764, p. 7). He had wanted to deploy no less than 
160 windmills in order to achieve his goal, but the reclamation of this lake would 
have to wait until the nineteenth century, when steam engines replaced the pictur-
esque, emblematic windmills of the classical era.
In this same landscape, other scientific practices emerged, notably in the area of 
the life sciences, but again in close connection with water. Jan Swammerdam 
(1637–1680) and Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723) are the two most 
famous representatives of this movement. A booklet by the Dutch ecologist Jac. 
P. Thijsse (whose work will be discussed later on) contains a beautiful story con-
cerning the birth of natural history in the Netherlands. In this booklet, entitled 
In Sloot en Plas (“In Ditch and Pool”, 1895/1898) it is narrated how early in the 
seventeenth century an apothecary from Amsterdam decided to place an aquarium 
in his shop window, filled with various life forms collected in local wetland areas – 
a gesture that was to have a stimulating effect on two youngsters, Swammerdam 
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and Van Leeuwenhoek, who eventually became the two most outstanding Dutch 
naturalists of the century, focusing attention of scientific communities worldwide 
to minuscule aquatic life forms. Whereas Van Leeuwenhoek’s fame rests on his 
extensive observations of bacteria, using self-built microscopes, Swammerdam’s 
renown is predominantly connected with his work on insects (his Bible of Nature 
was published posthumously by the famous physiologist Boerhave). The Dutch 
landscape as it emerged in the seventeenth century formed the “context of discov-
ery” for their work.
A no less dramatic transition occurred on the ideological level, namely the rise 
of Protestantism. There is an evident affinity between polderlands and Calvinism. 
In his book on the birth of capitalism and protestant ethics, Max Weber (1965) 
points out how Calvinistic Protestants excelled and took pride in maintaining them-
selves in a hostile natural environment. Nature was fundamentally distrusted. 
Indeed, the Dutch Calvinists put their trust solely in God. The goal of leading a 
Christian life in threatening surroundings called for a methodical and disciplined 
way of existence, based on diligence, technology and labour. Traditional Christian 
constraints on the accumulation of capital were removed and since according to 
protestant ethics the profits of labour had to be reinvested rather than spent, huge 
sums became available for financing ambitious and expensive reclamation projects. 
The classical windmill alone represented an enormous investment in those days. 
A new type of human being emerged, the protestant self-made man, dwelling in a 
self-made environment. The natural world, the inhospitable semi-maritime realms 
of old, were now radically disenchanted and Kreaturvergötterung (deification of 
nature) was vehemently rejected. The late medieval transgressions, such as the 
notorious St. Elizabeth’s Day Flood (November 18, 1421) that created a huge wet-
land area called the Biesbosch as well as the flood of 1570 that created the wetland 
area of Saeftinghe in the province of Zeeland, were reinterpreted as the Great 
Deluge of the Dutch nation, a calamity that signified the downfall of a morally 
deficient, medieval world, a “winnowing of souls”, as Schama (1987/1991, p. 38) 
calls it. It ended one world, while a new and cleaner world was reborn, sealed by a 
new covenant with God. Political geography (the emergence of the Netherlands as 
an independent nation) and environmental geography (land reclamation by means 
of polders and windmills) were all part of one complex, one Gesamtbild so to 
speak. The old water-devil, the demon of the floods, commemorated in many 
coastal names, had been intimidating previous generations long enough and was 
now finally driven out, together with the Spanish forces and Catholicism. Political 
borders and geographical demarcations were established simultaneously. The word 
reclamation itself is not a neutral term, but has evident moral connotations. The 
protestant reclaimer takes back what is his: the land that had been expropriated 
from the human sphere during the far too reluctant late medieval period. Nature had 
to be controlled and disciplined with the help of science-based practices (creating 
polders, canals, sluices and dikes) and, above all, with the help of a new ideology.
So far, a series of landscapes has been described in historical succession: the 
terp-landscape, the dike-landscape, the polder-landscape. The question now is: 
what kind of impression or Totaleindruck (Von Humboldt) did these landscapes 
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evoke? What kind of view or Ansicht did they offer? And, finally, what were the 
typical plant forms, the vegetal icons that gave them their identity, their face?
Pliny’s contemporaries who visited the landscape of the terps were overwhelmed 
by its desolateness, its emptiness, its shapelessness. In the lower, slowly subsiding 
and periodically flooded areas, sphagnum peat and other forms of marshland vege-
tation must have been omnipresent, but Roman visitors were most of all struck by 
the formlessness of this damp and dreary world, by the lack of clear distinctions 
between land and water, and by the absence of discrete and recognizable vegetable 
forms. This diffuse landscape could hardly be called a land-scape at all, as a sub-
stantial part of it was covered by brackish, semi-stagnant water. Pliny inserted his 
description of the Netherlands right at the beginning of his book on forest trees. 
Before turning to genuine forest areas, such as the woodlands of interior Germany, 
he speaks about a country without trees where the sea sweeps in a flood twice a day 
“over a measureless expanse” (p. 389). It was an environment deprived of a typical 
plant form, a landscape without a face.
The introduction of dikes and polders effected a “greening” of the Dutch land-
scape. The bleakness of its semi-stagnant waterlands gradually gave way to a com-
pletely different type of surface, dominated by grass forms. Primal nature or júsiV 
(“oernatuur” in Dutch) gradually gave way to agricultural nature (“boerennatuur”), 
where the imprints of human intervention and rectification were omnipresent. The 
large-scale reclamation projects of the Protestant era produced huge stretches of 
fertile soil. Notably in areas on the boundaries of dunes and polders, the soil proved 
favourable for growing bulbs and colourful flowers. Wealthy Calvinists were not 
allowed to spend their money on a grand scale, but there were no moral objections 
to decorating one’s garden. Thus, besides the windmill, the reclamation era (the 
Dutch “classical age”) also produced the second landscape icon that still gives the 
Netherlands its face: the bulbous plant, notably the tulip. Tulipmania raged in 
Holland in the 1630s and reached its peak in 1636–1637. Astonishing amounts were 
paid for the most colourful varieties. It was the first “hype” in history. And when the 
government finally intervened to end the trade, many were ruined in what was 
the first example of a stock-market crash. What is the significance of this episode 
from the point of view of moral geography?
7.4 Tulipmania, or the Beautiful and the Sublime
As an artificial, highly cultivated plant, the tulip was perfectly suitable for repre-
senting an artificial, highly cultivated landscape. The first tulips were imported into 
Holland in 1571 from Turkey, probably by the well-known horticulturist Carolus 
Clusius, professor of botany at Leyden university, who planted them in the newly 
established Hortus Botanicus where he started a series of experiments in cultivation 
(Lambert 1971). The easily modifiable Dutch soil (a balanced mixture of sand, clay 
and manure) readily allowed for the production of new varieties. Horticulture 
became a fashionable way of spending one’s time and money, notably in the gardens 
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of the country manors and residences of the Protestant rich. Professional botanists 
experimented in a systematic manner with colour, size and shape. Catalogues were 
published and tulip bulbs became the object of financial speculations. In 1623 a 
single bulb of Semper Augustus (red flames on white) was selling for thousands of 
florins. The tulip was a flower devoid of instrumental value. It was not grown 
because of its nutritional ingredients, nor put to use in any other manner. Rather, it 
was grown for its own sake, for aesthetic reasons only. It had, so to speak, intrinsic 
value. It was simply a feast for the eye and symbolized the Sunday of life.
According to Schama (1987/1991), what was so astonishing about the Dutch 
tulipmania was “the apparent incongruousness between the banality of the flower 
and the extravagance of its treatment” (p. 350). Yet, although a tulip may seem 
humble to us, in those days it was an exotic, distinguished and alluring novelty. 
Initially the growing of tulips had been a leisure time occupation of the elite, but 
around the beginning of the 1630s a popularization of the tulip set in. A new gen-
eration of horticulturists entered the scene and started to produce a series of bizarre 
and expensive specimen. A national, no longer class-linked cliché was invented.
Alexander Dumas, who visited the Netherlands in 1848, published his novel The 
Black Tulip in 1850. It is set against the backdrop of land reclamation and horticul-
ture in a landscape of windmills and canals. Its main character, Cornelius van Baerle, 
is a fancier, a connoisseur, solely obsessed by tulips. The wealthy Van Baerle, being 
at a loss what to do with his time and with his money, becomes engaged in a prac-
tice both elegant and expensive. He looks after his tulips with the utmost care and 
patience, in a methodical and systematic manner, indeed: in a scientific manner, 
keeping exact records and creating the most perfect conditions for his bulbs in 
terms of temperature, sunshine, soil and wind and thus producing new varieties. He 
invests all his intellectual and financial resources in growing bulbs. One day, the 
Horticultural Society of Haarlem offers a prize of a hundred thousand guilders for 
the production of a black tulip. By means of careful and minute manipulations, Van 
Baerle succeeds in this laborious task. An envious neighbour, likewise a tulip-fancier, 
tries to ruin him, but while in prison, the jailor’s daughter comes to Van Baerle’s 
aid and, by closely following his instructions, she manages to produce the tulip. In 
those days, tulip growers really went to elaborate lengths to produce new varieties 
and to protect their precious artefacts from envious neighbours – the novel, not-
withstanding some extravagancies, was true to life.
From the point of view of moral geography, the Dutch preoccupation with the 
tulip, transforming it into a national cliché, is quite understandable. As a highly arti-
ficial and modifiable plant form it exemplifies and represents a highly artificial land-
scape. The windmill (the symbol of intelligence and labour) produced it, the tulip 
adorned it. Kant’s distinction between the “beautiful” and the “sublime” may help us 
to further clarify its meaning. According to Kant (1788/1975), there are two ways in 
which nature appeals to us. Nature can either be beautiful (“schön”) or sublime 
(“erhaben”). In its formless, overwhelming and “measureless” immensity, nature 
(notably maritime or mountainous nature) is not beautiful, but sublime. Flowers, on 
the other hand, are beautiful, precisely because of their marked and pleasing form. 
A crystal is beautiful, a mountain sublime. The aesthetic significance of the sublime 
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was discovered by romantic poets and scholars of the eighteenth century, such as 
Alexander von Humboldt and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. During his walks along the 
shores of Lac de Bienne, now a wetland restoration reserve, Rousseau found them 
wilder and more romantic (“plus sauvages et romantiques”) than those of Lake 
Geneva – thus using the word “romantic” for the first time (1782/1965, p. 89).2 
During the classical age, however, the romantic appreciation of the sublime and over-
whelming aspect of nature was more or less absent. The diffuse and formless immen-
sities of maritime or semi-maritime nature beyond the dikes were emphatically 
ignored, but the beauty of delicate forms was valued to the extreme. Dutch painters 
not only immortalized a highly cultivated landscape, but also the flower that gave it 
a face. The tulip exemplified the beautiful par excellence. Calvinism did not entail a 
rejection of nature as such, but it did reject the diffuse, unstable, unreliable aspect of 
nature, while valuing nature in its pleasing forms, exemplified by the tulip.
Speaking of the Dutch, Kant noticed that they appreciated order, utility and 
gracefulness. Hegel, who (unlike Kant) actually visited The Netherlands himself, 
carefully analyzed the paintings of the Dutch classical era. In the landscapes of the 
Dutch masters of the (first) Golden Age, he tells us, we see a flat and low terrain, 
with a foggy horizon and the sea always nearby. Because of the grey and dreary 
aspect of their natural environment, the Dutch painters became obsessed with light 
and colours. In their still-lives, the tulip played a decisive part. They painted, as 
Hegel puts it, the Sundays of their life, spent in a landscape completely reshaped 
by the human hand and mind. The explanation for this art form, according to Hegel, 
is to be found solely in Dutch history. The Dutch produced the soil on which they 
dwelled themselves – Der Holländer hat sich zum größten Teil den Boden, darauf er 
wohnt und lebt, selber gemacht (1970/1986, I, p. 222). That is, the Dutch appreci-
ated and immortalized the products of their own making in their still-lives and their 
landscape paintings. Of all flowers, the tulip aroused the greatest interest. In the 
floral paintings of Jacob de Gheyn, Ambrosius Bosschaert, Balthasar van der Ast, 
Christoffel van den Berghe and many others, the tulip always is the dominant 
flower (Haak 1984/1996).
7.5 Growing Tensions
The policy of land reclamation continued during the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. In 1798, under the French occupation, water management in the Netherlands 
became centralized and professionalized (Bosch 2000). The centralizing spirit of 
Enlightenment encouraged coordinated management and administration in all spheres 
2 “Les rives du Lac de Bienne sont plus sauvages et plus romantiques que celles du lac de Genève 
… Le pays est peu fréquenté par les voyageurs; mais il est intéressant pour des contemplatifs soli-
taires qui aiment à s’enivrer à loisir des charmes de la nature, et à se recueillir dans un silence qui 
ne trouble aucune bruit que le cri des aigles …” (1782/1965, p. 89)
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of public life. As far as water management was concerned, this was well in time, 
because the “Little Ice Age” of the early modern period, with its slightly lowered sea 
level, had ended. Still, this episode in Dutch (water) history is generally regarded as 
one of stagnation. The Dutch leisure class preferred income and ease to enterprise and 
exertion. In rural and urban areas, poverty and social malaise increased. Due to exten-
sive peat-cuttings, new water areas and interior lakes started to undo what previous 
generations had achieved. The plans for reclaiming the Haarlemmermeer and the 
Zuyderzee, put forward by engineers like Leeghwater and Hendrik Stevin, were not 
realized. It is interesting to note that the self-content and relative passivity of this 
era, compared with the frantic industriousness of the classical or Golden Age, was 
expressed by nicknaming it after a plant. In 1841 the Dutch poet E.J. Potgieter 
published one of his most famous stories, whose main character Jan Salie (“John 
Sage”) exemplified the general loss of élan. Tulips no longer expressed the Dutch 
morale and were replaced by this humble plant form, appreciated for its instrumental 
(herbal) rather than for its esthetical or intrinsic value.
Yet underneath the quiet façade of the leisure class, the struggle continued. This 
is emphasized by a literary document written in 1888, but describing an event that 
took place in the middle of the eighteenth century, namely Theodor Storm’s novel 
Der Schimmelreiter (“The Grey Rider”). The novel’s setting is the coastal zone of 
the eastern (i.e. German) part of Friesland. A huge dike divided the human world 
from a dark, grey, cold, coastal immenseness, the realm of strange apparitions and 
frightening birds: the Wadden Sea. Storm’s novel tells the story of a talented dike 
master who, as a boy, came across a Dutch translation of Euclid’s Elements – a 
clear reference to the significance of mathematics in early modern Dutch water 
management. He further expanded his autodidactic knowledge by means of clay 
models and as an adult he tried to apply his rationalistic and methodical approach 
to improving the art of dike management, facing obstinate resistance from his 
superstitious, less-enlightened social environment. The novel describes the clash 
between, on the one hand, the demonic immensities of the Wadden Sea, forever 
defying human control and, on the other hand, the mathematical tools and calcula-
tive efforts human beings may rely on to warrant their safety. The ancient clash 
between júsiV and técnh, between the (fluid) Id and the (solid) rational Self was 
reframed in terms of a clash between Rationalism and Romanticism. On the ideologi-
cal level, it describes the clash between a Christian, enlightened world, on the safe 
side of the dike, and an older demonic world filled with pagan, Wotanesque reminis-
cences beyond it. In the novel, these two basic attitudes towards nature are exposed 
to and played out against one another. The author refuses to take sides. He is fasci-
nated by both perspectives, by science-based efforts to domesticate nature as well 
as by the alluring aspects of untamed júsiV.
As an account of a struggle, it is a retrospective novel, reflecting on reminis-
cences of the past, because in real life, the rationalistic, calculative approach was 
quickly making progress. In 1852 the Haarlemmermeer was finally drained with 
the help of steam engines (in the twentieth-century Schiphol Airport would be built 
there). Tidal inlets were closed by dikes and other projects, such as the draining in 
1874 of the Prince Alexander Polder (21 feet below sea-level) followed. But the 
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Zuyderzee still offered resistance. In 1859 the island of Schokland had to be aban-
doned. It still can be seen today: a small hill with a lighthouse and a harbour in the 
middle of a polder landscape. Yet, in 1891, Cornelis Lely presented his plans for 
turning the Zuyderzee into a lake. Work did not begin until 1919, but in 1932 the 
dike that changed the sea into the man-made lake, separating it from the Wadden 
Sea in the north, was closed. Polders were created and mud became soil, while 
brackish and saline water was gradually replaced by fresh water. Common reed, 
phragmites vulgaris, was sown from helicopters, later to be replaced by grass. What 
once had been bleak and diffuse, became distinct and discrete. Primal nature (“oer-
natuur”) was converted into agricultural nature (“boerennatuur”). New settlements 
received the names of old ones that had long ago been surrendered to the sea. This 
ambitious and successful project again expressed a sense of moral criticism, 
directed towards the older generations of the John Sage era. The decisions to carry 
out the huge project was made almost unanimously ( Van de Ven 1993, p. 237). 
Lely’s plan, presented during the second Golden Age, was in all respects the mod-
ern equivalent of the grand impolderisation projects of the classical era. The 
famous Dutch physicist Lorentz (a Nobel Prize winner) was asked to predict the 
tidal effects caused by the closure of the Zuyderzee (Bijker 1995). The extensive 
calculations this involved took him 8 years (Wagret 1960/1968). From the engi-
neer’s point of view, the project was an astonishing success. Through the partial 
reclamation of the Zuyderzee, 166,000 ha of new land was gained.
When Sigmund Freud visited the Netherlands in 1920 he was deeply impressed 
by what he saw happening there. In a famous passage he compared psychoanalysis 
to the Trockenlegung (“impolderment”) of the Zuyderzee (Freud 1932). It inspired 
him to frame his famous maxim, the metaphor that indicated to aims of psychoa-
nalysis: “Where Id was, the Ego should become (“Wo Es war soll Ich werden”). 
According to Freud, the basic objective of psychoanalysis is to allow the Ego to 
reclaim (“aneignen”) parts of the Id. His metaphor emphasized the synchronicity 
between changes in water management on the one hand and ideological transitions 
on the other, between Kulturarbeit on the hydro-technical and on the psycho-technical 
level. In Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (“Civilization and its discontents”) Freud 
had already indicated that “culture” literally means cultivating the earth, and 
defending cultivated earth against the forces of nature. Ideally, according to Freud, 
culture is a landscape in which optimal use is made of resources and space, where 
rivers are regulated and excess water is drained off by canals (1930, p. 451). 
Moreover, Freud points out that such a “polderisation” of nature is often supple-
mented by the careful treatment of beautiful things, such as flowers on windowsills 
(p. 452). It is quite clear that in this beautiful picture of a cultivated landscape par 
excellence, Freud is actually thinking of the Dutch landscape that he had visited 
himself.
Indeed, Paul-Laurent Assoun (1987) has emphasized that for Freud the Dutch 
polder landscape served as an image of culture as such. Freud visited the 
Netherlands three times, in 1908, 1910 and 1920. During the first two visits, he 
went to see the cities, such as The Hague, Delft and Leyden, in whose museums 
he studied the works of the Dutch painters of the seventeenth century. In 1920, 
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however, he visited the Dutch landscape. This time he saw the polders and the 
canals with his own eyes, travelling by rowing boats, carriages and on foot. Due to 
these experiences, the impolderisation of Dutch nature (not merely pictorial and 
historical this time, but real) became a metaphor for culture as such. Indeed, he 
came to regard Holland as the “prototype” of culture (Assoun 1987, p. 223).
The great project whose realization Freud actually witnessed was the reclama-
tion of the Zuyderzee. Huge dikes and powerful hydraulic devices were used to 
reclaim significant amounts of land at the expense of sea. A clear demarcation was 
introduced between culture and nature, at the latter’s expense. Paul-Laurent Assoun 
stresses the remarkable synchronicity between the history of this astonishing 
project and that of psychoanalysis itself. In 1891, when Freud (together with 
Breuer) became involved in the therapeutic efforts that would eventually be pub-
lished as the Studien über Hysterie (1895/1940), Cornelius Lely actually presented 
his famous plan for the closing of the Zuyderzee. The first polder was finished in 
1929, the same year in which Civilisation and its discontents was written. And in 
1932, when the huge dike that closed off IJssel Lake from the Wadden Sea was fin-
ished, Freud’s New Lectures on Psychoanalysis were published – the third of which 
contains his famous maxim (cited above), his tribute to the epic of impolderisation 
as a remarkable feat of ethical significance. Indeed, by comparing the creation of 
polders with the practice of psychoanalysis, the analogy between psychological and 
geographical cultivation is emphasized. Both efforts had one and the same objec-
tive, they represented the internal (individual) and external (collective) impact of 
one and the same Zeitgeist. The building of dikes and the draining of polders exem-
plified a process of much broader significance, moreover. They constituted a work 
of culture. There was a clear affinity between the “gospel” of psychoanalysis and 
modern water policies (Assoun 1987, p. 232). The modern subject constituted him-
self through impolderment. In a reclaimed environment he established his modern 
Self.
There is a price to every form of progress, however. According to the German 
painter Joseph Beuys, who postulated this theory in the late 1970s, the price of rec-
lamation was difficult to notice but rather dramatic: the light in the Netherlands had 
changed. The light for which Holland had been famous, notably through its land-
scape painters, had lost its unique radiance, due to reclamation of the Zuyderzee. 
Moreover, he maintained, the reclamation marked the end of a visual culture, a style 
of perception dating back to the seventeenth century. The Zuyderzee had functioned 
as a vast mirror of light. By draining it to create polders, the Dutch had actually 
blinded themselves.3
Freud visited the Netherlands at a time when the Trockenlegung of primal coastal 
nature was almost brought to a completion, but he explicitly pointed out that reclama-
tion efforts (the process of demarcation between Ego and the Id) could never be 
regarded as really completed. Rather, it would involve ongoing psychic efforts, and this 
3 http://www.hollandslicht.nl/www/html/eng/film/synop_01.html.
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applied to moral geography as well. Diffuse remainders, such as the Wadden Sea, a 
bleak and more or less “primal” zone beyond the new dike, was allowed to remain 
what it had been since time immemorial – a tidal area more or less untouched by 
Kulturarbeit. This does not imply of course that the Wadden Sea is “natural” or “pri-
mal” in an absolute sense. Landscapes and seascapes cannot be categorized as either 
artificial or wild. They vary along a continuum (Cole-King 1994). Even the Wadden 
Sea and other leftovers are, in their present form, the results of human choices, policies 
and modifications. And yet, there is a striking and undeniable contrast between the 
grey, júsiV-like Wadden Sea beyond the dike and the green, domesticated polders, 
separated from the water by a straight line, a demarcation of mathematical precision.
In the era of Freud, this process of ongoing reclamation nearly reached its com-
pletion. It is remarkable that precisely at that moment, a competing attitude towards 
coastal nature began to emerge, a cultural undercurrent, so to speak, adhering to a 
rather different view. Already in the nineteenth century, but even more so during 
the twentieth century, the reclamation campaign had to compete with a movement 
that, psychoanalytically speaking, could be regarded as a “return of the repressed”. 
Around 1880, a small but influential group of poets, painters and naturalists began 
to discover and appreciate the charms and qualities of what was still left of the 
ancient bogs, swamps, dunes and marches. Anton Mauve’s sublime painting The 
Marsh (1885) may stand as a telling example of this new awareness, this love of 
pristine nature – biophilia. His most famous pupil, Vincent van Gogh, further dis-
seminated the ideal. The movement not only produced an impressive series of 
poems, paintings and educational booklets on nature, but scored its first major 
political success when Jac. P. Thijsse, a primary school teacher and ecologist avant 
la lettre, managed to arrest the plans, put forward by the city council of Amsterdam, 
to turn the nearby Naardermeer (“Lake Naarden”) into a refuse dump.
The Naardermeer was a natural wetland area of glacial origins that had been part 
of the Vecht basin, one of the branches of the Rhine River, from which it was sepa-
rated by a dam in the fourteenth century (Van Zinderen Bakker 1942, p. 42). 
Between 1623 and 1629, a first serious attempt had been made to turn the area into 
a polder, but on this occasion the Dutch engineers had lost their pernicious battle. 
Pieter Cornelis Hooft, one of the most important poets of the Dutch Golden Age, 
but also bailiff at the nearby coastal town of Muiden, was responsible for the area. 
He not only had to deal with various illegal attempts at peat digging, but he also 
documented the abortive reclamation efforts (Thijsse 1912, p. 11; Van Zinderen 
Bakker 1942, p. 53). Finally, the authorities decided to give the area back to nature, 
so to speak, albeit for strategic reasons: as a watery obstacle assisting them in ward-
ing off the advancing Spanish forces.4 In 1906, this wetland area became the first 
official Dutch Nature Monument, a model for the future. A major shift had occurred 
on the Dutch attitude to coastal and wetland nature.
4 A second major attempt was made in the period 1883–1886, this time relying on the use of steam 
power. But once again, the engineers failed to overcome the problem of seepage water emerging 
from the primeval boggy soil.
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7.6 Poetry as the Art of Remembrance
In 1932 (as was indicated above) the IJsselmeerdam was closed and the great 
project of impoldering the Zuydersee was brought to an end. A whole coastal land-
scape had been domesticated, so it seemed. A few years later, however, in 1936, 














Scattered throughout the land.
Clusters of trees, villages,
Cropped towers,
Churches and elms
In one great association.
The air hangs low
And the sun is slowly
Muffled in a grey
Mottled fog.
And in all the provinces
The voice of the water
With its eternal calamities
Is feared and heard.
On January 27, 2000, during the “Night of Dutch Poetry”, this poem was elected as 
the best Dutch poem of the twentieth century. What does it tell us about the Dutch 
landscape and its inhabitants, from the perspective of a moral geography?
In this poem a particular experience of nature is articulated, namely nature as 
júsiV – all-encompassing, immense, powerful, diffused. Sunken within this 
immense natural landscape we find small human enclaves, unassuming human 
footprints so to speak, such as farm houses and church towers. In other words, 
human beings are present, as inhabitants of nature, but they inhabit it in a 
 peaceful, silent and retained manner, living their quiet lives as they had done for 
centuries. Nature invokes in them a sense of awe (a mixture of fear and respect). 
They are respectful and fearful of nature, and dependent on nature – they are part 
of nature. Natural time flows slowly, and natural space is apparently endless. 
Within this landscape, there are no clear boundaries or demarcations. The ele-
ments (air, water, land, light) are blended. Daylight is dim, the atmosphere foggy, 
the horizon hardly noticable, the demarcation between land and water unclear.
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This ideal is in contrast with those of the engineers of the classical era (such as 
Leeghwater) and their descendants who, in the twentieth century, had apparently 
managed to pacify the element of water and to reclaim the Zuyderzee. Clear demar-
cations had been introduced by them into the diffuse natural landscapes, the broad 
rivers had been contained by dikes, and behind these man-made structures the time-
old menacing voice of water had become more or less inaudible. Marsman’s poem 
is therefore an exercise in remembrance. In reality, rivers had been straitjacketed 
and wetlands and marshes transformed into humanized space. Fresh and saline 
waters had been ruthlessly segregated and the horizon had become a distinct 
straight line. For indeed, the engineer’s landscape is a compartmentalized land-
scape, anthropogenic and man-made. Human beings are emphatically present. They 
dominate it. They are in control. Space is differentiated into separate compartments, 
each with a more or less clear function. Time moves faster in such a landscape, as 
we ourselves will travel through it much more easily and at a much higher speed. 
Long before Marsman wrote his panegyric on the Dutch riverscape, Dutch engi-
neers had already started to transform this area in a rather drastic manner. And by 
the time Marsman conceived his poem, this process was more or less completed. In 
other words, his poem conveys nostalgic desire. It longs for a return of the 
repressed. Up to a certain extent, and notably under certain metereological condi-
tions, the natural, as elsewhere ju´siV-like aspect of the Dutch landscape is still 
discernable, but on closer inspection a new and drastically anthropogenic landscape 
has more or less taken its place. The poet finds himself on the boundary, so to 
speak, of both landscapes, experiencing the basic tension that exists between them. 
His poem gives voice to a more or less romantic attitude towards nature, a yearning 
for nature as elsewhere ju´siV, but under rather modern (and therefore unnatural) 
conditions. Romanticism presupposes the very technologies it deplores so much.
In the seventeenth century, Dutch river poetry had played a rather different role. 
Poets of the Golden Age, such as Pieter Cornelis Hooft (1581–1647) had reshaped 
the Dutch language, similar to the way in which the early modern engineers had 
reshaped the Dutch landscape. Hooft’s poetry, however, was inspired by Renaissance 
(Italian) and classical (Roman) sources rather than by personal experiences and 
observations of Dutch nature. When it came to describing the Dutch landscape, his 
most important source of inspiration was not the landscape itself, but Tacitus, author 
of a number of influential documents concerning the Netherlands and its early 
inhabitants. Hooft regarded himself as a second Tacitus, so to speak, and he saw the 
seventeenth century as the beginning of a new era. Indeed, he aspired to be its 
chronicler. Some of his works are clearly modeled after Tacitus’ examples. In his 
poetry, nature provides sceneries for Arcadian fantasies, but nature as a real land-
scape is hardly present in his work.
The same predilection for literary sources over first-hand observation of nature 
characterizes the work of the greatest Dutch poet of the (“first”) Golden Age, Joost 
van den Vondel (1587–1679) – although he was fascinated more by biblical and 
theological than by classical themes. It is remarkable that although the first Golden 
Age produced a number of very important scholars of nature (Swammerdam, Van 
Leeuwenhoek and others) as well as important landscape painters (such as Salomon 
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van Ruysdael 1600–1670), but also Rembrandt van Rijn, who created a famous set 
of etchings of the river Amstel), the period was less prolific in terms of its land-
scape poetry. Vondel’s long poem on the Rhine River (1986, pp. 777–778), for 
example, strikes modern readers as remarkably lifeless, bookish and boring. The 
poem contains several references to Tacitus, as well as an enumeration of the 
Rhine’s principal tributaries, and various praises of its historical and economic sig-
nificance, but nothing in it suggests that the Rhine as a natural entity, as a river-
scape, ever made much of an impression on Vondel.
This is clearly in contrast with the poetry of the “second” Golden Age (1880–
1920), an episode which, like the first one, produced a relatively large number of 
outstanding artists and scientists in the Netherlands. From the 1880s onwards, after 
an extended period of cultural malaise, the Netherlands suddenly experienced a 
period of reawakening. In a relatively short time, the country not only counted five 
Nobel Prize winning scientists (Van’t Hoff 1901; Lorentz and Zeeman 1902; Van der 
Waals 1910; Kamerlingh Onnes 1913) but also a series of outstanding painters and 
poets (of which Vincent van Gogh is no doubt the most famous example). Notably 
the work of the Tachtigers, a generation of poets who became famous during the 1880s, 
is important in this respect. The indisputable highlight of the epoch was the poem 
Mei (“May”) written by Herman Gorter (1864–1927). This brilliant and compelling 
poem published in 1889 (and containing no less than 5,000 lines), was a fascinating 
panegyric on the Dutch coastal landscape, but difficult to translate. Let me insert just 
a few lines, more or less arbitrarily chosen:
From the pond a rivulet fled away,
Water of jewel-like light. With heavy leaves
Young plants were standing on the earthy banks
Listening to the soft flourish of the water …
Her foot in the white soft sand, her ankles dragged
The water through the stream, erasing her trail.
The clear surface seemed to enjoy her presence,
Its spirals continued to play in the shade (Gorter 1889/1948, p. 27)
In his poem, the author describes how everything in nature is touched and awak-
ened by an enchanting young girl, the personification of the month of May. It con-
veys the impression, moreover, that it is possible for human beings to be present in 
nature in an unobtrusive manner, joyfully sharing in the seasonal euphoria. Gorter’s 
poetry is full of close observations and detailed descriptions of nature in general 
and of plant forms in particular. He was an important source of inspiration for later 
generations of poets, such as Marsman.
Another important reader of Gorter’s poem was Jac. P. Thijsse, who clearly shared 
the enthusiasm and fascination with nature so characteristic of the work of the poets and 
painters of the “second” Golden Age. There are remarkable similarities in style between 
Gorter’s poetry and Thijsse’s prose. In fact, Thijsse’s booklets were originally published 
by W. Versluys (Amsterdam), who also published Herman Gorter’s Mei as well as the 
poetry of most of the poets of the 1880s. I will come back to his work in Section 7.7.
The second Golden Age was also remarkable in the domain of the life sciences. 
In the 1890s, the attention of the experimental botanist Hugo de Vries was drawn by 
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the Evening Primrose (Oenothera Lamarckiana), a plant that grew in masses in 
meadows in the neighbourhood of Amsterdam. He observed how varieties of this 
species disintegrated spontaneously into a number of new forms and concluded that 
evolution proceeds by distinct changes which he called “mutations”. Because of its 
experimental employability, he elected the Evening Primrose as his model species 
and soon it became an experimental flower par excellence. It stimulated a new sci-
entific practice and made the introduction of “mutation” as a key concept in genetics 
possible. As a wild but charming flower, adorning the polder landscape in the imme-
diate vicinity of extending cities, it was the tulip, so to speak, of the second Golden 
Age. It is a natural flower, representing the new appreciation of naturalness, but still 
within a broader context of policies of impolderisation, whose technologies had 
become extremely powerful. Its remarkable plasticity was natural rather than artifi-
cial. Moreover, the presence of a university professor, an experimental botanist, in 
a picturesque polder landscape indicates that scientists has left their laboratories, 
more or less as impressionistic and expressionistic artists had left their urban studios 
to wander about in rural picturesque sceneries in order to produce their paintings on 
site – like Van Gogh. But it also indicates the extent to which urban extension began 
to enter the polder areas. Interestingly enough, the rediscovery of nature more or less 
coincided with industrialization and urbanization in the Netherlands. The increased 
sensibility towards the intense beauty of typical, semi-natural Dutch landscapes took 
place at a time when industrial activity was growing and major urban centres, nota-
bly in coastal regions, such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were quickly extending, 
at the expense of coastal nature. How were the Dutch to harmonise this new appre-
ciation of nature with these competing interests and claims?
7.7 Romanticism and the Emergence of a More 
“Natural” Natural Science
In order to understand this question, a short historical detour must be inserted at 
this point. Looking back upon the geographical history of the Netherlands, two 
competing views on nature have emerged: on the one hand the science-based 
view of the engineer (as the dominant perspective), on the other hand the artis-
tic view of the poet (as its “recessive” counterpart so to speak) – ego and alter 
ego. However, the engineer-poet dichotomy or, more broadly speaking, the “Two 
Cultures”-paradigm, fails to appreciate the ways in which poetry and Romanticism 
actually inspired scientific research efforts and vice versa. Notably, it would be 
a mistake to identify the romantic view with art, and the engineer’s view with 
science. Romanticism as a cultural movement, as a style of thought, gave rise to 
important forms of scientific activity, notably in the life sciences. Albrecht von 
Haller (1708–1777), for example, who, as was already mentioned in Chapter 5, 
meticulously described the plant forms of the Alpine landscape (his famous flora 
listed no less than 2,490 Swiss plants), was a romantic scholar – and a romantic 
poet as well.
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Another outstanding representative of Romanticism, indulging in similar scien-
tific activities, was Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) who, as we have seen, 
discovered the romantic landscape during his promenades on Ile Saint-Pierre in Lac 
du Bienne, where he developed a passion for collecting and identifying flowers 
(“herboriser” in French).This was his way of re-establishing a form of contact, a 
rapport with nature. He set out to write a Flora Petrinsularis, a systematic descrip-
tion of all the plant forms he encountered on the islet. Whereas he regarded – or 
rather: discarded – research with animals as a violent research practice, herborisa-
tion was a peaceful and innocent endeavour, a gentle way of getting in touch once 
again with nature, a form of research devoted to studying life forms in their natural 
environment. At the same time it was a form of leisure, of far niente. And Rousseau 
was, of course, an educator. Herborisation was a cultural remedy, a pastime he 
emphatically recommended to his readers. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–
1832) was among those who followed his example. He too became devoted to bot-
any and became addicted, so to speak, to studying, collecting and carefully drawing 
the wild plant forms he encountered during his wanderings with romantic zeal.5 He 
regarded it as an activity on the borderline between art and science.
Another interesting protagonist of the romantic movement in botany was Franz 
Bratranek (1815–1884), a Goethe scholar, but also a fellow-friar of Gregor Mendel 
at the famous Augustinian monastery at Brno.6 Both friars were devoted to botany, 
but Bratranek’s style of research was apparently quite different from that of his 
colleague Mendel. Like Von Humboldt, Bratranek claims that nature presents itself 
to us primarily as a landscape, and that every landscape expresses itself in typical 
plant forms that determine its character, its identity so to speak. At the same time, 
a landscape evokes in us a particular mood. And this explains the experience of 
rapport between subjectivity (“Stimmung”, mood) and objectivity (the landscape, 
notably the typical plant forms we encounter in it) that so often befalls us when 
wandering through charming natural surroundings.7 It explains why certain plant 
forms will strike us as particularly beautiful and valuable. And this concordance, 
this empathy between subject and object, between man and nature, between wan-
derer and plant form, arouses in us a sense of profound happiness.
Initially, the great romantic movement that spread across Europe during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century more or less by-passed the Netherlands – until 
the 1880s. All of a sudden, a new generation of poets and painters stepped forward 
5 Wer wollte nicht dem in höchsten Sinne verehrten Johann Jakob Rousseau auf seinen einsamen 
Wanderungen folgen, wo er, mit dem Menschengeschlecht verfeindet, seine Aufmerksamkeit der 
Pflanzen- und Blumenwelt zuwendet und in echter, gradsinniger Geisteskraft sich mit den stillrei-
zenden Naturkindern vertraut macht (1910, p. 59).
6 Bratranek’s work will be discussed more fully in Chapter 9.
7 “Die Stimmung des Menschen [wird] durch den Vegetationscharakter der Landschaft geleitet, 
und andererseits spiegelt die Innigkeit selbst ihre Gestaltung in der Wahl von Pflanzen und in sol-
cher Umgestaltung der Landschaft ab” (p. 23).
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who endorsed romantic techniques and ideas and who emphatically discovered and 
affirmed the beauty of the natural Dutch landscape, of coastal areas, dunes and 
wetlands, of ponds, river beds and marshes. And in the wake of this movement, a 
number of influential authors tried to combine an artistic with a scientific view on 
nature. By describing the Dutch landscape in a way that was both artistically con-
vincing and scientifically informed, they tried to educate the public, notably the 
working-classes and other inhabitants of the emerging industrial cities, allowing 
and inciting them to rediscover nature.
The most important representative of this movement was already mentioned 
above: Jac. P. Thijsse, a prolific author of booklets on Dutch landscapes, or rather: 
mnemoscapes, and the life forms they contained, with a special focus on rivers, 
wetlands and coastal regions. Famous titles are, among others: In Sloot en Plas (“In 
Ditch and Pool”, 1895), Blonde Duinen (“Blond Dunes”, 1910), Het Naardermeer 
(“Naarden Lake”, 1912), Langs de Zuiderzee (“Along the Zuyderzee”, 1914), De 
Vecht (“The Vecht River”, 1915), De IJssel (“The IJssel River”, 1916), Texel (“The 
Isle of Texel”, 1927) and Onze Groote Rivieren (“Our Great Rivers”, 1938). These 
booklets were not only famous because of the charming and poetic vein in which 
they were written, but also because of the beautiful pictures of plants, animals and 
sites they contained. Thijsse was an educator who believed that knowledge of ani-
mal and plant forms would further our respect for nature. Although the larger part 
of the Netherlands had been compartmentalized and made functional by genera-
tions of engineers, there were still valuable enclaves and remainders of the natural 
and the picturesque waiting to be discovered and preserved.
In the opening lines of Our Great Rivers (“Onze Groote Rivieren”), one of his 
most important works, Thijsse explains that the basic mood from which his book 
was written was a sense of “welbehagen” – feeling at home in one’s own landscape. 
Thijsse clearly acknowledges, moreover, that the Dutch landscape results from an 
ongoing interaction between human activity and natural processes. The Dutch land-
scape is natural (in the sense that it is a manifestation of the creative forces of 
nature), but at the same time it is thoroughly man-made. For example, several pages 
are devoted to praising the exceptionally rich and beautiful vegetation one is likely 
to encounter along man-made dikes. Moreover, there is, to use the words of 
Bratranek, a happy concordance between the mood the Dutch landscape tends to 
evoke in us, and the typical plant forms one is likely to encounter in it. Thijsse sees 
the Dutch landscape predominantly as a river landscape – formed and dominated 
by rivers, and certain typical plant forms feel quite at home in such a riverscape: 
they give it a “face”. The typical Dutch riverscape is exemplified by a typical plant 
form, the Gevlekte Dovenetel (Lamium maculatum), in which all the conditions of 
this ecosystem come together, become visible so to speak. Thijsse does not want to 
remove the dikes from the Dutch landscape. On the contrary, even the countless 
chimneys of brickworks one encounters along Dutch river-sites are a beautiful and 
inevitable part of the river as a comprehensive landscape, the outcome of a joint 
activity, so to speak, a co-evolution of human and natural forces. Indeed, a remark-
ably natural site, consisting of endless rows of dunes and marshes, can be found in 
the immediate vicinity of Rotterdam harbour, the largest harbour complex worldwide. 
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We have to care for our landscape in a prudent manner and this implies that we 
must carefully mediate the (sometimes conflicting) claims, desires and tendencies 
of man and nature.
According to Thijsse, the Dutch riverscape encourages two different forms of 
scientific research that often tend to be seen as antagonistic, namely the knowledge 
of the engineer and that of the “friend of nature” (“natuurvriend”). The engineer is 
someone who uses his mathematical and physical expertise and tools to make the 
dynamic and ever-changing Dutch landscape not only inhabitable but even more or 
less stable and safe. Without the research and interventions of the engineer, cities 
like Amsterdam and Rotterdam would inevitably disappear. In other words, the 
Dutch landscape literally calls for this kind of scientific activity. At the same time, 
however, a completely different form of knowledge is stimulated and evoked by the 
Dutch landscape as well, a form of research that resembles “romantic botany” 
already described above. The landscape literally invites us to study the life forms 
that inhabit it very closely and intimately, from a basic attitude of empathy. Both 
forms of knowledge are important, when it comes to managing and developing riv-
erscapes in a responsible manner. Thijsse clearly believes that somehow the con-
cerns of the engineer and those of the friends of nature, however contradictory they 
may seem at first glance, may eventually be brought together in a comprehensive 
view on landscape management. Both the engineer (Stevin c.s.) and the naturalist 
(Leeuwenhoek c.s.) are, after all, the product of the first Golden Age. They consti-
tute complementary forms of expertise.
Thijsse’s work contains a simple moral message for the “ordinary reader”, of all 
walks of life, namely: visit nature. He urges his readers to expose themselves to 
nature as a kind of cultural remedy, a form of public education. “Ins Freie!”, as 
Bratranek had phrased it: expose yourself to landscapes and get to learn the plant 
forms that inhabit them and represent them. This is important, not only for our per-
sonal development, but also for our rapport with nature. It was this powerful, 
research-based message, in combination with political skills, that eventually 
allowed Thijsse to become a decisive factor in the preservation of the Naardermeer 
(“Lake Naarden”) as the first Dutch Natural Monument. The creation of the 
Naardermeer as a natural monument became a turning point in the history of Dutch 
water management. It was no coincidence of course that the wetland reserve was 
situated in the middle of a beautiful area called het Gooi, not very far from 
Amsterdam, where a significant number of the poets and artists involved in the 
second Golden Age had taken up their residences. The plea for the conservation 
and rehabilitation of wetland nature, at the expense of both urban expansion and 
rural cultivation, was an expression of moral criticism directed towards the ethos of 
mastery, the engineering mentality of previous generations. It was the beginning of 
a very successful pursuit. The Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten in 
Nederland [“Dutch Association for Nature Conservation”], established by Thijsse 
and others in 1905, now owns over 80,000 ha of natural areas. In short, the century-
old tendency towards pacifying nature was finally counter-pointed by a movement 
in the opposite direction. It was the beginning of a significant change in the Dutch 
attitude towards the element of water. The “softer” approach of the “friends of 
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
nature” gained in strength, while the “tougher” approach of the traditional engineer 
seemed to have reached its limits.
According to Thijsse, the Naardermeer was not simply a remainder from the 
past, to be preserved for nostalgic reasons, as an open-air museum for natural his-
tory. Rather, it would open-up possibilities for scientific research and serious bio-
logical inquiry into wetland ecology. Relatively undisturbed by anthropogenic 
influences, under conditions that could be regarded as being “as natural as possi-
ble”, scientists would be able to study how a dynamic natural area would gradually 
change from open water into boggy wilderness. In other words, the Naardermeer 
as a natural monument was an object of scientific inquiry that would yield impor-
tant information on the history – and future – of the Dutch landscape. In 1953, 
however, a unexpected disaster occurred that temporarily halted the “friend of 
nature” perspective and greatly reinforced the traditional engineering view.
7.8 Challenged Ideals
In the night of February 1, 1953, a major flood claimed 1,836 human victims 
(besides over 200,000 farm animals) and inundated 165,000 ha of arable land in the 
Dutch river deltas.8 The “voice of the water”, with its “eternal calamities”, was 
heard again. A Delta Commission was established and its members quickly decided 
to close all sea entries. The Delta Works were developed to address the fact that the 
southwest of the country, where Scheldt, Meuse and Rhine enter the North Sea, was 
still dangerously exposed to uncontrollable, maritime nature. The Delta Act was 
passed in 1958, with almost unanimous support. The Delta Works were to reduce 
the chances of a future flood disaster to virtually zero. Other, more or less similar 
projects were executed as well. In 1969, for example, a unique ecosystem called 
Lauwers Zee was closed by a concrete dike, some 13 km long.
Gradually, however, the dramatic ecological consequences of this uncompro-
mising hydrotechnical agenda became increasingly clear. The public image of the 
engineer began to change. In the years following 1953 he had been a hero of safety, 
but in the 1970s he became something of an ecological threat. The Delta Plan 
implied that unique and complicated ecosystems would be destroyed as tidal activ-
ity and the regular inflow of saline water (as well as marine organisms) would come 
to a halt (Nienhuis and Smaal 1994). One by one, they were to be transformed into 
stagnant lakes, most of them filling up with polluted river water. Initially, the eco-
logical aspects did not receive much attention, as water policies were primarily 
directed towards the final realization of the old aquaphobic dream of establishing a 
8 Nowadays, the claim that this flooding should be regarded as a “natural disaster” is highly dis-
puted. On closer inspection, it was a disaster that resulted from the failure of authorities to take 
proper action, before and during the event. We live in a world where disasters are at least as much 
the result of policy decisions as they are “natural”.
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permanent demarcation between land and water, fresh and saline water, tidal and 
non-tidal systems. Hydrotechnical policies had but one unequivocal objective, 
namely safety, and initially they met with unanimous support. During the 1960s 
and early 1970s, however, the environmentalist movement made the public more 
aware of the need to protect these unique tidal habitats. Ecology became an issue 
and the ecosystems involved began to be closely monitored.
This called for a “new” Jac. P. Thijsse and he was found in the person the Dutch 
ecologist Victor Westhoff who, in 1970, published a highly influential, three-volume 
encyclopaedia of Dutch landscapes entitled Wilde Planten: Flora en Vegetatie in 
onze Natuurgebieden (“Wild Plants: Flora and Vegetation in our Natural Areas”). 
These impressive volumes were based on scientific research and expertise, but writ-
ten in an accessible style and illustrated with beautiful pictures. Not surprisingly, 
they were published by the Nederlandse Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten, 
the Dutch Society for the Preservation of Natural Monuments that had been 
established by Thijsse in 1905. The authors explicitly wanted to work along the 
lines Thijsse had set out (Westhoff et al. 1971, p. 6). Knowledge of plant forms was 
necessary to improve our understanding of natural landscapes. This new way of 
looking at nature, as a follow-up of the romantic tradition, quickly gained ground 
and incited a more critical stance towards the Delta Project.
Because of this, a considerable number of corrections drastically changed the 
original Delta Plan. Notably, in 1974, the Dutch government decided to alter its 
plans for the most ambitious of all projects, the Easter Scheldt Dam. The original 
design was replaced by a complex and hydrotechnologically unique compromise: a 
storm surge barrier that allowed tidal movements to enter the estuary freely, but 
guaranteed safety whenever a storm flood threatened the area. This massive con-
crete construction became a new landscape icon, a materialization of moral criti-
cism directed towards the values and decisions of previous generations. It became 
a model project, as similar plans, costly but eco-friendly, were developed for other 
parts of the Delta area. One by one the stagnant lakes are now again transformed 
into tidal, dynamic systems. The Veerse Meer for example was closed by two dams 
in 1960 and 1961. Water quality rapidly deteriorated, notably because of eutrophi-
cation, and mass extinction of its fauna was the inevitable consequence. Recently, 
however, a twenty million Euro plan has been accepted to revitalize the system by 
creating a connection with the tidal Easter Scheldt.
Towards the end of the millennium, a reliable frontier of dikes, dunes and dams 
extended from the Swin inlet in the southwest of the Netherlands to the Dollard in 
the northeast, fencing off immense areas of reclaimed land. Natural defences 
(beaches and dunes) existed side by side with high hydrotech. Rivers travelled 
down constricted beds and man-made channels. Only in marginal areas, patches of 
wetland and coastal leftovers could still be seen. Notably in the Wadden Sea, small 
islands and sandbanks were still allowed to disappear and resurge, and coastlines 
were still allowed to migrate. Even “natural” landscape fragments such as dunes 
and wetlands, however, depended on human interventions and modifications for 
their survival. A history of two millennia, starting with terp building in the time of 
Wotan and Pliny and finally resulting in the Easter Scheldt Dam in the 1970s, 
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seemed to have come to an end. The Dutch landscape seemed to be “finished” more 
or less. In recent years, however, an unexpected reversal has set in. There is a 
strong desire, even among policymakers, to allow a more natural landscape to re-
emerge once again. What is happening?
7.9 Down with the Dikes
Indeed, in recent decades, a dramatic reversal has set in. Freud’s famous maxim, so 
it seems, has been rephrased: “Wo Ich war, soll Es werden”. Instead of planning 
still higher and safer dams and dikes, a new generation of engineers is aware of the 
need for collaboration with nature, to preserve wetlands, to make room for water 
and even to breach some of the dikes (Sellers 2001). Instead of regarding water as 
an adversary, the new engineers agree that wetland areas have to be restored, not 
for ecological reasons only, but also because they can absorb huge quantities of 
excess water in times of crisis.
From the Middle Ages until the middle of the twentieth century, the Dutch have 
worked hard to replace the diffuse, natural wetlands that still existed during the 
early medieval period by a highly compartmentalized geography. Now, all of a sud-
den, the Wadden Sea and other wetland and coastal areas have become issues of 
public interest, not because new reclamation projects are being planned, but rather 
because a strong plea is made in favour of their conservation and rehabilitation. 
Dramatic events such as the death of 14,000 seals in coastal waters in 1988 added 
to environmental awareness. The beautiful, picturesque, agricultural landscape that 
had gradually been created in the course of history, with its farms, green meadows, 
canals and dikes, its colourful flowers and grass form vegetations, is challenged by 
a significant change on the level of aesthetic appreciation: a rehabilitation of the 
diffuse, desolate nature as depicted by Mauve and others. Wotan instead of Christ? 
Not only have the ecological drawbacks of hydrotechnical policies become appar-
ent, even nature itself seemed to protest when in the mid-1990s the huge rivers that 
transect the Netherlands suddenly started to flood their banks again, as if they 
refused to accept their straightjackets any longer. A policy was initiated to create 
natural buffer zones alongside the river beds, as they had existed before the onset 
of intensive human interventions, that could temporarily absorb the surplus of water 
during exceptionally wet seasons.
It all started with an accident. When the last of the polders that had been created 
in the former Zuydersee was drained, a marshy landscape began to evolve in the 
lowest area, earmarked for industry. Before the planned industrial park could be 
built, planners were faced with something unexpected: nature. The area involved, 
called the Oostvaardersplassen, soon developed into a perfect habitat for plant forms 
and migratory birds associated with a more natural landscape. But instead of correct-
ing their negligence, the planners made a remarkable decision. The Oostvaardersplassen 
were to be given back to nature. The area was to be recognized officially as a natural 
reserve, as a model even for future restoration projects (Vera 2000; Wigbels 2000).
7.9 Down with the Dikes 171
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
172 7 Aquaphobia, Tulipmania, Biophilia: A Moral Geography of the Dutch Landscape
Indeed, this new attitude would give rise to a series of plans for introducing and 
developing “new nature”. This ideological reversal has become a prominent factor 
in Dutch water policies of today. Rivers are allowed more space, polders are inun-
dated and at certain places even the sea is allowed in again. In 1997, a groove (kerf 
in Dutch) was made in a dune area near the town of Schoorl, called the Parnassia-
Valley, in order to allow a more natural, more dynamic coastal landscape to develop, 
where wind and water are allowed to reign. Every now and then, during high tide, 
the sea may enter the tidal inlet, so that drifting, calcareous sands may change the 
properties of the soil, allowing unique forms of vegetation, typical for dynamic dune 
systems, to reappear and flourish. The ecological value of these border-line ecosys-
tems is now emphatically recognized and it is perhaps a telling coincidence that the 
valley where the Kerf is situated is named after the Parnassia flower (Parnassia 
Palustis, Grass of Parnassus), “one of our most beautiful wild flowers”, according to 
the famous Dutch ecologist Victor Westhoff mentioned above (1970/1972, p. 301). 
It is a pioneer species found in wet dune valleys and flourishing in this type of soil. 
By creating a dynamic dune landscape, the conditions are realized that will allow 
this and other precious flowers to return. The Parnassia therefore functions as a 
symbol or icon of a particular type of landscape, more natural and diffuse, more fluid 
and dynamical than the classical, compartmentalized and consolidated coast line. 
The Parnassia has emerged as the anti-tulip, so to speak. Aquaphobia gave way to 
“biophilia”, not as a genetically based human propensity to affiliate with nature 
(Kellert and Wilson 1993; Kahn 1999), but rather as a recent chapter in the history 
of the way we interact with our coastal and wetland environment.
And this is not a temporary craze. Rather, these developments seem to convey a 
sense of moral criticism directed towards previous generations, much less suscep-
tible to the values of dynamic coastal and wetland nature. The dream of former 
generations, namely a completely sealed off and standardized landscape, is rejected 
by the water managers of today. A new chapter in the history of water management 
is being written in the Netherlands. As I said: the dictum Where Id (bogs, fens and 
other swampy places) was, ego (arable land) should become is reversed as aquapho-
bia gives way to biophilia. Patches of arable land are transformed into wetlands, 
mud flats and salt marshes. The focus is on the rehabilitation of coastal and wetland 
nature. Still, the precondition for appreciating new nature is a sense of safety and 
therefore, as Thijsse already noted, the irony is that the engineers of the past have 
made the present predilection for a more natural landscape possible. New nature is 
a new synthesis of júsiV and técnh. The Dutch landscape of the future will be a 
hybrid landscape, at combination of diffuse, dynamic nature (“oernatuur”) on the 
one hand and urban expansion at the other, at the expense of agricultural nature 
(“boerennatuur”). There will, however, remain loci of conflict. The Naardermeer, 
for example, is under pressure once again because of plans to alleviate Amsterdam’s 
pressing traffic problems by building a new highway right beside it.
The objective to create “new nature” is, of course, a paradoxical one. Pliny’s 
Totaleindruck (Humboldt) of the Netherlands as a fluid, bleak and anonymous 
landscape without a face, and with no particular plant form to represent it, can never 
return unchanged. After centuries of intensive cultivation, the original vegetation of 
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the Netherlands has been almost completely destroyed (Arts 1990). The character-
istic continuum between fens and bogs, for example, has now almost entirely van-
ished (Lamers 2001, p. 75). Due to processes like desiccation, habitat fragmentation, 
pollution, eutrophication, alkanisation and acidification, the biochemical and eco-
logical conditions indispensable for the development of natural wetland ecosystems 
have been irreversibly affected. This excludes the possibility of restoring the natural 
situation in a truly “pristine” state. Rather, “semi-natural states” are regarded as a 
reference situation for wetland restoration (Brouwer 2001). Furthermore, restora-
tion is only possible within a strict hydrological and biochemical framework. New 
nature, in other words, will be the outcome of drastic and scientifically informed 
human interventions. Careful experiments are conducted to monitor restoration 
efforts as closely as possible. By modifying the biochemical and hydrological con-
ditions, it is hoped that the desired semi-natural ecosystems will recover. Certain 
plant species (like the Parnassia) play a significant role in this process. They func-
tion as target species or bio-indicators. Their incidence is regarded as a standard by 
means of which the effectiveness of restoration policies can be measured. The pro-
duction of new nature is structured more or less like an experimental design. 
Biochemical and hydrological conditions are established and varied by scientists 
(or scientifically informed water managers) with the purpose of causing certain 
ecological effects, or testing the effectiveness of certain strategies. The conditions 
(the x-axis so to speak) are defined in chemical or physical terms, that is, in terms 






3−, etc. By modifying the chemical composi-
tion of the water, and by maintaining a strict water level regime, certain target spe-
cies or bio-indicators (representing the y-axis so to speak) are “invited”, so to speak, 
to take possession of their newly reconstructed, semi-natural habitats. New nature 
is, in other words, a dialogue between the scientist (who modifies the conditions in 
a systematic and evidence-based manner) and nature, acting as natura naturans, 
bringing forth the desired plant forms (the natura naturata), not completely on its 
own accord, but in response to human interventions. Scientists (ecologists, bio-
chemists, and others) try to create favourable conditions in order to allow nature to 
manifest itself in the form of favoured species a return of repressed vegetations. 
Nature is regarded as a collaborating and enhancing factor in the process of land-
scape development. The new semi-natural landscape has become a large-scale 
open-air laboratory and new nature is, quite literally, an experiment.
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Chapter 8
Taming Microbes: Ibsen’s Dr. Stockmann 
as a Contemporary of Pasteur and Koch
8.1 Introduction
Ibsen’s play A Public Enemy is set in a tranquil Norwegian coastal spa and tells the 
story of a doctor who discovers that the Baths, on which the livelihood of the town 
depends, are contaminated because the water conduit system has been too economi-
cally designed.1 A brief summary of the play was already given in Chapter 6. 
Stockmann analyses the bathing and the drinking water, sends samples to university 
experts who have the right equipment at their disposal, and concludes that the local 
bath facilities, about to be visited by health-seekers and tourists, are petrified by 
animalculae or infusoria – living beings that can only be detected with the help of a 
microscope. Convinced that he is about to avert a major public disaster he alerts both 
town officials and journalists (simultaneously). He regards it as his duty to disclose 
his discovery to the authorities, notably his elderly brother, the conservative Mayor, 
who had offered him his present position, but also to the latter’s opponents: the lib-
eral press. Moreover, he regards himself as somewhat more than simply a medical 
officer or local physician. He is repeatedly referred to, both by himself as by others, 
as a “man of science”, and devoted to the cause of scientific enlightenment and 
societal reform. Initially he is praised as a public benefactor who simply wants to 
avoid illness among tourists, but when the public learns that Stockmann’s discovery 
might irreparably damage the town’s reputation while necessary improvements of 
the Baths will greatly affect their income, they turn against him. The necessary 
repairs seem far beyond their means. Stockmann calls a public meeting but is pre-
vented from delivering his speech and getting his message to the villagers due to a 
number of tactical manoeuvers by the more dexterous politicians present. This 
makes him decide to give a philosophical lecture instead, on the intellectual superi-
ority of the elite in comparison to the unenlightened and prejudiced majority of 
mankind. As a result of this snobbish tirade by a “man of science” against popular 
1 A Public Enemy by the Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906) was published and 
performed for the first time in 1882. All references are to the Penguin edition, easily available in 
English (Ibsen 1882/1964).
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opinion, the audience brands him as an enemy of the people, the target of a cordon 
sanitaire – as if he himself is exposed as an infectious agent. They stone his house 
and leave him “revelling in his position as a pariah” (Mehra 2001, p. 2).
One could say that Ibsen’s play analyses the impact of a number of emerging 
technologies on the life-world. In the final decades of the nineteenth century, 
Norway’s coastal zones were made more easily assessable, were being opened up 
for tourism by steam ships (cf. Chapter 10), while public health policies became 
possible because of the dissemination of the microscope as a general research tool 
in the biomedical and life sciences. Moreover, the play assesses the impact of the 
press on politics. As Kierkegaard had argued in Two Ages (1846/1978), because of 
the press, society was no longer in the hands of “men of excellence” (and this is how 
the mayor sees himself ) but rather in the hands of the whimsical “public”, described 
by Kierkegaard as an unreliable artefact, a phantom-like phenomenon called into 
existence by mass media, something politicians could no longer afford to neglect. 
Stockmann’s attitude towards this new phenomenon, “the public”, is rather ambiva-
lent. At first he aspires to become a public hero, but then, all of a sudden, he rather 
depicts the public in terms of a “phantom”, much like Kierkegaard.
Usually, Dr. Stockmann is applauded as a champion of science and enlighten-
ment, who runs into conflict with prejudices, hypocrisy and vested interests. By 
several authors he is presented as the archetypical literary model of a whistle-
blower. Examples of such unequivocal, one-dimensional portrayals can be found in 
the comments on Ibsen’s play by left-wing intellectuals such as Bernard Shaw 
(1891) and Emma Goldmann (1914). According to Shaw, the play is about a an 
honest doctor who insists on exposing the danger that visitors will be infected, and 
therefore has to face fierce opposition from people who are pecuniarily interested 
in concealing the truth. And according to Goldmann, the doctor is a sincere man of 
high ideals, a conscientious physician who has the courage to stand alone, a herald 
of reason who is silenced by force and deprived of his right to free expression by 
conservative forces. Others, however, are more willing to stress the ambiguities of 
Ibsen’s play. They notice for example how Dr. Stockmann’s obsessive and self-
centered character keeps him from understanding how anyone could possibly disa-
gree with his scientific views (Mehra 2001). He is unable to adequately respond to 
or interact with his social environment, unable to cooperate with stakeholders in 
order to find viable solutions for a complicated situation that involves much more 
that lab results alone. By exposing a potentially malignant public health problem, 
he is undoubtedly doing the town a service in the long run, and he certainly has the 
courage to stand fast to his beliefs despite overwhelming criticism, abuse and dis-
ciplinary measures (such as dismissal as medical officer to the Baths). At the same 
time, however, he is “blindly naïve to the implications of his discovery. His slavish 
devotion to objective truth is so uncompromising that he sees his scientific discov-
ery in a self-absorbed vacuum” (Merha, p. 2). He is not only driven by zealous 
dedication, Mehra continues, but also by vanity and a desire to be canonized as a 
kind of public hero. His ideals are virtuous, but his motives partly selfish and nar-
cissistic. And his final pseudo-scientific speech is a disastrous blunder, a desperate 
overstep from the scientific realm (where he is at home) into the philosophico-
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political realm – a move that makes this potentially dangerous antagonist of those 
in power a very easy target. His scientific discovery becomes mired in (contami-
nated by) local politics.
Ibsen himself both criticises and espouses his protagonist’s attitudes and views. 
In letters to Georg Brandes and to his publisher, Ibsen makes it clear that Stockman 
and he have much in common, notably their criticism of both conservative (right-
wing) and liberal (left-wing) politicians, and there is ample evidence that Stockmann 
was (up to a certain extent) a mouthpiece for the playwright himself. But (subtly in 
the beginning and more emphatically towards the end) Stockmann is also portrayed 
as a buffoon-like figure. Indeed, many years later Ibsen insisted that he was cer-
tainly not responsible for all the philosophical nonsense his Dr. Stockmann pro-
claimed (Arpe 1972; Beyer 1978).
I have several reasons for submitting Ibsen’s drama to a more thorough analysis. 
First of all, its key issue, the vicissitudes of a wistleblower, is as up-to-date as ever 
and Ibsen offers his readers a classical case study in which different roles and per-
spectives are fleshed-out in a convincing manner. Moreover, the scandal which 
Dr. Stockmann intends to disclose concerns environmental pollution, caused by 
short-sighted policy decisions, a problem which we are still all too familiar with 
today. With its lively and far-from-outdated style and atmosphere, the play consti-
tutes rewarding material for educational purposes and is very usable in ethics 
courses for science students. But the play is of interest for other reasons as well. 
Underneath the ethical issues involved in disclosing touchy information on hazard-
ous situations to a public-at-risk, epistemological issues are addressed. Ibsen stages 
a dramatic confrontation between the scientific way of seeing and understanding 
the world and common sense. Moreover, a very discrete and particular form of sci-
ence is represented in Ibsen’s drama. Dr. Stockmann’s discovery of microscopic 
carriers of infectious diseases in the bathing and drinking water of a Norwegian spa 
does not stand on its own. He is a contemporary of Louis Pasteur in France and 
Robert Koch in Germany.2 His research and public performance bears close affinity 
to contemporary events in the realm of “real” science. The decade between 1879 
and 1889 is generally regarded as the “Golden Era” of (medical) bacteriology and 
microbiology (Davis et al. 1973, p. 9). In 1882, the very year when A Public Enemy 
was published and performed, Robert Koch published his famous paper on the 
aetiology of tuberculosis. Subsequently, he and Pasteur (who in 1881 had devel-
oped his anthrax vaccine) went to Egypt to hunt the microbes that cause cholera. 
Moreover, very much like Stockmann, Pasteur and Koch not only had to deal with 
the scientific and technical difficulties involved in microbe research, but also with 
the problem of how to communicate their findings to journalists, official authorities 
and public audiences. Stockmann’s performance, both as a researcher and as a 
2 In Ibsen’s play Doctor Stockmann is presented as being in his mid-life years, around the age of 
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 public figure, reflects (in a compact and concise form) the opportunities and obsta-
cles, the failures and successes that were also experienced by real “microbe hunters”. 
In other words, Ibsen’s play constitutes an exercise in comparative epistemology.
What can we learn from Ibsen’s play, not only with regard to science communi-
cation and professional ethics, but notably in the context of comparative epistemol-
ogy? What philosophical message does it convey? To answer this question, the play 
will be analyzed in three successive steps. First of all, the focus will be on the clash 
between science on the one hand and its social and cultural environment on the 
other, between the scientific worldview and the common sense (or life-world) view. 
Subsequently, attention will shift to the ethical and political dimension of the play. 
In this section I will read Ibsen’s text as an effort to show what may happen to more 
or less “simple” scientific facts regarding environmental pollution when they enter 
the complex and turbulent social world of interests and values (either moral or eco-
nomic). I will monitor Dr. Stockmann in his role as a relentless whistleblower who 
unfortunately lacks the social sensitivity and strategic instincts needed to confront 
his adversaries successfully, but who suffers a fate that is at times uncannily similar 
to that of those who nowadays find themselves in similar positions. Finally, I will 
take a comparative epistemological approach. I will describe in more detail the 
similarities between Stockmann’s and his scientific contemporaries Pasteur and 
Koch, not only in terms of their scientific performance, but also in terms of 
the societal import of their scientific discoveries. This will allow me to reflect on 
the affinity between literary and scientific “microbe hunters” as counterparts. What 
can we learn from Ibsen’s play concerning science, and what can we learn from 
researchers like Pasteur and Koch to further our understanding of Ibsen’s play?
8.2 Stockmann as a Man of Science
As was indicated above, Dr. Stockmann regards himself as somewhat more than 
merely a country doctor. Not only is he repeatedly referred to as a man of science, 
but he is also a prolific contributor to a liberal (left-wing) local newspaper. In this 
manner, he became rather notorious for his radical and non-conformist political 
ideas. Before accepting his present position as medical officer of the Baths, he 
worked as a physician somewhere in a remote and sparsely inhabited part of 
Norway (“up north”) under difficult financial and climatic circumstances. In his 
imagination, he developed grand schemes for making a lasting contribution to the 
cultural and political transformation of his country in general, and of his home town 
in particular, by means of scientific discoveries. And now it seems he finally made 
such a discovery. At the same time, he is represented as rather naïve, self-indulgent 
and as lacking practicality.
Ibsen published his play at a time when the typical literary profile of the physi-
cian had changed. For centuries, in the writings of Molière and others, physicians 
had been staged persistently as buffoons who cared more for grand, obsolete theo-
ries and academic disputes than for the well-being of their patients. Their sole 
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expertise seemed to consist (according to one of Molière’s characters) in translating 
into scholarly Latin what everybody else already knew, namely that the patient was 
ill. In the nineteenth century novel, however, the physician came to play a much 
more serious role, observing and discerning facts and details that went unnoticed 
by others. In Ibsen’s drama, we are faced with a serio-comic mixture of these liter-
ary stereotypes. On the one hand, the play shares some similarities with the “doctor 
novel” through whose eyes a somewhat backward community is (both literally and 
figuratively) enlightened. But he is also a buffoon, with a somewhat pedantic dic-
tion and a greater interest in theory than in real life.
The play can be read, to some extent, as a literary experiment – in Zola’s sense, 
with Stockmann (and, indirectly, Ibsen) as its conductor. What happens if lay audi-
ences are exposed to an important but distressing scientific truth? Will they respond 
the way Plato in his famous simile of the cave had already predicted, namely by 
rejecting the truth and by ridiculing or even killing the messenger? Normally we 
see but shadows on the wall. In order to discern the truth, we must learn to see 
things scientifically, that is – with the help of scientific apparatus – and formulate 
our truth claims in scientific language.
In ACT I, at the beginning of the play, Stockmann is eagerly awaiting a letter 
from the university. When the document finally arrives, he knows that he is on the 
right track. His hypothesis is confirmed by the experts. The letter shows, he 
exclaims, that we think we know everything, while in fact we are completely blind. 
Stockmann, the man of science, has managed to labour himself out of Plato’s cave, 
so to speak, and now he tells his fellow human beings what he saw out there, a 
message they do not like to hear. Because the town officials (for financial reasons) 
refused to construct the conduits in accordance with Stockmann’s original direc-
tions, the waters are polluted by decaying organic material. Strange cases of illness 
among visitors gave him the idea that something was wrong, but he wanted to have 
“absolute proof ”. He meticulously prepared samples and dutifully sent them to the 
University for a full analysis:
I’ve made the most careful investigations.… I started to analyse the water.… I hadn’t the 
necessary scientific equipment here, so I sent samples of both our drinking water and the 
sea water to the University for a complete analysis by an expert. (p. 122)
In other words, he obtained a “second opinion” from an expert. And this gave him 
certainty. Millions of animalculae or infusoria are present in the water. “Used 
either internally or externally” (a translation into scientific language of the verbs 
“to drink” and “to swim”), this water is a positive menace to health.
Let us reflect for a moment on the scientific (or quasi-scientific) terminology that 
is being used here. Animalculae (or animalcules) was the word for microbes or micro-
organisms that Anthony van Leeuwenhoek from Delft had originally used in the letters 
he sent to the Royal Society of London – the Anfang of microbiology (Dobell 1932). 
In 1683 he had for the first time observed “little animals” in drops of rainwater through 
one of his home-made microscopes. Animalculae was, of course, a rather vague gen-
eral term encompassing all sorts of microscopic organisms. Most of Van Leeuwenhoek’s 
little animals would be called bacteria nowadays (although in current literature experts 
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reject even this term as unsatisfactory), but he also used it to refer to protozoa (which 
he discovered in canal water) and spermatozoa. Infusoria is also used in a rather vague 
and obsolete way in Ibsen’s play. Originally it applied to all microscopic organisms 
found in water. The term came from the practice of infusing substances such as hay 
into liquids. Later, “infusoria” was used to specifically refer to ciliated protozoa, but 
nowadays, like animalculae, it is no longer in use in the academic literature.
Contemporaries of Stockmann, such as Pasteur and Koch, did not use terms like 
“animalculae” any more. They wrote about bacteria, bacilli (rod-shaped bacteria), 
and the like. Professor Ferdinand Cohn from Breslau, Robert Koch’s mentor at the 
time of his first discoveries, was an expert on bacteria and he had stated that bacte-
ria are minuscule plants rather than little “animals”. In France, lexicologist Emile 
Littré had coined the word microbe in 1878 as an alternative for animalculae (Debré 
1994/1998). Around 1880 a new scientific language was emerging and the word 
microbe began to make “its way around the world” (Debré, p. 364). Thus, in 1882, 
Ibsen used a scientific idiom that was outdated from a scientific point of view. In 
the 1880s not only the original terminology (dating from the seventeenth century) 
had become obsolete, but scientists were also far beyond the sense of horror still 
experienced by Van Leeuwenhoek’s contemporaries when they realized for the 
first time the presence of little animals in, for example, their oral cavity. The sur-
vival of outdated scientific jargon outside academic circles is a very common phe-
nomenon of course. While scientists continuously update their research practices 
and terminology, the vocabularies and experiences of previous generations of 
scientists (once they have managed to spread through the public realm) tend to per-
sist among the public at large for quite some time. In 1882, more sophisticated 
terms like bacteria and bacilli had not yet permeated public consciousness and its 
idioms – while terms like prokaryotes and eukaryotes had not yet been invented.
In the 1880s, the omnipresence of micro-organisms was still a novelty the gen-
eral public had to get used to. The presence of microbes in the environment was not 
a fact that outsiders were very familiar with. On the contrary, evidence concerning 
the existence and omnipresence of microscopic living beings caused uneasiness, at 
times even panic among lay audiences. One of the reasons was that after the days 
of Van Leeuwenhoek and Hooke the interest in microbiology had declined. For 
many decades only a few persons had studied bacteria (Carpenter 1972, p. 28). 
Although the dispute over spontaneous generation of micro-organisms (involving 
Spallanzani, Needham and others) caused a temporary revival, Linnaeus exempli-
fied the general lack of interest among naturalists when he assigned microbes to the 
class “Chaos”. When Louis Pasteur made his first discoveries, interest in and 
awareness of the importance of microbes had more or less come to a stand still. 
Microbes were virtually forgotten, even by the scientists themselves, until Pasteur 
and Koch rediscovered their existence. It took the “crusading spirit of Pasteur, his 
zeal and skill as a polemicist, to drag the microbes out of the obscurity into which 
they had passed once more after Spallanzani died” (De Kruif 1927, p. 79). He 
brought them back to life again, so to speak. By the time Ibsen published his play, 
microbes were “in the air” again and news about research by visible scientists like 
Pasteur and Koch made the newspaper headlines. Pasteur and Koch initiated 
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successful research programs to find the causes of various infectious diseases. But 
Ibsen’s play suggests that this information had not reached everyone in Norway yet. 
Local sceptics did not believe a word of it and regarded it as a cynical joke. They 
thought that Stockmann used these little animals (that no one could see) on order 
to play a trick on his powerful but scientifically illiterate brother:
KIIL: I never thought you had it in you to play monkey tricks against your 
own brother.
DR STOCKMANN: Monkey tricks?
KILL: What was it? Some animals that had got into the water pipes?
DR STOCKMANN: Animalculae, yes. Infusoria.… Hundreds of thousands perhaps.
KILL: But no one can see them! Wasn’t that it? Damn, if that isn’t the best 
thing I have heard from you yet! (p. 128)
Not only the objects of Stockmann’s research (i.e. the microbes) are looked upon as 
something odd and strange, also the figure of the scientist as such is something the 
village people find difficult to comprehend. This notably applies to the scientific 
ethos, the ideal of disinterested research, for the sake of truth and human well-being 
alone. From the very onset until the very end, bystanders keep suspecting Stockmann 
of having personal or financial motives for acting as he does, such as a wish to take 
his revenge on his hated brother, or simply a desire to achieve a rise in salary. In the 
end, when Stockmann’s shrewd father-in-law goes around the town buying up deval-
ued shares in the Baths, most bystanders are convinced that a prospect of financial 
gain was behind it all from the very beginning. The disinterested scientist simply did 
not seem to have a place yet among the stock of Norwegian characters.
Hovstad, the radical editor of the local left-wing newspaper, is driven by politi-
cal motives, rather than by an interest in science, which he regards as instrumental. 
He immediately discerns the political significance of Stockmann’s discovery.
HOVSTAD:  To you, as a doctor and a man of science, this affair of the water supply 
seems to stand on its own – I mean, you haven’t realized that a good many 
other things are involved.… [But to me] it seems that a journalist incurs a 
heavy responsibility if he fails to seize any favourable opportunity of eman-
cipating the humble, down-trodden Masses!
As soon as he presents his findings either to the (right-wing) municipal authorities 
or to the (left-wing) journalists, Stockmann’s touchy data enter a complicated 
political arena. His facts are no longer simple, clear and neutral (as he himself tends 
to see them). On the contrary, they quickly find their place in political schemes and 
agendas. Water pollution changes from a scientific observation into a political met-
aphor. From a left-wing perspective, society as such becomes a polluted swamp that 
needs to be cleansed. From a right-wing perspective, Stockmann is an educated 
hooligan who misuses his data and scientific prestige to satisfy his desire for anar-
chy and turmoil. But even Stockmann himself soon “contaminates” his scientific 
data by connecting it with political intentions.
As a man of science, Stockmann finds it difficult (if not impossible) to subordi-
nate himself to the authorities. He sees it as his duty towards truth and humanity to 
make his discoveries widely known. Indeed, he emphatically refers to his findings 
as a great discovery, something like a major scientific breakthrough – I have found 
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it, Eureka! And he talks about his four-page manuscript as if it is a masterpiece of 
scholarly writing. Why did he keep it all so secret? Because, as a man of science, 
he had wanted to be absolutely sure. And now “the public” should hear about it as 
soon as possible. When it comes to apprehending the impact his news is likely to 
have, Stockmann plays the role of unworldly scientist:
DR STOCKMANN:  And if the board [of directors of the Baths] should happen to raise 
my salary, I won’t accept it. Oh, it’s wonderful for a man to feel 
that he’s done a service to his fellow citizens. (p. 125)
Before long, however, the doctor is made to understand that on the political level a 
“self-evident” scientific fact can easily become the object of a fierce dispute, of a 
struggle between interpretations, as different stakeholders are likely to read scien-
tific findings from different perspectives.
8.3 Stockmann as a Whistleblower
Dr. Stockmann has dutifully submitted his four-page report to his brother, the 
Mayor, but also chairman of the board of directors of the Baths. At the beginning 
of Act II the doctor is eagerly awaiting his response. Meanwhile, however, he has 
informed his family members and the press as well. Thus, the news immediately 
starts to leak and seep into the community. In his enthusiasm about his grand dis-
covery, Stockmann neglects the discreteness and confidentiality which no doubt 
should have been observed by him at this stage. The societal import seems so obvi-
ous to him that procedural discretion and constraints can hardly be relevant. In the 
context of whistle blowing, this course of action (reporting and exposing hazardous 
situations to different audiences at the same time) is known as the “shotgun approach”. 
Although it increases the likelihood that corrective action will be taken, the whistle 
blower may well be accused of having failed to use the proper reporting channels 
(Miethe 1999, p. 218).
All the audiences he addresses respond in their own peculiar manner. His family 
members, to begin with, support Stockmann’s views and strengthen him in his con-
viction that the course of action he has taken is for the benefit of mankind. 
Apparently they are accustomed to act in this vein, for Stockmann easily feels 
offended when he is being criticized in his own house. It happens more often, of 
course, that personalities who stand up against authorities in public life, act in a 
somewhat despotic manner themselves within the confines of their own private life 
– like Proudhon, for instance.
Hovstad, representing the media, has his own agenda. In his eyes, the findings 
should be exploited politically right away, at the expense of “the bureaucrats that 
rule us”. He insists that the myth of their infallibility must be exploded once and 
for all. The mayor’s gross and inexcusable blunder must be brought home to every 
voter in the place. Hovstad’s professional and political ethos forbids him not to 
exploit Stockmann’s information in a political manner. Together with Aslaksen, the 
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more moderate and elderly printer, the young and radical editor offers his political 
assistance, advice and support to Stockmann, but the latter kindly declines:
Dr STOCKMANN: I really can’t believe that all these precautions are necessary: it seems to me 
that the thing would go ahead on its own momentum. (p. 135)
Should the authorities refuse to undertake the necessary changes, however, he gen-
erously grants Hovstad and Aslaksen the favour of publishing his report, on the 
condition that they handle it as if it was “written in gold”. The published version 
must contain no typos or printing errors. This means that Stockmann regards it as 
something more than just a newspaper article.
Finally, the mayor himself pays the doctor a visit. The formal way in which he 
addresses him makes it clear right away what course he has decided to take:
THE MAYOR: Last night after office hours, I received a communication from you con-
cerning the condition of the water at the Baths.… Was it necessary to carry 
out all these inquiries behind my back?
DR STOCKMANN: Well, until I had absolute proof, I –
THE MAYOR: Is it your intention to submit this document to the Directorate of the Baths 
as some sort of official report?
DR STOCKMANN: Of course. Something must be done about the state of affairs – and quickly, 
too.
THE MAYOR: As usual, you make use of some very strong expressions in your report. 
You say, among other things, that what we offer to our visitors at the Baths 
is consistently poisonous.
DR STOCKMANN: What else can you call it? Just think – water that’s poisonous to drink and 
to bathe in?
THE MAYOR: And so you arrive at the conclusion that we must build a sewer to carry off 
the alleged impurities.… Etc. (p. 138)
Dr. Stockmann pretends to have written a scientific report, leading from hypothesis 
to observations and from analysis to conclusions. One gets the impression, how-
ever, that his style is not as scientific and restrained as ought to be expected. He not 
only expresses himself in vehement terms at times, but uses a very large number of 
exclamation marks (and insists that they are to be maintained in the printed ver-
sion). Perhaps he should also have been more careful in leaping from observations 
to “measures to be taken”. However, as the adjustments he proposes are “exorbi-
tantly” costly, they are out of the question as far as the Mayor is concerned (who 
consulted the town’s engineer on this matter). And he summarizes his conclusion 
in a beautiful bureaucratic phrase:
THE MAYOR: I have not been able to convince myself, from your report, that the condition of 
the water at the Baths is as serious as you present. (p. 140)
To Stockmann’s astonishment, the facts he reported apparently leave room for 
interpretation, for political hermeneutics. For the Mayor, the question now simply 
is: how do I silence the medical officer or – should that prove impossible – how do 
I eliminate him? In any event, the report must be withheld. The matter is to be dealt 
with “discretely” (p. 141). Upon being told that Stockmann already informed the 
press, he insists that Stockmann agrees to sign a proclamation to contradict his own 
findings:
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THE MAYOR: You have been so indiscreet as to chatter to outsiders about this delicate matter, 
which should have been treated as an official secret.… It will be necessary for 
you to contradict such rumours, publicly.… We expect that, after further investi-
gations, you will come to the conclusion that matters are not nearly so seriously 
or so urgent as you had imagined at first sight.… You will publicly proclaim 
your confidence in the Board of Governors and in the thorough and conscien-
tious steps which they will take to remedy any possible shortcomings. (p. 144)
Moreover, he denies his brother the right to form, let alone to disseminate, personal 
opinions on the matter. Of course he has freedom to speak, but only as long as it 
does not concern the Baths, since his senior director forbids it. According to the 
mayor, Stockmann’s say is limited to ascertaining the scientific data as such. When 
it comes to pointing out their significance, or proposing measures and policies, 
town officials are better equipped:
DR STOCKMANN:  This is too much! I’m a doctor – a man of science …
THE MAYOR:  The point at issue is not a purely scientific one; it is a complex question, 
with both technical and economic aspects. (p. 144)
Stockmann refuses to give in, of course, but the Mayor quickly alters the terms of 
the debate. Instead of discussing the facts as presented to him, he decides to focus 
on the author of the report. He resorts to ad hominem arguments in order to dis-
credit him (describing the doctor as a quarrelsome, turbulent, intractable person 
whom it is impossible to work with) but soon he threatens him with instant dis-
missal. Stockmann, convinced that his political friends will back him up, decides 
to allow the press to publish his paper.
Act III, therefore, takes us to the editor’s office. Here, revolution seems about to 
break out, until the Mayor is allowed to display his tactical dexterity and political 
intelligence. What happens? Initially, Stockmann’s discovery seems to fit in extremely 
well with stereotypical political fantasies of Hovstad and his colleagues to get rid 
of “those in power” – a scenario that inevitably culminates in a beheading (“heads 
will fall”). Stockmann imagines himself as the leader of a popular uprising against 
the stodgy forces of aristocracy. The manuscript, apparently a pamphlet rather than 
a sober report, is to be printed (“Don’t cut out any of the exclamation marks!”, p. 155), 
but this will only be the beginning. Although Stockmann pretends to have written 
a formal report, to be submitted to the board of directors, it now becomes quite clear 
that he actually produced a text that belongs to a somewhat different genre and 
addresses a much broader audience:
Dr STOCKMANN: Well, Mr Hovstad, what do you think of my article?
HOVSTAD: I think it’s an absolute masterpiece.
Dr STOCKMANN: It is, isn’t it? I’m delighted you should think so – delighted.
HOVSTAD: It’s clear and to the point – no need to be an expert to follow it. Take my 
word for it, you’ll have every thinking man on your side. (p. 153)
He has written his report in such a way that it can appear in the newspaper just as it is, 
without any editorial adjustments. He has taken care not to write formally or expertly, 
but in an accessible manner. The more easily will it achieve political significance. The 
doctor will use the newspaper as his headquarters from now on and he will bombard 
those in power with one explosive article after another. The whole community will be 
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cleaned and disinfected. The lower classes will take control of all the important posts, 
and a Revolution will be staged in the name of science and conscience:
DR STOCKMANN: Such endless vistas have opened out before me today. I haven’t got it quite 
clear yet, but I’ll soon put that right. (p. 154)
After Stockmann’s departure, however, it is the Mayor’s turn to pay a visit to the 
editor’s office. He arrives with his hat and staff, the symbols of his official status, 
but uses the back door so that his unusual visit will pass unnoticed. He does not 
need as many words as his brother to explain his position, and he expresses himself 
in courteous, formal language. When he indicates the kind of money the Norwegian 
village will have to raise in order to cover the expenses, his left-wing interlocutors 
agree that Stockmann’s data suddenly appear “in a different light” (162). The mayor 
himself has prepared “a short statement” on the situation as it would appear “from 
a more reasonable point of view” and Hovstad and Aslaksen agree to print it. Then 
all of a sudden the doctor reappears. He cannot wait to have a glance at the proofs 
of his article, and he wants to discuss with Hovstad and Aslaksen what he should 
do if the village people should decide to organize a torchlight procession in his 
honour. The Mayor is forced to take cover, but forgets to take his hat and staff with 
him, and when Stockmann notices them, he forces his brother to come out from his 
hiding place. Stockmann makes fun of him, puts on his official hat (“the pinnacle 
of authority”!), and in a playful manner dismisses him from his post, until it suddenly 
dawns on him that the situation has changed drastically. It will be his brother’s 
statement, not his own article, that will appear in tomorrow’s newspaper. Aslaksen 
even refuses to print it as a pamphlet at the Doctor’s own expense. Finally, cut off 
from these channels of dissemination, Stockmann decides to organize a meeting in 
order to read his paper to the public.
In ACT IV, the meeting takes place and villagers “from all walks of life” have 
convened to listen to Stockmann’s speech, but the politicians (The Mayor, Hovstad 
and Aslaksen), relying on a series of procedural tricks, manage to prevent 
Stockmann from presenting his paper. At a certain point, he decides to give a 
speech on another important discovery of his – or rather, a revelation – something 
that had been on his mind for quite some time. His great discovery is that the true 
obstacle to progress and enlightenment is the stupidity of the uneducated masses, 
the mob, common man. “Now you know”! It is a lie to say, as democrats do, that 
the majority is always right. The minority is right, the intellectual elite, those who 
stand at the outposts, far in advance of others:
DR STOCKMANN: As a general rule, an ordinary … truth lives – let’s say – seventeen or 
eighteen years … twenty at the outside. Rarely longer. But … it isn’t till 
then that the majority takes them up and recommends them to society as 
wholesome spiritual food. There isn’t much nourishment in that sort of 
diet, I can assure you – and I’m speaking as a doctor. (p. 186)
This is the proposition that he intends to prove to his audience “scientifically”. He 
does so by explaining that the relationship between common people and men of 
science can be compared to that between ordinary mongrels and poodle’s of 
 pedigree stock.
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Think of an ordinary, plebeian mongrel.… Then put that mongrel beside a poodle with a 
pedigree going back through generations of famous ancestors – who’s been properly 
reared, and brought up among soft voices and music. D’you really think the poodle’s brain 
won’t have developed quite differently from the mongrel’s? [They can be trained] to do 
things that an ordinary mongrel could never learn. (p. 189)
He accuses his public of agreeing with him when it comes to dogs, but not daring 
to apply this train of thought to humans, thereby following the idea to its logical 
conclusion. And he ends by attributing the intellectual depravity of common people 
to shortage of oxygen in ordinary houses.
In ACT V, Stockmann has been dismissed, and the same has happened to his 
daughter, a teacher. His window panes are broken and his sarcastic father-in-law 
remarks that now at least he has enough oxygen in his house. By buying up huge 
amounts of inexpensive shares in the Baths, the latter makes Stockmann’s project 
seem like a concerted plan. Apparently, it was the Doctor’s secret design to create 
confusion on order to take over the Baths. Indeed, it is the villagers’ guess that his 
scientific expertise will allow him to find some antidote or disinfectant. But 
Stockmann has the final say and announces another great discovery of his: the 
strongest man in the world is he who “stands most alone”.
To a certain extent, the sympathy for Stockmann that is voiced almost unani-
mously in ethical and political comments on Ibsen’s play is justified. Here we have 
a physician who has discovered a serious case of environmental pollution. Public 
health issues are at stake and sanitary measures are to be taken. Unlike the town’s 
engineer, who is consulted by the Mayor and who limits the scope of his attention 
to the technical and economical side of things, Stockmann acutely senses his pro-
fessional responsibility. Furthermore, the mayor’s response is typical for those in 
power who find their position suddenly undermined by a (potential) whistle blower. 
The Mayor tries to cover up the contamination and when his brother refuses to go 
along with his scheme, because of his conviction that such a dishonesty would be 
a crime to society, the Mayor typically resorts to ad hominem arguments and force. 
All this is typical of the whistle-blowing complex too. As a rule, whistleblowers are 
supported (for a certain period of time) by the press, but eventually they are likely 
to lose their job and to find their possessions vandalized (Miethe, p. 220). As an 
employee who reveals dangerous pollution, he soon finds out that his own career is 
at stake. Indeed, Stockmann is a typical whistle blower in his acceptance of the fact 
that (because of his loyalty to lofty goals) his personal life is threatened with disin-
tegration. But, like all true whistleblowers, he seems willing to sacrifice his per-
sonal well-being as well as his social position to his cause. A marital crisis also 
belongs to the aftermath of whistle blowing, but we do not know what will happen 
to Stockmann’s marriage after the event.
We should not close our eyes, however, to a number of mistakes the doctor 
makes. Upon receiving the decisive letter from the university, he immediately 
informs the press. In view of his position and professional ethic he should have 
acted more carefully and discretely. He vehemently takes sides in a conflict 
between two ethical styles: the (old-fashioned) ethics of discretion and the (pro-
gressive) ethics of openness. He sees his brother as his enemy, rather than as a 
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stakeholder whom he has to come to terms with in order to find a viable solution. 
It is as if he experiences great relief at finally discovering a way to injure him. But 
the most important thing is that there is some truth in the mayor’s remark that the 
issue at hand is not a purely scientific one, that it is a complex issue, involving 
technical and economic aspects, besides ethical ones. What the community needs 
is a comprehensive account, addressing and weighing all the relevant aspects. 
There is still some time left to consider carefully what measures are to be taken. In 
other words, Stockmann’s view is one-sided. He leaps from fact to conclusion and 
leaves no room for reflection. Dr. Stockmann is not merely a scientist, moreover. 
He too instrumentalises science. In his view, scientific data are powerful tools in a 
relentless struggle to reform society. A will to power is behind his will to know. 
The facts he discovered become “contaminated” by politics, as we have seen. In 
Stockmann’s eyes, they acquire their true meaning when they are set against the 
backdrop of his ideological vision.
If we follow Sissela Bok (1981) in her assessment of whistle blowing, Stockmann’s 
line of action must be regarded as adequate in some respects, but as inadequate in 
others. According to Bok, whistleblowers should assure themselves of the accuracy 
of their reports, checking and rechecking the facts before they speak out – and this 
is what Stockmann does. He fails, however, to explore and use what she refers to 
as “the existing avenues for change within the organization” (p. 211). Whistle 
blowing, she argues, has to remain a last alternative because of its destructive side 
effects, for the person himself as well as for others; it must be chosen only when 
other alternatives have been considered and rejected. Stockmann, because of his 
eagerness to communicate his findings to the press, fails to observe Bok’s basic 
recommendation to those who find themselves in his position: “Try the regular 
channels first” (p. 211). Moreover, she argues that whistle blowers should be scru-
pulously aware of any motive that might skew their message. The whistleblower’s 
motives ought to be above suspicion. But in Ibsen’s play this is clearly not the case. 
Stockmann is partly driven by personal motives – such as his extreme desire for 
recognition and his feelings (markedly unfriendly) towards his brother. Finally, 
she stresses that whistle blowers should seek advice before going public. But 
Stockmann acts on his own accord, without informing or consulting anybody 
beforehand, and he clearly takes delight in the effect of general astonishment and 
surprise his unexpected message evokes. Yet, this ethical dimension, the one that 
is usually emphasised in comments on the play, is merely one layer. Beneath the 
ethical quandaries of whistle blowing, another type of problem emerges, of an 
epistemological kind.
8.4 Stockmann as a Microbe Hunter
The plot of Ibsen’s play had its origin in a number of actual incidents (Meyer 
1967/1985, p. 523; Watts 1964, p. 13). To begin with, Ibsen had heard a story about 
a medical officer at a spa who, when an outbreak of cholera occurred, felt it his duty 
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to make it known publicly. The season was ruined and therefore his house was 
stoned. And in 1881 a Norwegian chemist had tried to read a paper disclosing 
shortcomings of Steam Kitchens for the poor. He was prevented from speaking and 
forced to withdraw. Moreover, Ibsen had responded with indignation at the recep-
tion of Ghosts, his previous play that caused a scandal because it publicly addressed 
issues like euthanasia and venereal disease, and there are hints that Ibsen trans-
ferred some of his personal anger to Stockmann. More interesting from an episte-
mological point of view, however, is the apparent concurrence of Ibsen’s play with 
crucial events in the history of science. Stockmann is the literary equivalent, the lit-
erary counterpart of outstanding experimentalists and “microbe hunters” (De Kruif 
1927), of champions of hygiene and public health like Pasteur and Koch.
To compare theatre with scientific research is not as far-fetched as it may seem 
at first glance. In comparison to other forms of scholarly activity (such as making 
calculations or reading books), experimentation constitutes a dramatic form of 
research, a dramatic “art” (Crease 1993).3 An experiment is basically a perform-
ance. The emphasis is on doing, on acting, sometimes hidden from view, but often 
before an audience (of students, colleagues or readers). It is a performance moreo-
ver that involves rehearsals, repetitions and practice. Especially experiments with 
human subjects, such as performed by social psychologists for example, can be 
reminiscent of drama in the eyes of those who witness them. But basically the the-
atrical analogy applies to all forms of experimental research (although sometimes 
the performance is actually executed with the help of instruments and equipment 
while the experimenters are more like producers or directors).4 The affinity between 
the literary drama of the playwright and the scientific drama of the experimental 
researcher will be of help when it comes to comparing literary figures like 
Stockmann with real “men of science” like Pasteur and Koch. As I explained in 
Chapter 1, moreover, it is my conviction that contemporary events share a certain 
basic mood or Zeitgeist – that they tend to mirror one another. This means that 
Ibsen’s play may allow us to further our understanding of what goes on in the life 
sciences during the 1880s, while the experiences of the “real” scientists during that 
period may deepen our understanding of what happens to Stockmann on stage. The 
element of drama is what both events (the discovery of animalculae by Stockmann 
and of the tuberculosis bacillus, for instance, by Koch) have in common.
3 Another example of science theatre is, of course, the lecture. As a student, Pasteur was fascinated 
by such a “spectacle”, namely the courses that chemist Jean-Baptiste Dumas gave at the Sorbonne. 
His lectures attracted a considerable audience. In one of his letters Pasteur describes the scene as 
follows: “The lecture hall is huge, and always filled. One has to be there a half hour early in order 
to get a good seat, just like in the theatre. Here too there is a lot of applause.…” Pasteur was struck 
by the attentive silence of the audience, interrupted by passionate exclamations (Debré 1994/1998, 
p. 23).
4 A beautiful example of science-as-theatre can be found in The Double Helix by James Watson 
where Linus Pauling, when presenting a protein structure, keeps his model behind a curtain, 
unveiling it only at the very end of his talk, leading Watson to comment that it was “as if he had 
been in show business all his life” (Crease 1993, p. 98; Watson 1968/1980, p. 25).
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This is also the reason why I will use one particular monograph on the history 
of microbiology as my starting point, namely Paul de Kruif’s best-seller The 
Microbe Hunters published in 1927.5 It presents a rather supportive and protagonist 
portrayal of scientists as heroes, but with its lively style it emphatically emphasizes 
the dramatic element inherent in experimental inquiry. Therefore, although it is 
perhaps not always the most reliable source when it comes to historical detail (from 
a professional historical point of view), is does present the achievements of 
“microbe hunters” like Pasteur and Koch as if we witness their performances life 
on stage, as if we (the audience) are allowed to enter for a moment their laboratories 
and studies in order to shed a glance on their dramatic performances. In fact, the 
case of Louis Pasteur is hardly in need of any dramatization. He is unanimously 
described as an “actor” and a “showman” by his biographers, as someone who 
regarded the disclosure of nature as a “spectacle” (Davis et al. 1973, p. 4).
As I already pointed out, after Van Leeuwenhoek and Spallanzani interest in 
microbes had eclipsed in favour of other branches of research. According to De 
Kruif, it took a “propagandist”, a “missionary”, a “showman” like Louis Pasteur to 
change the situation. He started a campaign, “part science, part drama” (p. 84), to 
put microbes on the map again. He had a strong desire to involve larges audiences 
in his discoveries and he enjoyed to “spout” his results to the public (p. 95). At 
Paris he staged a “scientific vaudeville” to make Emperor Napoleon III, Alexandre 
Dumas and other contemporaries more aware of the omnipresence of microscopic 
species in the environment. Besides that, he loved to fight with colleagues who had 
attained the status of authorities. His campaign created a storm in the republic of 
science and got him into dramatic conflicts with Liebig and other powerful men. 
During a meeting of the Academy of Science in Paris he shouted scandalous 
remarks and got into a fight with an elderly colleague. He was notorious for trans-
gressing every now and then the limits of scientific discretion by using provocative 
language and “unseeming remarks”. Furthermore, according to De Kruif, his head 
was incessantly inventing new theories and wild guesses and he often jumped to 
conclusions. In short, Pasteur and Stockmann share the same character, to some 
extent, especially if we study Pasteur through the lens of Paul de Kruif.
One of the highlights of Pasteur’s career was the discovery of the anthrax vac-
cine. It culminated in a dramatic public experiment at Pouilly-le-Fort in 1881 that 
was broadcasted by newspapers all over the Western World, such as the London 
Times. Pasteur accepted the invitation to come to Pouilly-le-Fort, a small provincial 
town, in order to personally lead the battle against local rural scepticism and prejudices 
5 Paul de Kruif was “America’s first great science writer” (Henig 2002). Born in 1890, he was 
trained as a bacteriologist. He published on streptococci and worked at the Rockefeller Institute, 
where he was fired after publishing an anonymous, critical review of contemporary medical 
research. He was co-author of Sinclair Lewis’ novel Arrowsmith, published in 1925, about a 
research institute modeled after the Rockefeller Institute. Critics often content that De Kruif relied 
too much on his imagination, but two successful Hollywood movies and one successful Broadway 
play were based on Microbe Hunters, his most famous book.
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that hindered the emerging scientific view on the aetiology of disease. With his 
Stockmann-like character he eagerly accepted the challenge.6 This event was an 
experiment and a public performance at the same time, an experimental “show” 
(Debré 1994/1998, p. 397). Actually, it was intended as a plot by enemies to lure 
Pasteur into a dangerous situation, but he succeeded. Pasteur, the “scientific show-
man”, the “actor”, the maker of “theatrical gestures” (De Kruif, p. 234) was inspired 
(in his own words) by “a passion for progress and truth” (p. 219). He marched into 
the arena “like a matador”, facing dignitaries, farmers and other visitors of all walks 
of life – a typical stage-setting for an experimental drama (p. 214). Spectators 
formed a large crowd and it took some time for the noise to die down. The atmos-
phere was that of a country fair rather than a laboratory (Debré 1994/1998).
Bruno Latour describes Pasteur’s dramatic public experiment at Pouilly-le-fort in 
similar terms, namely as a “theatre of proof” (1984/1988, p. 85). Pasteur performed 
his experiments not only live, before a large audience, but also in front of the assem-
bled media who followed and reported his operations meticulously (p. 87). Thus, he 
was able to interest a large educated public in the “daily drama” of his trials. The 
experiment was a grand success and the sceptics were converted.7 In this manner he 
set a model for what Stockmann (albeit unsuccessfully) tried to achieve in Norway.
Robert Koch, secluded and austere, was the reverse image of his much more 
passionate French contemporary. Like Stockmann – so to speak – he started as a 
lone doctor, living and working in almost complete scientific isolation (Brock 
1988). He performed his researches in silence, spending his days as a country doc-
tor in villages in Eastern Prussia (notably in Wollstein). Like Stockmann during his 
early years “up north”, he was virtually cut off from the world of science, from 
libraries and contact with other scientific workers. “Never could a man have found 
himself in a position less favourable for scientific research – poor, humble, 
unknown, isolated from the scientific appliances which are the necessary tools of 
the investigator” (Brock, p. 27). From 1876 onwards, however, Koch managed to 
rise above his environment and to become a major medical and public figure – a 
6 “Pasteur’s reports on preventing sheep anthrax were so unbelievable to some, that he was chal-
lenged by the well-known veterinarian Rossignol to conduct a carefully controlled public test of 
his anthrax vaccine. This was to take place at Pouilly-le-Fort, a farm in the town of Melun south 
of Paris. Twenty-five sheep were to be controls, the other twenty-five were to be vaccinated by 
Pasteur and then all animals would receive a lethal dose of anthrax. All of the control sheep must 
die and the vaccinated sheep must live.… The publicity was intense. A reporter from the London 
Times sent back daily dispatches. Newspapers in France followed the events with daily bulletins. 
There were crowds of onlookers, farmers, engineers, veterinarians, physicians, scientists and a 
carnivalesque atmosphere.… Happily, the trial was a complete success – indeed, a triumph! Two 
days after the final inoculation (May 5, 1882), every one of 25 control sheep was dead and every 
one of the 25 vaccinated sheep was alive and healthy. The fame of Pasteur and these experiments 
spread throughout France, Europe and beyond. It was … the anthrax vaccine that spread through 
the public mind faith in the science of microbes”. (Cohn 1996)
7 Unfortunately, however, it was a temporary success. Before long, disturbing comments began to 
arrive, notably a scientific report, signed by Robert Koch from Berlin.
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
visible scientist. With the help of his microscope, he designed careful and accurate 
experiments to discover the causes of diseases afflicting farm animals (e.g. anthrax) 
and patients (e.g. tuberculosis and cholera). Thus, he has had a tremendous impact 
on hygiene and public health. As a self-made scientist working in a home-made 
laboratory, he made his first great discovery – he discovered the microbe that 
caused anthrax, prevalent among farm animals in the Wollstein district. By means 
of careful painstaking experimentations he proved scientifically that the bacillus 
was really what caused the disease. Upon writing a courteous letter to Professor 
Ferdinand Cohn at Breslau, he presented his results in 1876 by performing a 
number of experiments before an academic audience. Unlike Stockmann, he was 
extremely hesitant when it came to publishing his results, but Cohn took care of it. 
Due to this publication, he immediately soared out of the ranks of anonymous phy-
sicians and found himself among the most original researchers (De Kruif, p. 155).
Public interest in and enthusiasm over his results was strong. Subsequently, he 
developed ingenious methods for fixing, staining and photographing bacteria. After 
he had moved to Berlin in 1880 he decided to investigate the microbe that caused 
tuberculosis. He patiently and silently performed a great number of experiments in 
a relatively short time and then he was ready to give his news to the world: the 
bacillus was discovered. Once again, the scientific proof was presented in a dra-
matic, performative fashion. On the March 24, 1882 he presented his findings to a 
meeting of the Physiological Society in Berlin. He showed his audience a summary 
of the experiments he had performed in his own laboratory. The meeting was, so to 
speak, the absolute opposite of the fourth act of Ibsen’s play. When he finished his 
lecture, there was silence. No applause, no questions, no debate – the audience was 
simply stunned with admiration. This is how De Kruif describes it:
He told the plain story with no oratorical raising of his voice.… At last Koch sat down, to 
wait for the discussion, the inevitable arguments and objections that greet the finish of rev-
olutionary papers. But no man rose to his feet, no word was spoken, and finally eyes began 
to turn toward Virchow, the oracle, the Tsar of German science, the thunderer whose mere 
frown had ruined great theories of disease. All eyes looked at him, but Virchow got up, put 
on his hat, and left the room – he had no word to say.… In 1882 the news that Robert Koch 
had found the microbe of tuberculosis trickled out of the little room of the Physiological 
Society the same evening, sang to Kamchatka and to San Fransisco on the cable wires that 
night, and exploded on the front pages of the newspapers in the morning. (p. 182)
Yet the publication of his paper 3 weeks later created a sensation throughout the 
world (in the Kruif’s words: “The world went wild over Koch”). On April 22, 1882 
the news was brought by the London Times, and on May 3 by the New York Times. 
At least an echo of the stir must have reached fervent newspaper readers like Ibsen.8 
A few months later, at the German Exposition of Hygiene and Public Health, 
8 Robert Koch was not the only man of science involved in this kind of research. Paul von 
Baumgarten had reported the discovery of the tuberculosis bacillus a few days earlier, but his the-
sis was less well-founded that Koch’s. It shows, however, that this type of research was really up 
to date.
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a replica of Robert Koch’s laboratory was shown to the public, with the latest 
equipment for studying infectious diseases. It made his name even more familiar to 
the general public. Together with Pasteur, Koch initiated microbiology as an experi-
mental science. He was responsible for developing and refining the logical structure 
of microbiological experiments. But perhaps it would be more accurate to say that 
his chief interest was in applied ecology: he was interested in the way bacteria 
maintain themselves in different environments and spread from host to host (Brock, 
p. 290).
The life histories of Stockmann, Pasteur and Koch confront us with three more 
or less contemporary events, situated on the borderline between theatre and science. 
In 1881, Pasteur performs his dramatic public experiment at Pouilly-le-Fort. The 
atmosphere is tense and Ibsen-like, but unlike Stockmann, Pasteur is eventually 
heralded as a public benefactor, rather than as a public enemy – for the time being 
at least. Subsequently, in March 1882, Robert Koch gives his lecture and performs 
his famous experiments before a scholarly audience in Berlin. The atmosphere is 
quite unlike the tumultuous scenes of Ibsen’s fourth act, but as the news spreads 
round, he too is heralded as a public benefactor. Finally, later that same year, 
Ibsen’s play is performed for the first time. Stockmann, intent on lecturing on 
microbes and infectious diseases and hoping to be heralded as a public benefactor 
too, meets with a completely different, more unfortunate fate. Nevertheless, he too 
is a microbe hunter interested in improving the hygienic conditions of his fellow 
human beings by using microscopic data, hoping to prevent the spread of infectious 
diseases by taking sanitary measures.9
A few years later, when Hamburg was struck by a cholera epidemic, the similar-
ity between Stockmann and Koch became closer even.10 Koch went over to 
Hamburg in order to investigate the local hygienic conditions. Contrary to some of 
his colleagues, he insisted that cholera was due to an infectious agent and saw water 
as the primary mode of transmission. The Hamburg epidemic permitted Koch to 
prove the relationship between the purity of water and the incidence of infectious 
diseases. Both Hamburg and the nearby city of Altona obtained their water from the 
Elbe, but while Hamburg obtained it unfiltered from apparently unpolluted surface 
water, Altona derived it from the water that had flowed through Hamburg, picking 
 9 Besides Pasteur and Koch, Ignaz Semmelweis (1818–1865) and Joseph Lister (1827–1912) 
deserve to be mentioned as microbe fighters. Semmelweis was persecuted for saying that physi-
cians should wash their hands before doing any procedures on patients, and when Joseph Lister 
actually saw microbes in a microscope he knew that Semmelweis was right. Inspired by the work 
of Pasteur he became the pioneer of antisceptic surgery. Also in this case, biomedical history has 
a literary counterpart. The Norwegian playwright Jens Bjørneboe (1920–1976) wrote a play about 
Semmelwies’s struggle against childbed fever, with strong political overtones (Bjørneboe 1998). 
For obvious reasons, it is often compared to Ibsen’s A Public Enemy. Finally, in 1924, the famous 
French novelist Celine – a physician – published his thesis on Semmelweis.
10 One could say that Stockmann is more similar to Pasteur in terms of temperament, to Koch in 
terms of biography.
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up sewage water on the way (Brock 1988, p. 32). Yet, while Hamburg was visited 
heavily with cholera, Altona was nearly free of the disease, due to the fact that it 
filtered its water supply by means of sand. Koch provided solid bacteriological evi-
dence for the efficacy of sand filtration by counting bacteria before and after filtra-
tion. Thus, he showed engineers the most effective (albeit costly) way to attack the 
problem, thereby placing sanitary engineering on a firm footing. His work became 
the basis for government regulations requiring bacteriological examination of pub-
lic water supplies. In short, Koch set a model for physicians interested in public 
health like Stockmann. He managed to do what Stockmann failed to achieve, not 
only by assembling convincing scientific evidence, but also by communicating his 
conclusions and recommendations to politicians, officials and policymakers in an 
effective manner.11 In other words, he not only proved that cholera was transmitted 
by microbic agents, but he also demonstrated the pivotal importance for scientists 
involved in ecological research to develop communicative and socio-political 
insights and skills.
Bruno Latour (1984/1988) describes the work of Pasteur and other “microbe 
hunters” against the backdrop of the much broader hygienist movement of his days. 
The hygienists’ aim was to make the environment (notably the urban environment) 
healthier for humans. Costly municipal investments (to improve the water supply 
for example) had already been promoted by them, but microbiology finally offered 
a scientific guarantee that these investments would really proof effective and indis-
pensable. Thus, the microbiologists displaced the traditional engineers who had 
forgotten the microbes in their plans. By making the microbes visible they were 
able to translate laboratory data into concrete plans and policies. This pattern is 
clearly recognizable in Ibsen’s drama as well: Stockmann tries to overrule the 
municipal engineer who, by supporting the “economical” solution, failed to taken 
the animalculae into account. Unlike other microbe hunters, however, he was 
unsuccessful – and I tried to point out why.
Two basic scripts or typical scenarios are embedded in these biographical sto-
ries. The first script concerns the isolated, invisible scientist, working quietly in his 
home-made laboratory, whose only contact with the world of science consists of an 
occasional letter to a university expert, but who suddenly experiences his Eureka!, 
his breakthrough, the decisive event that puts him on one line with the other famous 
“heroes” of science. The contours of this script can be discerned in Koch’s biogra-
phy as well as in Ibsen’s play, but while it works out extremely well in the case of 
Koch, it completely miscarries in the case of Stockmann. The second script con-
cerns a dramatic public event during which a scientific proof of great import is pre-
sented by a scientific hero to a mixed audience. Once again, this scenario is present 
11 Koch’s life was not always a success story, however. His claim that he had discovered a remedy 
for tuberculosis proved a disapppointment and his decision to devorce his wife and remarry a 
much younger woman caused a scandal. Whereas Stockmann considered emigrating to America, 
Koch went off to Africa to escape public criticism – and to do research on malaria and other 
infectuous diseases.
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both in the case of a real scientist (Pasteur) and in the case of Stockmann, but 
whereas it works out quite successfully in the case of Pasteur, Stockmann faces a 
dramatic failure. In his play, Ibsen makes full use of the contrast between the quiet, 
secluded atmosphere of the first script and the tumultuous and dramatic nature of 
the second. Indeed, they are like two Acts in a play.
A major reason for Stockmann’s failure, his tragic flaw so to speak, is his 
unwise and sudden decision to change genres and to leap from science to philoso-
phy without preparing himself properly. Instead of discussing environmental pol-
lution and issues of public health, he enters upon one of the typical themes of 
nineteenth century philosophical discourse, namely “mass phobia”, or the anxiety 
(articulated by Le Bon, Mill, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and others) over the fact that 
the intellectual, the autonomous individual, the free-thinker is likely to be outnum-
bered, in a democratic era, by a prejudiced and backward “majority”. After failing 
to see the anonymous masses for centuries and consciously focussing on the elite, 
when finally philosophers become aware of the majority of mankind, their first 
image of their societal environment is that of a “swarm” of microbe-like entities.
Besides being “politically incorrect”, Stockmann’s ideas on this subject are rather 
confused and his discourse is anything but carefully composed. It reads, rather, like 
a desperate improvisation. The argument that the environment has been polluted due 
to mistakes made by blundering and short-sighted politicians is based on a com-
pletely different kind of “scientific proof” than Stockmann’s revelation that the 
majority of people is unable to think rationally and consistently. There is no attempt 
at careful analysis, for instance in terms of styles of thinking. He eagerly extrapo-
lates Darwinism and pseudo-genetics to human society without giving it much 
thought. Therefore, his address is the outcome of imagination, rather than of reason-
ing. It is an intuition, rather than an argument. That is, Stockmann articulates an 
archetype, the archetypical image of sociology, the sociological equivalent of the 
monster-archetype of biology: the image of the (amorphous, violent, irrational etc.) 
monstrous masses, a promising and fascinating prospect for some, a terrible idea for 
others. His radical aristocratic conceptions conflict with the views of both the “right” 
and the “left”. Indeed, the apparent ease with which Stockmann shifts from discern-
ing the fascinating aspect of the mass phenomenon (in the beginning of the play) 
while highlighting its terrible and deínoV aspect towards the end, is a symptom of 
the fact that we are indeed confronted with an archetype.
8.5 Taming the Micro- and the Macro-monster
What can we learn from Ibsen’s play, what is its “message”? As we have seen, 
Dr. Stockmann belonged to a whole generation of microbe hunters who directed 
public attention to the presence of microbes in the environment (be it as our benefactors 
or as our enemies). From a purely scientific point of view Stockmann is of course 
far from being Koch’s equal. While the latter assembled and handled his own equip-
ment for example (indeed: technical dexterity in using delicate tools was part of his 
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genius), Stockmann remained heavily dependent on the tools and expertise of others. 
But what is important is that none of these researchers were pure scientists. They 
were all very much involved in the process of making research more relevant for 
society: Pasteur as a champion of vaccination, Koch as an influential and interna-
tionally acknowledged hygiene expert and Stockmann – if only he had succeeded – 
as a public health expert who could have been involved in revealing and addressing 
instances of environmental pollution. The dispute over spontaneous generation that 
had obsessed previous microbe experts had been purely theoretical. The new micro-
biology had an immediate and highly significant impact on human existence.
Indeed, the inquiries made by Pasteur, Koch and their followers (such as Roux, 
Behring, and Ehrlich who became famous in their own right) had an outspoken 
societal relevance. Their research had an obvious link with environmental concerns 
and public health issues. And therefore, sooner or later, the researchers involved 
were called upon to go beyond their small subculture of scientific experts and to 
address broader non-expert audiences: the press, the authorities, the public at large. 
In others words, these researchers were not only involved in internal communica-
tion among fellow scientists, but (because of the nature of their discoveries) they 
also took part in the intricate dialogue between science and societal stakeholders. 
At first, they would present their findings to small assemblies of scientific experts, 
as Koch did in Breslau and Berlin. But sooner or later, they would be facing much 
broader publics (or their political and journalistic representatives). And in order to 
be successful in reaching this broader audience, the microbe hunters had to switch 
genres, they had to develop new forms of communication, more dramatic even than 
traditional experimental demonstrations. They began to use more theatrical forms 
of presentation, such as public speeches or scientific demonstrations before audi-
ences “of all walks of life”. Like experimentation, the public dissemination of 
research findings presupposes a considerable amount of skill and exercise as well. 
Only if the “theatrical” component is professionally done can researchers hope to 
convey their information on microbes – information that lay persons may find very 
difficult to comprehend at first – and prepare the ground for preventive measures.
Although Stockmann on previous occasions had shown himself a prolific con-
tributor to Aslaksen’s newspaper, that is, as someone who successfully popularized 
the scientific point of view, on the crucial moment (which could have been his “fin-
est hour”) he completely failed to communicate his research findings to the public. 
This was not completely his fault of course. His four-paged manuscript might have 
had a tremendous impact on the public had he been allowed to read it, but his 
adversaries successfully prevented him from disseminating his views. Relying on 
their political techniques, they managed to transform Stockmann’s audience into a 
fearful, archetypical “mob” – an image that incited Stockmann to launch his des-
perate assault. What we may learn from Ibsen’s play, in short, is that scientific 
“heroes” – visible scientists – had not only developed their talents and dexterity for 
handling microscopes, or for collecting and analysing water samples. They also 
excelled in the more theatrical dimensions of their work, notably when it came to 
addressing broader audiences and discerning the societal and communicative 
dimensions of their work.
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These communicative talents and skills were especially important when it came 
to dealing with the two most important intermediaries that had positioned them-
selves between scientists and the public at large, namely politicians and journalists. 
The histories of Pasteur and Koch are interesting because, notwithstanding their 
striking differences in terms of strategy and style, they constituted role models that 
could (and to a certain extent still can) be copied by others, not only in order to 
become successful experimentalists, but also in order to become successful com-
municators. Stockmann, on the other hand, is interesting precisely because, as an 
anti-hero, his story more or less constitutes the reverse image of the performances 
of these real microbe hunters. From Ibsen’s play we may distil a list of possible 
mistakes to be avoided. We may read A Public Enemy in order to understand what 
may go wrong, and what kind of pitfalls are to be avoided, whenever a scientist 
feels the need (often for very good reasons) to address a larger public, first through 
its intermediaries (notably journalists and politicians), but eventually face-to-face. 
The most basic skill of all is the ability to tame, to domesticate – rather than to 
infuriate – the monster. This is what Pasteur and Koch manage to do. And this 
applies both to the monster of microbiology (the swarm of microbes) and to the 
societal monster (the anonymous masses). Pasteur not only handled microbes 
quite effectively, he could also work with large lay audiences. Notably the domes-
tication of the latter involves a gift for theatre. This – rather than the ethics of 
whistle-blowing – is Ibsen’s basic message.
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Chapter 9
Pea Stories. Why was Mendel’s Research 
Ignored in 1866 and Rediscovered in 1900?
9.1 Introduction
The story of Mendel’s research is one of the highlights in the history of the life 
sciences. It has become a scientific legend. In 1865, after 8 long years of careful, 
time-consuming and laborious experiments with Pisum Sativum (the common 
garden pea), father Gregor Mendel (1822–1884) of the Augustinian monastery of 
Brünn (now: Brno) recorded and analysed his findings in a two-part lecture before 
the Brünn Society for Natural History. Subsequently, he published, in the society’s 
proceedings, a forty four-page article on which his fame still rests (Mendel 
1866/1913). He dispatched several copies of it to leading experts in biology and 
botany but apparently, hardly anyone took notice of it. He did receive an answer 
from Professor Carl Nägeli of the University of Munich, but even he took 2 months 
to reply. And instead of becoming interested in Mendel’s work, Nägeli tried to 
persuade him to participate in a research programme of his own. And indeed, in the 
correspondence that subsequently evolved, Mendel offered his services as an unpaid 
research assistant, more or less. Mendel had hoped that Nägeli would assess, and 
even repeat, his experiments on Pisum Sativum, but instead the latter urged him to 
join his experiments on Hieracium (hawkweed). Their correspondence lingered on 
for some years (they continued to exchange letter until 1873), centring around 
Mendel’s discouraging problems with his Hawkweed-trials, but eventually it ended 
in silence. For years to come, Mendel’s masterpiece was virtually ignored. Although his 
article was cited every now and then,1 it failed to really impress his contemporaries. 
Then, all of a sudden, in the spring of 1900, his paper was unearthed and rediscov-
ered, posthumously, by three different scholars, simultaneously but independently 
from one another. They were all active in what was about to become the field of 
genetics. All of a sudden, Mendel’s paper became a scientific classic, the starting 
1 As pointed out by Orel (1996), we must not exaggerate his contemporaries’ lack of apprecia-
tion. Orel lists a number of authors referring to Mendel. One of these sources (Focke 1881) even 
refers to him fifteen times. Notwithstanding the existence of citations predating the year of his 
rediscovery, the difference in impact of Mendel’s work before and after 1900 remains 
considerable.
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point of a new style of research, and its impact was enormous. It was the beginning 
of a dramatic transition of biology as a field. As a result, researchers suddenly 
became interested in this enigmatic author, who was almost totally unknown among 
professionals. But even today, Mendel remains a surprisingly obscure figure. After 
decades of historical research, data on Mendel’s life and work are remarkably 
sparse, compared to what we know about some of his contemporaries such as, for 
example, Charles Darwin (1809–1882) or Louis Pasteur (1822–1895).
Mendel’s story has raised (and will no doubt continue to raise) a host of ques-
tions of various kinds: historical, philosophical and scientific. The most tenacious 
one, I think, is how we are to explain the tremendous difference between the impact 
his article had when it was originally published and its eventual impact after its 
rediscovery. All of a sudden, an obscure and more or less forgotten publication was 
celebrated as a scientific highlight. What had happened, between 1866 and 1900? 
Various explanations have been given. First of all, Mendel’s paper contains a rela-
tively large amount of mathematics, and in the 1860s his readership, the natural 
historians (both professional and amateur) were not yet very fluent when it came to 
mastery of numbers. Many of them were still suffering from what we nowadays 
refer to as “innumeracy”.2 His subtle mathematical reasoning was apparently 
wasted on them.3 Mendel was, moreover, an exceptionally shy person, an introvert, 
and rather hesitant when it came to disseminating his data. He allowed his master-
piece to appear in an obscure source, hardly accessible to the scientific avant-garde 
of the day. And although he did send copies to a number of acknowledged experts, 
he undertook no further action. Perhaps Mendel should have given it more effort. 
Eventually, he even allowed his correspondence with Nägeli to die out. In other 
words, it was Mendel himself, up to a certain extent, who was to blame for his lack 
of recognition. His biographer Orel (1996) is rather outspoken on this issue. He 
points out that, although Mendel did draw attention to his paper immediately after 
it was published, he did little to promote his ideas in later years:
We may well ask why he did not publish the results of experiments with other plant species 
[besides peas], about which he reported in detail in his correspondence with Nägeli. In effect 
each of his letters was a scientific communication which might have been published after 
slight editing. … Mendel must have had every reason to publish the results of further experi-
ments, and prove the wider validity of his theory. … But he was silent. (p. 290/291)
2 According to Simon Mawer (1998) innumeracy was among the reasons why the event of Mendel 
reading his first paper, “one of the most momentous scientific events of the nineteenth century … 
a moment like few others in the history of science”, failed to have much of an impact: “Can you 
wonder that a great silence fell in the room, the silence of incomprehension, of indifference, of 
boredom? Can you wonder that the applause in the end was thin? … There was a vague sense of 
embarrassment, a feeling that they had been called out in the cold evening on a fool’s errand. They 
had come to see about plants and hybrids; they had got mathematics” (p. 194).
3 His audience “listened uncomprehendingly as he plunged into the mathematics of hybridization. By 
training and inclination a physicist rather than a botanist, Mendel preferred to express his ideas in 
mathematical terms wherever possible. … He was completely unaware that he had left his audience 
behind” (Sottin 1959, p. 152). “Mendel flooded his audience with statistics, numbers and ratios. … 
He did not begin by declaring ‘I have found the secret of heredity’” (Shreeve 2004, p. 29).
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Another explanation sometimes given is that, as a priest, he may have felt reluctant 
to publish data that could have brought him into conflict with religious authorities. 
Of all possible explanations, this is surely the least convincing one. Mendel never 
seems to have experienced any conflict between his scientific research and his reli-
gious convictions, or between theology and science. He seems never to have felt “any 
basic differences between science and religion. He functioned both as a scientist and 
as a priest without conflict” (Sottin 1959). He belonged to an order that regarded 
scholarly and experimental research as a perfectly legitimate vocation.
Although Mendel’s reluctant style of communication is no doubt a relevant factor 
in itself, it does not tell us the whole story. In this chapter I will focus on another pos-
sible explanation, mentioned in various sources, but usually in a rather vague manner, 
the idea namely that somehow, Mendel’s time was not yet “ripe” for his findings and 
his approach, that somehow his paper was “ahead of its time”, that it failed to concord 
with the “spirit of the time” – the Zeitgeist.4 It is the objective of this chapter to criti-
cally assess this line of reasoning and to make it more precise. What exactly do we 
mean with phrases such as “the spirit of the time”, and in what way exactly did 
Mendel fail to concur with it? Why were contemporaries interested in the natural 
sciences ready for Darwin’s discoveries, for example, but not for his?
This is, of course, an epistemological question, rather than a historical one. It is 
not the objective of this chapter to add new historical or biographical data to what 
others have already uncovered and assembled. As far as biographical details are 
concerned, I will rely on the research that already has been done by various authors. 
My basic objective is to try to understand the intellectual content of Mendel’s work 
from an epistemological perspective. Why did he initially fail to impress his readers, 
and why were his ideas suddenly embraced with such enthusiasm 34 years later? 
How did Mendel’s work relate to his cultural environment, to the Zeitgeist of his 
own era and to that of the next generation? It is the type of question that should be 
addressed by a comparative epistemological approach. As was explained in Chapter 1, 
the focus of comparative epistemology is on synchronicities, on affinities between 
intellectual events in various domains of culture, notably science and literature. 
Mendel’s ideas somehow must have belonged to his time, but in what manner? And 
why did his ideas, “recessive” at first, all of a sudden become so “dominant”?
I will start with a concise account of Mendel’s life and work, a summary of the 
case study so to speak, before moving on to the comparative epistemological analysis. 
9.1 Introduction 199
4 Iltis (1924) speaks about the lack of concurrency, on Mendel’s part, with the “Bewuβtsein der Zeit” 
(“the Consciousness of the Time”). Posthumously, his nephews Alois and Ferdinand Schindler 
reported that, later in life, Mendel repeatedly said, referring to the future impact of his work, that 
“his time would come” (“Meine Zeit wird schon kommen”); also quoted in Henig (pp. 160, 171). 
Simon Mawer (1998) writes: “It is rare that a man is genuinly ahead of his time. Even the greatest 
discoveries in science [he mentions Darwin and Watson & Crick] are made in their appropriate time. 
… Few are ahead of their time – but Gregor Mendel was. He was so far ahead … that even when he 
spelled it out and people read the argument … they still couldn’t grasp the importance” (p. 257). 
Henig (2000) likewise states that Mendel was born a generation too soon.
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Notably, I will focus on the way Mendel communicated his findings, for although it 
is true that as a researcher he was a rather timid, modest and introvert person, he was 
nevertheless more active in terms of scholarly communication than is sometimes 
thought. Basically, however, I am interested in his style of working and thinking, in 
the epistemological profile of his experiments. What did he try to prove? What was 
his conceptual framework? How did he interact with his model species? And most of 
all, why were his readers in 1900 much more willing to accept this style of reasoning 
than those of 1866? Why were his ideas about what would become genetics more or 
less lost on his own generation?
This question will be addressed in the form of a case study in comparative epis-
temology. I will point out that, in important respects, the basic logic of Mendel’s 
ideas was quite out of tune with the scientific discourses that constituted the main-
streams of his disciplines (notably botany and, more generally, natural history) as 
they were evolving in this period (the 1850s and 1860s). Yet, they were remarkably 
congenial to the ways of thinking displayed in a number of literary sources of this 
epoch. The latter retained conceptual elements that were more or less “repressed” 
in dominant scientific discourse. The rediscovery of Mendel signifies the moment 
when these repressed ideas, through an epistemological reversal as it were, returned 
to the surface and became dominant once again.
9.2 The Imperfection of the Biographical Record
We still do not know very much about Mendel. Notwithstanding the fact that careful 
biographical research has been done, by scholars like Iltis (1924), Olby (1966) and 
Orel (1996), there remain deplorable gaps. Indeed, biographical data on Mendel are 
unsatisfactory to this day (Orel 1996, p. 1). He kept no diary and no research note-
books from his experiments survived. Despite all that has been discovered, we are 
not very well informed about his sources of inspiration (Olby 1966, p. 104). One 
gets the impression that in later years, he was not a very likable person. He died 
without leaving many friends. This may explain the deplorable fact that apparently, 
shortly after his death, Abbot Rambousek (Mendel’s successor) ordered his papers 
to be burned. Throughout his life he was a modest, introvert personality who per-
formed his research in the seclusion of a monastery on the edge of a provincial town. 
It is not at all surprising, therefore, that time and again so many of his biographers 
rely on their imagination to a considerable extent when it comes to describing his 
life and work in more detail. And this not only goes for more popular biographies 
such as Sottin’s (1959). Recently, Robin Marantz Henig (2000) published a biogra-
phy that contains beautiful novel-like sections and Simon Mawer (1998) even wrote 
a novel that is in part a biography of Mendel. In terms of genre, Mawer’s document 
is a perfect hybrid: a dialectical interplay of fact and fiction. Time and again biogra-
phers have reverted to more or less narrative styles of writing. Due to the scantiness 
of data, we have to rely on our imagination when it comes to entering Mendel’s 
world and to familiarise ourselves with the details of his performance. These hybrid 
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sources, recasting biographical data in a narrative manner, blurring the boundaries 
between scholarly monographs and belles-lettres, will also prove valuable sources 
for an epistemological analysis, especially if we want to situate Mendel’s work in 
the context of his world, his cultural environment.
The scantiness of data not only affects our biographical knowledge. It also 
affects our knowledge of his research as such. His paper raises a whole set of ques-
tions. Indeed, for those who read it carefully, it is likely to raise more questions than 
it answers. First of all there are questions about the technical and methodological 
details of his work. In a famous article Fischer (1936) tried to reconstruct the 
experiments and came to the conclusion that Mendel cannot possibly have per-
formed them as they were reported, while DiTrocchi (1991) even concluded that 
most of the experiments described in his article are fictitious in the sense that they 
were performed on paper, in retrospect as it were, by disaggregating the data from 
various trials.5 Others have criticised these findings,6 quite convincingly in my 
view, but the debate over the issue still continues. Even less transparent, even more 
opaque are the ideas and concepts that led him to his experimental design. What 
precisely did he want to show? What where the theoretical conceptions that were 
guiding him? What was the epistemological profile of his reasoning? This type of 
questions is especially important if we want to address the issue of Mendel’s appar-
ent lack of congruency with the “spirit” of his era.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, resulting from “the imperfection of the bio-
graphical record”, I believe it is possible and legitimate to ask ourselves in what 
way the epistemological profile of Mendel’s work conflicted with the spirit of the 
age in 1866, while suddenly being in agreement with the spirit of the age at the turn 
of the century, when they were much more favourably considered. I will formulate 
an answer to this question in three successive steps. First of all, I will look at 
Mendel’s scientific sources: his predecessors in the field of experimental botany. 
Notably, I will draw attention to the writings of Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter, whose 
work contains some theoretical ideas that may also have guided Gregor Mendel. 
This will provide us with the beginning of an answer to the question in what way 
and to what extent Mendel fell out of tune with his intellectual environment.
Subsequently, I will turn attention to Mendel’s own time, his cultural world. It 
is notably in this section of the chapter that a comparative epistemological approach 
will be fleshed out. I will start by pointing out that, on the cultural level, there are 
remarkable similarities between Mendel’s work and a number of literary docu-
ments that were written in this same epoch. These literary documents may help us 
to elucidate Mendel’s research practice and style of reasoning. Indeed, Mendel’s 
paper is not the only remarkable “pea story” written in the nineteenth century. This 
exercise will indicate that, apparently, the manner in which Mendel interacted with 
5 DiTrocchi does not deny that Mendel actually performed a great number of experiments, but he 
claims that the logical schema Mendel used to interpret his data were developed in retrospect.
6 Lamprecht (1968), Pilgrim (1986), Joyce (1987), Valen (1987), Weiling (1989).
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his peas, as well as with other model species, was somewhat out of tune with main-
stream biology of his lifetime, but not at all out of tune with other dimension of his 
cultural milieu, notably belles-lettres.
Finally, I will turn attention to Mendel’s scientific contemporaries. Notably, I will 
compare Mendel’s view with those of his contemporary Charles Darwin who 
became immediately famous when in 1859 The Origin of Species was published. In 
various respects, Darwin was Mendel’s perfect counterpart. I will argue that 
Mendel’s work, up to a certain extent, can be regarded as a polemical dialogue with 
Darwin. Initially, the focus will be on their strategies for communication and dis-
semination, on their tactics as authors. But eventually I will argue that these differ-
ences in strategy cannot suffice to explain the difference in impact between Darwin’s 
best-seller and Mendel’s obscure paper. Somehow, time was ready for Darwin, and 
not for Mendel – but in what sense? What can be meant by the claim that in 1866 
the world was ready for evolution, but not quite ready for genetics? What was, on 
the epistemological level, the basic difference between the theoretical views of 
Darwin and those of Mendel? A comparative epistemological approach will allow 
us to address this issue.
9.3 Mendel: A Case Study
Gregor Mendel was born in 1822 in Heinzendorf in Northern Moravia.7 He came 
from a rural (agricultural and horticultural) background. Three out of four of his 
forefathers were of German origin, one out of four was Czech. Thus, his genealogy 
already displayed the famous ratio he was to discover later on (Orel 1996). In biog-
raphies, young Mendel is depicted as a withdrawn, but sympathetic person who 
tended to respond to the more serious existential challenges and difficulties in his 
life by falling ill and hiding in his bed for extended periods of time (weeks or even 
months). He had a lively interest in the natural sciences, but his parents were unable 
to financially support an intellectual career. After years of hardship and poverty he 
decided to enter the Augustinian monastery at Brno (Brünn).8 He was admitted 
there as a novice in 1843 at the age of 21. Four years later he became a priest. His 
priesthood activities, notably caring for the ill and dying, soon resulted in a severe 
psychic and physical crisis, and his considerate abbot decided that Mendel should 
become a priestly intellectual instead. The monastery was a centre of learning, an 
intellectual oasis, an outstanding scholarly institution. Mendel joined a brotherhood 
7 He was in other words a Sudeten-German (Mawer 1998). He was actually born as Johann, but 
received the name Gregor upon entering the Augustinian monastery.
8 “It was the only route available for the son of a destitute peasant in search of an education. … 
[The Augustinian monastery] was an ideal haven for a young man with an interest in natural 
science and little forward momentum in life” (Shreeve 2004, p. 28).
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of scholars devoted to a broad range of scientific pursuits – although horticulture 
seemed to be something of a common ground. Scientific investigation and experi-
mentation was greatly encouraged among the friars dwelling in these medieval liv-
ing quarters. By entering the Augustinian order, he was not at all cutting himself 
off from the world of cultural and scientific developments, rather the reverse was 
true (Olby 1966, p. 107). Virtually every single member of this cloistered commu-
nity was a learned man (Henig 2000, p. 151).
Mendel’s colleagues included several outstanding scholars such as Matthew 
Klacel (1808–1882), a well-known botanist9 and Hegel expert; Pavel Krizkovsky 
(1820–1885), musician, composer and an expert on church music; and Franz 
Thomas Bratranek (1815–1884), whose work I already briefly discussed in Chapter 7. 
The latter was a Goethe scholar who edited Goethe’s correspondence with natural 
scientists such as Alexander von Humboldt. In 1853 he published a remarkable 
book, Ästhetik der Pflanzen (“The Aesthetics of Plants”) in which he developed a 
rather Romantic view on plant life and its impact on human beings. I will come 
back to it in more detail below. Besides gardening, Mendel engaged in various 
other scientific activities. Throughout his life he was interested in weather-forecasting 
and beekeeping. In fact, the majority of his publications are about meteorology. He 
was the official weather watcher of Brno, taking meteorological observations daily 
and sending them to the Vienna Meteorological Institute. Accurate observation and 
mathematical treatment of data is characteristic of his work in this area as well.
On two occasions, namely in 1850 and in 1856, he failed the examination 
that was supposed to bring him his teaching certificate as well as a permanent 
appointment – and on both occasions he fell ill. After the first failure, his superiors 
made it possible for him to study at the University of Vienna (1851–1853), where 
he received a thorough training in physics (with Doppler), mathematics (with 
Ettinghausen) and botany (with Unger) and acquainted himself with the logic of 
experimental research. Upon his return from Vienna to Brno, he started working 
with peas and in 1856, after his second failure, his seminal pea experiments in the 
monastery garden really began. He wanted to apply the standards of the “hard” 
sciences (notably physics) to biology, at a time when this was still a much “softer” 
science (Henig 2000).10 His abbot, running his monastery like a university depart-
ment, encouraged him to do so.11 Rather than questioning nature in an aggressive 
 9 He had been in charge of the experimental garden before Mendel and grew alpine plants in it to 
test whether changes in the environment led to changes in the plants themselves.
10 Cf. The famous saying by Ernst Rutherford that science is either physics or stamp collecting. In 
the days of Mendel biology was still to a large extent “natural history”, a scientific practice still 
centred around the art of collecting and classifying specimens.
11 Initially, Mendel had worked with mice, but a bishop who came to visit the establishment found 
it improper that a priest who had taken vows of chastity and celibacy should be watching and 
studying rodent sex. Therefore, but perhaps also for hygienic reasons, Mendel turned from animal 
to plant breeding. In those days not everybody realised that plants were sexual entities as well.
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manner, Mendel applied softer skills, such as painstaking brushwork. His work 
implied caressing rather than torturing nature, carefully moving his paintbrush 
among the delicate petals in order to fertilize his plants. Whereas Bacon said that 
nature reveals her secrets when put to torture, Mendel proved that nature reveals 
her secrets when she is stroked (Mawer 1998, p. 61). Nonetheless, his method came 
down to “castrating”, “de-sexing”, “emasculating” or “feminizing” his plants. Even 
in Mendel’s experiments there was an element of violence.
As is argued convincingly by Orel (1996), the Pisum-experiments were part of a 
larger, long-term research programme of which the work with peas formed only the 
first stage. After 8 years of experimentation he published his results and this brought 
him in contact with Nägeli, an expert in the field of hybridisation. The latter man-
aged to convince him that he should try his hand at Hieracium – a real challenge. 
Due to technical problems as well as to the fact that reproduction in Hieracium usu-
ally takes place through apomixis, his results were not very impressive. Although he 
published his data, the Hieracium-paper remained obscure until today (unfortu-
nately, the rediscovery of Mendel’s work only concerned his Pisum-paper, not his 
work as such). Besides Pisum (the garden pea) and Hieracium (hawkweed), Mendel 
worked with various other species as well, such as mice (already mentioned), beans, 
fuchsias and bees.12 After he was elected abbot, however, administrative duties 
increasingly interfered with his research work. Besides that, his health gradually 
deteriorated, notably due to stress, obesity (due to his excessive fondness for good 
food) and heavy smoking (recommended as a remedy to counter overweight). His 
administrative position brought him into a chronic conflict, first with the Austrian 
authorities, but eventually with more or less everyone around him. At the time of his 
death, his life must have seemed more or less a failure.
This is the basic outline of the story. The question to be addressed now is: what 
precisely was Mendel doing in his garden? What were the ideas he was putting to 
the test? To answer this question, we will first of all look at the ideas of his prede-
cessors, his sources of inspiration.
9.4 Mendel’s Predecessors
The monastery which Gregor Mendel entered was a centre of research and 
learning, an intellectual stronghold of considerable import. The combination of 
monasticism and research was less remarkable than stereotypical conceptions 
of monasticism may suggest.13 The study of natural science itself had originated 
12 Fragments by Mendel in which he analyses data on beans and some other species were published 
by Olby (1966).
13 William Whewell, author of an influential book entitled History of the Inductive Sciences 
(1837/1967), is usually held responsible for disseminating the belief that medieval times were 
scientifically speaking a dark and barren episode of stagnation.
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in monasteries in the Middle Ages. In recent years historians of science have 
successfully demolished the pernicious myth that experimental research only 
became possible after Enlightenment had put an end to the “dark”, monastic 
and gothic medieval style of thought.14 We now know that the experimental 
method, the scientia experimentalis, emerged in a monastic context. It was 
developed by outstanding medieval scholars such as Albert the Great, Peter 
Peregrinus, Duns Scotus and Cusanus (Grant 1974). These “gothic” experi-
menters were especially interested in physics (notably statics and dynamics), 
but some of them, such as Albertus Magnus (and presumably even his pupil 
Thomas Aquinas), had a lively interest in alchemy (or proto-chemistry) as well. 
These men were, one could say, the “gothic” predecessors of the “neo-gothic” 
biologist Gregor Mendel.
Modern experimental botany started with the discovery of sexuality in plants by 
Rudolf Jacob Camerer in 1694. Due to this discovery, hybridisation became an 
important method of investigation (Morton 1981). Mendel’s experiments were part 
of a flourishing research tradition and in his famous paper he mentions five prede-
cessors by name: Kölreuter, Gärtner, Herbert, Lecocq and Wichura. The first one, 
Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter (1733–1806) deserves our special attention. Starting 
from Camerer’s discovery of sexuality in plants, he argued that a demonstration of 
the existence of hybrids would be the strongest proof of sexual reproduction. He 
undertook a large number of controlled experiments, notably with Nicotiniana 
Rustica, and studied, for example, the re-conversion of hybrids to parental forms 
(Morton 1981). One of his greatest achievements was the discovery of the impor-
tance of insect pollination.15
His work is also interesting in terms of the theoretical framing of his experi-
ments. Kölreuter was especially interested in the possibility of Transmutation (in 
German: Verwandlung) of one species into another, that is, in the possibility of 
creating new species. Transmutation refers to a sudden rather than a gradual 
change. The word transmutation, moreover, has strong historical connotations – 
of an alchemical nature to be precise. Alchemists believed in the possibility of 
transmutation, notably in chemistry. They tried to produce sudden, leap-like 
changes of one metal or mineral into another (e.g. the transformation of lead into 
gold). Now the interesting thing is that, in Kölreuter’s case, the alchemical con-
notation of the word “transmutation” must be taken quite literally. He explicitly 
tells his readers that it is his objective to achieve in the field of botany what the 
alchemists had tried to achieve in the field of chemistry. He consciously com-
pares the transformation of one plant form into another with the alchemical 
14 One of the first to challenge the traditional image of medieval intellectual life was Oswald 
Spengler (1918/1923).
15 During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there were two types of naturalists: travellers 
who collected large numbers of specimen and data, and experimentalists who stayed at home. 
Kölreuter and Mendel belonged to the latter, less prestigious category (Olby 1966, p. 22).
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transformation of lead into gold.16 The alchemists believed that it was possible to 
improve or refine (literally: to ennoble) metals or minerals, Kölreuter argues, but 
for some reason or other they did not try their ideas on plants. Here, however, in 
the vegetable sphere or kingdom, the “miracle” can be successfully performed. 
We can really change certain characteristics of a plant form effectively.17 Due to 
this process, an original feature of a plant (e.g. a particular colour) is “repressed” 
(“Verdrungen”, p. 88) by the new feature (the colour of the new variety), artifi-
cially induced by the experimenter. He regards his results as “strikingly” similar 
to what the alchemists had in mind. And he states that the alchemists would have 
achieved their goal, had they applied their ideas to vegetable species rather than 
to metals. The comparison of botany with alchemy is less awkward than the 
contemporary reader may be inclined to think if we realize, for example, that 
the symbols for male (♂) and female (♀) used by Kölreuter, and still in use in 
biology today, were borrowed from the alchemical tradition, where they referred 
not only to male and female, but also to the plants, minerals and planets (Mars 
and Venus) associated with them.
We do not know whether or to what extent Kölreuter’s alchemical analogies 
were also guiding ideas for Mendel. Nonetheless, it is clear that Mendel was also 
involved in “creating a new kind of pea, a hybrid”, in order to find out “how new 
and better types of plants could be created” (Henig, p. 70/71). Like Kölreuter, he 
was interested in the question whether and how “man can create new species” 
(p. 74). How plausible then is the idea, articulated by Ernst Peter Fischer (2004), 
that Mendel could indeed be placed in a more or less alchemically minded botanical 
tradition? Whether scientists like it or not, the alchemical body of thought has had 
a tremendous influence on a large number of heroes of modern science such as 
Kepler, Newton and Boyle. Indeed, it is “an unmistakable part of modern science” 
(Fischer 2004, p. 1). Although in the eighteenth century alchemy was pushed away 
into the shadowlands of science, some fundamental ideas continued to be effective 
(p. 4). According to Fischer, alchemists’ ideas did have a considerable effect on 
Mendel. Like Kölreuter he studied and described the transformation of plants. He 
16 “Ich glaube durch [die Verwandlung einer Pflanze in die andere] eben so viel geleistet zu haben, 
als wenn ich Bley in Gold, oder Gold in Bley verwandelt hätte. Man hat die Verwandlung der 
Metalle von uralten Zeiten her für möglich gehalten; es ist aber noch niemand eingefallen, dass es 
möglich wäre, eine Pflanze in die andere, oder ein Tier in das andere zu verwandeln. Vielleicht 
erweckt es bey einigen meiner Leser ein vergnügen, wenn ich ihnen zeige, dass die Theorie der 
Alchymisten von dem Wachstum und der Veredlung der Metalle mit derjenigen, die ich von der. 
… Verwandlung einer Pflanze in die andere gegeben, sehr viel übereinkommt” (Kölreuter 1764, 
p. 88). I am indebted to Professor Ernst Peter Fischer (University of Berlin) for drawing my atten-
tion to this passage. The analogy with alchemy is briefly mentioned by Olby (1966, p. 29).
17 What changes abruptly in an experimental setting is not the plant form as such, of course, but 
rather certain definite characteristics. Nonetheless, an accumulation of such discrete changes may 
lead “nach und nach” (Kölreuter 1764, p. 88), but still relatively fast, to an alteration of the plant 
form as such.
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thought about the question how colour and shape of pea varieties could be changed 
and he was intrigued by the fact that sooner or later original forms (carrying 
“repressed” traits) were bound to recur.18
Although Mendel had studied Kölreuter carefully and highly regarded him, one 
might nonetheless argue for the possibility that he only used his botanical data and 
ignored Kölreuter’s “out-dated” theoretical framing. But on further consideration it 
is not that easy to separate the two completely. What Kölreuter and the alchemists 
had in common was the idea that sudden changes (transmutations) are possible, and 
this basic idea appealed to Mendel as well. His research also focused on the sudden 
disappearance or reappearance of particular characteristics in subsequent genera-
tions. There is a certain attractiveness to the possibility that the neo-gothic experi-
mentalist Mendel was, up to a certain extent, inspired by concepts that had 
flourished in gothic monasteries of medieval times, where outstanding monastic 
scholars had been involved in alchemical experiments. The decisive question is not, 
however, whether Mendel really believed in or was inspired by alchemy. What is 
important is that Mendel – and in this respect at least he agrees with the alchemical 
tradition – subscribed to the idea that more or less abrupt changes are possible in 
nature – natura facit saltus. Mendel proved that it is perfectly possible for a strain 
of garden peas to yield yellow and round peas in one generation, but green and 
wrinkled ones in the next.19
But perhaps this is all a bit far-fetched? Indeed, it may be somewhat hazardous, 
when it comes to making a connection between Mendel and alchemy, to rely on just 
one source, namely Kölreuter. I therefore want to follow this line of thinking a bit 
further. During the last decades of his life, Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) was 
intrigued by the extent to which alchemical schemas and ideas influenced modern 
science. Together with Nobel Prize winner Wolfgang Pauli (1900–1958), for exam-
ple, he explored the similarities between on the one hand some basic concepts of 
alchemy and on the other hand the epistemological profile of the new physics that 
originated in 1900, starting with Planck’s introduction of the photon-concept (Jung 
1952).20 After summarizing Jung’s findings I will once again raise the question to 
what extent Mendel’s basic views, his basic design, his style of thought, concurred 
with the epistemological profile of the alchemical tradition. What is at stake is not 
the question whether Mendel was an “alchemist”, or was “influenced” by alchemy. 
18 And it was perhaps more than just a coincidence that in 1865, in the very year Mendel presented 
his data, Friedrich August Kekulé von Stradonitz had his famous dream about a snake that bit his 
own tail – the ancient alchemical symbol of Ourobos that revealed to him the structure of 
benzene.
19 According to alchemists, circularity (e.g. in round peas) is dominant because it is more 
perfect.
20 A famous example of the reappearance of “repressed” alchemical conceptions in modern science 
is the dream (mentioned earlier) of Mendel’s contemporary Friedrich August Kekulé (1829–1896), 
also dealing with difficulties pertaining to the question of coniunctio (Jung 1946, p. 179). Jung 
describes it as a wandering alchemical idea that “finally reaches its chemical goal”.
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Rather, I intend to use the “logic” of alchemy to elucidate the epistemological pro-
file of “Mendelism”. And this will provide us with a first clue for answering the 
question why “time was not yet ripe” in 1866 for Mendel’s ideas.
9.5 Separate and Recombine
Of the many publications Jung devoted to alchemy in the later stages of his life, 
Mysterium Coniunctionis is perhaps the most important one (Jung 1995). According 
to Jung, the basic maxim of alchemy was solve et coagula – separate and recom-
bine. Alchemy tends to understand the world in terms of basic oppositions: hot – 
cold; humid – dry; red – white; warm – frigid; good – bad, etc. Some natural 
entities are “pure”, such as gold, but most natural entities are hybrid forms, combi-
nations of contrasting elements. They contain good things and bad.21 The combina-
tion of opposites into one entity is called a “chemical wedding”, and the union of 
Mars (the male factor) and Venus (the female factor) is an exemplification of this 
process of conjunction par excellence.
Alchemists are intrigued by the fact that hybrid forms are able to contain appar-
ently incompatible elements or “opposites” (coniunctio oppositorum). The visible 
element is combined somehow with its hidden (invisible) opposite. But how can 
incompatible elements coexist in one and the same entity? According to alchemy, 
this is possible because the dominant factor temporarily represses the opposite one. 
In the course of an alchemical procedure, however, it becomes possible to separate 
them once again. In this manner, alchemists tried to liberate “pure” but repressed 
entities in their laboratories. Alchemists tried to set free what was somehow “within” 
(Fischer 2004, p. 5). In Jung’s terms, they tried to recover the repressed element. In 
an alchemical procedure, the pure but hidden factor is given a chance to reveal itself. 
It is clear that Mendel’s work was also about hiding and setting free again certain 
repressed (recessive) “factors”. But the analogy goes much further than that.
The alchemical phrase coniunctio roughly corresponds to what modern chemists 
would refer to as “synthesis”. According to alchemists, laboratory work basically 
consists in reducing compounds to their “elements” or “factors” and in recombining 
these elements or factors into new conjunctions. But these new conjunctions do not 
display everything they contain. Natural as well as artificial entities are to be seen as 
combinations of active and passive, visible and invisible, conscious and unconscious 
elements, and one of the definitions of alchemy is that it is the art to make manifest 
what is hidden, and to hide what is manifest (Jung 1995, p. 283). The visible and 
hidden elements may be disconnected (“solution”) so that they reappear precisely as 
they were available in the beginning, before they were combined, either by the hand 
21 In rerum natura nihil est, quod non in se mali tantum quantum boni contineat (“In nature there 
is nothing that does not contain as many good things as bad”, 1995 p. 74).
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of nature or by the hand of man. Almost everything we encounter in the real world 
contains the hidden opposites of its visible features (1946/1958).22 This is also the 
case with human beings. According to Jung, our conscious personality is connected 
somehow to a hidden self, an unconscious alter ego. There is always the possibility 
however that, under certain circumstances, the repressed elements reappear. What 
goes for other entities goes for human beings as well. These unconscious factors 
may reappear in dreams or works of art, in therapeutic sessions or in novels – such 
as Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde – but also in the character traits of subsequent genera-
tions. A son may be similar to his father in certain respects, but he may well be his 
very opposite, his alter ego in others. In terms of career choice or partner choice, for 
example, he may reveal and realise his father’s hidden, repressed desires.
So far we have been discussing single pairs of opposite factors. The combination 
of two pairs of opposite factors constitutes what alchemists refer to as a 
“Quaternity”, another concept of pivotal importance in the alchemical tradition. 
The combination of a red male rose, for example, with a white female one would 
count as a “quaternity”. In the case of both opposites, one factor is usually the 
dominant and the other the “inferior” one, and therefore bound to become repressed. 
If we combine both pairs of opposite factors, one of the four resulting entities will 
contain both inferior factors. Therefore this “fourth” element of a quaternity will be 
quite unlike the other three and will more or less stand apart. It is different in the 
sense that it makes manifest what remains invisible in the other forms. This is why 
the proportio sesquitertia, the ratio 3:1, is of pivotal importance in alchemy. In the 
fourth entity reappears what is somehow present, yet hidden in the other three. Or, 
as alchemical wisdom has it, whenever there are three entities of something, there 
will always be a fourth, hidden somewhere. And whenever there are four entities 
of something, one of them is likely to be quite unlike the others.
One of the most important examples of the 3:1 ratio are the four elements of 
ancient Greek physics. There are four basic elements, but the fourth element (fire) 
is different from the other three and stands apart, because of it volatility – it is 
hardly a material element at all, rather something like warmth or light. It is there-
fore no coincidence that, whereas the other three elements are still present in con-
temporary science as the three states of aggregation (solid state, fluid state, gaseous 
state), the fourth element (fire) reappears in a completely different manner (namely 
as energy). In other words, if we start with four elements there is always the ten-
dency to reduce them to three, whereas if we start with three elements there is 
always the tendency to rediscover a fourth one.23
22 “Nach alchemistischer Lehre enthält jedes Element ‘innen’ sein Gegenteil” (1946/1958, p. 254).
23 To the mind of an alchemist, for example, it is no “coincidence” that Plato’s Timaios, his most 
“alchemical” work, begins as follows: “One, two, three – but where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth?” 
(Plato 1929/1999, 17 A). Another example Jung gives of the importance of the 3:1 ratio is the ambigu-
ous relationship between Virgin Mary and the Trinity, which involves three male persons and one 
(initially repressed) female person, that nonetheless makes its reappearance time and again.
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It is not difficult to discern the logic of the “conjunction of opposites” and the 
proportio sesquitertia as part of the basic conceptual framework of Mendel’s trials. 
The conjunction of opposites is a phrase he almost literally uses.24 He also speaks 
of a hybrid form as a combination (“Combination”) of elements (“Elemente”). The 
Mendelian 3:1 ratio can be regarded as a modern biological version of this propor-
tio. Indeed, one could even go a step further and discern a basic affinity between 
the mathematics of alchemy and that of Mendel. The mathematics of alchemy was 
based on the Pythagorean understanding of numbers. According to Pythagoras, the 
cosmos is structured in a perfectly mathematical fashion and the basic features of 
minerals, plants or planets can be described in terms of ideal mathematical propor-
tions. In this respect, the gnomon-concept is extremely important. Gnomons are 
numbers that can be represented as carpenter’s squares (such as 1, 3, 5 or 9) and 
they fit into a matrix:
They can be combined in various ways and used to describe natural entities. 
Mendelian proportions (e.g. 1:3:3:9) can be regarded as numerical relationships 
between “gnomons”. Other analogies between Pythagoras and Mendel can also be 
mentioned. For example, they were both members (even leaders) of religious 
scientific communities who spent their life in celibacy, and whereas Pythagoras 
introduced the primal equation of Euclidian geometry (a2 + b2 = c2), Mendel coined 
the first important equation of contemporary biology, namely: (A + a) (A + a) = 
A + 2Aa + a.25
In pointing out such analogies, however, we may run the risk of becoming too 
speculative. Although as I said there may be a certain attractiveness to the idea that 
Mendel’s key concepts can be connected to these ancient theories, it is important to 
keep in mind what it is we want to prove. I do not want to claim that Mendel was 
acquainted with, inspired by or even in support of alchemy – that is not the point. 
Especially in view of the “imperfection of the biographical record”, we have to be 
careful not to jump to conclusions. Not only would it be impossible to prove such a 
claim, it would also be irrelevant for my purposes. What is important is that there 
are certain structural similarities, certain congruencies in terms of basic logic 
between Mendelism and alchemy. Mendel’s experiments, intended to produce 
hybrid plant forms or to reproduce the original (“pure”) forms in subsequent genera-
tions, can be described as conjunctions and disjunctions of opposite “elements”. 
24 “Zwei differirende [Merkmale] vereinigen sich an der Hybride” (1866/1913, p. 6).
25 It was perhaps no coincidence that both Mendel and Pythagoras had such a remarkable interest 





Mendel even uses this very term in his paper.26 Examples he gives are characteristics 
such as green and yellow (pod colour), or dwarfish and tall (height of plants), where 
the inferior or recessive factor temporarily disappears from view. But the hidden 
factors or traits will re-emerge sooner or later, the original strains will reappear. This 
process can be described as a kind of “botanical wedding”, a conjunction of genetic 
opposites, the biological equivalent of the chemical wedding of alchemy. In terms 
of “basic logic” or “style of thinking”, some important congruencies can therefore 
be discerned between alchemy as a proto-experimental tradition and the kind of 
experimental botany that started with Kölreuter and others and reached its climax in 
the work of Mendel. Kölreuter himself had already pointed to it, but Jung’s analysis 
of the epistemological core concepts of alchemy lends it further support.
But what exactly did the alchemists and Mendel have in common? It was the 
belief, the basic scheme, the synthetic judgement a priori so to speak, that natural 
entities consist of combinations of discrete elements. They change when elements 
are added or removed, when “factors” become visible or repressed. This implies 
that changes in nature occur suddenly rather than gradually, in a discontinuous, 
leap-like fashion, as mutations. The idea that the “invisible” or “repressed” ele-
ments (e.g. a particular colour) may become visible all of a sudden is logically 
connected with the idea that the characteristics of the entities involved depend on 
discrete factors. These factors may be either visible or repressed, either dominant 
or inferior (“dominirende und … recessive [Merkmale]” as Mendel phrases it, p. 10). 
The sudden reappearance of the repressed trait in subsequent generations proves 
that the entities one is working with are hybrids. Due to the predominance (“das 
Übergewicht”) of the visible trait, the opposite trait (“das andere an der Hybride”, 
as Mendel phrases it) is no longer visible. These hybrids thus constitute examples 
of what alchemists referred to as a contiunctio oppositorum. The recessive trait has 
the tendency to “step back” (“zurücktreten”, Mendel’s term), but it is bound to 
reappear unaffected (“wieder unverändert zum Vorscheine kommen”) somewhere 
in the future.27 In short, Mendel and the alchemists both adhered to the discontinu-
ity-principle. They were convinced of the fact that leaps do occur in nature: natura 
facit saltus. The colour of peas may suddenly change from yellow to green or from 
green to yellow. Parents with wrinkled peas may suddenly produce off-spring with 
perfectly round ones. Nature progresses through sudden, discrete, definite changes, 
rather than through infinitesimal small ones, invisible to the human eye. These 
discontinuous changes may eventually lead to the transmutation of one species 
into another.28 According to Jung the discontinuity-principle was an “a priori” 
26 He uses German terms like “Combination” (p. 22) or “combiniren” (p. 37) and this can refer to 
“Merkmale” (p. 22) or “Elemente” (p. 41). He also speaks about the presence in hybrids of “dif-
ferirende Elemente” and “widerstrebende Elemente” (pp. 41, 42), in alchemical terms: coniunctio 
oppositorum.
27 “Des Ausdruck ‘recessiv’ wurde deshalb gewählt, weil die damit benannten Merkmale an den 
Hybriden zurücktreten oder ganz verschwinden, jedoch unter den Nachkommen derselben … 
wieder unverändert zum Vorschein kommen” (p. 10).
28 “Die Umwandlung einer Art in eine andere … ” (pp. 43, 46).
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statement (1946, p. 180), something that was part of the basic structure of alchemic 
thought. It exemplified its logic of Either/Or, in contrast to the post-alchemic logic 
of More and Less.29
Interestingly, however, the new physics that emerged from 1900 onwards reha-
bilitated this idea, in the form of the quantum concept. In a way, Mendel’s biology 
can be regarded as quantum biology. Rather than turning from green to yellow very 
slowly and gradually, in the course of countless generations, through many inter-
mediate forms, as is the case in the Darwinian understanding of change, peas may 
leap from the one to the other all of a sudden because these features somehow 
depend on discrete units. These units may remain hidden or latent for some time, 
but (as the alchemists already said) what is hidden may become manifest – all of a 
sudden. Indeed, Mendel’s experiments perfectly meet the definition of alchemy 
cited by Jung: It is the art of making visible what was previously hidden (or 
repressed), and of repressing what was previously visible.
The conclusion is not that Mendelian genetics is a form of alchemy. We may 
conclude, however, that alchemy and Mendelism have something in common, some-
thing very basic, namely the principle of discontinuity, as well as the idea (closely 
related to it) that natural entities such as plant forms can be understood in terms of 
combinations of definite “elements”. Natural entities may be “pure” forms, but often 
they contain combinations of “opposites”, one of which will be temporarily “invisi-
ble”, “dominated” or “repressed”. One of the reasons why Mendel’s ideas failed to 
be in agreement with the “spirit of the time” was the fact that, in the nineteenth cen-
tury, modern science had been able to overcome and “repress” its disturbing alter 
ego, alchemy. Was Mendel himself, as a neo-gothic biologist who adhered to the 
discontinuity-principle, a kind of “recurrence of the repressed”, something that had 
to remain invisible, had to be forgotten once again, had to be repressed by the domi-
nant logic of the time, the logic of continuity and gradual progress? Think of the 
posthumous burning of his papers, containing among other things the records of his 
experiments with various other species besides Pisum and Hieracium. And why was 
the year 1900, the year of Mendel’s rediscovery, suddenly more favourably disposed 
to the epistemological profile of his thinking, so that his discovery could finally 
become visible again? These are the questions I would like to address in the follow-
ing sections, using comparative epistemology as my method.
9.6 Playing Chess with Nature
Gregor Mendel’s monastery was built in the fourteenth century, at a time when Roger 
Bacon developed his concept of a scientia experimentalis, and it is intriguing to think 
of Mendel’s work as the neo-gothic revival of medieval (“gothic”) experimentalism. 
29 Mendel explicitly states that he will focus his attention on traits that differ in a discontinuous 
manner (“deutlich und entschieden”) rather than on those that differ in a gradual, continuous 
fashion (“mehr oder weniger”, 1866/1913, p. 7).
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Mendel lived and worked at a time when architecture experienced something of a mas-
sive recurrence of the repressed: the return of the gothic style in the form of neo-gothic 
architecture. The Houses of Parliament in London, for example, erected between 1834 
and 1864, constituted one of the highlights of the neo-gothic wave in European archi-
tecture and the process of its construction roughly coincided with Mendel’s edification 
as a scientist. The great bell was winched into position in 1858, when Mendel was 
already engrossed in his experiments. The neo-gothic, neo-medieval style was visible 
in other realms of culture as well, such as art. Mendel was a contemporary of Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti (1828–1882), for example, whose lifework consisted in rehabilitating 
the late medieval, preraffaelite artistic style, and of Gustave Doré (1832–1883), famous 
for his neo-gothic illustrations of the Bible, Dante’s Divine Comedy and similar “neo-
medieval” publications. In theology, the neo-gothic mood was represented by authors 
like Cardinal Newman, still famous for his conversion to Roman Catholicism. Mendel 
himself as a youth had joined the glorification of the late-medieval mind when he wrote 
a paean to Johann Gutenberg who in the 1430s had invented the moveable type. 
Intuitively, the German pioneer Gutenberg had been an object of identification for him. 
Whereas his contemporaries failed to acknowledge his achievement sufficiently during 
his lifetime, Mendel wrote, he would nonetheless feel satisfied when, arising from his 
grave, he would notice how his art was thriving among those who came after him.
In his novel Mendel’s Dwarf Simon Mawer puts considerable emphasis on the neo-
gothic backdrop of Mendel’s research, for instance when he mentions that Newman 
was going over to Rome “exactly at the same time that father Gregor … was watering 
his first-generation peas” (1998, p. 170). Mawer refers to contemporary laboratories 
of molecular biology as the “cathedrals” of the new age … were priests and scribes 
decipher and transcribe the texts, and find damnation written just as clearly as they 
ever did in medieval times” (p. 66) – observing en passant that these laboratories are 
quite often situated in neo-gothic premises. His comparison of the modern laboratory 
with a medieval scriptorium resonates of course with the widespread comparison of 
DNA with a library or a text to be copied, and of genes with letters or words.
Mawer’s novel is a story about a dwarf (Benedict Lambert) who happens to be a 
key expert on genetics and who is said (by family legend) to be genetically related to 
Mendel (he would be his great-great-great nephew). His life’s work ironically con-
sists of finding the gene that “caused him”, and of developing a genetic test that will 
allow future parents (by means of selective abortion) to prevent the birth of children 
suffering from dwarfism (achondroplasia) – such as Benedict Lambert himself. As a 
dwarfish biologist he constitutes a kind of visualisation or exemplification of what 
can go wrong (and should somehow be prevented) in the process of human procrea-
tion (copying the code). This is how Mawer describes the reaction of laboratory 
researchers when Benedict Lambert enters their laboratory for the first time:
They looked up from their benches and stared. … In the street it is the fascination of the 
freak show, of the monster, of the walking gargoyle, in the laboratories, within the temples 
of molecular biology, it is the thrill of seeing a manifestation of the texts that they read with 
such minute attention, as though a beast from the Apocalypse were walking through the 
scriptorium of a medieval monastery and by his existence confirm the truth of everything 
that the monks just had transcribed. (p. 67).
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This is one among many comparisons Mawer makes between late medieval gothic 
science (copying and glossing ancient texts) and “neogothic” (Mendelian) biology 
(analyzing and transcribing the language of DNA). Mendel led the life of a medie-
val monk, a life of celibacy, punctuated by timetables and calendars. This allowed 
him to become involved in as drudgery a work as that of counting and counting 
thousands of peas, year after year, a monk-like type of activity. Mendel’s monastic 
lifestyle made it possible. He really represented neo-gothic biology.
Mendel’s research, however, was not the only form of biology that flourished in 
this monastic context of discovery at Brno. On the contrary, his pea experiments 
constituted a kind of follow-up of the research activities his colleague Franz Thomas 
Bratranek had been involved in, although they ostensibly differed from them quite 
dramatically. Bratranek was undoubtedly the most famous friar of the Augustinian 
monastery during his lifetime. Abbot Cyrill Napp considered him the most outstand-
ing scientific figure in the monastery (Orel 1996). What did Mendel’s most respected 
scholarly colleague think of nature in general and of plant life in particular?
His book Beiträge zu einer Aesthetik der Pflanzenwelt [“Contributions to an 
Aesthetics of Plant Life”] was published in 1853 – the very year Mendel took up 
working in his garden. In this book a view on plant forms is presented that at first 
glance appears to be as far removed from Mendel’s experimental work as possible. 
Bratranek’s “green aesthetics”, as it is sometimes called, constitutes the other 
extreme of neo-gothic biology so it seems. Apparently, their styles of research 
could hardly differ more. According to Bratranek, nature presents itself to us pri-
marily as a meaningful whole, a landscape, and particular plant forms give this 
landscape an identity, a face. In other words, typical plants forms determine a land-
scape’s physiognomy. As was already explained in Chapter 7, Bratranek adheres to 
the “romantic” idea that landscapes invoke in us a certain subjective mood, sym-
bolised by the plant forms that represent it. And this explains the almost magical 
rapport between subjectivity (Stimmung, “mood”) and objectivity (the landscape, 
notably the typical plant forms encountered in it) that so often befalls us while 
wandering through charming natural surroundings. On the other hand, a certain 
mood may urge us to transform a landscape by means of gardening, in order to 
attune it to our subjectivity.30 The rapport between sensitive individuals and land-
scapes explains why certain plant forms will strike us as particularly beautiful and 
valuable. A poet will write about this particular plant form in order to articulate the 
mood that was invoked in him by the landscape type in question. And this mysteri-
ous concordance, this empathy between subject and object, between man and 
nature, poetry and plant forms, arouses in us a sense of profound happiness.
Bratranek’s view of nature builds on the ideas of Goethe, Alexander von 
Humboldt and others, but he is also familiar with representatives of the alchemical 
tradition, such as Paracelsus, whose ideas had a notable influence on Goethe as 
30 “Die Stimmung des Menschen [wird] durch den Vegetationscharakter der Landschaft geleitet, 
und andererseits spiegelt die Innigkeit selbst ihre Gestaltung in der Wahl von Pflanzen und in 
solcher Umgestaltung der Landschaft ab” (1853, p. 23).
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well. The latter’s masterpiece Faust is basically a drama about alchemy.31 Notably, 
Bratranek agrees with Paracelsus that a profound parallelism exists, not only 
between subject (poet) and object (flower), but also between, for instance, flowers 
and stars.32 Stars constitute a heavenly, sidereal garden, while both starry and veg-
etable flowers may have a “magical” influence on us (p. 14). Individuals may have 
a star and a flower of their own, marking their identity. This correspondence is part 
of the idea of a cosmic parallelism that exists between the various spheres33 of real-
ity: the mineral, vegetable, animal, human, planetary and sidereal spheres, etc. The 
sun flower, for example, is associated with gold (metal) and with the sun (heavenly 
body). Various practices were based on this idea, widespread in previous epochs, 
not only astrology, but also the habit of Germanic priests, described in Chapter 3, 
to study the neighing and snorting of wild horses they kept in sacred groves.
This idea of cosmic affinities was a key concept of alchemy. Alchemists dis-
cerned fundamental affinities between the various realms of nature: between miner-
als, plants and human beings, but also between the heavenly bodies and man. Our 
languages still contain many reminiscences of these ancient theories, for example, 
when we speak about “veins” in the crust of the earth, and the “mouth” of a vol-
cano, comparing “mother earth” to a massive body. The various spheres or king-
doms of nature were seen as mirroring one another and Bratranek’s key area of 
interest, the congruency between subjective mood and landscape, is part of this 
universal parallelism. But in order to discern all this, he argues, we must con-
sciously withdraw ourselves from scientific reasoning, from activities such as clas-
sification and calculation.34 Rather, we must rely on the subjective experiences of 
poets. People in general and poets in particular may interact with nature in a more 
intuitive vein, and Bratanek’s research builds on this basic mental sensitivity, as 
documented by poetry, fairy tales and other forms of literature. The dialogue 
between subjective experience and plant forms is part of the great cosmic play of 
mirroring analogies.
Should we regard the “poetic” views of Bratranek and the “mathematical” views 
of Mendel as logical opposites? In a certain way: yes, but it depends on what we 
precisely mean by this term. Bratranek’s idea of communication between humans 
and plant forms refers to particular ways of experiencing and interacting with 
nature. It invites us to look at nature or a forest in a particular way. Mendel himself 
also communicated with the plants forms in his garden, albeit in a rather different 
manner. He saw them not as exemplifications of landscapes, but rather as mosaics, 
31 Carl Gustav Jung calls it the highlight of the alchemical tradition: “das letzte und grösste alche-
mistische Werk” (1946, p. 221).
32 “Jeder Stern am Himmel ist ein geistiges Gewächs, dem ein Kraut bei uns auf Erde entspricht, 
und jener zieht durch seine anziehende Kraft das ihm entsprechende Kraut auf der Erde an, und 
jedes Kraut ist daher ein irdischer Stern und wächst über sich dem Himmel zu” (p. 205).
33 Spheres (Greek: σϕαιρα) here to be taken in its literal sense as a series of concentric globes 
(Sloterdijk 1999).
34 Science (“verständige Wissenschaft”) desires to calculate and classify (“berechnen, numeriren 
und classificiren”, p. 6).
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as compilations of discrete factors. That is why Mendel became an experimenter 
rather than a poet and why his methodology was mathematical rather than aestheti-
cal. In Bratranek’s view, plant species have a meaning. Individuals, social classes, 
political parties35 and countries identify themselves with plants. The Edelweiss as a 
plant form, for instance, symbolizes the alpine landscape, giving it an identity and 
a face. In a similar way we could say that the garden pea is full of meaning. It sym-
bolizes the vegetable world, the household garden, the domain of early childhood, 
of motherhood and the “oral stage”. Whereas in poetry and fairy tales this dimen-
sion of meaning is retained, in Mendel’s work it is “repressed”. The garden pea has 
become a model organism, the object of accurate calculations. The mathematician 
and the poet have gone their separate ways. Mendel and Bratranek are the ego and 
the alter ego of neo-gothic biology. They articulate complementary views than can 
no longer be merged into one single comprehensive view. What is repressed in 
Mendel (the meaning of particular plant forms) is emphatically emphasised in 
Bratranek, and vice versa: the calculative view of scientific reasoning is con-
sciously rejected in Bratranek’s work. And still, their views somehow belong 
together, they originated in the same intellectual community, the same context of 
discovery. The one is the reverse image of the other. Unfortunately, although 
Bratranek wrote about roses, lilies and fuchsias (Mendel’s favourite plant form), he 
mentioned the garden pea just once, in passing. Others, however, paid due attention 
to it. Prominent poetical counterparts to Mendel, in which peas and other plant 
forms have meaning, are not at all absent. These literary documents, as reverse 
images of his work, may help us to deepen our understanding of Mendel’s views.
One of Mendel’s contemporaries was Lewis Caroll (1832–1898) who likewise 
tried to combine botany with mathematics, but in a literary fashion. Alice in 
Wonderland was written and published in 1865, the very year in which Mendel pre-
sented his research findings. It contains an interesting passage about a large rose-tree 
near the entrance of a garden. The roses growing on it are white. Alice enounters 
three gardeners, busily painting the roses red. Why are they doing such a thing? 
There ought to have been a red rose-tree, they explain. They put a white one in by 
mistake, and the Queen will be furious if she discovers it (1865/1965a, p. 75). In 
other words, characteristics of roses (such a colour) are discrete (either white or red), 
rather than continuous. Apparently, the gardeners planted a mutation and now they 
are busy tranforming the rose-tree from the one variety into the other, but their tech-
niques for doing so are rather primitive, and fraudulous at that. To really change a 
rose from white to red would amount to something like horticultural alchemy.
Mendel’s method for communicating with his plant forms, for entering into a 
dialogue with the species in his garden can perhaps be clarified if we think of the 
way in which Alice in Through the Looking-Glass interacted with the plants forms 
she encountered in the garden (Carroll 1872/1965b). Alice quickly discovers that it 
is not impossible to communicate with flowers:
35 The plane-tree of Socrates, the red rose of socialism, the potato of the working classes, the white 
lily of French aristocracy, etc.
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“O Tiger-lily,” said Alice, addressing herself to one that was waving gracefully about in 
the wind, “I wish you could talk!”
“We can talk,” said the Tiger-lily: “when there’s anybody worth talking to.” (Carroll 1872, p. 26)
Nature does talk, flowers do talk – but only to those who are worth talking to, who 
are able to ask the right kind of questions in the right sort of way. Nature is willing 
to speak, but only if she is being addressed in a proper language. Only then is she 
willing and able to answer the questions posed to her. How are we to question 
nature? The next scene in the book provides us with a hint:
“For some minutes Alice stood without speaking, looking out in all directions over the 
country – and a most curious country it was. There were a number of tiny little brooks run-
ning straight across it from side to side, and the ground between was divided up into 
squares by a number of little green hedges, that reached from brook to brook. “I declare 
it’s marked out just like a large chessboard!” Alice said at last. … “It’s a great huge game 
of chess that’s being played – all over the world.” (p. 32)
What are we to make of this awkward scene? Simon Mawer’s novel proves helpful 
here. At a certain point he draws the attention of his readers to a famous photograph 
of Mendel, taken from a group photograph of the friars of the Augustinian monas-
tery at Brno in 1862. Mawer writes:
Father Gregor holds a Fuchsia flower. He holds it up almost for the camera to see, and he 
squints at it pointedly, with a quizzical expression, as though asking it a question. … Father 
Gregor holds a fuchsia and asks it a question. (1998, p. 43)
But how is it possible to ask questions to a flower? The answer is given 
elsewhere:
[Mendel] watched and examined and thought. He had the mind of a chess player (he was 
a chess-player) and he watched nature’s moves patiently. (p. 60)
Mendel played chess with nature. He charmed her into playing a game of chess. He 
made a move, using a particular combination, and waited for nature to respond. The 
same idea, the same image of friar Mendel playing chess with nature is used in 
Henig’s book:
Skilled chess player that he was, he was thinking through his next move and his next. … 
He wanted to see what would happen to the non-dominating trait. (Henig 2000, p. 80)
Mendel was able to speak with nature, and particularly with flowers, because he 
addressed them in a language that allowed nature to answer him. He was, in a way, 
the scientific counterpart of Alice. He addressed nature in the manner of a chess 
player, transforming his garden into a checkerboard. As Henig (2000, p. 215) points 
out, Mendel’s checkerboard later evolved into Punnett’s matrix or Punnett’s square 
(Punnett 1911) with traits like colour, size or shape serving as chess pieces. 
Mendel’s experiments were part of a movement known as the mathematisation of 
nature. Playing chess with nature was a mathematical and experimental way of 
questioning her.
There are other literary sources, however, roughly contemporary to Mendel’s 
work, that may help us to elucidate the epistemological profile his research practice. 
Two of the fairy tales written by Hans Christian Andersen (1805–1875) happen to 
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be pea stories – they are devoted to garden peas. Indeed, like Mendel, Andersen has 
written on peas. In 1853, the very year in which Bratranek published his plant aes-
thetics and Mendel began his activities in the garden of his monastery, Andersen 
wrote a pea story that actually describes something of a pea experiment.36 It com-
bines, as an epistemological hybrid, as it were, the two perspectives that are emerg-
ing as separate and “pure” in the writings of Bratranek and Mendel. On the one hand 
it describes the garden pea as the perfect icon of the household garden. It identifies 
this garden as a particular, intimate place, a childhood landscape. This is the poetic, 
Bratranek-like aspect of the story. On the other hand, it clearly displays the structure 
of an experimental design, in which numbers and conditions play a role: peas are 
being counted and tested.
Five peas, taken from one and the same shell, find themselves suddenly exposed 
to the outside world. It is a story about the struggle for life under different conditions. 
Initially, while still safely growing in their shell, the world had seemed completely 
green, and therefore safe, but when all of a sudden the shell is torn off by the hand of 
a little boy, their view of the world is bound to change. It is, so to speak, their trauma 
of birth. One by one, the boy shoots them away with his pea-shooter and each pea 
lands in a different spot. At first glance, it is a typical childhood story. From a psy-
choanalytical viewpoint, the story is a psychic exercise and the peas may be seen as 
allowing the boy to anticipate the psychic transition from the oral phase (in which 
peas represent food and motherhood) to the phallic phase (for he also can be seen as 
practicing proto-phallic activities with a proto-phallic instrument). But then a reversal 
occurs: the fairy tale becomes something of an experiment. The pea become experi-
mental entities in a trial, each pea being exposed to specific conditions. Only one of 
them will eventually be able to grow into a mature plant. A childhood game inadvert-
ently gives way to an experimental setting.37
The one pea plant that survives happens to grow just outside the garret where a 
young girl is recovering from her illness. Their vicissitudes seem to mirror one 
another – they both barely make it: a vegetable entity (representing the vegetable 
sphere) as an accompaniment of a human subject. The pea is the only flower in her 
“little garden”, the only other living entity with which the girl amuses herself dur-
ing her recovery. She has a garden containing just one plant: N = 1, so to speak. An 
intimate bond of affinity develops between these two living beings. Upon her 
recovery she gently kisses the delicate leaves. Once again, it is the idea of parallel-
ism between human subjects and a particular plant form. It was Mendel himself 
who chose the fuchsia as his personal plant and called his peas his “children”. 
Mendel can be compared to the pea-shooting boy, planting peas in various settings 
and under various conditions, but also to the girl who forms such an intimate bond, 
a mental rapport with her vegetable alter ego. Mendel himself fell ill at critical 
36 “Fem fra en ærtebælg” (“The Pea Blossom”). Andersen (1993), pp. 404–406.
37 The primal experiment was of course recounted in the famous parable of the sower who went 
out to sow his seeds. Some fell along the road, some on the rocks, still others amid thorns, and 
some on good, fertile ground (Matt. 13:3–23; Mk 4:2–20; Lk 8:4–15).
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times during his life, spending extended periods of time in his bed, and one could 
say that after one of these crises, when he failed his second examination, it really 
were the pea plants that saved him. Yet, in his case, N amounted to very many.
A second story by Andersen, a far more famous one, happens to be about peas as 
well. The Princess on the Pea, written by Andersen in 1835, is a story about a prince 
who sets out to find a suitable princess.38 How can he be sure that the princess is a 
real princess? There is always something that raises his suspicion. How to distinguish, 
in a reliable manner, a real princess from a fake one on the basis of “phenotype” 
alone? Unfortunately, the prince lacks the means, the methodology so to speak, to 
answer this type of question in a reliable way and this epistemological deficit seri-
ously frustrates his chances of establishing intimate relationships with women, for we 
are told that he finally comes home again to live with his parents, as a bachelor. His 
mother, however, is an expert when it comes to the epistemology of partner choice. 
As soon as a marriage candidate (a girl who claims to be a princess, although her 
outward appearance – her “phenotype” as it were – does not seem to confirm this) 
presents herself, she quickly decides to set up an experimental design, a test.
‘Well, we’ll soon find that out,’ thought the old queen. But she said nothing, went into the 
bed-room, took all the bedding off the bedstead, and laid a pea on the bottom; then she took 
twenty mattresses and laid them on the pea, and then twenty eider-down beds on top of the 
mattresses.
On this the princess had to lie all night. In the morning she was asked how she had slept.
‘Oh, very badly!’ said she. ‘I have scarcely closed my eyes all night. Heaven only knows 
what was in the bed, but I was lying on something hard, so that I am black and blue all over 
my body. It was horrible!’
Now they knew that she was a real princess because she had felt the pea right through the 
twenty mattresses and the twenty eider-down beds.
In other words, the queen subjects the girl to an experimental test (N = 1). Without 
informing the subject, she exposes her to an experimental condition in which a pea 
functions as a subluminal cue, so to speak. Sensitivity, rather than outward appear-
ance, is the criterion. The experiment requires a whole night. Whereas the inde-
pendent variable is the presence of a pea, the dependent variable is the amount of 
sleep the girl will get. The next morning, when asked to estimate the amount of 
sleep she had, her answer is highly significant. “Nobody but a real princess could 
be as sensitive as that”, the Queen concludes, and so “the prince took her for his 
wife, for now he knew that he had a real princess”.
Although in terms of outward appearance (phenotype) she may not look like a 
princess at all, the decisive trait (“exceptional sensitivity”) is apparently part of her 
genetic make-up. Extreme environmental conditions such as meteorological hardship 
(the bad weather and the thunderstorm to which she had been exposed in the beginning 
of the story) can perhaps temporarily conceal it, but they cannot completely repress or 
erase it. This characteristic feature is bound to manifest itself under experimental 
 conditions sooner or later. Moreover, being a princess is a matter of either/or. Either 
38 “Prinsessen på ærten” (“The Princess on the Pea”). Andersen (1993), pp. 25–26.
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one is endowed with this extreme form of sensitivity or not. It is a discrete unity or 
factor. It introduces a discontinuity between “true” princesses and normal people (in 
whom this trait will be, if present at all, “repressed”). Although Andersen describes an 
experiment that may be regarded as primitive (N = 1) in comparison to Mendel’s work 
with thousands of pea plants, they share the experimental style of thinking, as well as 
the conviction that the traits under study are discontinuous and discrete. In short, there 
is a Mendelian atmosphere in Andersen’s story. The prince is looking for a real prin-
cess: a pure and rare variety. Being a princess would probably count as homozygote 
recessive in terms of Mendelian genetics. The affinity resides not only in the fact that 
Andersen’s story describes an experimental setting, but also in the fact that the a priori 
logical structure is basically the same.
Thus, Andersen’s fairy tales represent a literary counterpart to Mendel’s classical 
paper. Moreover, the views (apparently incompatible) of Mendel and Bratranek are 
combined in these stories – apparently they are not logically incompatible. On the one 
hand, the pea emerges as a meaningful plant form that represents (in psychoanalytic 
terms) the transition from the oral to the phallic phase, from the childhood garden to the 
marriage bed – for also in Andersen’s second pea story the pea pod becomes transformed 
from an edible entity into an erotic symbol, that can easily be associated with either 
semen – as in The Pea Blossom – or with the  clitoris – as in The Princess on the Pea. 
That the restlessness of the princess has erotic significance is obvious – it was essentially 
a test of love, focusing on physical symptoms. A particular form of sensitivity is awak-
ened in her body. At the same time, the structure, the design of the story is determined 
by an experimental (indeed: Mendelian) style of thought. Thus, Andersen’s story indi-
cates how the works of Mendel and Bratranek, apparently quite separate, as ego and alter 
ego, can be recombined and merged as complementary views.
There is at least one other literary classic, one other literary “double” that seems 
to mirror Mendel’s work, although it is about humans rather than about peas, namely 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886/1981). It is a tale 
of two psychic dimensions coming together in one single person. One of these 
dimensions, the manifest personality, is Henry Jekyll: a pure gentleman of average 
height. The other one, the latent or repressed personality is Mr. Hyde: a dwarfish 
criminal. Whereas Jekyll lives in a bourgeois neighbourhood (Cavendish Square, the 
“citadel of medicine”), is engaged in respectable academic pursuits and entertains 
academic friendships, his hidden “other” or alter-ego lives in Soho, a creature of the 
twilight and the night. Jekyll is described as a perfect representative of the homo 
academicus (he is introduced as “Henry Jekyll M.D., D.C.L., L.L.D., F.R.S., etc.”), 
whereas in his description of Mr. Hyde, Stevenson emphasises the latter’s deform-
ity, his “troglodytic” malformation. The story is a more modern version of the trag-
edy of Mephistopheles and Faust,39 where a repressed aspect of Faust’s personality 
seems to separate itself from a psychic unity that had become unstable due to Faust’s 
psychological problems, his epistemological neurosis, his mid-life crisis.
39 Jekyll shares with Faust the latter’s aversion to “the dryness of a life of study” (p. 85) and the 
“self-denying toils of [his] professional life.”
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Like Faust, Henry Jekyll is an outstanding bachelor scientist in his mid-life. 
Yet, notwithstanding his impressive academic track record, there is in him a 
tendency – indeed: a hidden, recessive tendency – towards the “unscientific”, as 
his colleague and lifelong critic Lanton clearly observes: a tendency to become 
engaged in “scientific heresies”, such as “transcendental medicine” (p. 76).40 
These illicit activities reveal that his psychic personality is not a unity, but rather 
a combination of two factors that can be separated from one another.41 His labo-
ratory is a rather secluded site, difficult to enter and located in what formerly 
had been a dissection room (a research field that had been regarded as highly 
dubious and heretic in the past). He transformed it into a “modern” experimental 
laboratory, but in his research facilities a series of strange experiments, reminis-
cent of alchemy, are conducted – in utmost secret.
Stevenson’s tale is a story about the basic “duplicity of life”, the “duality of 
man”, and about sudden transformations, from one personality into another, by 
means of chemistry (or alchemy). In Jekyll’s laboratory, human personalities 
change, not gradually, as in normal life, but in a sudden, leap-like fashion: natura 
facit saltus. The story is usually seen as an anticipation of Freud, but we could also 
see it as a counterpart to Mendel. Dr. Jekyll is a hybrid personality who, in the 
course of the story, dissolves, falls apart, so that the “lower” element is set free, 
only temporarily at first, but in the end for good. The higher element is bereft of 
its “supremacy” and dethroned by the “lower element”, suddenly “expressing” 
itself. Referring to his counterpart, Jekyll says: “This too was myself”. The ordi-
nary self is a compound, a hybrid. By exposing himself to a drug (a white powder), 
the repressed, recessive element may separate itself from this compound and 
express itself in its pure form. Whereas the ordinary self is double: a heterozygote 
so to speak (secretly struggling with a “hidden tendency”), the hidden dimension, 
as soon as it absolves itself form the hybrid union, is a homozygote, a downright 
criminal. Or, as Dr. Jekyll phrases it quite explicitly in the novel: “It [i.e. Mr. Hyde, 
his “other” character] seemed more express and single, than the imperfect and 
divided countenance I had hitherto accustomed to call mine. … Hence, although 
I had now two characters, as well as two appearances, one was wholly evil, and 
the other was still the old Henry Jekyll, that incongruous compound of whose 
reformation and improvement I had already learned to despair” (84/85). Indeed, 
Jekyll was “composite” (91), or heterozygote, but in his “hours of weakness” he 
“returned to this subordinate station of a part instead of a person” (101). Thus, 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is about the recessive element setting itself free. Separated 
from the dominant aspects of Jekyll’s personality, this hidden part suddenly 
becomes visible in its own right. Jekyll is engaged in an experiment that displays 
similarities to Mendel’s trials, although whereas Mendel performed his experiments 
40 This idea of transcendental medicine returns in Jekyll’s own confession: “It chanced that the direc-
tion of my scientific studies … led me wholly towards the mystic and the transcendental” (p. 79).
41 [The] direction of my scientific studies … reacted and shed a light on the perennial war among 
my members (p. 79).
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on peas, Dr. Jekyll performs them upon himself. The researcher is his own research 
subject or model organism. But the idea is similar: separate and recombine. 
Separate what (in ordinary personalities) is combined, and recombine the elements 
once again. As Jekyll himself phrases it: the basic objective of his research is “the 
separation of these elements”, these “polar twins”, the just and the unjust, continu-
ously struggling (p. 80). Unfortunately, as seems to be more often the case in 
practices of alchemy, the second part of the experiment (“recombine”) proves 
rather more difficult.42
Jules Verne wrote a novel that is quite similar to Stevenson’s in various respects, 
namely Le secret de Wilhelm Storitz [The Secret of Wilhelm Storitz] (1910/1913). 
This book (posthumously published) is also about a scientist, living in seclusion and 
secretly engaged in strange experiments that turn out to be alchemical (rather than 
chemical) trials. In fact, Wilhelm Storitz is literally and repeatedly called an “alche-
mist”. While Jekyll had been engaged in “transcendental medicine”, Storitz has 
devoted his life to “transcendental chemistry” (p. 245). Instead of transforming him-
self into another aspect of his own self, as happens in Stevenson’s story, he makes 
himself invisible, but the basic tenet is quite similar. Wilhelm is the son of Otto 
Storitz, a famous chemist, who greatly contributed to the progress of physics and 
who rightfully earned his place in the annals of science, although he was already 
notorious for his occasional excursions into the field of alchemy. In the same way 
that Mr. Hyde had been the “son” (more or less) of Dr. Jekyll, Wilhelm is Otto’s 
progeny. He is the “second generation”, so to speak, in whose research practices 
become manifest what remained more or less hidden and illicit in those of the first 
generation. Whereas his father was still an epistemological hybrid, Wilhelm is a 
downright alchemist, a “pure” alchemist, who has left the path of scientific chemistry 
unequivocally and for good. He moves about in the twilight, following by-passers 
closely, like an invisible shadow, frightening them. His laboratory is remarkable 
similar to that of Jekyll. At first glance, it seems an outright chemical laboratory, 
with books, heating devices, glass work, etc. But a strange odour makes it clear that 
a secret compound is being produced there. By introducing it into his organism, the 
secluded introvert Wilhelm Storitz manages to transform himself into his ghostly 
alter ego. Living the life of a bachelor (like Jekyll), his invention allows him to enter 
the houses and bedrooms of women, thus endangering, as Verne formulates it, the 
intimacies of family life. It is of course remarkable to notice that, although chemistry 
was placed on a firm scientific footing by Lavoisier and others in the eighteenth 
century, thereby replacing alchemy (or “gothic” chemistry) for good, literary 
authors of the nineteenth (and early twentieth) century were still fascinated with 
alchemical practices as the repressed and hidden dimension of chemistry, as its 
epistemological double or secret aspect. One could regard it as a neo-gothic fascina-
tion, as neo-alchemy, and a return of the repressed.
42 Jekyll himself attributes this failure to “impurities” of the sample of the compound that causes 
the change, but the impossibility of replication is a standard problem in alchemy and due to the 
fact that so many conditions (not only chemical but also psychological and astrological ones) have 
to be favourable for the experiment to succeed.
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We may conclude that, from a comparative epistemological perspective, Mendel’s 
work was not at odds with his cultural environment. Comparable experiments as 
the ones he performed were recorded by literary authors. In their stories, they 
describe experiments that share some structural similarities with Mendel’s. We 
have discussed a number of stories about the presence or absence of discrete causal 
factors, and of recessive factors that are allowed to separate themselves and mani-
fest themselves in the context of scientific or literary experiments. What Zola 
claimed for novels apparently may apply to stories and fairy tales as well. Although 
Andersen’s queen is a “lay” person, she uses forms of reasoning that resonate with 
the experimental method as it was emerging in the formal discourses of science, 
notably in the life sciences, where this style of reasoning was more or less new 
(imported from physics and chemistry). At the same time, there is an epistemological 
distance between the tendencies of these tales (including Mendel’s) and main-
stream discourse in the life sciences of the day. It is no coincidence that Jekyll is 
accused of having reverted to scientific “heresies” – namely alchemy: the art of 
provoking leap-like changes by means of procedures that may prove somewhat 
difficult or hazardous to replicate. Mendel’s work is not at all out of tune with what 
literary writers of his time such as Andersen, Carroll, Stevenson and Verne were 
doing.43 To the extent that a lack of congruency hampered the outreach of his work, 
it concerned the scientific discourse of Mendel’s time. What is repressed in aca-
demic discourse on natural history, namely the logic of discontinuity, is retained in 
literary genres. Mendel’s problems with the Zeitgeist predominantly concerned its 
scientific dimension. His being “at odds with his time” predominantly concerned 
his relationship with his scientific contemporaries, with the scientific trends and 
tendencies of his era. Elsewhere I pointed to important similarities between 
Mendel’s work and a number of previous endeavours, such as Kölreuter’s work. 
But how are we to situate Mendel vis-a-vis biology as it existed and evolved during 
his own lifetime, in the 1850s and 1860s?
9.7 Science Communication
Although Gregor Mendel’s fame rests on his article on peas, he actually published 
not one, but two papers on plant hybrids. In the second one, which was presented 
to the Society for Natural History in 1869 and published in the Society’s proceed-
ings in 1870, he presented his experimental results with Hieracium. As was indi-
cated above, this was Carl Nägeli’s favourite experimental plant. Experimentation 
with Hieracium proved extremely tedious. It has minute flowers with even more 
43 Perhaps also Franz Kafka’s story Die Verwandlung (written in 1912) should be mentioned here. 
Yet, although it is about a sudden and dramatic change (from one species into another) it clearly 
belongs to a different genre. In no way whatsoever is the change associated with an experimental 
trial. It is simply an absurd event, beyond causation. Unlike for example in Stevenson’s tale, no 
effort whatsoever is made to explain the event in scientific (psychological, biological, etc.) terms.
9.7 Science Communication 223
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
224 9 Pea Stories. Why was Mendel’s Research Ignored
minute sexual parts and artificial pollination had to be carried out using a lens. 
Mendel almost ruined his eyes in the course of the project. But the more fundamen-
tal obstacle was the way these flowers reproduce. They normally reproduce not 
sexually, but through parthenogenesis and this rendered them useless for the kind 
of research Mendel was interested in. Simon Mawer calls it an “absurd plant” and 
argues that it was the worst choice Mendel could have made. And he puts the blame 
solely on Nägeli, who talked him into this line of investigation. Due to this mistake, 
Mendel lost his way, and in the end even his confidence, Mawer argues. Henig 
basically agrees with him: “Because of apomixes, the results Mendel got from 
Hieracium undermined his confidence in everything he had done before. … 
Undone by the bizarre behaviour of Hieracium, [Mendel] now doubted all his 
previous ideas … [he] lost faith in his own results” (p. 161). Eventually, he gave 
up his research. His only contact with the established academic world proved a 
failure. Mendel really did stand apart.
According to Orel (1996), however, this view (that Mendel should never have 
made the step from garden peas to hawkweed) is highly questionable. On the first 
page of his article Mendel makes it quite clear that his pea research is part of a 
much larger programme,44 involving a whole range of model species: pea, bean, 
fuchsia, mirabilis, maize, bees and others, while in his early days he had already 
worked with mice. After 8 years of research with peas it was time to study hybrid 
forms in other plants and to try his theory on a more challenging target. And 
Hawkweed was an obvious choice, being one of the model species of contemporary 
research in the field of botany. Indeed, “Mendel’s choice of Hieracium as a new 
experimental plant was in no way unfortunate. … It was a logical step forward in 
the research that had begun with the Pisum experiments” (Orel, p. 184). Mendel 
himself was quite clear about this. Precisely because Hieracium was such a highly 
controversial plant form, he saw it as a challenge to test his theories on this notori-
ously complicated species.45 It was, moreover, Mendel’s wish to get in touch some-
how with the research activities of outstanding experts like Nägeli, and therefore it 
was his own logical choice to try his luck with Hieracium. From a scientific point 
of view, it was not at all a side track. If this should work, the validity and robustness 
of his theory would be greatly enhanced. That his experiments with Hieracium 
yielded indecisive results did not make them usesless, of course. It merely showed 
that not all plant forms comply with the laws he had established earlier and that a 
lot of work still had to be done. Unfortunately, Mendel himself was beginning to 
leave the field, and that was why he decided merely to publish a short summary of 
his (not very satisfying) results so far (1870/1913, p. 52).
In short, although usually the Hieracium experiments are regarded as unsuccessful 
owing to an unfortunate choice of model plant, Orel convincingly argues that it was 
44 “Eine Endgültige Entscheidung kann erst dann erfolgen, bis Detail-Versuche aus den ver-
schiedensten Pflanzen-Familien vorliegen”.
45 “Ueber keine andere Gattung ist so viel geschrieben, sind so viele und heftige Kämpfe geführt 
worden. … Das Verhalten der Hieracium-Bastarde muss notwendig durch Versuche ermittelt 
werden” (1870/1913, pp. 48–49).
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
a logical next step for a researcher like Mendel. The problem was not that Nägeli 
talked him into a dead alley, the problem rather was that, although Mendel systemati-
cally collected data from a wide variety of species, he only published his results with 
Pisum and Hieracium. This made it impossible for readers to appreciate the true 
extent of his investigations. It eclipsed his gradual progress from relatively “simple” 
experiments with peas to more complex problems. Perhaps his work would not have 
been so completely ignored, Orel argues (p. 180), if he had presented all his data.46 
The reason for abandoning his research, according to Orel, was not his disappointing 
results with Hieracium, but rather his substantial administrative difficulties and 
duties, in combination with his deteriorating health (due to stress, excessive smoking, 
overweight and lack of exercise). Posthumously, some notes jotted down by Mendel 
on his results with other species were found, but they are far too fragmentary to allow 
us to reconstruct the full scope of his experimental program (Olby 1966).
Nägeli was not the only famous biologist who in 1866 kindly received a reprint 
from Mendel. The Augustinian friar also sent a copy to another famous contempo-
rary, namely Charles Darwin. It is interesting to see how at a certain point, during 
the 1860s, their research trajectories skimmed one another. Unfortunately, however, 
whereas Mendel was avidly interested in Darwin, the latter took no notice whatso-
ever of the former. What may have been the reason, given the fact that Darwin was 
a prolific correspondent who included large amounts of data in his publications that 
reached him through letters he received from colleagues and readers? And why was 
Darwin so successful in his own time, while Mendel’s work had to be rediscovered? 
What were, besides the things they had in common, their points of disagreement?
When The Origin of Species was about to be published, there was a difficulty 
over the title (cf. Chapter 3). Darwin had wanted it to be called An Abstract of an 
Essay on the Origin of Species and Varieties Through Natural Selection (De Beer, 
p. 155), but the publisher objected. Still, it was Darwin’s firm intention to devote 
the remainder of his life to the elaboration of this mere “abstract” into a series of 
extended studies. Yet, writing the Origin so debilitated Darwin (Henig 2000) that 
he was not only forced to take a rest cure immediately after the book’s publication, 
but became a chronic invalid more or less for the remainder of his life. Because of 
his bad health, only the first part of the huge and ambitious project he had designed 
for himself was finished. In 1868 he published Variation of Animals and Plants 
Under Domestication (1868/1988), basically a follow-up and extended version of 
the first chapter of the Origin – we already discussed it in Chapter 6. It is this book 
that brings him remarkably close to Mendel’s lifework. Mendel made a thorough 
study of it during his abbacy, as is proven by his careful handwriting in the margins. 
Many of the remarks he made were critical, notably deploring Darwin’s lack of 
methodological strictness (his anecdotal method). In this book Darwin not only 
writes about ducks, as we have seen earlier, but also about a broad variety of other 
46 “The picture that emerges is of a man very actively and effectively experimenting, aware of the 
importance of his discovery, and testing and extending it on a wide variety of forms. None of these 
results were published; it is difficult to suppose that his work would have been so completely 
ignored if he had presented this confirmatory evidence” (Sturtevant 2001, p. 12).
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species under domestication. In Chapter 9, on cultivated plants (cereal and culinary) 
Mendel came across Darwin’s remarks on some experiments with Pisum Sativum 
(pp. 302 ff.). Darwin notices a considerable amount of variation in terms of height, 
manner of growth, period of maturity, shape (wrinkled or round peas), colour (blue 
and white peas) and other features. Systematic analysis of numerical data, however, 
is absent. Darwin was not a quantitative experimenter. And unlike Mendel, he did 
not work with large numbers of plants. His style is anecdotal and the pages devoted 
to Pisum Sativum merely contain a variety of facts coming from various sources. 
Darwin, however, also writes about other species that interested Mendel. If there 
was so much proximity of interest, in what respects precisely did Mendel and 
Darwin differ from one another?
The first difference was already mentioned. Mendel’s work relied to a consider-
able extent on numbers. He introduced the methodological and mathematical tools 
of experimental physics into biology at a time when biology was still for the 
larger part a matter of fact finding or “stamp-collecting”, as Rutherford notoriously 
phrased it. Most publications Mendel consulted disappointed him, as they failed to 
provide precise numerical data. The reappearance of hidden traits in living beings 
had long been known in an inexact sort of way, but many authors still were of 
the conviction that exactness did not apply to living entities. Darwin’s Variation 
belongs to this category. It does not follow a systematic experimental design. 
Scientific research was seen by biologists like Darwin as an inductive, Baconian 
process, whereas Mendel worked more like an experimental physicist who wanted 
to test a particular theory or hypothesis by means of a carefully planned experi-
ment, and he was quite happy to consider and analyse his results in mathematical 
terms. Moreover, in order for a quantitative analysis to be possible, an extremely 
large number of plants had to be studied. Mendel used some 10,000 plants and 
counted something like 300,000 peas. This implied that the researcher involved in 
such a process would have to focus on a limited number of model species for an 
extended period of time. Darwin, however, preferred to include data from as many 
different species as possible. In other words, Mendel’s work involved a special kind 
of mind-set, a particular way of organizing one’s work, a particular style of record-
keeping. It involved keeping track records of every single plant. This difference 
between Darwin and Mendel is also reflected in their style of writing. Mendel’s style 
was precise and concise, methodical and mathematical, whereas Darwin’s 
style was anecdotal and conversation-like or letter-like.47 For that reason we can 
easily imagine why the latter’s output was more accessible to the readers of his 
time. Moreover, Darwin evoked a grand idea, the idea of evolution, whereas the 
grand idea behind Mendel’s work (the possibility of modifying life or of creating 
new species) remained more or less implicit in his text.
Another important difference is that Darwin, notwithstanding his bad health, 
was a prolific writer in terms of output – his collected works take up as much as 
47 Mendel way of thinking was more similar to that of Galton than to that of Darwin. In fact, Galton 
became involved in an experiment with peas at a certain point (Olby 1966, p. 77). Unfortunately, 
he was not really a gardener and he was not familiar with Mendel’s work.
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twenty-nine volumes. Mendel published only two papers on plant hybrids, besides 
his meteorological papers that need not interest us here – something like the bare 
minimum for someone to count as an author at all. And even in the case of the 
experiments on peas and hawkweed it is clear that only part of his results were 
described in these two papers. If he had collected all his data, not only those on 
Pisum Sativum and Hieracium, but also those on mice, beans, fuchsias, bees and 
various other species, he would no doubt have been able to produce an impressive 
volume, very much like Darwin’s Variation in terms of scope, but quite different 
in terms of methodology and style. It would have put his work on Pisum and 
Hieracium in a much broader perspective. In short, I disagree with Mawer’s state-
ment that later in life Mendel’s intellectual activities (such as beekeeping and 
meteorology) degenerated into mere “stamp collecting” (p. 263). Although it is true 
that he found less and less time for his scientific work, his experiments with bees 
and other species were still extremely carefully designed and in concordance with 
the basic ideas he had put to test in his epoch-making research with the garden pea. 
A comprehensive publication would not only have saved his research data from 
these later years from being posthumously destroyed, but would also have stressed 
the importance of his methodological concepts. Later in life, Mendel often told his 
nephews that they would find papers for publication which he himself had not been 
able to publish during his lifetime. Shortly after his death, however, these papers – 
the Mendelian counterpart of Variation of animals and plants under domestication 
so to speak – were burned. Orel is undoubtedly right when he emphasizes that a 
more extensive publication would have made the logic behind his experiments 
more accessible to his readership. And it is too easy only to accuse his successors 
for having destroyed his intellectual legacy. Mendel himself should have been less 
hesitant, less reluctant. He should not have left the task of publishing his valuable 
data, this highly important counterpart to Darwin, to others. On the other hand, he 
realised from the very start48 what a Guarguantian task it would be, precisely 
because of his systematic way of working. To establish a general law of hybridisa-
tion would involve detailed trials concerning a great number of life forms.
Yet, if a Mendelian counterpart to Darwin’s Variation had been published, it 
would have become clear that, notwithstanding many similarities of interest, the 
epistemological difference between Mendel and Darwin was substantial. And this 
difference is more profound than their divergent strategies of communication or 
the use of mathematical tools. It affects the basic epistemological profile of their 
work, their style of thinking. Both men believed in change, but they endorsed 
completely different conceptions of change. Darwin believed in minute, gradual 
changes, in the logic of more and less. He could not accept an understanding of 
evolution in terms of “definite steps” (Olby 1966, p. 82). Natura non facit saltum 
48 “Wenn es noch nicht gelungen ist, ein allgemein gültiges Gesetz für die Bildung und Entwicklung 
der Hybriden aufzustellen, so kann das Niemanden Wunder nehmen, der den Umfang der Aufgabe 
kennt, und die Schwierigkeiten zu würdigen weiss, mit denen Versuche dieser Art zu kämpfen 
haben. Eine eindgültige Entscheidung kann erst dann erfolgen, wenn Detail-versuche aus den 
verschiedensten Pflanzenfamilien vorliegen” (1866/1913, p. 3/4).
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was one of his most favourite phrase, his basic axiom, his synthetic judgement a 
priori so to speak, his “canon” as he calls it, citing it on no less than five occasions 
in the Origin (1859/1985, pp. 223, 233, 263, 435, 445). Change is a gradual and 
continuous process. Evolution occurs through countless small changes. As such 
they are hardly noticeable. In the case of hybrids, parental differences are merged 
or blended. It is through the slow but continuous accumulation of minute differ-
ences that change is introduced:
Natural selection acts solely by accumulating slight, successive variations, it can produce 
no great or sudden modification; it can only act by very short and slow steps. Hence the 
canon of ‘Natura non facit saltum’. (p. 444/445)
In Mendel’s view, however, nature evolves in a leap-like fashion, through discon-
tinuous variations. He thinks in terms of Either/Or, rather than in terms of More 
or Less. This binary logic finds a perfect expression in the symbols Mendel used: 
upper-case (A) and lower-case (a) letters. There is nothing in between. In the 
1860s, slow, continuous change was still the dominant idea in the realm of science. 
Influential authors such as Lyell and Darwin propagated it. They preferred to 
attribute sudden changes and ruptures that seemed to occur in the history of evolution 
to the incompleteness of the geological record rather than to real discontinuity. 
This explains why the “spirit of the time” was not yet ready for Mendel and why 
the biologists of the time were not yet susceptible to his ideas. If this is true, then 
how are we to explain the fact that in 1900, all of a sudden, Mendel’s style of 
thinking could so readily be assimilated by a new generation of biologists. What 
had happened?
9.8 The Year 1900
This is how Sottin (1959) describes the lack of impact Mendel had in 1865. 
Although his paper was clear and precise, Mendel’s audience soon grew restless 
and bored:
It was obvious that not a single person at that meeting … realised that he had just heard an 
epoch-making report; nor that he had been present at the founding of a new branch of 
biology – the study of genetics. As far as the members of the Brünn Society were con-
cerned, nothing of great importance had been said. The monk had delivered a boring 
lecture about endless experiments. … The brilliance of Mendel’s work was completely lost 
on the amateur scientists. (p. 152)
The contrast with the events of 1900 can hardly be greater. On the first page of her 
biography, Henig (1900) describes what happened to the famous biologist William 
Bateson when during a train ride to London he was confronted for the first time 
with an old, but far from boring article from a small journal, written by an obscure 
monk. She writes: “When he boarded the train, he could have had no idea that in 
the next sixty minutes he would read a paper that would change [the course of his] 
career” (p. 1). He immediately joined De Vries, Correns and Tschermak (a “qua-
ternity”) in their cause and even made a pilgrimage to Brno to visit the site where 
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the mysterious “saint” of modern genetics, who apparently had been born a genera-
tion too soon, had lived and died.49
In order to understand this remarkable change, we have to look at the year 1900 
in some more detail. In that year a number of scientific events took place that had 
something in common. To begin with, Max Planck (1858–1947) introduced the 
photon-concept, that is, he rehabilitated the idea of discontinuity in physics. On an 
elementary level, light and darkness is not a matter of more or less. Rather, light 
consists of particles that can be either present or absent. Photons can either pene-
trate a piece of glass or be reflected by it (and the probability of both events is 
equally divided). Beginning with the photon-concept of Planck, the discontinuity-
principle quickly gained impetus in physics. It was at the basis of quantum-physics. 
Niels Bohr discovered that the distance of an electron to the atomic nucleus cannot 
be expressed in gradual terms. Rather, electrons leap from one “orbit” to the next. 
Whereas change on the macro-level is gradual (linear, continuous), change on the 
micro-level is discontinuous and abrupt. The emergence of the discontinuity prin-
ciple can be witnessed in others realms of science as well. In the same year 1900 
Hugo de Vries (1848–1935) introduced his concept of mutation. Once again: 
natura facit saltus. Nature evolves through sudden, leap-like changes. New traits 
do not emerge slowly and continuously, they come about suddenly. Also in 1900 
Karl Landsteiner (1868–1943) discovered the existence of blood types (A, B and 
O). The blood in our veins is not “more or less” similar to or different from the 
blood of others. It is either similar or dissimilar, due to the presence or absence of 
discrete, definite elements, units, factors. Finally, the year 1900 is also the official 
year of publication of Die Traumdeutung [The Interpretation of Dreams] by 
Sigmund Freud (1856–1938). Again: “conscious” or “unconscious” is not a matter 
of more or less. Rather some ideas or memory traces are available while others are 
recessive or repressed. And even in art, with the emergence of fauvism, reality is 
suddenly represented by means of discrete strokes of paint. Paintings suddenly 
begin to resemble mosaics. In other words, in or around the year 1900 the disconti-
nuity principle suddenly breaks free. Something has changed in terms of the basic 
view of the world among both scholars and artists. The “spirit of the time” is now 
all of a sudden quite susceptible to and “ready” for the idea of leap-like change, of 
discrete entities and ruptures. This explains the “uncanny synchronicity”, as Henig 
(p. 178) describes it, the simultaneous rediscovery of Mendel’s work by three biol-
ogists in the spring of 1900, when a new century began. It is no coincidence that 
they “chanced upon the same article at almost exactly the same time” (p. 178).
The difference between 1866 and 1900 is the difference between Darwin and 
Mendel. Both were interested in variation and change, both were involved in collect-
ing data on domesticated species, but their basic views on nature greatly differed. 
This is emphasized by Sottin (1959) when he writes: “Darwin’s nature takes no 
49 The “rediscovery” of Mendel should not be taken all too literally. As Orel and others have pointed 
out, not that many people have really read Mendel’s paper; even less have read it in German, while 
even today hardly anyone (outside expert circles) is aware of the fact that he also wrote and pub-
lished a paper on Hieracium. For the larger part, Mendel’s work and ideas are still unknown.
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jumps … [but in Mendel’s case] inherited changes or variations are discontinuous”. 
And Orel (1996) likewise emphasises that Mendel replaced the holistic, gradually 
evolving image of a species by an “atomistic” or “mosaic” conception, where an 
organism is regarded as a composition of discrete “elements” or “factors”. Unlike 
Darwin, Mendel believed that “traits passed from parent to offspring as discrete, 
individual units in a consistent, predictable, and mathematically precise manner” 
(Henig, p. 7). This idea, which failed to impress his contemporaries, was celebrated 
by a new generation of biologists, such as Bateson and De Vries.50 Mendel’s 
discontinuity-concept was, so to speak, a biological idea that had been “recessive” 
in the days of Darwin but now reappeared abruptly in the writings of a different 
generation in order to become dominant – the become the new “canon” – during the 
“century of the gene” (Fox Keller 2000).
The question I set out to answer in this chapter was: why was Mendel’s research 
virtually ignored in 1866 and rediscovered in 1900? Several answers have been 
considered, such as Mendel’s communicative style. The focus, however, was on the 
idea that somehow Mendel had been “ahead of his time”. I indicated that, if his 
work is placed in a broader cultural context, Mendel represents “neo-gothic 
biology” at a time when the neo-gothic style flourished in architecture and other 
realms of culture. Moreover, he was not the only author who has written a classical 
story on peas. His scientific paper shares important characteristics with some well-
known stories by literary contemporaries. Hans Christian Andersen also wrote on 
peas, and his ideas were remarkably similar in certain respects to Mendel’s. His pea 
stories also describe experimental settings and in one of them, a pea is used in an 
experiment designed to establish the absence or presence of a discrete factor. The 
idea is not that Mendel was somehow “influenced” by these literary sources or vice 
versa. Rather, the idea is that Andersen, Stevenson and Mendel share a basic logic. 
As contemporaries, they think along similar lines.
Finally, also Charles Darwin wrote about peas and important similarities can be 
indicated between Darwin and Mendel as well. Darwin clearly shared Mendel’s 
interest in a broad variety of species under domestication. Their basic difference 
was that Darwin believed in gradual change, while Mendel subscribed to the 
discontinuity-principle. The rejection or repression of the idea that nature makes 
leaps had been part of the struggle of modern science to free itself from alchemy, 
a research tradition for which the belief in leap-like changes had been an epistemo-
logical core conviction. In the year 1900, this basic epistemological conviction 
suddenly conquered the field again, in physics, biology and biomedicine, but also 
in other realms of culture. In 1866, Mendel’s publication had been ill-starred. His 
ideas were shared by literary authors, but not by prominent biologists. Literature 
50 Mendel’s adherence to the discontinuity-principle also adds a special dimension to his youthful 
admiration for Johann Gutenberg (described above) who in fact reduced language to a limited set 
of discrete, moveable elements. This is especially telling in the light of the widespread comparison 
of genes with letters. Note that Mendel himself used letter (A, a, B, b) for referring to what he 
called “factors” or “elements”.
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retained (or anticipated) lines of thinking that had temporarily become recessive in 
scientific discourse. Yet, under the new constellation of 1900 Mendel’s style of 
thinking quickly rose to prominence. Due to an epistemological mutation, so to 
speak, the Zeitgeist suddenly took sides with Mendel. In the course of the twentieth 
century, Mendel and Darwin (who had been epistemological counterparts during 
their lifetime) were brought closer together. Under the banner of the “new synthesis” 
even Darwinism would eventually be forced to endorse the idea of discontinuity, 
firmly embedded in the logic of genetic research as established by Mendel. In other 
words, Darwin and Mendel finally came together in a new and powerful coniunctio 
oppositorum called “evolutionary genetics”.
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Chapter 10
Jules Verne’s Oeuvre: A Literary Encyclopaedia 
of Science and Technology
10.1 To the Centre of the Earth
In the first chapter of Alice in Wonderland, Alice follows a rabbit into a rabbit-hole. 
The hole goes straight on “like a tunnel” for some way and then suddenly dips 
down. She finds herself falling down what seems to be a very deep well, passing 
bookshelves, maps and pictures:
Down, down, down. Would the fall never come to an end? ‘I wonder how many miles I’ve 
fallen by this time?’ she said aloud. ‘I must be getting somewhere near the centre of the 
earth. Let me see: that would be four thousand miles down … but then I wonder what 
Latitude or Longitude I’ve got to?’ (Carroll 1865/1965a, p. 24)
The book was published in 1865, shortly after Jules Verne’s Voyage to the Centre 
of the Earth, which was published the year before. In the time-span of a few seconds, 
and on a much smaller scale, Alice is exposed to similar experiences as Axel in 
Verne’s novel. In Axel’s case, the journey is consuming much more time. Indeed, 
one could say that Carroll’s version is a miniaturisation of what in Verne’s novel is 
projected on a grand tableau. But apparently, both authors were fascinated by the 
same idea: a journey through a tunnel towards the centre of the earth, passing 
numerous latitudes and longitudes.
An important difference is, however, that Verne describes a scientific journey, 
scientifically documented, indeed: a scholarly expedition to an Icelandic Volcano 
(Sneffels). The team consists of three members: Otto Lidenbrock, professor of 
mineralogy at the University of Hamburg, his adolescent cousin Axel and a local 
Icelandic guide named Hans. But, also in this case, the “quaternity principle”, 
already mentioned in Chapter 9, is at work. Wherever there are three of something 
(persons, elements, etc.), a fourth is hidden somewhere. And indeed, in Verne’s 
novel, there is a fourth element, a “hidden” scholar, who made the expedition pos-
sible and plays a decisive role as the team’s informant and predecessor, namely 
Arne Saknussemm, a “famous alchemist” of the sixteenth century.
Who is Arne Saknussemm? In order to answer this question, and to put this 
“fourth element” into its proper perspective, we have to ask ourselves another ques-
tion first, namely: who is Professor Lidenbrock? For they are like ego and alter ego. 
From the very outset it is clear that, although Lidenbrock’s name, as Verne informs 
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us, is “mentioned with honour” in academic circles, and although he is being con-
sulted by famous scientists and natural historians (p. 3), there is something dubious 
about him as well. Not so much because he is the worst possible teacher for his stu-
dents, but rather for reasons having to do with the basic direction of his research, his 
basic views. He is the type of erudite scholar who is drawn to the arcane. Indeed, 
although Humphry Davy, Humboldt, Becquerel and several other heroes of modern 
science drop by every now and then for some good advice, they seem not to be very 
open about their relationship with Lidenbrock and prefer to keep their communica-
tions with the professor secret. Their visits to Lidenbrock are something of an 
embarrassment, like a Victorian gentleman paying a visit to a brothel. But why?
Not simply because he is such a “volcanic”, explosive personality. The real 
reason is that a decade ago, in 1853, Professor Otto Lidenbrock had published a 
controversial book with a telling title: Treatise on Transcendental Crystallography 
(p. 3). What is “transcendental crystallography”? Although we are not really 
informed about the contents of the book, it is not difficult to imagine its basic 
epistemological profile. Remember that in Chapter 9 we discussed similar titles, 
namely “transcendental medicine” (the specialty of Dr. Jekyll) and “transcenden-
tal chemistry” (the specialty of Wilhelm Störitz). Lidenbrock’s book belongs to 
the same genre. As a scientific genre, it is highly suspect. It exemplifies a return 
of the repressed, namely alchemy.
Historically speaking (and framed in quasi-Mendelian terms), alchemists con-
stitute a “first generation” of experimental researchers. Their work can be seen 
both as a preparatory research practice, furthering the progress of modern science, 
and as an epistemological obstacle, hindering its development. As we have seen 
in Chapter 9, alchemy constituted a choice research object for Carl Gustav Jung 
and his circle. Hans Eduard Fierz-David (1952), for example, professor of chem-
istry and a friend of Jung’s, wrote a history of chemistry in which he emphasised 
that the influence of alchemy on modern science extended well into the nineteenth 
century. Yet, its influence tended to be neglected for two reasons. First of all, 
alchemists themselves tended to opt for secrecy: they were notoriously reluctant 
to share their results with outsiders.1 Cryptology was there favourite genre, so to 
speak. And they encrypted their messages on purpose, so that their views would 
only be accessible for fellow alchemists. This atmosphere of secrecy was rein-
forced, however, by their successors, the modern chemists, who tended to be very 
reluctant to confess the extent to which they (or some of them at least) profited 
from alchemical practices.2 Indeed, one could say that the alchemists had been the 
1 “Die Alchemisten behielten ihre Weisheit für sich und schrieben nur für Eingeweihten, ganz im 
Gegensatz zur heurtigen Zeit, wo jeder Chemiker seine Resultate so schnell als möglich publik 
macht” (Fierz-David 1952, 4).
2 There are exceptions to this rule, of course. In one of his letters to his father, Louis Pasteur 
remarked: “I am looking for the philosopher’s stone, and you too have read about the joys and the 
disappointments of those alchemists who came before me. They always believed that they were 
about to grasp it. That is how I feel …”. (Debré 1994/1998, p. 64)
h.zwart@science.ru.nl
proverbial giants on whose shoulders modern scientists were standing. And 
Lidenbrock – or a part of him at least – was a living remainder of this intellectual 
“lost world”, stubbornly dwelling in a kind of alchemical cave, while progress had 
taken his professional colleagues much further down the path of scientific 
“evolution”.
What is alchemy? As was already indicated in Chapter 9, alchemists believed 
that sudden, leap-like changes (“transmutations”) were possible in nature. 
Moreover, they believed that everything in nature strives for perfection and that 
there is an inherent desire in metals, for example, to be transformed into gold, 
while all that is lifeless desires to become alive. This natural process towards per-
fection, or at least towards a higher state of being, tends to be extremely time-
consuming, however. Therefore, in his laboratory, an alchemist would try to act as 
a servant of nature (“minister naturae”), assisting nature in its eternal strive for 
purity by accelerating the pace of the transformation process. In order for an 
alchemical experiment to succeed, a number of conditions had to be realised. 
Physical and chemical conditions (light or darkness, the right temperature, purity 
of substances, etc.) were important of course, but so were astrological ones (the 
art of choosing the opportune moment) as well as psychological ones. The 
researcher had to be morally “pure” himself in order for the experiment to suc-
ceed, while engaging in alchemical research was regarded as an exercise in self-
purification. This meant that trials were difficult to replicate. If an experiment 
failed, if (for instance) an experimenter failed to transform lead into gold, this did 
not imply that the experiment was impossible as such. Rather, the alchemist would 
probably conclude that he himself was not yet “pure” enough, or that he had failed 
to await the optimal astrological constellation, or to cite the right passage from the 
proper sacred text. In other words, alchemy was not one particular discipline, but 
rather a comprehensive research practice, a universal science. It involved astron-
omy, geology, pharmacology and experimentation as well as psychology and 
 theology and numerous other branches of learning. It was a comprehensive  science 
– a Totalwissenschaft.
Besides astrology, cryptology was an important auxiliary discipline, not only 
in the context of dissemination, as was already explained above, but also as a 
research tool used for deciphering sacred scriptures, such as the Gospel of John, 
a text that was treated more or less as an experimental manual. Encrypted mes-
sages had to be recovered from these ancient sources by means of intricate tech-
niques of decoding. Still another aspect of alchemy was the belief in parallelism, 
i.e. the idea that there is a concordance between the different “spheres” (or 
“globes”) of reality, for example, between the movements of heavenly bodies and 
simultaneous events in the sub-lunar world below (the guiding idea of astrology). 
Finally, in order for an experiment really to succeed, the experimenter remained 
dependent on an act of grace: a willingness of nature to manifest and disclose 
herself on the decisive moment. Although various heroes of modern science 
(such as Boyle and Newton) are known to have been engaged in alchemistic 
practices, this aspect of their work tended to remain hidden and invisible. Indeed, 
they tended to be highly secretive about it themselves, and their alchemical 
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affinities had to be reconstructed by means of careful research (or even detective 
work) by professional biographers.3
Finally, the alchemist’s basic moral attitude towards the world differed from that 
of modern researchers. Alchemists lived in a world of value whose entities could 
be placed on a value scale. Gold, for example, was more valuable, more “noble” 
than lead. They did not look upon nature as modern chemists do, namely as a neu-
tralised, disenchanted world, where entities such as atoms are basically described 
in quantitative terms (atomic weight and so on).4 Moreover, alchemists believed 
that they themselves, through their research activities, were progressing towards 
perfection. Besides reading and experimentation, other sources of information were 
important as well, such as the interpretation of dreams. Finally, a notable character 
trait of alchemists was their enthusiasm, their epistemological furor. A discovery or 
breakthrough was likely to evoke in them a state of epistemological intoxication.
Roger Bacon (1214–1294) who in his Opus Maius anticipated the invention of 
flying machines and steam ships, is generally regarded as one of the founding 
fathers of the modern scientific method (the scientia experimentalis), but at the 
same time he was heavily involved in alchemical and astrological research. 
Chemistry and alchemy, the conscious (“ego”) and the unconscious (“alter ego”) 
dimensions of modern science so to speak, had not yet been clearly separated from 
one another in Bacon’s days. Alchemy had not yet been “repressed”, and the scien-
tific Self had not yet emancipated itself. The alchemical manual Speculum 
Alchemiae, for example, which was translated into English as The Mirror of 
Alchimy in 1597, was attributed to Bacon. Together with Albertus Magnus and a 
number of other prominent “gothic” scientists he represented the “first generation” 
of experimental researchers.
The heroes of modern science (eminent researchers such as Newton, Boyle, 
Lavoisier, and others) constitute what might be termed the “second generation”. 
Although they “stand on the shoulders” of their alchemical predecessors, and prof-
ited from their preparatory efforts, the mind-set of alchemy was repressed in order 
for quantitative experimental research to emerge. Indeed, an “epistemological 
rupture” (Bachelard 1938/1947) proved inevitable. The world had to be rigorously 
3 In the case of Isaac Newton, for example, Richard Westfall (1980) has carefully documented the 
extent to which Newton was really involved in alchemy, whose profundities fascinated him, rather 
than in primitive chemistry (p. 285) and how well he was acquainted with the alchemical corpus. 
Indeed, Westfall estimates that, in his posthumous notes, “well over a million words [are] devoted 
to alchemy” (p. 290). His most important manuscript in this area bears the title The Vegetation of 
Metals (p. 305). Moreover, it was from the world view of alchemy that he borrowed his crucial, 
but mysterious, and more or less “irrational” concept of attraction (action-at-a-distance).
4 Although Lidenbrock apparently subscribes to the equivalence of all metals (“ces métaux, depuis 
le fer jusqu’à l’or, dont la valeur relative disparaissait devant l’égalité absolue des spécimens sci-
entifiques”, p. 6), other aspects of his research practice are clearly reminiscent of alchemy, such 
as his interests in runes, in ancient manuscripts and symbols in general, in cryptology, in alchemi-
cal authors and theories, etc. The famous exclamation in Faust – “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in 
meiner Brust” (1808/1910, p. 1114) – also applies to Lidenbrock. He is an epistemological hybrid: 
an alchemist as well as a chemist/mineralogist – a coniunctio oppositorum.
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disenchanted. Basic images (such as the earth as a gigantic mother-organism) were 
replaced by symbolic languages (numbers, mathematical symbols, chemical 
nomenclature, formulas, etc.). From that moment onwards, an immense epistemo-
logical distance began to separate “modern” chemistry from “gothic” alchemy. As 
was indicated above, however, this process of epistemological segregation and 
repression was never really completed. The two epistemological layers remained 
actually much closer in contact with one another than is usually suspected. They 
continued to communicate with one another, through various channels.
In this volume, however, I am primarily interested in the “third generation” of 
researchers, the nineteenth-century successors of these famous second-generation 
heroes. In Mendelian terms, it is to be expected that, in some of them at least (one 
out of four no doubt), the repressed (recessive) element will return, namely alchemy 
and its auxiliary disciplines such as cryptology, astrology, oneirology (i.e. interpre-
tation of dreams), etc. Some of these third-generation scientists are “real” scientists, 
others are literary figures. Or perhaps we should say: some of the sources we are 
using in our analysis of these “third-generation” researchers are biographies, while 
others are novels or even hybrid documents.
The work of Freud, for instance, can be placed in this series, as someone who 
belongs to this “third generation”: a physiologist who, at a certain point in his career, 
became engaged in dream interpretation. The title page of Die Traumdeutung [“The 
Interpretation of Dreams”] contains a famous formula, borrowed from Vergilius: 
Flectere si nequeo superios, Acheronta marebo [“If I cannot persuade the gods, 
I will move the netherworld”]. This maxim should be taken here in an epistemological 
sense. If I cannot persuade standardised experimental science, I will turn my atten-
tion to another truth regime, to the repressed, forbidden realms. Interestingly, in Die 
Traumdeutung, Freud completely ignores alchemy. After mentioning some ancient 
Greek authors (Aristotle and Artemidoros) he immediately jumps to the followers of 
Schelling, suggesting that they inherited their interest in dreams from ancient Greek 
sources. In Freud’s Gesammelte Werke, alchemists are mentioned only once, in 
passing. Clearly, Freud is one of those representatives of the “third” generation for 
whom it would be an embarrassment to acknowledge their indebtedness in the form 
of an epistemological “coming out” – if they are conscious of their intellectual “per-
versity” at all. This “repression” is more than compensated, of course, by his 
archrival Jung, whose superabundant interest in alchemy can indeed be interpreted 
as a return of the repressed and as an instance of “oedipal” criticism directed towards 
the previous generation of “fathers”, notably Freud.
Another example of a “real” scientist belonging to this “third” generation is 
Friedrich August Kekulé von Stradonitz, who was interested in the structure of 
benzene. In 1865, after fruitlessly grappling with this problem professionally for a 
long time, the secret structure was suddenly revealed to him in an alchemical 
dream, a nightly vision of Ouroboros: the mythological snake that bites its own tail. 
He himself described the event retrospectively as follows: “I dozed off. Again the 
atoms danced before my eyes … everything in motion, contorting and turning like 
snakes. And behold, what was that? One of the snakes took hold of its own tail 
and whirled derisively before my eyes. I woke up as though I had been struck by 
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lightening. … I spent the rest of the night working out the consequences”.5 Fierz-
David (1952) describes him as a “visionary” (p. 235), a researcher for whom 
sudden insights, provoking experiences of great enthusiasm, constituted a struc-
tural element of his context of discovery. It is the combination of an alchemical 
method (reliance on dreams) with an alchemical content (the Ouroboros-symbol) 
that made this eureka-experience, allowing for the emergence of organic chemistry 
as a research field, a marker in the history of science.
Literary counterparts of real scientists (such as Kekulé) are Lidenbrock, Jekyll 
and Störitz, among others. All these research endeavours, either fictional or real, 
documented in novels and biographies, have one thing in common, namely: 
alchemy provides the cue, the key. What applies to Kekulé, applies to Lidenbrock 
as well: it is a “forgotten”, but rediscovered alchemical reminiscence that puts the 
nineteenth-century third-generation researcher on the right track. In Verne’s novel, 
it is the famous alchemical traveller Arne Saknussemm who provides Professor 
Lidenbrock with the decisive hint. Although Saknussemm was convicted for scien-
tific “heresies”6 (p. 51) and all his works were burned, Lidenbrock happens to come 
across a runic cryptogram he managed to leave behind – like a palaeontological 
imprint, a mere fragment, as a reminder of a lost world of ideas. With the help of 
cryptology, and assisted by his cousin Axel, Lidenbrock finally deciphers the mes-
sage. In an Icelandic volcano, it tells them, there exists an opening to a tunnel that 
gives access to the centre of the earth. Saknussemm went down that tunnel in the 
sixteenth century, leading the way as it were, and now he invites his readers to fol-
low him, as their scholarly Virgilius. He guides the travellers as their epistemologi-
cal shadow. Lidenbrock experiences the message as a “revelation” that completely 
“transfigures” him (p. 23). To Lidenbrock, the centre of the earth is not a neutral 
place, of course, but rather the innermost circle of the ancient κοσµος, the womb 
of the great earth-mother, and the transfiguration Lidenbrock experiences is a 
relapse into the epistemological furor typical of alchemy. Outwardly, however, he 
remains a modern scientist, using a variety of advanced scientific contrivances, 
carefully taking notes and continuously assembling quantitative data, for the pur-
pose of preparing a scientific report about his findings. Yet, beneath this modern 
surface (his epistemological ego) there is a different layer, an uncanny epistemo-
logical enthusiasm, a remarkable sensitivity to cues of a certain epistemological 
origin. As I said, Lidenbrock is something of an epistemological hybrid, – coniunctio 
oppositorum.
Their journey towards the centre of the earth is actually a travel backwards 
through time. It takes them through the bio-history of the earth, recorded in ancient 
5 “[Ich] versank in Halbschlaf. Wieder gaukelten die Atome vor meinen Augen. … Alles in 
Bewegung, schlangenartig sich windend und drehend. Und siehe, was war das? Eine der 
Schlangen erfasste den eigenen Schwanz und höhnisch wirbelte das Gebilde vor meinen Augen. 
Wie durch einen Blitzstrahl erwachte ich; auch diesmal verbrachte ich den Rest der Nacht um die 
Consequenzen der Hypothese auszuarbeiten.“(Anschütz 1929, II, S. 942). Cf. http://www.sgipt.
org/th_schul/pa/kek/pak_kek0.htm.
6 Dr. Jekyll was also accused of scientific “heresies” (cf. Chapter 9).
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formations (like the books, maps and pictures in Alice in Wonderland). In this manner 
the palaeontological layers can be studied in a much more reliable and systematic 
manner than through chance findings and “superficial” (literally) excavations. Like 
Alice, they encounter giant mushrooms and other bizarre phenomena and life 
forms. It is also an alchemical journey in the sense that it is an experience from 
which they themselves emerge completely transfigured. For Axel, initially a care-
free adolescent, it is a metamorphosis, a kind of epistemological ritual the changes 
and “ennobles” him.
Finally, in a gigantic subterranean cave near the centre of the earth, they are 
confronted with living specimens of Jurassic species that long ago became 
extinct on the surface. Deep underneath the crust of the earth, the evolution of 
Jurassic species has “frozen” more or less and come to a standstill. In this man-
ner, Verne actually created the Jurassic monster genre that was further devel-
oped by later authors such as Arthur Conan Doyle (1912/1981) and Michael 
Crichton (1990/1991; 1995/2002) in the twentieth century. Verne’s lively 
descriptions of the battles among these huge and voracious monsters set a model 
for these later writers. Under extreme circumstances, in far-off, isolated and 
inaccessible places, evolution followed different pathways, or even found itself 
completely halted. These extraordinary sites constitute gigantic natural parks 
where animals from vanished geological epochs are preserved and therefore can 
be studied as living specimens. It is, once again, a return of the repressed, in the 
sense of a return of the extinguished. Moreover, travels like that of Lidenbrock 
and his team can be regarded as instances of extremophilia. Scientists display a 
desire to study nature under extreme circumstances. Indeed, laboratories and 
other research facilities are often built to create extreme conditions (in terms of 
temperature, vacuum, etc.) in an artificial way, but in Verne’s case, these condi-
tions are realised through mobility, site visits to far-off places, often with the 
help of innovative machines that allow them unprecedented mobility in order to 
explore the unexplored regions of the world. In the crust of the earth, geological 
formations, containing records of living conditions during previous geological eras, 
but even extinct life forms themselves, are conserved in optima forma. As if 
evolution is present both as a library (the formations) and as a movie (the living 
monsters).
One of the highlights of Verne’s novel is Axel’s (waking) dream. As we have 
seen, for an alchemical research practice, dreams constitute an important source of 
information. This goes for Axel’s dream as well. After being exposed to an impres-
sive series of geological and palaeontological observations and discoveries, the 
process of biological evolution that is, the origin of species – is revealed to him in 
a dream, in two directions, from the beginning to the present and back again. All 
the paeleontological monsters of the various geological era, series of giant animals 
and plant forms, come to life before his eyes. All the life forms, whose fossil 
remains he has seen, are more or less reborn in what seems like an oneirological 
movie, or movie-like dream – an anticipation of Crichton’s/Spielberg’s Jurassic 
Park. Geological periods pass before his eyes like days or hours. His dream is truly 
a summary of the history of life, a summary of creation – but creation understood 
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in evolutionary terms.7 It also indicates that this scientific journey has really 
changed Axel as a subject, from a naïve and easy-going adolescent, a superficial 
surface-dweller, into someone who really becomes involved in the progress of 
science (and this is of course in accordance with the alchemical idea that scientific 
research is actually a spiritual exercise, a mental journey).
Moreover, the travellers become involved in a series of scientific discussions. 
The most prominent, no doubt, is the hollow earth-dispute. It is the “manifest” 
objective of Verne’s novel to demonstrate, with the help of informed imagination, 
the plausibility of the idea, the “hypothesis”, that the earth is hollow inside – an 
idea that is present in a number of other Verne novels as well. It has a long history, 
grounded in the idea of the universe consisting of concentric spheres, with the hol-
low earth as its innermost sphere. The alchemical traditions subscribed to this idea, 
and Lidenbrock’s fascination with it is part of his alchemy-complex no doubt.
Interestingly, unlike Humphrey Davy, Von Humboldt, Franklin, Becquerel, 
Milne-Edwards, Sainte-Clare-Deville and others, Charles Darwin is never men-
tioned in Verne’s book. Verne’s authorship was based on systematic and extensive 
desk research and the novel can be read as a well-informed dialogue with the sci-
entific discourses of his day. Verne’s reading resulted in a systematic collection of 
thousands of notes which he built into an archive, to be used as a basis for his writ-
ings. The views of scientific contemporaries come to life in Verne’s lively novel. 
Familiarising his readers with recent scientific discoveries and disputes was an 
important objective for Verne. He wrote his book when The Origin of Species was 
being translated into French. One reason for not mentioning Darwin was, of course, 
that he was not French. Moreover, Verne’s focus is not on the details of the process 
of evolution as such, but rather on some of the more “philosophical” disputes that 
evolve from this idea, such as the question how to harmonise the concept of evolu-
tion with the idea of creation. More importantly even, Verne’s novel joins in with 
the debate on gradualism versus catastrophism. The latter view, associated with 
Georges Cuvier (1769–1838) holds that the extinction of species occurs through 
cataclysms. Quiet periods in geological history end in mass extinctions, triggered 
by violent geological changes. Verne seems to accept the concept of evolution as 
obvious, although he notices that geological periods can perhaps be regarded as 
biblical days in the sense that, if we review them in retrospect, they pass the mind’s 
eye at such a pace that the analogy becomes more or less plausible. As for gradual-
ism, Verne seems to take a moderate position on this issue. On the one hand, the 
travellers notice various instances of extremely slow and gradual change, through 
accumulation of very slight changes. On the other hand, Verne is clearly fascinated 
with the idea of a catastrophe. Many of his novels actually end with catastrophic 
events, transforming complete landscapes and extinguishing life forms on a mas-
sive scale. Apparently, in his view, evolution is a combination of gradual changes 
(the usual situation) and dramatic events. In other words, the structure of his novels 
reflects the dynamics of evolution: a small-scale beginning (preferably on an 
7 “Toute la vie de la terre se résume en moi” (p. 154).
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island), next a story of dissemination and expansion, and finally a catastrophe, a 
disruptive darkening of the earth, a climate change.
10.2 Verne’s Work as an Encyclopaedia of Arts and Sciences
Jules Verne is not always regarded a serious writer. On the contrary, histories and 
anthologies of French belles-lettres have been written that do not even mention his 
name. He is still seen by many as a children’s author. Some critics, however, such 
as Raymond Roussel or Michel Foucault, regard his work as highly significant. In 
this chapter, his work will not be presented as a series of adventure stories, but 
rather as a literary assessment of science and technology and their impact on soci-
ety and human life. Verne can rightfully be regarded as the chronicler of his own 
epoch, the machine age. For although he is often considered a writer of “science 
fiction”, this is not really true. He wrote about his own era. The books written by 
him in the 1860s, for example, are situated in the 1860s. He explicitly builds and 
reflects on developments in science and technology that were actually happening 
when he wrote his novels. Moreover, as was already mentioned above, his books 
are well-documented and based on systematic research.
One way to clarify his “strengths and weaknesses” as an author is by comparing 
him to some of his contemporaries. The nineteenth century was the golden age of 
psychological novels and plays. Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) and Henrik Ibsen 
(1828–1906), to mention just two contemporaries of Verne, were born in the same 
year. They are generally regarded as outstanding psychologists. As was already 
mentioned in Chapter 5, Tolstoy’s novel Anna Karenina, published in 1878, is 
generally regarded as a classical study into the psychology of marriage. The novel 
begins and ends, however, with the arrival and departure of a train. It is this train 
that puts the novel between parentheses, so to speak. The first encounter between 
Anna and Vronsky takes place at a railway station, and in the end Anna commits 
suicide by throwing herself under a train, while shortly after that Vronski leaves 
the civilised world, heading for the front, by train, in the hope of getting himself 
killed. In the 1870s the train was still a novelty, an impressive technological phe-
nomenon. Tolstoy carefully describes the impact trains and railway stations have 
on human existence. Major cities become connected with one another and new 
forms of human mobility and communication are suddenly made possible. Yet, the 
train is also experienced as an uncanny mechanical monster, δεινος in every 
respect. This is how Tolstoy, at the beginning of Anna Karenina, describes the 
arrival of a train:
The approach of the train was made more and more evident by a bustle of preparations in 
the station, the rush of porters, the appearance of gendarmes and attendants, and the arrival 
of people meeting the train. Through the frosty vapour could be seen workmen in short 
sheepskins and soft felt boots crossing the network of rails. The whistle of an engine and 
the rumble of something heavy could be heard in the distance. … Indeed the engine was 
already whistling in the distance. Soon the platform began to vibrate as the train swung in; 
puffs of steam were driven downwards by the frosty air; slowly and rhythmically the piston 
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of the middle wheel rose and extended, covered with hoarfrost. Behind the tender came the 
luggage-van, with a dog whining inside, gradually slowing down and making the platform 
shake more than ever. At last the passenger coaches jolted to a standstill. A sprightly guard 
jumped out, blowing the whistle as he did so, and then one by one the impatient passengers 
began to get down. (1878/1978, p. 73/74)
Yet, the train quickly disappears into the background. The emphasis, in the novel 
as such, is clearly on human psychology and human relationships.
In a similar vein, Ibsen’s play The Lady from the Sea, already quoted in Chapter 1, 
begins and ends with the arrival and departure of a large steam ship, a δεινος 
phenomenon, that opens up the Norwegian coastal area and connects it with inter-
national networks, bringing in tourists, for example. The steamer puts Ibsen’s 
drama between parentheses. But the play as such focuses on human psychology, 
notably the psychology of marriage.
Jules Verne has also written a number of stories about steam ships, the most 
important one being Une ville flottante [“A Floating City” (1871)]. It is a story 
about the Great Eastern, a steam ship of gigantic proportions, large as a whole city. 
In principle, Jules Verne is interested in human psychology, of course. Like Ibsen’s 
play, Verne’s novel is about a man who fell in love with a woman suffering from 
psychological problems: unresolved tensions and conflicts from a distant past. Yet, 
in Verne’s case the emphasis is not on these human beings, but rather on the 
mechanical artefacts that transport them – preferably huge machines and the impact 
they have on human beings. The giant steamer is a machine that literally consumes 
human beings. It is an urban society, a microcosm, a floating city that brings old 
and new continents together and allows maritime nature to emerge in a completely 
different manner. The steamer’s features are described in a rather exact and quanti-
tative way, in the language of an engineer.
As a rule, Verne’s psychology, notably his psychology of love and marriage, 
seems somewhat stereotypical and naïve. Verne, Tolstoy and Ibsen all write about 
people, and they all write about machines, but whereas in the writings of his con-
temporaries the emphasis is on psychology, in Verne’s case the emphasis is on 
machines. He writes about people who invent, or use, or refuse to use, machines. 
His novels study the ways in which science and technology influence the way in 
which people travel, communicate and perceive the world around them. Quite 
often, the people using and inventing machines are scientists. In that case, the 
machine is an apparatus that allows new forms of research to be carried out. One 
could say that in Vingt mille lieues sous les mers [20,000 Leagues Under the Sea 
(1870)], the main character of the novel is neither Captain Nemo, nor Pierre 
Aronnax, but rather the Nautilus as such: a floating research station, comparable to 
the space stations of today.
Verne was a workaholic. Although he made his debut at a relatively late age (in 
1863), he published something like ninety novels (two or three novels every year). 
In this manner he created a literary encyclopaedia, covering all the major research 
fields (both fundamental and applied) of his era, a comprehensive overview of 
science and technology and their societal potential.
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10.3  Extremophilia: Experimental Research Under 
Extreme Conditions
One could say that all Verne’s novels are structured as a journey. Moreover, they 
are also structured as an experiment.
The first claim is obvious, more or less. His novels are literally and explicitly 
presented as journeys (“voyages extraordinaires”). Their point of departure is usu-
ally a major city (Paris, London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Hamburg, New York, 
Philadelphia, San Fransisco, Moscow, etc.) and they take the travellers to extremely 
remote areas, far beyond the realms of civilisation, where they find themselves 
exposed to extreme conditions (the North Pole, the South Pole, Siberia, uninhabited 
islands, the Amazon forest, a subterranean cave, the Sahara desert, etc.).
But the second claim is no less important. In fact, both elements are closely inter-
twined: it is an experimental journey, an experimental trial in the form of (or in the 
context of) a journey. Many of his novels are literally and explicitly presented as an 
experiment, and virtually all of them can be read as such. The voyage to the moon, 
for example, is repeatedly called an experiment,8 while the moon travellers spend 
their time performing experiments (such as experiments with zero-gravity).9 Because 
the American Civil War has come to an end, the members of the Gun Club (experts 
in ballistics who had put their expertise in service of artillery warfare) suddenly find 
themselves deprived of the possibility to “test” their theories and calculations “exper-
imentally”. They can no longer continue their “field” trials. Indeed, it seems as if their 
science will be transformed into an innocent, “platonic” endeavour (“artillerie plato-
nique”, p. 10). In fact, the members of the Gun Club (most of whom already had been 
severely mutilated and dismembered in the course of their experimental practices) 
feel more or less emasculated. Therefore, their President (Barbicane) proposes to 
conduct an “experiment” (“expérience”, p. 24) on an even larger scale than the Civil 
War allowed, by building a giant canon for the purpose of shooting a bullet at the 
moon. Moon research conducted from the surface of the earth seems to have reached 
its technical limits and this explains the sense of malaise, the absence of progress in 
the field. Moon science (“selenology”) has come to a stand still. A “direct communi-
cation” with the moon seems indispensable. This “unprecedented experiment” will 
not only stimulate further research, but will bring the field as a whole on a much 
higher level. It will revolutionise the field. So far, all voyages to the moon have been 
imaginary or literary voyages, written by authors such as Jean Baudoin, Cyrano de 
Bergerac, Edgar Allan Poe, and others. Although these “imaginary experiments” 
(“tentatives imaginaires”, p. 29) are interesting and stimulating in themselves, they 
cannot be regarded as satisfactory any longer. Barbicane proclaims that he has seen 
enough of these “literary experiments” (“tentatives littéraires”, p. 30). Their basic 
8 “Une tentative scientifique sans précédent dans les annales de la science”, 1870, p. 1.
9 “Ils passaient leur temps à faire des expériences”, 1865, p. 210.
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flaw is that they lack the exactitude that is so typical of a truly scientific approach. 
They fall short on the level of mathematics. It is now high time for a real and serious 
trial,10 the first no doubt in a whole series of experiments (“série d’expériences”, 
p. 39). And indeed, Verne’s novel contains extensive and even plausible mathematical 
calculations. This transformation of ballistics into a peaceful and even “moral” field 
of enquiry is rightfully called a “sublimation”. The death drive gives way to the erotic 
one. The capsule is like a spermatozoon on its way to a huge, white and bleak, shin-
ing, virgin, motherly body. It will be an act of fertilisation, a second creation. Before 
long, the moon will be populated by masses of human beings. The journey will bring 
human beings on an equal footing with the great Creator of life (p. 79). It will be the 
beginning of an era of space colonisation. While God created the planets (motherly 
bodies), man created the bullet-shaped capsule (the spermatozoon) that will fertilise 
these abiotic heavenly bodies.
Moreover, Barbicane and his colleagues are the research subjects of their own 
trial. Like the “gothic” monk Bertold Schwartz, the legendary, fourteenth-century 
inventor of gunpowder (and as such an important representatives of the medieval 
scientia experimentalis) they are clearly aware of the fact that they may lose their 
lives while conducting their trials. Schwartz paid for his invention with his life, and 
their experiment may become an act of scientific suicide or self-sacrifice as well. 
But in the case of Barbicane and his colleagues, a mathematical handling of the trial 
will guarantee their safety. Personal courage is replaced by mathematical certainty. 
The number of moon travellers reflects the quaternity ratio, discussed in Chapter 9. 
Three members imprison themselves inside the capsule, while a fourth decides to 
stay behind on the last moment in order to observe their progress form the surface 
of the earth.11 They take a number of research animals with them on board, notably 
two dogs, and one of them dies during the trial. One of the important problems to 
be solved in an experimental manner is how to maintain a viable oxygen level while 
getting rid of the carbon dioxide the moon travellers produce. In order to solve this 
problem, they rely on experiments that have already been successfully performed 
by two chemists, who used research animals (“anima vili”) however, rather than 
human subjects.12 Although their experiments had been carefully conducted, it was 
as yet unclear to what extent their results could be safely extrapolated to humans. 
“Anima vili” was a technical phrase, coming from nineteenth-century research ethics 
– from the maxim: Fiat experimentum in corpore vili or in anima vili, to be exact. 
This maxim was used to indicate that experiments, if possible, should be conducted 
10 “J’ai donc l’honneur de vous proposer, mes braves collègues, de tenter cette petite expérience” 
(p. 32); “rien ne serait négligé pour assurer le succès de cette grande expérience” (p. 42), etc.
11 A second “quaternity” is also noticeable: while three of the team members are experts, a fourth 
is a lay adventurer.
12 “[L]es deux chimistes, MM. Reiset and Regnault, avaient expérimenté avec  succès. Mais, il faut le 
dire, l’expérience avait eu lieu jusqu’alors in anima vili – quelle que fût sa précision scientifique, on 
ignorait absolument comment des hommes la supporteraient” (1865, p. 309).
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on “lower” or “less valuable” bodies” (i.e. on animals rather than humans, and on 
“lower” rather than “higher” animals).13
Science is present in Verne’s novels in two ways. In the first place as the science 
that makes the experimental journey possible, but also in the form of the science that 
is made possible by it.
In the two novels devoted to the journey to the moon (1865, 1870), ballistics is 
the science that makes possible the experiment by allowing experts to determine 
exactly how and when the capsule should be fired in the direction of the moon. 
Subsequently, however, new forms of scientific research are made possible by the 
experiment. The moon journey allows selenographic inquiries (i.e. the mapping of 
the surface of the moon) to be carried out in a much more accurate and reliable 
manner than ever before. In the past, the moon’s surface had to be surveyed with 
the help of telescopes. Now it can be studied from a close distance (“de visu”). One 
could say that, in the novels of Verne, new apparatus, new contrivances, such as the 
moon capsule, take the researchers to the things themselves, as phenomenologists 
would phrase it: “Zu den Sachen selbst”. In this manner, the moon journey has a 
concrete scientific outcome. The Mappa Selenographica published by De Beer and 
Mödler of 1830 can be corrected and improved and a whole series of scientific 
disputes concerning the moon can now be settled. The field experiences an episte-
mological quantum leap overnight.
The same goes for Captain Nemo’s Nautilus. On the one hand, a number of 
scientific and technological disciplines are necessary for the apparatus to be built 
(mechanics, electrophysics, etc.). At the same time, the Nautilus is a floating labo-
ratory, a mobile observatory that makes new and more reliable forms of research 
possible, by going to the things themselves, such as: oceanography, deep sea 
zoology, marine archaeology, marine mineralogy, etc. On the one hand, the 
Nautilus is a master piece of mechanics and electrophysics. On the other hand, it is 
a mobile research facility that transforms the ocean into a giant “aquarium” 
(p. 120/123) so that it can be opened up for scientific analysis. The obscure and 
opaque depths of the ocean are literally enlightened by the lights of the Nautilus. 
These lights, in combination with a giant glass window, produce the clearing that 
allows maritime nature to manifest itself, more or less for the first time. Earthly 
science (“science terrestre”, p. 70) had reached its limits and was suffering from a 
sense of malaise. Aronnax himself was more or less suffering from a mid-life crisis. 
At the beginning of the novel, instead of continuing his research, which had 
obviously come to a stand-still, he is wasting his time with trivial pursuits (such as: 
giving various kinds of advice) and far niente. Nemo studies the ocean under com-
pletely different conditions, thereby putting the field on a much higher level. He 
studies the submarine world directly (de visu) rather than indirectly. Earthly 
science is represented in the Nautilus in the form of an impressive library. 
Aronnax’s book is the “youngest” book, the most advanced specimen of the “old” 
epistemological regime. Nemo’s own oceanography, however, is represented by 
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various research contrivances, built into his floating observatory, the most impor-
tant being the huge glass window, already mentioned, through which submarine 
life forms can be studied, not anatomically, but alive and in the context of their own 
natural environment. In other words, Nemo’s submarine even makes Ishmael’s 
cetology “superficial”. While the latter remained at the ocean’s surface, Nemo 
really follows the whales into their own dark habitat. He refuses, however, to 
publish his results. Nemo is the archetypical “genius”, and Aronnax, a university 
professor, becomes his student, so to speak, who (after a long holiday) suddenly 
finds himself enrolled as a Ph.D. student in a prestigious cutting-edge laboratory. 
Sophisticated research apparatus allow Nemo and his team (a group of silent, 
scientific monks) to make exact measurements continuously concerning numerous 
parameters such as temperature, pressure, depth, etc. It is a completely different, 
really modern scientific practice. All of a sudden, official science as it had been 
practised thus far seems a rather primitive and outdated affair.
In Cinq semaines en ballon [Five Weeks in a Balloon (1863)], pneumatics and 
aerodynamics are the sciences that make the experiment possible, while geography 
(until then more or less a matter of adventure) is placed on a much more scientific 
footing. Pneumatics and aerodynamics allow Samuel Ferguson and his fellow air 
travellers to build a highly advanced balloon. This apparatus makes a new form of 
mobility possible and opens up new possibilities for (geographical) research. It 
allows them to study the geography of Africa in a more reliable and comfortable 
manner. The journey is literally called an “experiment without precedents” 
(“Tentative sans précédents”). In order for the experiment to succeed, Ferguson 
conducts a number of preparatory experiments as well, but only the real experiment 
can determine the adequacy of his (highly disputed) theories. Notwithstanding a 
number of highly dramatic events, the experiment proves a great success as the map 
of Africa becomes literally visible (unfolds itself) beneath them.
Also typical for Verne’s novels is that the experimenter invites (or even forces) 
his most prominent critics or antagonists to take part in the experiment. In this man-
ner, the experimental trial is continuously monitored by a critical reviewer, so to 
speak. This is also part of the experimental structuring of the Verne novel: the logic 
of conducting and assessing an experiment, the logic of experimental design even 
determines the casting. Thus, the sceptic can be converted into an enthusiastic fol-
lower. In this manner, Ferguson invites his opponent Dick Kennedy to supervise 
the experiment of flying over Africa in vivo and the same goes for Barbicane, who 
invites his opponent Nicholls to travel to the moon. In some cases, the critics 
become involved in the experiment against their will. Thus, by forcefully imprison-
ing them on board of his aeroplane, Robur (the “conqueror”) forces his major 
antagonists to witness the experiment. In this manner he intends to prove once and 
for all that the future of air travel belongs to aircraft built on the basis of the princi-
ple “heavier than air” (such as helicopters and airplanes), rather than devices built 
on basis of the principle “lighter than air” (such as balloons).14
14 Robur-le-Conquérant [“Robur the Conqueror” (1886)]
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In Voyage to the Centre of the Earth (1864) cryptology and geography (as we have 
seen) are the disciplines that makes the voyage possible, whereas palaeontology and 
geology are the disciplines that can now be studied in a more reliable way.
The Voyages et aventures du capitaine Hatteras [“Voyages and Adventures of 
Captain Hatteras” (1866)] describe the ways in which highly advanced sailing boats 
make new forms of research possible in unexplored arctic regions: notably meteor-
ological research under extreme conditions. The North Pole is described as a gigantic 
“laboratory” where highly innovative experiments concerning very low tempera-
tures can be performed by scientific travellers under extreme but real-life 
conditions.15
Une fantaisie du docteur Ox [“A Fantasy of Dr. Ox” (1872)] is again quite liter-
ally presented as an experiment. The inhabitants of a Flemish town are exposed to 
relatively high levels of oxygen and the impacts of this condition on their physiology 
and behaviour are carefully registered and analysed.
In Les enfants du capitaine Grant [“The Children of Captain Grant”] geography, 
as an exact science, guides the travellers on their “mathematical” journey, follow-
ing a straight orbit around the globe, in a precise and methodical manner, while 
cultural anthropology is one of the sciences that profit from their journey. Their 
sophisticated steam ship is, quite literally, a search engine.
Another “mathematical” journey is even more famous: Le tour du monde en 
quatre-vingts jours [“Around the World in Eighty Days” (1870)]. In this novel a 
number of contrivances for human mobility are analysed, notably the two great 
innovations of the 1860s: the express train and the ocean steamer. Verne carefully 
describes these new forms of mobility as well as the new experiences of space and 
time they make possible. This mathematical journey is undertaken in order to test 
whether a hypothesis that is mathematically correct can actually be put to practice. 
Verne describes the impact this new form of mobility has in terms of how time and 
space are being experienced. Its main character (Phileas Fogg) no longer “travels”, 
in the traditional sense of the term. Rather, he is a physical “body” that traces an 
orbit around the globe, confining himself in a series of mechanical capsules.16 In 
terms of space, the earth seems to have grown smaller and as far as the temporal 
dimension is concerned, a new attitude towards time emerges: punctuality. 
Everything has to be done exactly on time. Moreover, time has become relative, it 
has become a function of displacement, a function of mobility. If a person travels 
around the globe in exactly 80 days, will he arrive exactly in time? The answer 
must be that it depends on the position and motion of the observer in space. 
Paradoxically, in this case, time has not take up as much time as was initially 
expected, and the time measurements of the traveller himself deviate increasingly 
from real time. By actually travelling around the globe, the factor time can be 
15 As Dr. Clawbonny, the team’s scientist phrases it: “Ces contrées sont un vaste laboratoire ou l’on 
peut faire de curieuses expériences sur les basses températures”.
16 “Il ne voyageait pas, il décrivait une circonférence … un corps grave, parcourant une orbite, sui-
vant les lois de la mécanique”.
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modified. It is, one could say, an Einsteinian intuition. Indeed, in his book on the 
theory of relativity, Russel writes: “Time depends on motion. Two perfectly accu-
rate clocks, one of which is moving very fast, will not continue to show the same 
time if they come together again after a journey” (1925/1969, p. 20). Subsequently, 
he describes a thought experiment involving research subjects who are standing 
(watch in hand) on different train platforms moving with great velocity away from 
one another. This will affect “their” time. Although the scale and speed of Verne’s 
trains are somewhat too small, too “earthly”, for these Einsteinian effects to 
become measurable, the intuition is there. This is what Verne’s experiment tries 
to convey: that in the new world of science-based travel, time and space themselves, 
as basic dimensions of experience, become modifiable.
So far, we have emphasised the scientific side of Verne, his epistemological ego, 
so to speak. Yet, there is another side to him as well. On the one hand, he describes 
and perceives the world as scientists or engineers tend to do, through the eyes of his 
scientific heroes, developers of new technologies, prodigious calculators. On the 
other hand, Verne is rather sensitive to what Bachelard (cf. Chapter 2) described as 
the logic of imaginary thinking, the logic of the archetypes. And this is his “other” 
dimension, his alter ego. Verne’s world, explored by scientists and engineers, literally 
teems with (either real or imaginary) monsters. His biology is basically a teratol-
ogy. Verne’s oeuvre stages a struggle between the monster-type (and various other 
archetypes) on the one hand, and a science-based worldview on the other. 
Sometimes, the scientist will reveal that the monster is a fabulous entity, in the 
sense of non-existing. On other occasions the monster is “naturalised” through 
strategies of classification. Let us have a closer look.
10.4 Elementary Imagination: Verne’s Work as “Teratology”
How can one present Verne’s ninety novels in an orderly fashion? It seems an 
impossible task. According to Gaston Bachelard, however, literary imagination still 
tends to follow the ancient classification of the world into four basic elements: 
earth, water, air and fire. These elements not only structured ancient Greek thinking 
about the universe and, subsequently, the mind-set of alchemy, but they continue 
to guide our perceptions, our imaginations, even in modern times. Moreover, these 
elements can be associated with a number of typical (or rather: “archetypical”) 
images. For example, the element earth is associated with the archetypical “Mother 
Earth”. In this section I will use Bachelard’s theory of “elementary imagination” to 
present Verne’s oeuvre in a concise manner.
Verne’s Journey to the Centre of the Earth obviously belongs to the category of 
novels that focus on the element “earth”. The same goes for the many novels Verne 
wrote about far-off, isolated islands, whose stranded inhabitants flesh out Robinson-
like existences for themselves. Other “earth”-novels are set in remote and inacces-
sible places, such as rain forests, deserts or mountain tops. Verne’s remarkable 
fascination for the South Pole and the North Pole, as immense expanses of ice, 
places them as boundary objects, so to speak, between earth and water.
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According to Jung and Bachelard, the archetypical image connected with the 
element earth is the image of the giant mother: the earth as a gigantic motherly 
body. For example, Journey to the Centre of the Earth can be read as a journey of 
three (or four) earthlings on their way back towards a gigantic uterus, the centre of 
the earth as the core region of an enormous female body, in whose life-preserving 
liquids Jurassic life forms (that somehow never made it to the surface) are kept 
alive eternally, as perpetual fetuses, so to speak. The idea of the hollowness of the 
earth relies on this imaginary association with a huge motherly body, rather than on 
scientific evidence: a secret opening to a tunnel that gives access to the centre of 
the earth. The idea of the earth as a gigantic body is, of course, an alchemical asso-
ciation as well. It emphasises the concordance between the animal sphere (normal-
sized bodies) and the mineral sphere (macro-bodies). Everyday language still 
contains traces of this association, for example, when we say that there are “veins” 
hidden in the crust of the earth.
In Five Weeks in a Balloon, the continent of Africa is represented as a forbidden, 
resisting virgin mother, and Ferguson is referred to as the “modern Oedipus” who 
will conquer the obstacles that hindered others in achieving their goal of penetrating 
deeply into this terra incognita. It is also significant that the South Pole is described 
by Verne as a huge magnet, in the form of a giant Sphinx [Le sphinx des glaces/“An 
Antarctic Mystery” (1897)]. Countless travellers are attracted and deluded by the 
immense frozen expanses surrounding it, and died on their way to this forbidden 
part of the world which man seems prohibited to enter. Shipwrecked sailors who 
find themselves on deserted island are like orphans who have to begin their life 
anew in the absence of a caring mother – who is actually replaced by a stepmother, 
a surrogate mother.17
Other images connected with the element earth are the cave and the mine (or: 
the natural and the artificial cave), as the dark and claustrophobic insides of the 
mother’s body. In these caves, bizarre life forms manage to exist, Jurassic life 
forms, for example, inhabiting subterranean lakes, but also strange human beings, 
representatives of vanished worlds, who decided to spent their life in a deserted 
mine, far beneath the surface of the earth [Les Indes Noires/“Black Indies” (1877)] 
in order to carry on the kind of life that has vanished in the modern world on the 
earth’s surface because of progress. The mine itself is described by Verne as an 
enormous monstrous “corpse”, a deceased body containing veins and lungs. The 
novel tells the story about an effort to revivify this corpse by inhabiting it, so that 
dead matter becomes alive again and coal is transformed into gold again (i.e. death, 
meaningless matter receives symbolic value again, becomes humanised – the 
alchemical idea of sublimation). The mine is like a giant dark uterus, a huge cave, 
filled with a subterranean lake, the inside of a living and life-preserving body of 
17 Marie Bonaparte in her extensive study on Edgar Allan Poe writes: “ Tous les voyages dans la 
lune, dont les hommes ont rêvé de toujours, ont d’ailleurs ce sens profond de retour nostalgique 
au sein maternel. La plupart des récits d’explorations et d’aventures dont raffolent les enfants, de 
l’Ile au Trésor de Stevenson jusqu’aux romans de Jules Verne et en deçà et au-delà, possèdent 
aussi, comme le récit de Pym … les mêmes racines” (1958, p. 450).
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which normally only the external parts are exposed (the landscapes at the surface). 
The alchemical connotations are evident here as well. The experiment consists 
in bringing a girl who spent her life in the mine to the surface, exposing her to day-
light and outside air in order to find out how her senses and her organism will 
respond to this type of stimuli. These responses are carefully recorded, as in a 
laboratory report.
Yet another “earth”-novel is Le village aérien [“Village in the Treetops” 
(1901)]. Once again, it is about strange life forms hidden in unknown territory 
(somewhere in the Congo region in the heart of Africa). This time, the scientific 
discipline that is furthered or made possible by travelling is anthropology, and its 
archetype is the mysterious “missing link”, a hybrid, anthropoid (“monstrous”) life 
form, an intermediary between man and ape.
The mother and the monster archetypes are also present in novels that belong to 
the “water”-category. To begin with, every sea journey is a temporary state of sepa-
ration from the motherly body, a detour towards some kind of geographical, earthly 
“mother”, old or new. And on the way to these old or new mothers (for instance: 
old or new continents), monsters are encountered. In 20,000 Leagues Under the 
Sea, the South Pole is literally described by Verne as a gigantic, silent, unapproach-
able, ghastly, terrifying, fascinating, virgin “mother”. The Nautilus resembles a 
spermatozoon wandering through a lonesome ocean in search of this huge female 
body. And when finally the encounter takes place, the sperm cell is almost suffo-
cated and consumed by this gigantic body of ice, on whose perfectly white skin fine 
bleu arteries stand out. Once again, the earth as such is represented as more or less 
being alive – the world as a macro-organism. And on its way to this giant white 
mother, the Nautilus encounters a series of maritime monsters. But they can be 
subdued by modern technology and even studied at leisure.
For the element “water”, depth is very important. As we have seen in our analy-
sis of Moby-Dick, water is associated with mobility, with opening up the world, 
widening one’s horizon18 and with connecting continents. But at the same time, 
water is associated with nothingness. Hidden underneath the treacherous ocean 
surface are lurking the terrifying depths, in the form of ocean troughs, where 
bizarre and gigantic life forms dwell. Verne’s great water novel 20,000 Leagues 
Beneath the Sea is a monster story, even more so than Journey to the Centre of the 
Earth. The first chapters convey a Moby-Dick-like atmosphere, as a strange, huge 
and remarkably swift whale-like apparition is spotted at various parts of the mari-
time world. Due to the inability of prominent experts such as Professor Aronnax 
from Paris to come up with a rational explanation of the phenomenon, an epistemo-
logical interregnum is created in which the authority of science is temporarily sus-
pended and room is given to speculation and imagination, to “fantastic ichtyologies”.19 
Professor Aronnax sets out to calm the epistemological turmoil by capturing the 
18 Cf. Chapter 4.
19 “On vit réapparaître … tous les êtres imaginaires et gigantesques, depuis la baleine blanche, le 
terrible “Moby Dick” des régions hyperboréennes, jusqu’au Kraken démesuré” (p. 3)
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gigantic fish in order to determine its zoological identity in an anatomical manner 
and to store it among his maritime collections. For indeed, he knows how apt the 
“untutored mind” is to lose itself in crypto-zoological fantasies when it comes to 
the mysteries of the great ocean depths and their inhabitants, although it is not 
unlikely that gigantic living forms do manage to subsist in those regions. His objec-
tive is to capture, dissect and classify the monster (“ce digne animal”, p. 13). 
Eventually, however, he is forced to shift to a mechanical exploration rather than a 
zoological or anatomical one, as the mysterious “whale” turns out to be a techno-
logical artefact.
From the point of view of comparative epistemology, Verne’s novels clearly side 
with science in its struggle against other, less “advanced” knowledge forms. 
Practical people, notwithstanding their sharp senses, strong muscles and concrete 
knowledge of maritime environments, are represented as belonging to a pre-
scientific, “Rabelaisean world” (p. 21). Dialogues between experts on marine 
biology on the one hand and “practical whalers” on the other tend to be of a didactic 
nature. Eventually, the magnificence and sublimity of the whale as a natural entity 
is completely eclipsed by an artefact of human technology in the form of a gigantic 
submarine, built by Captain Nemo. The gigantic “thing” that surpasses all existing 
species of whales, turns out to be constructed by a “modern Galileo”. The real 
whale’s spout and flukes are nothing in comparison to this sophisticated monster of 
steel. Like Ishmael, Professor Aronnax’s ship is attacked by a “whale” and he falls 
into the ocean, but while Melville’s novel more or less ends with this event, in the 
case of Verne it is actually the beginning. The submarine turns out to be a well-
equipped research station, as well as a museum. It is a scientific monastery devoted 
to various forms of scholarly inquiry. Undisturbed by storms and other meteoro-
logical conditions at the surface, the Nautilus quietly and comfortably pursues its 
explorations in the silent world below. It is the oceanic counterpart of Ferguson’s 
balloon. As I said, the ocean itself is transformed into an “immense aquarium”. By 
means of the huge glass window, maritime life forms can be carefully examined 
and classified. Dialogues that evolve between Ned Land (the harpooner) and 
Conseil (Professor Aronnax’s assistant) in front of this window on the question 
“What it as fish”?20 are exercises in comparative epistemology, but of a rather 
biased type, as Verne clearly sides with the scientific worldview. Both men accuse 
the other of not really knowing what fishes are. It is a conflict between two forms 
of knowledge, two activities, namely chasing (chaser) and classifying (classer) 
whales. The Pequod and the Nautilus belong to completely different worlds, and 
the same goes for Captain Ahab (who claims that the sea is the same to him as it 
was to Noah, p. 1096) and Captain Nemo (a hero of modern technology who analy-
ses the chemical composition of sea-water as well as its temperature at various 
depths). In terms of comparative epistemology one could say that, although in the 
first chapters a more or less “imaginary cetology” is allowed to roam free, before 
20 “Sur ce sujet, une discussion s’éleva entre les deux amis, car ils connaissent les poissons, mais 
chacun d’une façon très différente” (p. 120).
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long a much more scientific view becomes dominant, and imaginary teratology is 
once again repressed. Symptomatic of the predominance of the scientific outlook is 
the fact that Verne’s book contains a large amount of quantitative data on various 
subjects (submarines, whales, oceans, etc.). Although initially the Nautilus itself is 
described as a monster, it is actually a highly advanced research tool that allows 
Nemo and his crew to study the real monsters that inhabit the maritime depths: 
huge whales (notably Sperm Whales), but also a gigantic octopus, gigantic shells, 
gigantic sharks, etc. Maritime teratology is surely among Nemo’s favourite research 
subjects.
Also in various other journeys over water recorded by Verne, travellers are con-
fronted with monstrous life forms (e.g. giant ice-bears). The novel Les histoires de 
Jean-Marie Cabidoulin (or Le grand serpent de mer [The Great Sea Serpent 
(1901)]) is an account of an epistemological struggle. The views, expectations and 
ideas with regard to maritime life forms that linger among sailors and seafaring 
people from all walks of life, stubbornly oppose the epistemological supremacy of 
the scientific world view. It is an old uncanny world, but progress of science is 
slow, and archetypical images associated with the sea and its hidden depths prove 
difficult to subdue. As was indicated in Chapter 2, the paradigm of Verne’s water 
novels was Poe’s The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket (1838/1976), 
analysed extensively by Bachelard as “poetic chemistry” and imaginary 
oceanography.
In the two novels Verne devoted to moon-travelling, the protagonists travel 
through space, rather than over sea, but the idea is basically similar: a temporary 
separation from “mother earth” and a technology-based effort to find another, 
whiter, more virgin-like mother. A capsule (spermatozoon) is fired by an enormous 
phallus-shaped canon in the direction of the moon, a heavenly body that is repeat-
edly and explicitly referred as a “mother” in Verne’s book. A moon landing would 
imply that eventually new life will be produced there, that the human race will be 
allowed to spread and multiply, by impregnating this lunar counterpart to the earth-
mother whose reservoirs of raw materials may one day become exhausted.
The element air is associated with freedom, openness and (above all) height. 
Floating through the air is clearly associated with a sense of freedom. By allowing 
engineers to build balloons, helicopters and aircraft, modern technology makes 
these new, free-floating forms of mobility possible. Thus, Five Weeks in a Balloon 
is an “earth”-novel (devoted to studying the earth below), but also an “air”-novel 
(devoted to the experience of travelling through the air). Other examples of air 
novels are Robur-the-Conqueror and Master of the World. Robur is the Captain 
Nemo of the element air so to speak. His aircraft is called a gigantic bird of prey, 
an aerial monster (“monstre aérien”, 1904/1997, p. 20).
And earlier example (published posthumously) of an “air”-novel describing a 
balloon flight, is Drame dans les airs [A Drama in the Air (1851)]. It is based on a 
story by Verne’s acknowledged predecessor, Edgar Allan Poe (1967/1976) called 
The Unparalleled Adventure of One Hans Pfaall. In her analysis of Poe’s story, 
Marie Bonaparte claims that the meaning of Poe’s balloon is “evident” (1958, 
p. 449). The balloon is the mother, carrying the traveller as her child. Moreover, 
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as both Poe’s and Verne’s story indicate, it is important that one knows how to use 
the new “motherly” powers of technology, emerging in the new large metropolises 
(“Mother Cities”) of the present in a responsible manner. In Verne’s novels, heroes 
of air travel display a tendency to go beyond their limits, thus exposing themselves 
to excessive risks and unnecessary dangers. It is, one could say, the Icarus-
complex. Technology liberates us from the sway of earthly (“fatherly”) powers, but 
if technology is used without the proper amount of prudence, and for trivial rather 
than for serious purposes, the contrivance may fail us and we may all of a sudden 
find ourselves exposed in an unsheltered way to an element in which we are not 
really at home – declining, falling, disappearing – as soon as the mother-machine 
is deficient or suddenly absent. The new powers built into modern technologies 
imply that individuals who use these technologies should be able to live up to its 
rather substantial moral demands in terms of discipline. Initially, in the 1860s, 
Verne was rather optimistic in this respect. The scientists building and using these 
contrivances tended to be moral exemplars, quite able to live up to the demands and 
constraints embedded in these new technologies. Technology implied self-discipline 
and self-constraint. Towards the end of his career, however, Verne becomes 
increasingly pessimistic. Not technology, but human beings themselves are the real 
problem, the real threat. They are too ambitious, too irrational, too emotional to use 
the new technologies in an intelligent and prudent way.
The fourth and final category of Verne’s novels are the “fire”-novels. And 
indeed, the novels devoted to the element of fire have their monsters as well: mon-
strous canons producing gigantic, catastrophic explosions. According to Gaston 
Bachelard, the explosion is the basic image or archetype that is associated with 
chemistry. And indeed, in Verne’s work, all novels involving chemistry or chemists 
end with a dramatic explosion: Les cinq cents millions de la Bégum [1879], Face 
au drapeau [1896] and L’étonnante Aventure de la mission Barsac [1920]. Another 
archetype, belonging to fire and the scientific disciplines associated with it, is 
“invisible radiation”, the archetype of physics (e.g. La chasse au météore [1908]).
Title Year Science Science Element Archetype
Drame dans les airs 1851 Pneumatics Physiology Air Mother
Cinq semaines en ballon 1863 Pneumatics Geography Air Mother
Voyage au centre de 
la terre




De la terre à la lune 1865 Ballistics Selenography Space Mother
Voyages et aventures 
du capitaine Hatteras
1866 Mechanics Physics, geol-
ogy
Earth Mother
Les enfants du capitaine 
Grant
1867 Geography Anthropology Earth
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Autour de la lune 1870 Ballistics Selenography Space Mother
Une ville flottante 1871 Engineering Psychology Water Machine-
monster
Aventures de trois Russes 
et trois Anglais
1872 Geodesy Zoology Earth Mother
Le tour du monde en 
 quatre-vingts jours
1873 Mechanics Logistics Earth
L’île mystérieuse 1874 Pneumatics Technology Earth
Les Indes noires 1877 Mining Psychology Earth Mother, Machine 
explosion
Les cinq cents millions 
de la Bégum
1879 Chemistry Industry Fire Explosion
Aventures Chinois en 
Chine
1879 Philosophy Statistics Earth
Matthias Sandorf 1885 Engineering Psychology Water Genius
Robur-le-Conquérant 1886 Aerostatics Aerostatics Air Machine-
monster, 
genius
Ile à hélice 1895 Engineering Tourism Water Machine-
monster
Face au drapeau 1896 Chemistry Artillery Fire Explosion
Le sphinx des glaces 1897 Geography Magnetism Water Mother
Le village aérien 1901 Geography Anthropology Earth Missing link
Jean-Marie Cabidoulin 1901 Water Monster
Maître du monde 1904 Aerostatics Aerostatics Air Machine-
monster, 
Genius
La chasse au météore 1908 Physics Economics Space Invisible 
radiation
Le secret de Wilhelm 
Storitz
1910 Alchemy Detection Homunculus
Mission Barsac 1919 Mechanics Management Earth Explosion
In the diagram above, a number of Verne novels are listed, together with the ele-
ments to which they belong, the sciences (or practices) they assess and the arche-
typical images they invoke.
Verne’s encyclopaedic oeuvre is an archive of monumental, perhaps even “mon-
strous” proportions, a real treasury for comparative epistemology. It may function 
as a benchmark, so to speak, for assessing and understanding similar endeavours of 
future writers, such as Michael Crichton – the Jules Verne of our own time.






Epistemological Exercises: Towards a Typology 
of Knowledge Forms
11.1 What is Knowledge?
Epistemology can be defined as the branch of philosophy that studies the origins, 
validity, reliability and limitations of knowledge. But what is knowledge? 
According to Plato and others, knowledge is something like true or justified beliefs 
or claims. This definition raises another (and perhaps even more difficult) question: 
What is truth?1 A famous answer to this decisive question was inspired by Aristotle 
and standardised by scholasticism as follows: adequatio intellectus ad rem. In mod-
ern language, this means something like “a correspondence between truth claims 
and facts”. As Heidegger has argued in various writings, however, this definition 
entails a simplification. Before facts can be established or acknowledged, we first 
of all must allow the world to appear in a certain manner. Nature has to be brought 
to light. This is what science is basically about. This is, as it were, the basic labour 
of science: making diffuse nature discrete. Nature must be discerned, uncovered, 
revealed in a certain manner before it can be analysed, before knowledge claims 
can be brought in connection with “facts”. This applies to human knowledge in 
general, but it certainly applies to the technosciences of modern times. Scientific 
equipment is developed in order to allow nature to appear, to become visible, in a 
certain way. Therefore, in the case of science, truth or knowledge cannot be defined 
merely as “the correspondence between science and nature”. Rather, we must 
acknowledge that the nature that is studied in scientific laboratories, under strict 
conditions, is a rather artificial and preformatted kind of nature. Only certain 
aspects of nature are allowed to reveal themselves. A laboratory is basically a cam-
era obscura, in which nature as such – as ϕύσις – is shut out as much as possible, 
in order to analyse particular aspects of nature, in splendid isolation as it were. 
Therefore, science and nature cannot be separated from one another. Technoscience 
is emphatically present in its own research objects, its own “nature”. Wo Es war soll 
Ich werden – scientists constitute themselves as epistemological subjects within the 
context of their technology-based research practices. They study the impact on 
natural entities of their own doings. Extrapolation (the translation of laboratory 
1 Cf. Pilate’s famous question in John 18:38.
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knowledge to real life, “mundane” conditions, where nature is much more 
“diffuse”) is always a delicate matter.
In the case of literary documents, things are even more complicated. These doc-
uments may do various things. Some literary documents set out to analyse nature 
or, rather, they analyse the ways in which human beings experience nature, under 
particular conditions. But they may also, in a very explicit manner, study the ways 
in which scientists interact with nature. Mary Shelley’s novel Frankenstein for 
instance studies the ways in which particular knowledge forms (notably alchemy 
and modern chemistry) allow nature to appear. In other words, literary documents 
may tell us something about nature, or about experiences of nature in the life-world, 
but they may also tell us something about science, about the way scientists perceive 
nature, or both. This implies that, if we ask ourselves to what extent literary docu-
ments can be epistemologically relevant, the answer is bound to be far from univo-
cal. As became clear in the context of our case studies in previous chapters, literary 
documents can be helpful when it comes to addressing particular epistemological 
quandaries. Indeed, they can broaden our understanding of the natural world, as 
well as of the natural sciences, but they may do so in various ways. In order to 
answer the question in what ways literary documents are important for epistemol-
ogy as a research field, we must draw up something like a “typology” of literary 
forms, a classification of literary genres – from an epistemological perspective of 
course. Not a typology in terms of “novels” versus “plays”, or “poetry” versus “prose”, 
or “tragedy” versus “comedy”. What would an epistemological typology of literary 
forms amount to?
11.2 An Epistemological Typology of Literary Forms
As was indicated in the Introduction, literary genres may remind us of the existence 
of other knowledge forms than the ones usually taken into consideration by episte-
mologists or philosophers of science. As a rule, these “other” forms are presented 
as more “intimate”, more “natural” even, than normal science, with epistemological 
profiles of their own. They exist “outdoors”, as it were, in verbal, informal forums 
of exchange. Novels, poems or plays may contain snapshots of these divergent 
knowledge forms. But how exactly does literature make these knowledge forms 
visible or accessible? As we have seen in previous chapters, there is more than one 
answer to this question. On the basis of our research so far, it is possible to draw 
up a (provisional) typology.
First of all, literary genres may function as forms of research in their own right, 
as ways of making everyday experiences of living nature (landscapes, animals, flow-
ers, etc.) more articulate and precise. Literary techniques may then be seen as ways 
of collecting and analysing experiences and observations that are neglected, to some 
extent at least, by more academic disciplines – novel writing or playwriting as a way 
of rendering diffuse nature more discrete – literature as “science without laborato-
ries”. Similar to the way in which Tolstoy has been regarded as a “psychologist” 
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(and Anna Karenina as an inquiry into the psychology of marriage), although he was 
never formally trained as such, Jack London may be regarded as an “animal psy-
chologist”. His dog novels contain insights that are not – or at least: not yet – articulated 
in a scientific manner. Knowledge-based practices such as animal husbandry, horticulture 
and navigation have been described in literary documents long before they were put 
on a scientific footing and became the object of systematic scientific research. For 
centuries, accounts of voyages of exploration tended to be hybrid genres: combining 
stories of adventures with more or less scholarly accounts. When on October 11, 
1492 Christopher Columbus all of a sudden noted in his diary that throughout the 
night he could hear the sounds of birds passing – Toda la noche oyeron pasar pája-
ros – an indication that he was in fact approaching land – this was both a scientific 
observation (the first of many devoted to the birds of the New World) and a dramatic 
turning point in a compelling story. As we have seen, Darwin’s The Origin of Species 
can still be regarded as a hybrid of this type: a scientific account that retains key 
features of narrative genres – of travelogues.
Moreover, literary genres may not only be regarded as studies of the natural 
world, that is, as forms or research in their own right, but also as archives, as col-
lections of particular knowledge forms – epistemological specimens so to speak. 
Sometimes, such literary sources may contain fragments of knowledge forms 
(vocabularies, methodologies, ideas) that have flourished in the past, but are no 
longer regarded as acceptable in official academic quarters. These knowledge 
forms have been scientific in previous epochs, but will no longer be respected as 
such. In this case, the interest in science is of a historical or even archaeological 
nature. Some of these knowledge forms are about to become extinct, about to disap-
pear for good, as epistemological remainders – as “endangered” epistemological 
genres (this applies, for instance, to some of the speech genres represented in 
Melville’s Moby-Dick).
Other genres represented in literary documents are still highly vulnerable, highly 
innovative and forward looking. In such as case, a literary document may depict 
and analyse a scientific discipline in statu nascendi, an anticipation as it were of a 
future academic discourse (as is the case for instance in Ibsen’s The Wild Duck). 
Documents such as Ibsen’s play may be regarded as literary “recordings” of episte-
mological events: “the birth of a research animal”, as well as of a particular laboratory 
setting – the birth of a particular experimental practice. In a similar way, Alexander 
Dumas has written about tulip cultivation as a proto-scientific practice. A play or 
novel like this, describing the genesis of a particular research field, could be written 
about, say, Mendel – and Mawer has done this more or less. Documents of this type 
are interested in science, in scientific discourse, but in an archaeological (backward 
looking) or anticipatory (forward looking) manner.
On other occasions, literary genres may be (tacitly or outspokenly) critical of 
science. In that case, they may describe or even promote (in a fragmented or in a 
systematic manner) styles of thinking that are incompatible with science – for 
instance because these rival styles rely on “imaginary” elements (basic images and 
their networks of associations) rather than on “symbolical” elements (such as num-
bers, logical operations, mathematical, physical or chemical symbols).
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Take, for example, the two classic literary documents on the natural sciences 
that were published during the first decades of the nineteenth century: Faust [1808] 
and Frankenstein [1818]. Goethe’s drama may be regarded, among other things, as 
a “short introduction” into alchemy, more or less like Mozart’s Die Zauberflöte 
[The Magic Flute] is a short introduction into freemasonry. In such a text, a particular 
discourse from present or past (such as alchemy) becomes the object of epistemo-
logical analysis and assessment. In the case of Goethe’s drama, however, alchemy 
is presented in an agonistic manner, as a rival discourse, an epistemological challenge 
– challenging an undermining scholasticism. This heterogeneity, which is more or 
less absent in Mozart’s case, is emphatically present in both Faust and Frankenstein. 
Yet, whereas in Goethe’s play scholasticism as an intellectual dead-end is con-
fronted with its dubious alter ego – the much more dangerous discipline of alchemy, 
notably the quest for the homunculus – Frankenstein stages a confrontation between 
alchemy and modern science. Its basic objective, from an epistemological point of 
view, is to show that, notwithstanding the conscious efforts of the modern sciences 
to actively repress their alchemistic reminiscences, ancient ideas and associations 
are nonetheless retained in modern forms of discourse, as symptoms of the linger-
ing sway of their epistemological “unconscious” or alter ego. Therefore, Mary 
Shelley’s novel is the Anfang, the true beginning, the inevitable starting point for a 
comparative epistemology. The struggle between modern science and alchemy, 
described in such a compelling way in her epoch-making novel, has significantly 
influenced my own analyses, notably of the work of Mendel (Chapter 9) and Verne 
(Chapter 10). Her novel is, as it were, the field of comparative epistemology in 
statu nascendi.
In the case of Shelley and Goethe, scholasticism, alchemy and modern science 
are treated with dead earnest: they are taken quite seriously as important knowl-
edge forms that may dramatically affect our life and world. Other authors may 
rather revert to caricature and exaggeration, as is the case in Gulliver’s voyage 
to Laputa (ridiculing experimental research) or in Dickens’ novel Hard Times 
(the Grandgrind episode as a parody of the practice of taxonomy). This is, as it 
were, the epistemological version of the distinction between “tragedy” and 
“comedy”.
In other words, novels and other literary genres may assume a variety of episte-
mological roles. They may be regarded as:
1. Forms of research in their own right (literature as phenomenology)
2. Archives of outdated or even extinct speech genres (literature as a depository of 
knowledge forms, as archaeology)
3. Parody (literature as criticism)
4. Descriptions of emerging research practices in statu nascendi (literature as 
maieutics)
5. Descriptions of the agonistic struggle between incompatible knowledge forms, 
such as alchemy and modern science, agonistic in the Nietzschean sense of the 
term (literature as genealogy)
In previous chapters we have studied important examples of these literary forms:
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Literature as phenomenology Jack London, The Call of the Wild
  Maurice Maeterlinck, La vie des Abeilles
Literature as archaeology Herman Melville, Moby-Dick
  Henrik Ibsen, Enemy of the People
Literature as criticism Jonathan Swift, Voyage to Laputa
  Charles Dickens, Hard Times
Literature as maieutics Alexander Dumas, The Black Tulip
  Henrik Ibsen, The Wild Duck
  Simon Mawer, Mendel’s Dwarf
Literature as genealogy Goethe, Faust
  Mary Shelley, Frankenstein
  Theodor Storm, The Grey Rider
  Jules Verne, 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea
The problem with classifications such as this one is that they suggest that literary docu-
ments have one unequivocal profile, one role to play, whereas in reality one and the 
same document may have various functions – may have more than one epistemological 
identity or face. “Notably, the distinction between archaeology” and “genealogy” is a 
fluid one. Henrik Ibsen’s play Enemy of the People for instance is listed here as an 
“archaeological” document because it analyses older “layers”, older “formations” of 
theories and vocabularies concerning micro-organisms than the scientific ones that 
were in vogue in academic circles at the time of the dramatic event. But at the same 
time, it is a “genealogical” document, of course, because it analyses the epistemological 
tension or even clash between old and new vocabularies, doing so in terms of power. It 
analyses the strengths as well as the vulnerabilities of an emerging truth regime, notably 
its political significance in terms of public health or “biopower”. And it can even be 
regarded as maieutics to the extent that it analyses a newly emerging knowledge form 
(detecting pathogenic micro-organisms with the help of a microscope) that has not yet 
established itself, has not yet acquired a robust epistemological profile of its own. In 
short, literary documents may be of interest to us for a variety of reasons. Ibsen’s play 
has an archaeological, a genealogical as well as a maieutical dimension – and that, of 
course, is what makes it so interesting from an epistemological perspective.
The same goes for Ibsen’s The Wild Duck. In Chapter 6, we compared this play with 
contemporary emerging research practices, notably the work of Spalding. As a rule sci-
entific documents tend to be homogeneous more or less in terms of their epistemologi-
cal profile. Spalding’s “aside” comparing research notes to court journals is typical for 
reports written when a research field is still in its period of gestation. In normal science, 
remarks like that tend to disappear. Ibsen’s play is heterogeneous rather than homoge-
neous. It focuses on the epistemological conflicts arising between the incommensurable 
views involved, namely the scientific and the romantic view. This is its “genealogical” 
dimension. But, as we have seen, Ibsen’s play has a “maieutical” dimension as well. It 
stages a new way of perceiving and interacting with animals.
According to Martin Heidegger, the value of true art resides in the extent to 
which it discloses important but forgotten or as yet undiscovered dimensions of 
being. Indeed, in his view, a work of art, rather than a scientific paper, is bound to 
be the place where αληθεια, the disclosure or opening up of new forms of animal-
hood, or of novel human–animal relationships, is likely to occur. The Wild Duck as 
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a work of art announces, discerns and stages for the first time an important event, 
about to realize itself in experimental practice. According to Heidegger, art pre-
cedes science. The primal scene, the original emergence of a new possibility for 
interacting with research animals could only occur in a literary text.
From the point of view of comparative epistemology, this is a questionable claim. 
It would be somewhat arbitrary to attribute the possibility of disclosure to literary 
writings only. Similar instances of αληθεια can be found in scientific documents as 
well. Some documents, such as Spalding’s original research account, almost read like 
narratives. While Ibsen (with his seismographic sensitivity) sensed the emergence of 
a new view on animals, similar instances of openness and revelation were presenting 
themselves within the discourses of science as well. And whereas forms of disclosure 
and discovery may emerge within the realm of science, literary documents may be 
rather obscuring and concealing, impoverishing the animalness of animals (as tends 
to be the case in the fable literature discussed in Chapter 3). It would be a prejudice, 
in other words, to regard literary works as epistemologically privileged per se.
If we reflect on Jules Verne’s works in terms of this typology we can say that, first of 
all, their purpose often is to describe the birth of a new research practice, based on a novel 
apparatus or machine, a new research tool that allows the field in question to undergo an 
epistemological transformation. But Verne also describes the epistemological struggle 
between imaginary thinking and the scientific worldview as well as the transformative, 
irresistible or even disruptive power of new machines. Although at first glance his analysis 
seems rather one-sided (biased in favour of science), the more one reads him, the more it 
becomes clear that things are more complicated. In fact, there is a basic similarity between 
his work and the philosophy of Gaston Bachelard. On the one hand, he describes the 
epistemological leap or rupture that allows science to emancipate itself from the episte-
mological “cave” of imaginary thinking. On the other hand, Verne is clearly fascinated by 
archetypes, as a symptom of his involvement with an imaginary mind-set. His oeuvre is 
a perfect archive for studying, not only the logic of science, but also the logic of elemen-
tary imagination and the role of scientific and elementary archetypes. His work allows us 
to study the tension, the struggle between these two styles of thinking. In Plato’s simile of 
the cave (1935/2000, 514 a–517 a), the archetypes are the puppets whose shadows are cast 
upon the wall. Science is the painful effort to guide someone, or to guide ourselves, 
towards the exit – education comes from the Latin word educere (to lead or escort some-
one towards outside). Through scientific education we can escape from the sway of the 
archetypes. Faust’s famous maxim also applies to Verne: “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in 
meiner Brust” (1112). He is fascinated by the archetypes, but at the same time willing to 
follow the scientific mind towards the realm of truth.
11.3 The Nineteenth Century
As was indicated in the Introduction, this volume has a diachronic as well as a syn-
chronic axis. On the one hand, we have discussed the relationship between science 
and literature more or less “in general”. In Chapter 3, for example, we briefly described 
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two important traditions, the scientific practice of classification (historia animalorum) 
on the one hand and the fable literature on the other, diachronically (i.e. as they 
evolved in the course of history). In our case studies, however, the focus was on con-
temporary knowledge forms emerging during a particular historical episode. This episode 
can be roughly defined as the second half of the nineteenth century. Why this episode 
is so important was indicated in the first two chapters. During this period, the life 
sciences distanced themselves from (emancipated themselves from) natural philosophy. 
In literary circles, the new scientific worldview, as well as the methodology on which 
it was based, met with enthusiasm as well as distrust. Some literary authors (such as 
Zola) identified themselves with the project of science. Others, however, gave voice 
to epistemological discontent. When in 1900 epistemology as a philosophical movement 
was launched, its supporters tended to side with literature as a way of articulating 
experiences in the life-world that were obscured in laboratory work. In short, the 
nineteenth century was the time when novel-writing, playwriting as well as experi-
mental research acquired their modern profile. Which of these practices produced the 
most adequate “representation” of the ways in which human beings experience and 
interact with the natural world? The novel emerged as a powerful instrument for 
studying psychological, sociological and even biomedical issues. At the same time, 
experimentalism (Bernard, Mendel, Pasteur, Koch, Pavlov, etc.) placed the life 
sciences on a much more scientific footing. From the point of view of comparative 
epistemology it is no coincidence that novels and experiments (notably in the life 
sciences) are contemporary phenomena. They share a number of common features, 
but tend to be agonistic as well. They are each others counterparts. And finally, during 
this same period, evolutionary theory emerged. The idea of evolution was not only 
elaborated in scientific documents, but also in literary ones. It was during the second 
half of the nineteenth century, therefore, that crucial comparative epistemological 
issues were being raised. It was the epoch during which epistemological disputes (the 
“literature versus science” dispute) reached its climax.
I have listed the dramatis personae of this volume in the table on the next page.
While philosophers either precede this episode (Kant, Hegel) or reflect on it, as 
two side panels so to speak, the scientists (experimentalists) and the literary authors 
(novelists, playwrights) are contemporaries.
As far as the life sciences are concerned, the nineteenth century gave rise to at 
least two grand ideas, namely evolution and the experiment. Although ideas con-
cerning evolution had been articulated before Darwin, while physiological and bio-
medical experiments had been conducted on a limited scale in previous centuries, it 
was during the second half of the nineteenth century that evolution and experimenta-
tion really became standard ideas. Therefore, this focus on the nineteenth century 
raises some issues, to be developed in subsequent sections of this chapter.
First of all, the concept of the experiment allows us to address the question how 
exactly we should understand the relationship between literature and science (Section 
4). Should we regard these forms of discourse as two incompatible “cultures”? Or will 
the idea of an experimental design allow us to discern a basic affinity between both?
Secondly, the idea of evolution is a key concept both in literature and science 
during this epoch. How is this idea addressed in these discourses (Section 5)?
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Finally, although from a comparative epistemological point of view the nine-
teenth century is a decisive episode, the focus of this volume on this period also 
limits its scope. In the final section I will indicate in broad outline what a compara-
tive epistemology of the twentieth century would look like (Section 6).
11.4 Two Cultures?
The tendency has emerged to see science and literature in opposition to one another. 
This notably applies to the “two cultures” theorem of C.P. Snow, discussed in the 
Introduction. At first glance our case studies seem to confirm this view. The “logic” 
of literary documents is the logic of “imaginary thinking”, relying on basic images 





































There is a clear epistemological proximity between experiences of nature articulated 
in literary documents and the way in which nature is experienced in the life-world.
At the same time, it became clear that this opposition is really a simplification. 
Snow’s arguments are largely based on anecdotal information rather than on systematic 
analysis of scientific and literary sources. In important respects, science and literature 
are actually very similar. First of all, we have indicated that quite often, literary 
documents are structured as an experimental design. Hegel already noticed that the 
novel was an art form that was evolving in the direction of more scholarly forms of 
writing (Chapter 2) and our case studies confirmed this. Our argument was that, as 
the fable literature was the literary counterpart of the historia animalorum tradition 
(both genres being interested in – moral or anatomical – classifications), the nine-
teenth-century novel was de literary counterpart of the scientific experiment. Many 
novels can be read as reports of experiments. This not only goes for the novels of 
authors like Zola, who consciously applied the principles of experimental research 
to his work, but it goes for many other novels as well. Moreover, it may also apply 
to plays. We have extensively analysed The Call of the Wild by Jack London 
(Chapter 5) and The Wild Duck by Henrik Ibsen (Chapter 6) and we explicitly 
regarded both documents as literary experiments. The idea of an experimental 
design allowed us to discern their basic structure. Finally, in Chapter 10 it was 
argued that virtually all the ninety novels written by Jules Verne were designed as an 
experiment. Their purpose was to test particular theories or hypotheses by allowing 
scientific travellers to make careful observations under extreme conditions in unex-
plored regions. Furthermore, in many cases these travellers not only acted as 
researchers, but also as research subjects themselves, or as critical reviewers. And 
Verne tended to present his novels as accounts of an experimental journey, involving 
innovative, science-based contrivances for mobility, measurement and observation.
Moreover, we have argued not only that literature is similar to science, but also 
that science is in important respects similar to literature. For instance, we have 
argued (notably in Chapter 8) that experimentation constitutes a dramatic form of 
research, a dramatic “art”, and that an experiment is basically a performance. In 
other words, there are very fundamental similarities between the ways in which liter-
ary and scientific documents are structured. Finally, in Chapter 7 it was emphasised 
that we should not identify Romanticism with art, and Rationalism with science. 
Rather, while Romanticism inspired important forms of research, Rationalism gave 
rise to important forms of art. The tension between these two cultural forces is a 
tension within, rather than between art and science as cultural domains.
If both discourses are so similar, why do we distinguish them at all? Besides fun-
damental similarities, there are a number of differences as well. First of all, as we 
have seen, literary documents may constitute instances of research in their own right. 
To the extent that this is so, their methods and orientation tend to differ from those of 
science. Whereas a research report will focus on the “object” (for instance, the behav-
iour of the research animal), a literary document will give due attention to the subject 
pole as well. Thus, in literary works the subject (the individual researcher or research 
team) is visibly present, visibly at work. In the case of Maeterlink’s work on bees, for 
instance, the author is a person with a definite identity. He constitutes himself as a 
subject in writing this personal account. The same goes for Darwin’s book on earth 
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worms, of course, but that is precisely why this book is so “literary” in style. Also in 
cases where literary authors describe the (experimental) doings of others, as in the 
case of Ibsen’s The Wild Duck, these individuals are not at all anonymous entities, 
researchers without a face, as is usually the case in the research reports and journal 
articles of normal science. Moreover, whereas in research reports the emphasis will 
be on the “context of justification” (systematically describing research question, 
design, method, results, statistics etc.) a literary document will highlight the “context 
of discovery” as well. This is why scientific documents coming from the early history 
of a particular field so often read like “narratives” or even novels – the discourse of 
the discipline in question has not yet been standardised, the “subject” (the individual 
researchers and his or her experiences) is still emphatically present.
Yet, as was indicated above, literary texts may play other epistemological functions 
as well. Some literary documents are of a “genealogical” type. They stage a clash 
between scientific and non-scientific worldviews, between scientific and non-scientific 
forms of interaction with the natural world. In the context of such a clash, both the 
logic of experimental thinking and the logic of imaginary thinking are fleshed out. In 
short, we cannot say that literature is “opposed” to science, or that literature belongs 
to a different culture, and has a world of its own. A genealogical novel is open to sci-
ence as well as “opposed” to science. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein conveys both 
enthusiasm and discontent concerning the contemporary life sciences. Science is 
described from within (from a first-person point of view, from the perspective of Victor 
Frankenstein himself ) as well as from outside (from a third-person point of view, an 
outsider perspective). The novel describes the logic of experimental thinking as well 
as the logic of imaginary thinking. And this goes for all truly genealogical novels.
11.5 A Grand Idea (“How Large the World is …”)
What do Melville’s Moby-Dick, Darwin’s The Origin of Species and Verne’s Voyage 
to the Centre of the Earth have in common? To a certain extent, these three impressive 
volumes address similar themes. To begin with, all three books describe scientific 
journeys, leading to dramatic theoretical results. Secondly, all three books convey a 
basic experience of astonishment, an awareness of how incredibly large the world 
really is. Finally, all three books address issues of genesis (“origin”) and extinction.
Melville’s Moby-Dick is the most backward looking of the three. It is a gigantic 
retrospect on a great variety of scientific, literary, philosophical, religious and other 
topics, genres or languages. One of the more dominant perspectives is the biblical 
perspective (the whale as Leviathan, survivor of the Flood) and the fabulous image 
of the whale connected with it (notably the story of Noah and the giant whale). 
Ishmael sets out to defend the imaginary whale against scientific strategies of clas-
sification and quantification. Still, Melville’s book is an account of a scientific 
journey, an effort to flesh out a cetology (whale-science) in the context of an expe-
dition. Although eventually this effort turns out to be something of an epistemo-
logical regression, the idea of a scientific journey as such is clearly present. It 
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determines the novel’s basic structure. Moreover, although Moby-Dick turns out to 
be a fabulous animal, a descendant of the time-old fable literature, an animal that 
belongs to cryptozoology rather than zoology, he is not only this, for he is also an 
evolutionary animal, a palaeontological survivor, a leftover from previous geological 
epochs, threatened with extinction. Indeed, Ishmael not only discusses the animal’s 
life and world, but also his future prospects in terms of survival. We are faced with 
a form of “animality” that involves two complementary dimensions: the imaginary 
and the scientific one. The comprehensive whale is a coniunctio oppositorum, a 
fabulous creature and a biological species – more or less as human beings are, we 
also combine two apparently incompatible dimensions: rationality and instinct, 
reason and impulse, self-consciousness and animalness. Furthermore, the scientific 
journey undertaken in Moby-Dick is similar to The Origin of Species also in another 
sense. In Melville’s book, traditional sciences such as taxonomy are criticised, not 
only because of their lack of imagination (which for a scientist may actually be a 
virtue), but also because of their lack of scale. Only in the context of a sea-journey, 
amidst the wide and endless watery expanses, can we hope to understand the whale 
and his world. What is lacking, in established scientific practices, according to 
Ishmael, is an acknowledgement of the immense size and dynamics of the natural 
world. This is a truly Darwinian experience. The Origin of Species conveys the 
same message.
Darwin’s book starts from the present (practices of breeding and horticulture), 
but positions it against a horizon of unprecedented dimensions. In literary terms, 
two styles are represented in Darwin’s oeuvre: the garden style (the micro-world of 
pigeon fanciers and dog breeders) and the style of the great expanses (the macro-
world of oceanography and evolution theory). Whereas his readership dwells in the 
former, Darwin’s opens up for them the latter. This is why his book “reads like a 
novel”, it opens up a world of experience. Whereas the garden style is peaceful, 
revealing a harmonious world, the macro-world is a world of relentless struggle. 
This idea of struggle, of competition and will to power, was one of the key ideas of 
this era. While Darwin described the struggle between varieties, Louis Pasteur 
highlighted the perpetual battle between microbes and macro-organisms (mammals 
and birds). On this grand scale, his story of genesis (“origin”) and extinction – of 
animals but, eventually, of humans as well – is set. We have never realised, he 
writes, how large the world is, notably in terms of its temporal dimension. Evolution 
is proceeding for millions of years, and will continue to do so. The present is but a 
fleeting snapshot amidst an ocean of time – as I said, Moby-Dick is written in a 
similar vein.
Finally, also Verne’s book exposes his readers to new dimensions. He opens up 
for them the internal depths of the earth. But he does the same for the internal 
depths of thinking. His book is a grand story about formations, of layers, not only 
geological ones, but also epistemological ones. Lidenbrock descends, not only liter-
ally, to uncover hidden and forgotten geological strata, but also figuratively, to dis-
cover forgotten intellectual worlds, one of whose remainders is Saknussemm’s 
encrypted note. The latter’s works have been destroyed, and the note is like a fossil, 
a trace, a palaeontological encryption. But as such, it opens up the intellectual 
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world of alchemy, a style of thinking for which the world consists of spheres and 
the centre of the earth is hollow. But it is also a style of thinking for which the 
world is grand and forever changing, transmuting. Epistemologically speaking, 
Verne’s book is a hybrid, composed of two conflicting elements – coniunctio opposi-
torum – namely alchemy and modern science, merged into one great intellectual 
dream. It builds on alchemical cosmology, but it is also a story of genesis and 
extinction. On the one hand, the scientific travellers are heading, not only to the 
centre of the earth, but also towards the world’s beginning, the very first stages of 
evolution. On the other hand, like Melville, who discovers a species, a monster, that 
(apparently) is about to become extinct, a leftover from a distant past, dwelling in 
the depths of the ocean, Verne also discovers en route a series of monsters, dwelling 
in the depths of the earth, leftovers from previous epochs. His book is the beginning 
of the Jurassic monster-genre, a branch of science literature that is bound to become 
important in the twentieth century. Its builds on the idea that Jurassic sites, as pal-
aeontological islands as it were, have been retained somewhere, as “lost worlds”, 
or can be put in place again. Like the novels of Michael Crichton (Jurassic Park, 
Lost World ) Verne’s novel is a “palaeontology of the present”, so to speak. The 
extinct life forms are still alive, they inhabit a preserved, insular world. This also 
goes for Melville, who describes life forms that felt more at home in “that shudder-
ing period, ere time itself began, when Saturn’s grey chaos swayed through Polar 
eternities” than in the present. But it also goes for Darwin. He also discovered his 
islands where evolution has taken a different course (with a slower pace). Moreover 
he also describes isolated mountain tops as islands, from an evolutionary point of 
view. Here as well, descendants of species that became extinct elsewhere can still 
be found – the lost world theorem of Conan Doyle, Crichton and others. Once 
again, it is clear that we are not dealing with two opposite “cultures” – literature 
versus science. Rather, we are faced with a number of works that are inspired by 
the same idea. They set out to achieve the same thing: writing the account of a 
scientific journey, towards isolated habitats, a journey with an impact, leading to a 
concrete result, a dramatic expansion of our world, testing and refuting theories, 
devising new ones, changing our view of our world, its history and its inhabitants 
significantly.
11.6 Prospects for Further Research: Some Case Studies 
in Broad Outline
The focus in this volume has been on the nineteenth century, an era of discovery, 
classification, exploration, experimentation. The twentieth century, as far as the life 
sciences are concerned, is the century of biotechnology, of genetics, of manipulation 
– genetic and otherwise (Zwart 2007). It is an era that displays a tremendous 
increase of pace (acceleration) as well as of space (globalisation). And the computer 
emerges as the generic research tool, dramatically transforming all fields and all 
forms of scientific inquiry.
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Around 1900, biologist Jacques Loeb (1859–1924) voiced the idea that nature 
must be regarded as raw material, to be modified and improved by biological engi-
neers (Pauly 1987). Biology’s core objective, Loeb said, is the improvement of 
nature. Why accept existing biological constraints as given? Why not use biological 
knowledge in order to improve life and – eventually – ourselves, much more 
directly and effectively than we have done so far? Why not prolong the human life-
span or opt for artificial instead of sexual reproduction? Although in the context of 
his experiments the actual power of science over nature was still rather limited, the 
ideological framing of his research (and the recognition of its potential impact for 
society) was clear enough.
A number of literary authors addressed these prospects opened up by science. 
First of all, the work of H.G. Wells (1866–1946) is important. Wells was trained as 
a biologist. In 1930 he published, together with G.P. Wells (his son) and Julian 
Huxley (brother of Aldous) a text book called The Science of Life. Reflecting on 
the research of Jacques Loeb on artificial parthenogenesis (non-sexual reproduc-
tion) in sea urchins, the authors ask themselves whether this would be possible in 
mammals (i.e. humans) as well. Their answer is affirmative. “In mammals the 
ovum is inaccessible to the experimenter, so that we do not know whether artificial 
parthenogenesis is possible. There is no reason to suppose that it is not . . . (p. 509). 
Like Loeb they argue that in the future, sexuality and reproduction will become 
separated for good: “Once more it becomes evident to us that sex is imposed upon 
reproduction and is in its essence a different thing” (p. 510). But these and similar 
issues are also addressed in Well’s literary writings. One of his first stories is about 
a scientist who manipulates pathogenic micro-organisms in his laboratory. An 
“anarchist”, posing as a visiting colleague, escapes from his laboratory carrying a 
test tube in his hands. There is a happy ending: the anarchist suffers from science 
illiteracy – he picks the wrong tube. London is not exposed to a plague. One of his 
most famous novels is The Islands of Dr. Moreau about a researcher who gradually 
transforms animals into human beings, using transplantation surgery. Eventually, 
the dreadful Dr. Moreau is killed by the monsters of his own making.
Aldous Huxley likewise responded to Loeb’s challenge. The famous first chap-
ter of his Brave New World, describing the “Central London Hatchery and 
Conditioning Centre” consciously echoes Loeb’s ideas. Huxley’s novel is a classic 
effort to describe the atmosphere of discontent that biotechnology incited in broad 
circles. The first chapter describes how the chemical environments of embryo’s 
kept in vitro are systematically manipulated in order to adapt them to societal 
demands and the chapter actually contains some references to Loeb’s views.
For the biosciences, the twentieth century ended with the announcement by 
President Clinton, Francis Collins and Craig Venter (on June 26, 2000) that the 
Human Genome Project (designed to sequence the human genome) was rapidly 
approaching its conclusion. Michel Houellebecq is one of the literary authors who 
responded to the emergence of genomics and its potential for human self-amelioration. 
Elementary particles (1998) is a narrative about a scientist who develops the algorithm 
that makes genetic enhancement possible, resulting in the emergence of a new, 
self-designed type of human being. While criticizing technologies of the self that 
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individuals experimented with in the 1960s, such as use of drugs and sexual liberation, 
Houellebecq propagates the idea that now, at the turn of the millennium, we are 
really entering a new era, in which much more powerful and science-based technol-
ogies will become available for self-improvement, leading us far beyond humanity 
as it had developed so far, on the basis of evolution. Although not many details are 
given in terms of exactly how this self-transformation, this leap into post-humanism 
will be achieved, the message is nonetheless clear enough.
When it comes to using novels as research tools for assessing the epistemologi-
cal profile of the life sciences in the genomics era, Michael Crichton (1942) is an 
important author. He is the Jules Verne of our time. His work is a literary encyclo-
paedia, critically reviewing the sciences and technologies of our own era, in which 
every research field has “its own novel” so to speak. He analyses the impact of ICT 
and genomics on various research fields. For instance, in Jurassic Park he describes 
how palaeontology becomes an experimental science, and dinosaurs are trans-
formed into research animals. When Alan Grant, an outstanding palaeontologist, is 
confronted with revivified versions of his model organisms, he immediately real-
ises the epistemological significance of this event. Palaeontological quandaries that 
had occupied his research community for years, such as the issue of whether dino-
saurs had been warm-blooded animals, whether they cared for their young and 
whether they were fast or slow, were now easily resolved by merely looking at 
these “surprisingly active” organisms:
Grant’s field of study was going to change instantly. The palaeontological study of dino-
saurs was finished. The whole enterprise – the museum halls with their giant skeletons and 
flocks of echoing school children, the university laboratories with their bone trays, the 
research papers, the journals – all of it was going to end. (Crichton 1990/1991, p. 84)
In a sequel to this volume, Crichton will be a key author.
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